@misc{GrossTiwariHammer2018,
  author    = {Gross, Sascha and Tiwari, Abhishek and Hammer, Christian},
  title     = {PlAnalyzer},
  series = {Computer Security(ESORICS 2018), PT II},
  volume    = {11099},
  journal   = {Computer Security(ESORICS 2018), PT II},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Cham},
  isbn      = {978-3-319-98989-1},
  issn      = {0302-9743},
  doi       = {10.1007/978-3-319-98989-1_3},
  pages     = {41 -- 59},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {In this work we propose PIAnalyzer, a novel approach to analyze PendingIntent related vulnerabilities. We empirically evaluate PIAnalyzer on a set of 1000 randomly selected applications from the Google Play Store and find 1358 insecure usages of Pendinglntents, including 70 severe vulnerabilities. We manually inspected ten reported vulnerabilities out of which nine correctly reported vulnerabilities, indicating a high precision. The evaluation shows that PIAnalyzer is efficient with an average execution time of 13 seconds per application.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{TiwariPrakashGrossetal.2020,
  author    = {Tiwari, Abhishek and Prakash, Jyoti and Groß, Sascha and Hammer, Christian},
  title     = {A large scale analysis of Android},
  series = {The journal of systems and software},
  volume    = {170},
  journal   = {The journal of systems and software},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {0164-1212},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.jss.2020.110775},
  pages     = {17},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Many Android applications embed webpages via WebView components and execute JavaScript code within Android. Hybrid applications leverage dedicated APIs to load a resource and render it in a WebView. Furthermore, Android objects can be shared with the JavaScript world. However, bridging the interfaces of the Android and JavaScript world might also incur severe security threats: Potentially untrusted webpages and their JavaScript might interfere with the Android environment and its access to native features. No general analysis is currently available to assess the implications of such hybrid apps bridging the two worlds. To understand the semantics and effects of hybrid apps, we perform a large-scale study on the usage of the hybridization APIs in the wild. We analyze and categorize the parameters to hybridization APIs for 7,500 randomly selected and the 196 most popular applications from the Google Playstore as well as 1000 malware samples. Our results advance the general understanding of hybrid applications, as well as implications for potential program analyses, and the current security situation: We discovered thousands of flows of sensitive data from Android to JavaScript, the vast majority of which could flow to potentially untrustworthy code. Our analysis identified numerous web pages embedding vulnerabilities, which we exemplarily exploited. Additionally, we discovered a multitude of applications in which potentially untrusted JavaScript code may interfere with (trusted) Android objects, both in benign and malign applications.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Gross2019,
  author    = {Groß, Sascha},
  title     = {Detecting and mitigating information flow threats in Android OS},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {93},
  year      = {2019},
  language  = {en}
}