@incollection{Khurana2024, author = {Khurana, Thomas}, title = {Die Unheimlichkeit des Gew{\"o}hnlichen}, series = {Trouble Every Day : Zum Schrecken des Allt{\"a}glichen}, booktitle = {Trouble Every Day : Zum Schrecken des Allt{\"a}glichen}, publisher = {Brill Fink}, address = {Paderborn}, isbn = {978-3-8467-6721-4}, doi = {10.30965/9783846767214_006}, pages = {91 -- 105}, year = {2024}, language = {de} } @article{Wallage2023, author = {Wallage, Martijn}, title = {Dotting the "I think"}, series = {Reading R{\"o}dl : On Self-Consciousness and Objectivity}, journal = {Reading R{\"o}dl : On Self-Consciousness and Objectivity}, publisher = {Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {Milton}, isbn = {978-1-03-234951-0}, doi = {/10.4324/9781003324638}, pages = {316 -- 333}, year = {2023}, abstract = {This chapter discusses a central problem in Sebastian R{\"o}dl's Self-Consciousness and Objectivity and in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. In a statement of the form "I think p", the words "I think" do not contribute to the content, and yet they are not redundant. In other words, a thinking subject is not something and yet not nothing. But then in what sense is a thinking subject a part of the world? The problem is intractable on a merely negative understanding of "I think", like Anscombe's merely negative thesis, endorsed by R{\"o}dl, that "I" is not a referring expression. In search of a positive understanding, this chapter proposes to understand "I think" by comparison to "hello". A speaking subject is the expression of mutual presence in conversation - in that sense a limit of the world. Such expression may be compared to facial expression, with the crucial difference that a verbal expression can be taken up - i.e., repeated - in the third person. A speaking subject, then, is potentially absent from conversation, and in that sense a part of the world.}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{Batti2023, author = {Batti, Anil Dominic}, title = {Schopenhauer's doctrine of salvation in relation to his critique of religion and philosophical teachings}, publisher = {Logos}, address = {Berlin}, isbn = {978-3-83255-735-5}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {319}, year = {2023}, abstract = {Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was perhaps the last polymath among the great Germanic philosophers. Switching with ease and elegance between epistemic positions and fields as diverse as idealism and empiricism, fideism and rationalism, realism and nominalism, art and religion, jurisprudence and politics, psychology and occultism, Schopenhauer erected an imposing edifice bearing testimony to his universal learning. This study is an investigation into the very conclusion of Schopenhauer's philosophy and endeavours to answer the following question: did Schopenhauer's doctrine of salvation issue forth organically from his intellectual output or was it annexed to his philosophy as a result of his critical engagement with religion? The labyrinthine paths through which Schopenhauer arrives at the soteriological culmination of his philosophy are subjected to critical assessment; the picture that emerges is of a philosopher who seemed convinced that he had solved some of the most pressing cosmic riddles to have tormented mankind through the ages.}, language = {en} } @misc{Troeger2023, type = {Master Thesis}, author = {Tr{\"o}ger, Hannah}, title = {Zeitreisen erkl{\"a}ren}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-59303}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-593039}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {77}, year = {2023}, abstract = {Die vorliegende Arbeit dreht sich um die Frage, wie sich schl{\"u}ssig und im Einklang mit g{\"a}ngigen philosophischen Modellen von Zeit und Identit{\"a}t {\"u}ber Zeitreisen sprechen l{\"a}sst. Dabei l{\"a}uft die Darstellung nicht auf einen einzelnen theoretischen Ansatz hinaus, sondern zeigt verschiedene Implikationen von Zeitreisen angesichts unterschiedlicher Konzepte von Zeit und Persistenz auf. Gearbeitet wird mit den Zeitreise-Modellen von Jack Meiland (1974), Geoffrey Goddu (2003) und Peter van Inwagen (2010) und insbesondere {\"U}berlegungen zu growing block-Universen und vierdimensionaler Identit{\"a}t werden