@article{EbingerRichter2016, author = {Ebinger, Falk and Richter, Philipp}, title = {Decentralizing for performance? A quantitative assessment of functional reforms in the German Lander}, series = {International review of administrative sciences : an international journal of comparative public administration}, volume = {82}, journal = {International review of administrative sciences : an international journal of comparative public administration}, publisher = {Sage Publ.}, address = {London}, issn = {0020-8523}, doi = {10.1177/0020852315586916}, pages = {291 -- 314}, year = {2016}, abstract = {In the last 10 years, the governments of most of the German L{\"a}nder initiated administrative reforms. All of these ventures included the municipalization of substantial sets of tasks. As elsewhere, governments argue that service delivery by communes is more cost-efficient, effective and responsive. Empirical evidence to back these claims is inconsistent at best: a considerable number of case studies cast doubt on unconditionally positive appraisals. Decentralization effects seem to vary depending on the performance dimension and task considered. However, questions of generalizability arise as these findings have not yet been backed by more 'objective' archival data. We provide empirical evidence on decentralization effects for two different policy fields based on two studies. Thereby, the article presents alternative avenues for research on decentralization effects and matches the theoretical expectations on decentralization effects with more robust results. The analysis confirms that overly positive assertions concerning decentralization effects are only partially warranted. As previous case studies suggested, effects have to be looked at in a much more differentiated way, including starting conditions and distinguishing between the various relevant performance dimensions and policy fields.}, language = {en} } @article{KuhlmannReiter2016, author = {Kuhlmann, Sabine and Reiter, Renate}, title = {Decentralization of the French welfare state: from 'big bang' to 'muddling through'}, series = {International Review of Administrative Sciences}, volume = {82}, journal = {International Review of Administrative Sciences}, number = {2}, publisher = {Sage}, address = {London}, issn = {0020-8523}, doi = {0.1177/0020852315583194}, pages = {255 -- 272}, year = {2016}, abstract = {This article analyses the decentralization of the French welfare state focusing on the transfer of the Revenu minimum d'insertion (RMI) welfare benefit to the departments in 2003 and 2004. We map and explain the effects of the reform on the system and performance of the subnational provision of welfare tasks. To evaluate the impact of decentralization on the RMI-related action of the departments, we carry out a qualitative document analysis and use data from two case studies. The RMI decentralization offers an exemplary insight into the incremental implementation of French decentralization. We find many unintended effects in terms of the performance and outcome of the subnational welfare provision. This is traced back to the combining of institutional and policy reforms and the inadequate translation of high political expectations into an inadequate action programme both resulting in excessive demands on the local actors. Points for practitioners The decentralization of public tasks is associated with high expectations in terms of the effects on the performance of public services and public governance on the subnational levels. For an in-depth measure the range of administrative performance and political systems effects should be taken into account. We propose a five-dimensional scheme allowing for the determination of decentralization effects on the resource input to and the operative output of subnational public services, on the horizontal coordination between subnational task holders and the affected non-public stakeholders, on the vertical intergovernmental coordination, and on the democratic accountability of subnational authorities.}, language = {en} }