@article{Ganghof2018, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {A new political system model}, series = {European Journal for Political Research}, volume = {57}, journal = {European Journal for Political Research}, number = {2}, publisher = {Wiley}, address = {Hoboken}, issn = {0304-4130}, doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12224}, pages = {261 -- 281}, year = {2018}, abstract = {Semi-parliamentary government is a distinct executive-legislative system that mirrors semi-presidentialism. It exists when the legislature is divided into two equally legitimate parts, only one of which can dismiss the prime minister in a no-confidence vote. This system has distinct advantages over pure parliamentary and presidential systems: it establishes a branch-based separation of powers and can balance the 'majoritarian' and 'proportional' visions of democracy without concentrating executive power in a single individual. This article analyses bicameral versions of semi-parliamentary government in Australia and Japan, and compares empirical patterns of democracy in the Australian Commonwealth as well as New South Wales to 20 advanced parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. It discusses new semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require formal bicameralism, and pays special attention to semi-parliamentary options for democratising the European Union.}, language = {en} } @article{GanghofEppnerPoerschke2018, author = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian and P{\"o}rschke, Alexander}, title = {Australian bicameralism as semi-parliamentarism}, series = {Australian Journal of Political Science}, volume = {53}, journal = {Australian Journal of Political Science}, number = {2}, publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {Abingdon}, issn = {1036-1146}, doi = {10.1080/10361146.2018.1451487}, pages = {211 -- 233}, year = {2018}, abstract = {The article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executive-legislative system - a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government - which we call 'semi-parliamentary government'. We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation, and that it can achieve a certain balance between competing models or visions of democracy. We specify theoretically how the semi-parliamentary separation of powers contributes to the balancing of democratic visions and propose a conceptual framework for comparing democratic visions. We use this framework to locate the Australian Commonwealth, all Australian states and 22 advanced democratic nation-states on a two-dimensional empirical map of democratic patterns for the period from 1995 to 2015.}, language = {en} } @article{GanghofEppnerPoerschke2018, author = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian and P{\"o}rschke, Alexander}, title = {Semi-parliamentary government in perspective}, series = {Australian Journal of Political Science}, volume = {53}, journal = {Australian Journal of Political Science}, number = {2}, publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {Abingdon}, issn = {1036-1146}, doi = {10.1080/10361146.2018.1451488}, pages = {264 -- 269}, year = {2018}, abstract = {The article responds to four commentaries on the concept of semi-parliamentary government and its application to Australian bicameralism. It highlights four main points: (1) Our preferred typology is not more 'normative' than existing approaches, but applies the criterion of 'direct election' equally to executive and legislature; (2) While the evolution of semi-parliamentary government had contingent elements, it plausibly also reflects the 'equilibrium' nature of certain institutional configurations; (3) The idea that a pure parliamentary system with pure proportional representation has absolute normative priority over 'instrumentalist' concerns about cabinet stability, identifiability and responsibility is questionable; and (4) The reforms we discuss may be unlikely to occur in Australia, but deserve consideration by scholars and institutional reformers in other democratic systems.}, language = {en} } @article{GanghofEppner2017, author = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian}, title = {Patterns of accountability and representation}, series = {Politics}, volume = {39}, journal = {Politics}, number = {1}, publisher = {Sage Publ.}, address = {London}, issn = {0263-3957}, doi = {10.1177/0263395717710566}, pages = {113 -- 130}, year = {2017}, abstract = {Arend Lijphart uses an average of five standardized variables - the executive-parties dimension (EPD) - to describe patterns of democracy and explain differences in democracies' performance. The article suggests ways to improve the descriptive part of the project. It argues that the EPD maps different approaches to achieving accountability and representation, rather than differences in consensus. This re-conceptualization leads to a more coherent and valid measurement. It is also argued that more systematic adjustments are needed for differences in constitutional structures (presidentialism and bicameralism). The article presents data on a revised EPD and its components for 36 democracies in the period from 1981 to 2010. As to the explanatory part of the project, we contend that the EPD often hinders adequate causal analysis rather than facilitating it. We show this by re-analysing democracies' performance with respect to turnout and capital punishment.}, language = {en} } @article{Ganghof2016, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {The Regime-Trilemma: On the Relationship between the Executive and Legislature in advanced Democracies}, series = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift : Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung f{\~A}¼r Politische Wissenschaft}, volume = {57}, journal = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift : Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung f{\~A}¼r Politische Wissenschaft}, publisher = {Nomos}, address = {Hannover}, issn = {0032-3470}, doi = {10.5771/0032-3470-2016-1-27}, pages = {27 -- +}, year = {2016}, abstract = {A comprehensive typology of basic executive formats is presented and linked to a discussion of tradeoffs in the design of executive-legislative relations. The focus is on the tradeoffs between three goals: (1) programmatic parties, (2) identifiable cabinets and (3) issue -specific legislative coalitions. To include semi-presidentialism into the typology in a logically consistent manner, a heretofore neglected executive format has to be defined, which is labelled semi-parliamentarism. Based on a discussion of Australian states, it is argued that semi-parliamentarism has the potential to mitigate the trilemma.}, language = {de} } @misc{GanghofEppnerPoerschke2018, author = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian and P{\"o}rschke, Alexander}, title = {Australian bicameralism as semi-parliamentarism}, series = {Australian Journal of Political Science}, journal = {Australian Journal of Political Science}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-412984}, pages = {24}, year = {2018}, abstract = {The article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executive-legislative system - a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government - which we call 'semi- parliamentary government'. We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation, and that it can achieve a certain balance between competing models or visions of democracy. We specify theoretically how the semi-parliamentary separation of powers contributes to the balancing of democratic visions and propose a conceptual framework for comparing democratic visions. We use this framework to locate the Australian Commonwealth, all Australian states and 22 advanced democratic nation-states on a two- dimensional empirical map of democratic patterns for the period from 1995 to 2015.}, language = {en} } @book{Ganghof2021, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, address = {Oxford}, isbn = {978-0-19-289714-5}, doi = {10.1093/oso/9780192897145.001.0001}, pages = {1 -- 199}, year = {2021}, abstract = {In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores 'semi-parliamentary government' as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids power concentration in one person by shifting the separation of powers into the democratic assembly. The executive becomes fused with only one part of the assembly, even though the other part has at least equal democratic legitimacy and robust veto power on ordinary legislation. The book identifies the Australian Commonwealth and Japan, as well as the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, as semi-parliamentary systems. Using data from 23 countries and 6 Australian states, it maps how parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems balance competing visions of democracy; it analyzes patterns of electoral and party systems, cabinet formation, legislative coalition-building, and constitutional reforms; it systematically compares the semi-parliamentary and presidential separation of powers; and it develops new and innovative semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require two separate chambers.}, language = {en} } @misc{Ganghof2021, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism}, series = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, journal = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, isbn = {978-0-19-289714-5}, issn = {1867-5808}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-53783}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-537839}, pages = {199}, year = {2021}, abstract = {In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores 'semi-parliamentary government' as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids power concentration in one person by shifting the separation of powers into the democratic assembly. The executive becomes fused with only one part of the assembly, even though the other part has at least equal democratic legitimacy and robust veto power on ordinary legislation. The book identifies the Australian Commonwealth and Japan, as well as the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, as semi-parliamentary systems. Using data from 23 countries and 6 Australian states, it maps how parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems balance competing visions of democracy; it analyzes patterns of electoral and party systems, cabinet formation, legislative coalition-building, and constitutional reforms; it systematically compares the semi-parliamentary and presidential separation of powers; and it develops new and innovative semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require two separate chambers.}, language = {en} }