@article{FleischerPruin2023,
  author    = {Fleischer, Julia and Pruin, Andree},
  title     = {Organizational reputation in executive politics},
  series = {International review of administrative sciences},
  journal   = {International review of administrative sciences},
  publisher = {Sage},
  address   = {Los Angeles, Calif.},
  issn      = {0020-8523},
  doi       = {10.1177/00208523221132228},
  pages     = {16},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {In recent years, governments have increased their efforts to strengthen the citizen-orientation in policy design. They have established temporary arenas as well as permanent units inside the machinery of government to integrate citizens into policy formulation, leading to a "laboratorization" of central government organizations. We argue that the evolution and role of these units herald new dynamics in the importance of organizational reputation for executive politics. These actors deviate from the classic palette of organizational units inside the machinery of government and thus require their own reputation vis-{\`a}-vis various audiences within and outside their parent organization. Based on a comparative case study of two of these units inside the German federal bureaucracy, we show how ambiguous expectations of their audiences challenge their organizational reputation. Both units resolve these tensions by balancing their weaker professional and procedural reputation with a stronger performative and moral reputation. We conclude that government units aiming to improve citizen orientation in policy design may benefit from engaging with citizens as their external audience to compensate for a weaker reputation in the eyes of their audiences inside the government organization. Points for practitioners: many governments have introduced novel means to strengthen citizen-centered policy design, which has led to an emergence of novel units inside central government that differ from traditional bureaucratic structures and procedures ; this study analyzes how these new units may build their organizational reputation vis-{\`a}-vis internal and external actors in government policymaking. ; we show that such units assert themselves primarily based on their performative and moral reputation.},
  language  = {en}
}