@article{BuschFeilHeinzeletal.2021,
  author    = {Busch, Per-Olof and Feil, Hauke and Heinzel, Mirko Noa and Herold, Jana and Kempken, Mathies and Liese, Andrea},
  title     = {Policy recommendations of international bureaucracies},
  series = {International review of administrative sciences : an international journal of comparative public administration},
  volume    = {87},
  journal   = {International review of administrative sciences : an international journal of comparative public administration},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address   = {Los Angeles, Calif.},
  issn      = {0020-8523},
  doi       = {10.1177/00208523211013385},
  pages     = {775 -- 793},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Many international bureaucracies give policy advice to national administrative units. Why is the advice given by some international bureaucracies more influential than the recommendations of others? We argue that targeting advice to member states through national embeddedness and country-tailored research increases the influence of policy advice. Subsequently, we test how these characteristics shape the relative influence of 15 international bureaucracies' advice in four financial policy areas through a global survey of national administrations from more than 80 countries. Our findings support arguments that global blueprints need to be adapted and translated to become meaningful for country-level work. <br /> Points for practitioners <br /> National administrations are advised by an increasing number of international bureaucracies, and they cannot listen to all of this advice. Whereas some international bureaucracies give 'one-size-fits-all' recommendations to rather diverse countries, others cater their recommendations to the national audience. Investigating financial policy recommendations, we find that national embeddedness and country-tailored advice render international bureaucracies more influential.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Feil2021,
  author    = {Feil, Hauke},
  title     = {The cancer of corruption and World Bank project performance},
  series = {Development policy review / publ. for the Overseas Development Institute},
  volume    = {39},
  journal   = {Development policy review / publ. for the Overseas Development Institute},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Blackwell Publ.},
  address   = {Oxford},
  issn      = {1467-7679},
  doi       = {10.1111/dpr.12503},
  pages     = {381 -- 397},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Motivation: Corruption is often cited as a central reason why development projects fail. The article tests this claim by assessing whether World Bank projects perform worse in implementation environments with a higher corruption level. The article focuses specifically on bribery between public officials and firms during the procurement of needed goods and services. Approach and Methods: I use data from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys to avoid the often-criticized corruption perception indices and to allow for an assessment of effects at the subnational level. The analysis builds on an assessment of the performance ratings of 1,228 World Bank projects and covers 87 different countries. Finding: Overall, the article finds a small but statistically significant correlation between the corruption level and project performance. This result indicates that the corruption level of recipient countries should be considered during the design and implementation of projects. Policy Implications: Nonetheless, the relatively small correlation and the low pseudo R-squareds advise not overestimating the relevance of corruption for project performance. At least for the project level, the article finds no indication that corruption is a primary obstacle to aid effectiveness.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{LieseHeroldFeiletal.2021,
  author    = {Liese, Andrea and Herold, Jana and Feil, Hauke and Busch, Per-Olof},
  title     = {The heart of bureaucratic power},
  series = {Review of international studies : RIS},
  volume    = {47},
  journal   = {Review of international studies : RIS},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Cambridge Univ. Press},
  address   = {Cambridge},
  issn      = {0260-2105},
  doi       = {10.1017/S026021052100005X},
  pages     = {353 -- 376},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Expert authority is regarded as the heart of international bureaucracies' power. To measure whether international bureaucracies' expert authority is indeed recognised and deferred to, we draw on novel data from a survey of a key audience: officials in the policy units of national ministries in 121 countries. Respondents were asked to what extent they recognised the expert authority of nine international bureaucracies in various thematic areas of agricultural and financial policy. The results show wide variance. To explain this variation, we test well-established assumptions on the sources of de facto expert authority. Specifically, we look at ministry officials' perceptions of these sources and, thus, focus on a less-studied aspect of the authority relationship. We examine the role of international bureaucracies' perceived impartiality, objectivity, global impact, and the role of knowledge asymmetries. Contrary to common assumptions, we find that de facto expert authority does not rest on impartiality perceptions, and that perceived objectivity plays the smallest role of all factors considered. We find some indications that knowledge asymmetries are associated with more expert authority. Still, and robust to various alternative specifications, the perception that international bureaucracies are effectively addressing global challenges is the most important factor.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{HeroldLieseBuschetal.2021,
  author    = {Herold, Jana and Liese, Andrea and Busch, Per-Olof and Feil, Hauke},
  title     = {Why national ministries consider the policy advice of international bureaucracies},
  series = {International studies quarterly : the journal of the International Studies Association},
  volume    = {65},
  journal   = {International studies quarterly : the journal of the International Studies Association},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Oxford Univ. Press},
  address   = {Oxford},
  issn      = {0020-8833},
  doi       = {10.1093/isq/sqab044},
  pages     = {669 -- 682},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Scholars of international relations and public administration widely assume that international bureaucracies, in their role as policy advisors, directly influence countries' domestic policies. Yet, this is not true across the board. Why do some countries closely consider the advice of international bureaucracies while others do not? This article argues that international bureaucracies' standing as sources of expertise is crucial. We tested this argument using data from a unique survey that measured prevalent practices of advice utilization in thematically specialized policy units of national ministries in a representative sample of more than a hundred countries. Our findings show that ministries' perceptions of international bureaucracies' expertise, that is, specialized and reliable knowledge, are the key factor. International bureaucracies influence national ministries directly and without the support of other actors that may also have an interest in the international bureaucracies' policy advice. Our analysis also demonstrates that the effects of alternative means of influence, such as third-party pressure and coercion, are themselves partly dependent on international bureaucracies' reputation as experts. The findings presented in this article reinforce the emphasis on expertise as a source of international bureaucracies' influence, and provide a crucial test of its importance.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Feil2020,
