@article{DanielsenFleischer2022, author = {Danielsen, Ole Andreas and Fleischer, Julia}, title = {The effects of political design and organizational dynamics on structural disaggregation and integration in Norway 1947-2019}, series = {Governance : an international journal of policy and administration}, volume = {36}, journal = {Governance : an international journal of policy and administration}, number = {1}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}, address = {Oxford}, issn = {1468-0491}, doi = {10.1111/gove.12669}, pages = {299 -- 320}, year = {2022}, abstract = {In countries with long-standing agency traditions, the creation of new agencies rarely comes as a large-scale reform but rather as one structural choice of many possible, most notably a ministerial division. In order to make sense of these choices, the article discusses the role of political design-focusing on the role of political motivations, such as ideological turnover, replacement risks and ideological stands toward administrative efficiency-and organizational dynamics-focusing on the role of administrative legacies and existing organizational palettes. The article utilizes data on organizational creations in the Norwegian central state between 1947 and 2019, in order to explore how political design and organizational dynamics help us understand the creation of agencies relative to ministry divisions over time. We find that political motives matter a great deal for the structural choices made by consecutive Norwegian governments, but that structural path dependencies may also be at play.}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{Fleischer2012, author = {Fleischer, Julia}, title = {Policy advice and institutional politics : a comparative analysis of Germany and Britain}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-61873}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, year = {2012}, abstract = {Die Studie schließt an die Debatte in der vergleichenden politikwissenschaftlichen Verwaltungsforschung an, die sich mit der Rolle interner Beratungsakteure in Regierungsorganisationen besch{\"a}ftigt. Ziel dieser Studie ist es, die Mechanismen zu erkl{\"a}ren, durch die interne Beratungsakteure die ihnen zugeschriebene Bedeutung im exekutiven Entscheidungsprozess erlangen. Dabei werden jene Organisationseinheiten untersucht, die proaktiv an exekutiven Entscheidungsprozessen mitwirken und mit ihrer Beratung politischer Akteure in Konkurrenz zur Ministerialverwaltung stehen k{\"o}nnen. Die Einflussmechanismen dieser Akteure in der exekutiven Entscheidungsfindung werden als Formen einer "Institutionenpolitik" aufgefasst, bei der Akteure die institutionellen Bedingungen von Politikformulierungsprozessen bzw. die "Spielregeln exekutiver Entscheidungsfindung" ver{\"a}ndern, um ihre eigene Position bzw. die ihres "Klienten" zu st{\"a}rken. Das theoretische Argument dieser Arbeit folgt der neo-institutionalistischen Wende in der Organisationstheorie und definiert Institutionenpolitik als graduelle Institutionalisierungsprozesse zwischen Institutionen und organisationalen Akteuren, wobei einem weiten Institutionenbegriff folgend die Objekte solcher Ver{\"a}nderungsprozesse durch regulative, normative und kognitive S{\"a}ulen gekennzeichnet sind. In Anwendung des "power-distributional approach" lassen sich graduelle Institutionalisierungsprozesse durch institutionenbezogene Charakteristika erkl{\"a}ren, d.h. die Beschaffenheit der Objekte von Institutionenpolitik, insbesondere die Interpretationsfreiheit ihrer Anwendung, sowie die Restriktionen des institutionellen Kontexts. Zudem l{\"a}sst sich Institutionenpolitik durch akteursbezogene Charakteristika erkl{\"a}ren, d.h. den Ambitionen der Akteure sich als "potentielle institutionelle Agenten" zu engagieren. Diese beiden Erkl{\"a}rungsdimensionen dr{\"u}cken sich in vier idealtypischen Mechanismen von Institutionenpolitik aus: Sedimentation, Ersetzung, Drift, und Konversion, die mit vier Agententypen korrespondieren. Die Studie untersucht die institutionenpolitischen Ambitionen der Akteure explorativ, die Relevanz des institutionellen Kontexts wird mithilfe von Erwartungshypothesen zu den Effekten von vier Merkmalen analysiert, die in der bestehenden Debatte als relevant gelten: (1) die Parteienzusammensetzung der Regierung, (2) die Strukturprinzipien von Kabinettsentscheidungen, (3) die Verwaltungstradition sowie (4) die formale Politisierung der Ministerialverwaltung. Die Studie folgt einem "most similar systems design" und f{\"u}hrt qualitative Fallstudien zur Rolle interner Beratungseinheiten im Zentrum deutscher und britischer Regierungsorganisationen, d.h. der Regierungszentrale und dem Finanzministerium, {\"u}ber