@techreport{BruttelPetrishcheva2024,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Petrishcheva, Vasilisa},
  title     = {Does communication increase the precision of beliefs?},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {74},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-62936},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-629367},
  pages     = {1 -- 33},
  year      = {2024},
  abstract  = {In this paper, we study one channel through which communication may facilitate cooperative behavior - belief precision. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, we show that communication not only makes individuals more optimistic that their partner will cooperate but also increases the precision of this belief, thereby reducing strategic uncertainty. To disentangle the shift in mean beliefs from the increase in precision, we elicit beliefs and precision in a two-stage procedure and in three situations: without communication, before communication, and after communication. We find that the precision of beliefs increases during communication.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{PetrishchevaRienerSchildbergHoerisch2021,
  author    = {Petrishcheva, Vasilisa and Riener, Gerhard and Schildberg-H{\"o}risch, Hannah},
  title     = {Loss aversion in social image concerns},
  series = {Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association},
  volume    = {26},
  journal   = {Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Springer Science + Business Media B.V.},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {1386-4157},
  doi       = {10.1007/s10683-022-09782-7},
  pages     = {622 -- 645},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Does loss aversion apply to social image concerns? In a laboratory experiment, we first induce social image in a relevant domain, intelligence, through public ranking. In a second stage, subjects experience a change in rank and are offered scope for lying to improve their final, also publicly reported rank. Subjects who care about social image and experience a decline in rank lie more than those experiencing gains. Moreover, we document a discontinuity in lying behavior when moving from rank losses to gains. Our results are in line with loss aversion in social image concerns.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{HunoldPetrishcheva2022,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Hunold, Matthias and Petrishcheva, Vasilisa},
  title     = {Foreclosure and Tunneling with Partial Vertical Ownership},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {57},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-56560},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-565601},
  pages     = {47},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {We demonstrate how the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profits from the target (tunneling). Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target's profit but influence the target's strategy significantly. We show that the incentives for customer and input foreclosure can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations affect the scope for profit extraction.},
  language  = {en}
}