@article{GanghofEppner2019,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian},
  title     = {Faire Repr{\"a}sentation versus klare Richtungsentscheide? Zur Reform des Wahl- und Regierungssystems Fair representation versus clear decisions On the reform of the electoral system and form of government},
  series = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft},
  volume    = {13},
  journal   = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Wiesbaden},
  issn      = {1865-2646},
  doi       = {10.1007/s12286-019-00431-7},
  pages     = {375 -- 397},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {The increased fragmentation of European party systems and the resulting difficulties of government formation have led to renewed debates about electoral systems. Some authors characterize certain electoral systems as optimal compromises between "proportional" and "majoritarian" conceptions of democracy. We argue that these optimality arguments are biased towards the majoritarian conception. Ambitious proportional conceptions embrace the goals of mechanical proportionality, multidimensional representation and flexible, issue-specific legislative coalitions. However, in parliamentary systems of government these goals cannot be reconciled with majoritarian goals. This is because in parliamentarism the same electoral threshold applies to parliamentary representation and to participation in the vote of non-confidence procedure. The first threshold is crucial for the proportional, the latter for the majoritarian conception of democracy. If we are willing to decouple the two thresholds - and hence change the form of government - new avenues for reform open up. We illustrate our arguments using data for 29 democratic systems between 1995 and 2015.},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{EppnerGanghof2017,
  author    = {Eppner, Sebastian and Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Institutional veto players and cabinet formation},
  series = {European journal of political research : official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research},
  volume    = {56},
  journal   = {European journal of political research : official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Wiley},
  address   = {Hoboken},
  issn      = {0304-4130},
  doi       = {10.1111/1475-6765.12172},
  pages     = {169 -- 186},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {Are potential cabinets more likely to form when they control institutional veto players such as symmetric second chambers or minority vetoes? Existing evidence for a causal effect of veto control has been weak. This article presents evidence for this effect on the basis of conditional and mixed logit analyses of government formations in 21 parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies between 1955 and 2012. It also shows that the size of the effect varies systematically across political-institutional contexts. The estimated causal effect was greater in countries that eventually abolished the relevant veto institutions. It is suggested that the incidence of constitutional reform is a proxy for context-specific factors that increased the incentives for veto control and simultaneously provided a stimulus for the weakening of institutional veto power.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{GanghofEppnerPoerschke2018,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian and P{\"o}rschke, Alexander},
  title     = {Australian bicameralism as semi-parliamentarism},
  series = {Australian Journal of Political Science},
  volume    = {53},
  journal   = {Australian Journal of Political Science},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Abingdon},
  issn      = {1036-1146},
  doi       = {10.1080/10361146.2018.1451487},
  pages     = {211 -- 233},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {The article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executive-legislative system - a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government - which we call 'semi-parliamentary government'. We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation, and that it can achieve a certain balance between competing models or visions of democracy. We specify theoretically how the semi-parliamentary separation of powers contributes to the balancing of democratic visions and propose a conceptual framework for comparing democratic visions. We use this framework to locate the Australian Commonwealth, all Australian states and 22 advanced democratic nation-states on a two-dimensional empirical map of democratic patterns for the period from 1995 to 2015.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{GanghofEppnerPoerschke2018,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian and P{\"o}rschke, Alexander},
  title     = {Semi-parliamentary government in perspective},
  series = {Australian Journal of Political Science},
  volume    = {53},
  journal   = {Australian Journal of Political Science},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Abingdon},
  issn      = {1036-1146},
  doi       = {10.1080/10361146.2018.1451488},
  pages     = {264 -- 269},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {The article responds to four commentaries on the concept of semi-parliamentary government and its application to Australian bicameralism. It highlights four main points: (1) Our preferred typology is not more 'normative' than existing approaches, but applies the criterion of 'direct election' equally to executive and legislature; (2) While the evolution of semi-parliamentary government had contingent elements, it plausibly also reflects the 'equilibrium' nature of certain institutional configurations; (3) The idea that a pure parliamentary system with pure proportional representation has absolute normative priority over 'instrumentalist' concerns about cabinet stability, identifiability and responsibility is questionable; and (4) The reforms we discuss may be unlikely to occur in Australia, but deserve consideration by scholars and institutional reformers in other democratic systems.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{GanghofEppner2017,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian},
  title     = {Patterns of accountability and representation},
  series = {Politics},
  volume    = {39},
  journal   = {Politics},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {0263-3957},
  doi       = {10.1177/0263395717710566},
  pages     = {113 -- 130},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {Arend Lijphart uses an average of five standardized variables - the executive-parties dimension (EPD) - to describe patterns of democracy and explain differences in democracies' performance. The article suggests ways to improve the descriptive part of the project. It argues that the EPD maps different approaches to achieving accountability and representation, rather than differences in consensus. This re-conceptualization leads to a more coherent and valid measurement. It is also argued that more systematic adjustments are needed for differences in constitutional structures (presidentialism and bicameralism). The article presents data on a revised EPD and its components for 36 democracies in the period from 1981 to 2010. As to the explanatory part of the project, we contend that the EPD often hinders adequate causal analysis rather than facilitating it. We show this by re-analysing democracies' performance with respect to turnout and capital punishment.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{GanghofEppnerSteckeretal.2019,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian and Stecker, Christian and Heeß, Katja and Schukraft, Stefan},
  title     = {Do minority cabinets govern more flexibly and inclusively?},
  series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  journal   = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  number    = {114},
  issn      = {1867-5808},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-43417},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-434175},
  pages     = {541 -- 561},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {A widespread view in political science is that minority cabinets govern more flexibly and inclusively, more in line with a median-oriented and 'consensual' vision of democracy. Yet there is only little empirical evidence for it. We study legislative coalition-building in the German state of North-Rhine-Westphalia, which was ruled by a minority government between 2010 and 2012. We compare the inclusiveness of legislative coalitions under minority and majority cabinets, based on 1028 laws passed in the 1985-2017 period, and analyze in detail the flexibility of legislative coalition formation under the minority government. Both quantitative analyses are complemented with brief case studies of specific legislation. We find, first, that the minority cabinet did not rule more inclusively. Second, the minority cabinet's legislative flexibility was fairly limited; to the extent that it existed, it follows a pattern that cannot be explained on the basis of the standard spatial model with policy-seeking parties.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{GanghofEppnerHeess2015,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian and Heess, Katja},
  title     = {Normative balance and electoral reform: a finnish puzzle and a comparative analysis},
  series = {West European politics},
  volume    = {38},
  journal   = {West European politics},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Abingdon},
  issn      = {0140-2382},
  doi       = {10.1080/01402382.2014.929342},
  pages     = {53 -- 72},
  year      = {2015},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{GanghofEppnerPoerschke2018,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian and P{\"o}rschke, Alexander},
  title     = {Australian bicameralism as semi-parliamentarism},
  series = {Australian Journal of Political Science},
  journal   = {Australian Journal of Political Science},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-412984},
  pages     = {24},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {The article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executive-legislative system - a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government - which we call 'semi- parliamentary government'. We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation, and that it can achieve a certain balance between competing models or visions of democracy. We specify theoretically how the semi-parliamentary separation of powers contributes to the balancing of democratic visions and propose a conceptual framework for comparing democratic visions. We use this framework to locate the Australian Commonwealth, all Australian states and 22 advanced democratic nation-states on a two- dimensional empirical map of democratic patterns for the period from 1995 to 2015.},
  language  = {en}
}