einen l{\"a}ngeren Zeitraum durch (1969/1970-2005). Es werden jeweils drei Zeitperioden pro Untersuchungsland betrachtet, die britischen Fallstudien analysieren die Beratungsakteure im Cabinet Office, Prime Minister's Office und dem Finanzministerium unter den Premierministern Heath (1970-74), Thatcher (1979-87) und Blair (1997-2005). Die deutschen Fallstudien untersuchen die Beratungsakteure im Bundeskanzleramt und dem Bundesfinanzministerium unter den Bundeskanzlern Brandt (1969-74), Kohl (1982-1987) und Schr{\"o}der (1998-2005). F{\"u}r die empirische Untersuchung wurden die Ergebnisse einer Dokumentenanalyse mit den Erkenntnissen aus 75 semi-strukturierten Experteninterviews trianguliert. Die vergleichende Analyse zeigt unterschiedliche Muster von Institutionenpolitik. Die deutschen Beratungsakteure agieren anf{\"a}nglich in Ersetzung, sp{\"a}ter vornehmlich in Sedimentation sowie Drift, d.h. ihre institutionenpolitischen Aktivit{\"a}ten widmen sich nach anf{\"a}nglicher Ersetzung bestehender institutioneller Grundlagen zunehmend der Addition neuer Elemente sowie der deliberativen Nicht-Entscheidung zur Anpassung existierender institutioneller Grundlagen an Umweltver{\"a}nderungen. Die britischen Beratungsakteure sind zumeist in Ersetzung sowie Konversion engagiert, trotz gelegentlicher Sedimentation, d.h. einer direkten Ersetzung bestehender institutioneller Grundlagen durch neue Spielregeln exekutiver Entscheidungsfindung sowie einer bewussten Umwandlung und Neuausrichtung existierender institutionellen Grundlagen, gelegentlich auch eine Addition neuer Elemente zu bestehenden Regeln. Die institutionen- und akteursspezifischen Charakteristika sind f{\"u}r diese Muster von Institutionenpolitik erkl{\"a}rungsrelevant. Erstens weist die Studie nach, dass der institutionelle Kontext die institutionenpolitischen Aktivit{\"a}ten in Deutschland beschr{\"a}nkt und in Großbritannien beg{\"u}nstigt. Zweitens ist die Interpretationsfreiheit der Anwendung institutionenpolitischer Objekte bedeutsam, wie sich anhand der institutionenpolitischen Ambitionen der Akteure im Zeitverlauf und im L{\"a}ndervergleich zeigt und somit drittens best{\"a}tigt, dass diese Interessen der Akteure an Institutionenwandel die Mechanismen von Institutionenpolitik beeinflussen. Die Arbeit schließt mit der Erkenntnis, dass die Rolle interner Beratungseinheiten in der exekutiven Politikformulierung nicht nur aus ihren inhaltlichen, parteistrategischen oder medial-beratenden Funktionen f{\"u}r politische Akteure in Regierungs{\"a}mtern folgt, sondern insbesondere aus ihren institutionenpolitischen Aktivit{\"a}ten, deren Resultate die institutionellen Restriktionen aller Akteure in exekutiven Entscheidungsprozessen beeinflussen - und somit auch ihre eigene Rolle in diesen Prozessen.}, language = {en} } @article{Fleischer2021, author = {Fleischer, Julia}, title = {Federal Administration}, series = {Public Administration in Germany}, journal = {Public Administration in Germany}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, address = {Cham}, isbn = {978-3-030-53696-1}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-53697-8_5}, pages = {61 -- 79}, year = {2021}, abstract = {The federal administration is significantly small (around 10 percent of all public employees). This speciality of the German administrative system is based on the division of responsibilities: the central (federal) level drafts and adopts most of the laws and public programmes, and the state level (together with the municipal level) implements them. The administration of the federal level comprises the ministries, subordinated agencies for special and selected operational tasks (e.g. the authorisation of drugs, information security and registration of refugees) in distinct administrative sectors (e.g. foreign service, armed forces and federal police). The capacity for preparing and monitoring government bills and statutory instruments is well developed. Moreover, the instruments and tools of coordination are exemplary compared with other countries, although the recent digital turn has been adopted less advanced than elsewhere.