@article{FleischerDanielsenNebyetal.2024,
  author    = {Fleischer, Julia and Danielsen, Ole A. and Neby, Simon and Nykvist, Rasmus},
  title     = {The state as a marketizer vs. the marketization of the state},
  series = {Public organization review : a global journal},
  journal   = {Public organization review : a global journal},
  publisher = {Springer Science + Business Media B.V.},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {1566-7170},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11115-024-00769-x},
  pages     = {16},
  year      = {2024},
  abstract  = {Governments engage in corporatization by creating corporate entities or reorganizing existing ones. These corporatization activities reflect an interplay between political agency and environmental pressures, including (changing) notions of state-market relations. This paper discusses two ideal-typed organizational models of corporatization: the state as a marketizer and the marketization of the state. Whereas the first emphasizes the role of political design and agency in corporatization, the second emphasizes the role of (actors in) the environment for corporatization. Both models are assessed across five corporatization episodes in Norway and Sweden, where we also demonstrate the interplay between political agency and environmental pressure.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{FleischerBuzogany2023,
  author    = {Fleischer, Julia and Buzog{\´a}ny, Aron},
  title     = {Unboxing international public administrations},
  series = {The American review of public administration},
  volume    = {53},
  journal   = {The American review of public administration},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Sage},
  address   = {Thousand Oaks, Calif.},
  issn      = {0275-0740},
  doi       = {10.1177/02750740221136488},
  pages     = {23 -- 35},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {Recent debates in international relations increasingly focus on bureaucratic apparatuses of international organizations and highlight their role, influence, and autonomy in global public policy. In this contribution we follow the recent call made by Moloney and Rosenbloom in this journal to make use of "public administrative theory and empirically based knowledge in analyzing the behavior of international and regional organizations" and offer a systematic analysis of the inner structures of these administrative bodies. Changes in these structures can reflect both the (re-)assignment of responsibilities, competencies, and expertise, but also the (re)allocation of resources, staff, and corresponding signalling of priorities. Based on organizational charts, we study structural changes within 46 international bureaucracies in the UN system. Tracing formal changes to all internal units over two decades, this contribution provides the first longitudinal assessment of structural change at the international level. We demonstrate that the inner structures of international bureaucracies in the UN system became more fragmented over time but also experienced considerable volatility with periods of structural growth and retrenchment. The analysis also suggests that IO's political features yield stronger explanatory power for explaining these structural changes than bureaucratic determinants. We conclude that the politics of structural change in international bureaucracies is a missing piece in the current debate on international public administrations that complements existing research perspectives by reiterating the importance of the political context of international bureaucracies as actors in global governance.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{YesilkagitBezesFleischer2022,
  author    = {Yesilkagit, Kutsal and Bezes, Philippe and Fleischer, Julia},
  title     = {What's in a name? The politics of name changes inside bureaucracy},
  series = {Public administration},
  volume    = {100},
  journal   = {Public administration},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address   = {Oxford},
  issn      = {0033-3298},
  doi       = {10.1111/padm.12827},
  pages     = {1091 -- 1106},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {In this article, we examine the effects of political change on name changes of units within central government ministries. We expect that changes regarding the policy position of a government will cause changes in the names of ministerial units. To this end we formulate hypotheses combining the politics of structural choice and theories of portfolio allocation to examine the effects of political changes at the cabinet level on the names of intra-ministerial units. We constructed a dataset containing more than 17,000 observations on name changes of ministerial units between 1980 and 2013 from the central governments of Germany, the Netherlands, and France. We regress a series of generalized estimating equations (GEE) with population averaging models for binary outcomes. Finding variations across the three political-bureaucratic systems, we overall report positive effects of governmental change and ideological positions on name changes within ministries.},
  language  = {en}
}