@article{SalaKabeshkin2022,
  author    = {Sala, Lorenzo and Kabeshkin, Anton},
  title     = {A priori philosophy of nature in Hegel and German rationalism},
  series = {British journal for the history of philosophy : Bjhp},
  volume    = {30},
  journal   = {British journal for the history of philosophy : Bjhp},
  number    = {5},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {0960-8788},
  doi       = {10.1080/09608788.2022.2044753},
  pages     = {797 -- 817},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {Hegel's many remarks that seem to imply that philosophy should proceed completely a priori pose a problem for his philosophy of nature since, on this reading, Hegel offers an a priori derivation of empirical results of natural sciences. We show how this perception can be mitigated by interpreting Hegel's remarks as broadly in line with the pre-Kantian rationalist notion of a priori and offer reasons for doing so. We show that, rather than being a peculiarity of Hegel's philosophy, the practice of demonstrating a priori the results of empirical sciences was widespread in the pre-Kantian rationalist tradition. We argue that this practice was intelligible in light of the notion of a priori that was still quite prominent during Hegel's life. This notion of a priori differs from Kant's in that, while the latter's notion concerns propositions, the former concerned only their demonstration. According to it, the same proposition could be demonstrated both a posteriori and a priori. Post-Kantian idealists likewise developed projects of demonstrating specific scientific contents a priori. We then make our discussion more concrete by examining a particular case of an a priori derivation of a natural law, namely the law of fall, by both Leibniz and Hegel.},
  language  = {en}
}