}, language = {en} } @article{Fleischer2009, author = {Fleischer, Julia}, title = {Power resources of parliamentary executives : policy advice in the UK and Germany}, issn = {0140-2382}, doi = {10.1080/01402380802509941}, year = {2009}, language = {en} } @book{FleischerBertelsSchulzeGabrechten2018, author = {Fleischer, Julia and Bertels, Jana and Schulze-Gabrechten, Lena}, title = {Stabilit{\"a}t und Flexibilit{\"a}t}, publisher = {Nomos}, address = {Baden-Baden}, isbn = {978-3-8487-5258-4}, pages = {83}, year = {2018}, abstract = {Wie und warum {\"a}ndern sich die formalen Strukturen von Ministerien? Dieser Band pr{\"a}sentiert die Ergebnisse der ersten umfassenden formalen Organisationsstrukturanalyse der Bundesverwaltung zwischen 1980 und 2015. Neben einer Beschreibung der internen Dynamiken im Zeitverlauf, u.a. zur Anzahl und Verbreitung von Organisationseinheiten, zur Ver{\"a}nderungsintensit{\"a}t und zu den Arten der Ver{\"a}nderungsereignisse, werden zentrale politik- und verwaltungswissenschaftliche Erkl{\"a}rungsperspektiven er{\"o}rtert. Die empirische Analyse zeigt, dass sich die Bundesministerien in den letzten Jahrzehnten ausdifferenziert haben und dabei (partei-)politische aber auch politikfeldspezifische Motive relevant sind. Daneben wird in zahlreichen Beispielen illustriert, welche externen und internen Faktoren die strukturelle Entwicklung der Bundesverwaltung beeinflussen.}, language = {de} } @article{FleischerBezesJamesetal.2022, author = {Fleischer, Julia and Bezes, Philippe and James, Oliver and Yesilkagit, Kutsal}, title = {The politics of government reorganization in Western Europe}, series = {Governance : an international journal of policy and administration and institutions}, volume = {36}, journal = {Governance : an international journal of policy and administration and institutions}, number = {1}, publisher = {Wiley}, address = {Hoboken}, issn = {0952-1895}, doi = {10.1111/gove.12670}, pages = {255 -- 274}, year = {2022}, abstract = {The reorganization of governments is crucial for parties to express their policy preferences once they reach office. Yet these activities are not confined to the direct aftermath of general elections or to wide-ranging structural reforms. Instead, governments reorganize and adjust their machinery of government all the time. This paper aims to assess these structural choices with a particular focus at the core of the state, comparing four Western European democracies (Germany, France, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom) from 1980 to 2013. Our empirical analysis shows that stronger shifts in cabinets' ideological profiles in the short- and long-term as well as the units' proximity to political executives yield significant effects. In contrast, Conservative governments, commonly regarded as key promoters of reorganizing governments, are not significant for the likelihood of structural change. We discuss the effects of this politics of government reorganization for different research debates assessing the inner workings of governments.}, language = {en} } @article{FleischerBezesYesilkagit2023, author = {Fleischer, Julia and Bezes, Philippe and Yesilkagit, Kutsal}, title = {Political time in public bureaucracies}, series = {Public administration review}, volume = {83}, journal = {Public administration review}, number = {6}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}, address = {Oxford}, issn = {0033-3352}, doi = {10.1111/puar.13740}, pages = {1813 -- 1832}, year = {2023}, abstract = {Structural duration conveys stability but also resilience in central government and is therefore a key issue in the debate on the structure and organization of government. This paper discusses three core variants of structural duration to study the explanatory relevance of politics. We compare these durations across ministerialunits in four European democracies (Germany, France, The Netherlands, and Norway) from 1980 to 2013, totaling over 17,000 units. Our empirical analyses show that cabinets' ideological turnover and extremism are the most significant predictors of all variants of duration, whereas polarization in parliament as well as new prime ministers without office experience yield the predicted significant negative effects for most models. We discuss these findings and avenues for futureresearch that acknowledge the definition and measures for structural change as well as temporal aspects of the empirical phenomenon more explicitly.}, language = {en} } @article{FleischerBuzogany2023, author = {Fleischer, Julia and Buzog{\´a}ny, Aron}, title = {Unboxing international public administrations}, series = {The American review of public administration}, volume = {53}, journal = {The American review of public administration}, number = {1}, publisher = {Sage}, address = {Thousand Oaks, Calif.