  author    = {Feil, Hauke},
  title     = {The cancer of corruption and World Bank project performance: Is there a connection?},
  series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  journal   = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  number    = {3},
  issn      = {1867-5808},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-52468},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-524687},
  pages     = {19},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Motivation: Corruption is often cited as a central reason why development projects fail. The article tests this claim by assessing whether World Bank projects perform worse in implementation environments with a higher corruption level. The article focuses specifically on bribery between public officials and firms during the procurement of needed goods and services. Approach and Methods: I use data from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys to avoid the often-criticized corruption perception indices and to allow for an assessment of effects at the subnational level. The analysis builds on an assessment of the performance ratings of 1,228 World Bank projects and covers 87 different countries. Finding: Overall, the article finds a small but statistically significant correlation between the corruption level and project performance. This result indicates that the corruption level of recipient countries should be considered during the design and implementation of projects. Policy Implications: Nonetheless, the relatively small correlation and the low pseudo R-squareds advise not overestimating the relevance of corruption for project performance. At least for the project level, the article finds no indication that corruption is a primary obstacle to aid effectiveness.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{HeinzelRichterBuschetal.2020,
  author    = {Heinzel, Mirko Noa and Richter, Jonas and Busch, Per-Olof and Feil, Hauke and Herold, Jana and Liese, Andrea Margit},
  title     = {Birds of a feather?},
  series = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  journal   = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  number    = {5},
  issn      = {1867-5808},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-52169},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-521690},
  pages     = {27},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank ascribe to impartiality in their mandates. At the same time, scholarship indicates that their decisions are disproportionately influenced by powerful member states. Impartiality is seen as crucial in determining International Organizations' (IOs) effectiveness and legitimacy in the literature. However, we know little about whether key interlocutors in national governments perceive the International Financial Institutions as biased actors who do the bidding for powerful member states or as impartial executors of policy. In order to better understand these perceptions, we surveyed high-level civil servants who are chiefly responsible for four policy areas from more than 100 countries. We found substantial variations in impartiality perceptions. What explains these variations? By developing an argument of selective awareness, we extend rationalist and ideational perspectives on IO impartiality to explain domestic perceptions. Using novel survey data, we test whether staffing underrepresentation, voting underrepresentation, alignment to the major shareholders and overlapping economic policy paradigms are associated with impartiality perceptions. We find substantial evidence that shared economic policy paradigms influence impartiality perceptions. The findings imply that by diversifying their ideational culture, IOs can increase the likelihood that domestic stakeholders view them as impartial.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Feil,
  author    = {Feil, Hauke},
  title     = {God, bad, or ugly: Does it really matter?},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {XII, 224},
  abstract  = {Each year, donor countries spend billions of Euros on development cooperation. Not surprisingly, a large strand of research has emerged which examines the impact of development cooperation. A sub-discipline within this strand of the literature deals with the question of whether the impact or effectiveness of development cooperation depends on the quality of the recipient country's policy and institutional environment. Over hundreds of studies have assessed this question at the macro level. In so doing, most of these studies test whether a potential effect of aid on the growth of a recipient country's gross domestic product (GDP) is conditional on the country's policy and institutional environment. However, even after decades of research and hundreds of studies, no conclusive result has been found. One of the main reasons for the inconclusive state of the literature is that most macro-level studies have to deal with a high risk of endogeneity, treat aid as nothing but a pure income transfer, and rely on low-quality GDP data. To solve these three methodical issues, some authors have started to change the analytical focus from the macro to the micro level. Thus, these authors assess the determinants for the performance of individual development projects instead of the determinants for an effect of aid on GDP. Yet, even though the number of studies focusing on the micro level has increased steadily over the last few years, the state of the literature on the determinants for the performance of development projects still contains multiple highly relevant research gaps. The present thesis seeks to address three of these research gaps. The first research gap addressed by this thesis is related to the specific type of development cooperation. So far, nearly all existing studies focus on projects by Multilateral Development Banks. Research on the determinants for the performance of bilateral development projects is still rare. Thus, even though donors pledge to implement effective development projects, there are hardly any micro-level studies on bilateral projects. So far, only three studies use a sample which includes bilateral projects. Yet, none of the three studies assess the determinants for the performance of bilateral technical development projects. The first paper in the present thesis (GIZ paper) seeks to address this research gap by assessing the determinants for the performance of projects by the Deutsche Gesellschaft f{\"u}r Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), a bilateral state-owned aid agency active in the area of technical cooperation. The results of the paper indicate that some but not all of the existing theoretical arguments can be extended to bilateral technical projects as well.. For example, the level