weitergef{\"u}hrt. Schwerpunkte der Arbeit liegen einerseits auf Erkl{\"a}rungen zu Ver{\"a}nderungen der Vergangenheit und andererseits auf dem Problem der Bilokation durch Zeitreisen in Zeiten, zu denen die Zeitreisende bereits existiert. Nicholas J. J. Smith (2015) hat als notwendige Voraussetzung f{\"u}r die Erkl{\"a}rbarkeit von Ver{\"a}nderungen der Vergangenheit dia-hyper-chrone Identit{\"a}tsbedingungen f{\"u}r Jahre gefordert. Ich zeige, dass es sich hierbei um eine zu starke Forderung handelt. Demnach ist die Erkl{\"a}rung von Ver{\"a}nderungen der Vergangenheit durch Annihilation in growing block-Universen, wie Goddu und van Inwagen sie einf{\"u}hren, legitim. Bilokation stellt eine Herausforderung f{\"u}r personale Identit{\"a}t dar. Ich schlage eine {\"u}berarbeitete Definition von gegenw{\"a}rtigen zeitlichen Teilen vor, die es zul{\"a}sst, dass mehr als ein zeitlicher Teil einer diachron identischen Person synchron pr{\"a}sent sein kann. Auf diese Weise muss nicht zwischen zeitlichen Teilen und Personenstadien differenziert werden, wie Ted Sider (2001) es tut. Ich komme im Rahmen dieser Arbeit zu den Ergebnissen, dass erstens bisher kein Modell von Zeit oder Persistenz bekannt ist, f{\"u}r das Zeitreisen grunds{\"a}tzlich auszuschließen sind. Eine umfangreiche Systematik {\"u}ber M{\"o}glichkeiten und Implikationen von Zeitreisen bleibt jedoch l{\"u}ckenhaft, solange keine pr{\"a}sentistischen Modelle von Zeitreisen vorliegen. Zweitens erweisen sich Zeitreisen, die keine Ver{\"a}nderungen verursachen, nicht als weniger problematisch als Zeitreisen, die Ver{\"a}nderungen verursachen. Erstere werfen eigene Probleme auf, wie das Motivationsproblem und die Frage nach der Determination durch Zukunftsfakten. Drittens lassen sich trotz all der geleisteten Erkl{\"a}rungen weiterhin Szenarien entwickeln, die suspekt bleiben. Dies verweist auf die weiterf{\"u}hrende Frage, inwiefern Chronologie wesentlich und unverzichtbar ist f{\"u}r die Intelligibilit{\"a}t beispielsweise sozialer Interaktionen und Institutionen.}, language = {de} } @incollection{Khurana2023, author = {Khurana, Thomas}, title = {Self-knowledge and knowledge of nature}, series = {Reading R{\"o}dl : On Self-Consciousness and Objectivity}, booktitle = {Reading R{\"o}dl : On Self-Consciousness and Objectivity}, publisher = {Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {Milton}, isbn = {978-1-03-234951-0}, doi = {10.4324/9781003324638}, pages = {195 -- 223}, year = {2023}, abstract = {In this chapter, I consider the unity of self-consciousness and objectivity. Starting from the notion that the objective character and the self-conscious character of thought seem in tension, I discuss Sebastian R{\"o}dl's Self-Consciousness and Objectivity and his thesis that this tension is merely apparent. This resolution suggests an immediate route to absolute idealism. I recall two Hegelian objections against such an immediate route. Against this background, it transpires that the dissolution of the apparent opposition of objectivity and self-consciousness can only be a preliminary step, opening our eyes to an actual opposition animating the pursuit of knowledge: the opposition of knowledge of nature and self-knowledge. This actual opposition cannot be removed as merely apparent and instead has to be sublated through articulation of its speculative unity. I consider two paradigms for the exposition of such a speculative unity: Kant's account of judgments of beauty, and Hegel's account of the speculative unity of life and self-consciousness. I close by contrasting these two approaches with R{\"o}dl's characterization, which strikes me as one-sided. Absolute idealism, properly understood, requires us to develop the speculative unity of knowledge of nature and self-knowledge from both sides, showing us that knowledge of nature is self-knowledge, but equally: that self-knowledge requires knowledge of ourselves as nature.