}, issn = {0275-0740}, doi = {10.1177/02750740221136488}, pages = {23 -- 35}, year = {2023}, abstract = {Recent debates in international relations increasingly focus on bureaucratic apparatuses of international organizations and highlight their role, influence, and autonomy in global public policy. In this contribution we follow the recent call made by Moloney and Rosenbloom in this journal to make use of "public administrative theory and empirically based knowledge in analyzing the behavior of international and regional organizations" and offer a systematic analysis of the inner structures of these administrative bodies. Changes in these structures can reflect both the (re-)assignment of responsibilities, competencies, and expertise, but also the (re)allocation of resources, staff, and corresponding signalling of priorities. Based on organizational charts, we study structural changes within 46 international bureaucracies in the UN system. Tracing formal changes to all internal units over two decades, this contribution provides the first longitudinal assessment of structural change at the international level. We demonstrate that the inner structures of international bureaucracies in the UN system became more fragmented over time but also experienced considerable volatility with periods of structural growth and retrenchment. The analysis also suggests that IO's political features yield stronger explanatory power for explaining these structural changes than bureaucratic determinants. We conclude that the politics of structural change in international bureaucracies is a missing piece in the current debate on international public administrations that complements existing research perspectives by reiterating the importance of the political context of international bureaucracies as actors in global governance.}, language = {en} } @article{FleischerCarstens2021, author = {Fleischer, Julia and Carstens, Nora}, title = {Policy labs as arenas for boundary spanning}, series = {Public Management Review}, volume = {24}, journal = {Public Management Review}, number = {8}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, issn = {1470-1065}, doi = {10.1080/14719037.2021.1893803}, pages = {1208 -- 1225}, year = {2021}, abstract = {The recently adopted German Online Access Act triggered the creation of digitalization labs for designing digital services, bringing together federal, state, and local authorities; end-users; and private-sector actors. These labs provide opportunities for boundary spanning due to organizational field and lab features. Our comparative case studies on three digitalization labs show variations in boundary spanning and reveal lab members de-coupling from their parent organizations to a varying extent. We have concluded labs offer boundary spanning that supports safeguarding the legitimacy of innovative policy designs but also raise concerns over public accountability.}, language = {en} } @article{FleischerPruin2023, author = {Fleischer, Julia and Pruin, Andree}, title = {Organizational reputation in executive politics}, series = {International review of administrative sciences}, journal = {International review of administrative sciences}, publisher = {Sage}, address = {Los Angeles, Calif.}, issn = {0020-8523}, doi = {10.1177/00208523221132228}, pages = {16}, year = {2023}, abstract = {In recent years, governments have increased their efforts to strengthen the citizen-orientation in policy design. They have established temporary arenas as well as permanent units inside the machinery of government to integrate citizens into policy formulation, leading to a "laboratorization" of central government organizations. We argue that the evolution and role of these units herald new dynamics in the importance of organizational reputation for executive politics. These actors deviate from the classic palette of organizational units inside the machinery of government and thus require their own reputation vis-{\`a}-vis various audiences within and outside their parent organization. Based on a comparative case study of two of these units inside the German federal bureaucracy, we show how ambiguous expectations of their audiences challenge their organizational reputation. Both units resolve these tensions by balancing their weaker professional and procedural reputation with a stronger performative and moral reputation. We conclude that government units aiming to improve citizen orientation in policy design may benefit from engaging with citizens as their external audience to compensate for a weaker reputation in the eyes of their audiences inside the government organization. Points for practitioners: many governments have introduced novel means to strengthen citizen-centered policy design, which has led to an emergence of novel units inside central government that differ from traditional bureaucratic structures and procedures ; this study analyzes how these new units may build their organizational reputation vis-{\`a}-vis internal and external actors in government policymaking. ; we show that such units assert themselves primarily based on their performative and moral reputation.}, language = {en} }