of market interventions in the recipient county only affects the performance of financial development projects, while the recipient country's government capacity affects both technical and financial development projects. The paper also indicates that effects of determinants may vary among project sectors. The paper also highlights a dilemma of technical development cooperation. The countries with low government capacity are usually the ones most in need of technical cooperation projects. But, at the same time, they are also the countries in which these projects have the poorest performance The second research gap addressed by this thesis is related to one specific factor in the policy and institutional environment of recipient countries, namely corruption. This determinant is often cited as essential for project performance but has gained surprisingly little coverage in empirical studies. The few existing studies on the effect of corruption on project performance are inconclusive. Some find a statistically significant correlation, while others do not. Furthermore, so far, all existing studies use corruption perception indices as a measurement for corruption, despite the fact that these indices have well-known deficits when it comes to this research topic. One of these deficits is that such indices do not distinguish between different forms of corruption, even though it is likely that the effect of corruption will vary depending on the type of development project and form of corruption. The second paper in this thesis (Corruption paper) seeks to address this inconclusive state of the research while focusing on one specific form of corruption, namely bribery between private firms and public officials. The paper finds a small but statistically significant correlation between the corruption level and the performance of World Bank projects. The systematic effect of corruption on project performance confirms the need to consider the risk of corruption in the design and during the implementation of projects. Nonetheless, the relatively small effect of corruption and the low pseudo R-squareds advise not to overestimate the relevance of corruption for project performance. At least for the project level, the paper finds no indication that corruption is a primary obstacle to aid effectiveness. The third research gap addressed by this thesis is related to one specific sample, namely recipient countries of the International Development Association (IDA). The question of whether the policy and institutional environment affects project performance is of particular relevance for these countries, given that the World Bank's ratings on a country's policy and institutional environment decide how much IDA resources it receives. One core justification of such an allocation system is that it helps to steer more resources to places where they are most effective. However, so far, there is no conclusive empirical evidence for this statement. The only study specifically focusing on this topic, a study by the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank from 2010, has essential methodological limitations. The third paper of this thesis (CPR paper) seeks to address this research gap by testing whether a more refined analysis confirms the assumption of previous studies that the policy and institutional environment of IDA-recipient countries, measured by the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment ratings, has an effect on the performance of World Bank projects. Overall, neither the main regression models nor any of the robustness tests indicate a substantial correlation between the policy and institutional environment and project performance. Only for Investments Loans is the coefficient large enough to assume some effect. The overall results not only contradict the results of previous studies, but also raise strong doubts around one of the core justifications for the allocation system of the IDA. All three papers rely on a statistical large-N analysis of the performance ratings of individual development projects. These ratings are usually assigned based on the final evaluation of a project and indicate the merit or worth of an activity. The merit or worth of an activity itself is measured by criteria like relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency. In the case of the two papers on World Bank projects, the needed data stem from different databases of the World Bank. The relevant data for the GIZ paper are gathered from internal evaluation reports of the GIZ. Logistic regressions are applied as the main analytical tool. Overall, the three papers show that the policy and institutional environment of recipient countries matters for project performance, but only to a small degree and under certain circumstances. This result highlights that many researchers and practitioners tend to overestimate the role that the policy and institutional environment of recipient countries plays in project performance. Furthermore, the thesis shows that authors of future studies should consider possible interactions between project- and country-level determinants whenever possible, both in their theoretical arguments and statistical models. Otherwise, the debate on the determinants for project performance is at risk of degenerating into a statistics tournament without any connection to reality.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{HeinzelRichterBuschetal.2020,
  author    = {Heinzel, Mirko Noa and Richter, Jonas and Busch, Per-Olof and Feil, Hauke and Herold, Jana and Liese, Andrea},
  title     = {Birds of a feather?},
  series = {Review of international political economy},
  volume    = {28},
  journal   = {Review of international political economy},
  number    = {5},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Abingdon},
  issn      = {0969-2290},
  doi       = {10.1080/09692290.2020.1749711},
  pages     = {1249 -- 1273},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank ascribe to impartiality in their mandates. At the same time, scholarship indicates that their decisions are disproportionately influenced by powerful member states. Impartiality is seen as crucial in determining International Organizations' (IOs) effectiveness and legitimacy in the literature. However, we know little about whether key interlocutors in national governments perceive the International Financial Institutions as biased actors who do the bidding for powerful member states or as impartial executors of policy. In order to better understand these perceptions, we surveyed high-level civil servants who are chiefly responsible for four policy areas from more than 100 countries. We found substantial variations in impartiality perceptions. What explains these variations? By developing an argument of selective awareness, we extend rationalist and ideational perspectives on IO impartiality to explain domestic perceptions. Using novel survey data, we test whether staffing underrepresentation, voting underrepresentation, alignment to the major shareholders and overlapping economic policy paradigms are associated with impartiality perceptions. We find substantial evidence that shared economic policy paradigms influence impartiality perceptions. The findings imply that by diversifying their ideational culture, IOs can increase the likelihood that domestic stakeholders view them as impartial.},
  language  = {en}
}