}, language = {en} } @article{Khurana2023, author = {Khurana, Thomas}, title = {Die "europ{\"a}ischen Wilden"}, series = {Historische Urteilskraft}, volume = {5}, journal = {Historische Urteilskraft}, publisher = {Stiftung Deutsches Historisches Museum}, address = {Berlin}, isbn = {978-3-86102-231-2}, issn = {2626-8094}, pages = {15 -- 18}, year = {2023}, language = {de} } @article{Khurana2023, author = {Khurana, Thomas}, title = {Altera Natura: Das Anthropoz{\"a}n als {\"a}sthetisches Problem}, series = {Dritte Natur}, volume = {6}, journal = {Dritte Natur}, number = {1}, publisher = {Matthes \& Seitz}, address = {Berlin}, isbn = {978-3-7518-0704-3}, issn = {2625-9885}, pages = {175 -- 190}, year = {2023}, abstract = {Der Kunst wird seit langem nachgesagt, dem Subjekt ein anderes Verh{\"a}ltnis zur Natur zu er{\"o}ffnen, als dies die gew{\"o}hnliche theoretische oder praktische Erkenntnis erm{\"o}glicht. Statt die Natur zum distanzierten Objekt unserer Betrachtung zu machen oder zum bloßen Material und Mittel unserer praktischen Konstruktionen, erschließt sich uns in der Kunst eine Intelligibilit{\"a}t der Natur, die weiter reicht als unsere Begriffe, und eine Nat{\"u}rlichkeit unserer selbst, die uns mit dem verbindet, was uns sonst bloß gegen{\"u}bersteht. Vor diesem Hintergrund scheint es nicht verwunderlich, dass die j{\"u}ngeren Diskussionen um das problematische Verh{\"a}ltnis zur Natur, die das Anthropoz{\"a}n gepr{\"a}gt haben, immer wieder den Blick auf die Kunst richten und ihr Verm{\"o}gen hervorheben, den problematischen modernen Gegensatz von Subjekt und Objekt, Geist und Natur zu {\"u}berwinden, der uns in diese missliche Lage gebracht hat. Wenn die Kunst hier aber weiterf{\"u}hren soll, dann muss sie {\"u}ber die klassischen {\"a}sthetischen Paradigmen des Sch{\"o}nen und des Erhabenen hinausf{\"u}hren. Das Sch{\"o}ne tr{\"a}umt von einer Passung von Subjekt und Natur, die im Anthropoz{\"a}n gerade in Frage steht, und das Erhabene verwendet die {\"U}bermacht der Natur als Vehikel, um eine Macht im intelligiblen Subjekt zu markieren, die von der nat{\"u}rlichen {\"U}bermacht unber{\"u}hrt bleibt. Diese klassischen Figuren {\"a}sthetischer Erfahrung verstellen so, wie tiefgreifend wir das Naturverh{\"a}ltnis neu bestimmen m{\"u}ssen, um auf das Anthropoz{\"a}n zu antworten.}, language = {de} } @misc{Khurana2023, author = {Khurana, Thomas}, title = {Dialektische Anthropologie - oder romantischer Idealismus?}, series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie}, volume = {71}, journal = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie}, number = {2}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, address = {Berlin}, issn = {0012-1045}, doi = {10.1515/dzph-2023-0026}, pages = {304 -- 311}, year = {2023}, language = {de} } @incollection{Khurana2023, author = {Khurana, Thomas}, title = {True right against formal right: The body of right and the limits of property}, series = {Hegel's philosophy of right: critical perspectives on freedom and history}, booktitle = {Hegel's philosophy of right: critical perspectives on freedom and history}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {9781003081036}, doi = {10.4324/9781003081036-10}, pages = {147 -- 168}, year = {2023}, abstract = {The conception of property at the basis of Hegel's conception of abstract right seems committed to a problematic form of "possessive individualism." It seems to conceive of right as the expression of human mastery over nature and as based upon an irreducible opposition of person and nature, rightful will, and rightless thing. However, this chapter argues that Hegel starts with a form of possessive individualism only to show that it undermines itself. This is evident in the way Hegel unfolds the nature of property as it applies to external things as well as in the way he explains our self-ownership of our own bodies and lives. Hegel develops the idea of property to a point where it reaches a critical limit and encounters the "true right" that life possesses against the "formal" and "abstract right" of property. Ultimately, Hegel's account suggests that nature should precisely not be treated as a rightless object at our arbitrary disposal but acknowledged as the inorganic body of right.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Khurana2023, author = {Khurana, Thomas}, title = {The stage of difference: On the second nature of civil society in Kant and Hegel}, series = {Naturalism and social philosophy}, booktitle = {Naturalism and social philosophy}, publisher = {Rowman \& Littlefield}, address = {Lanham}, isbn = {978-1-5381-7492-0}, pages = {35 -- 64}, year = {2023}, language = {en} }