@article{HustedtSeyfried2017,
  author    = {Hustedt, Thurid and Seyfried, Markus},
  title     = {Inside the EU Commission},
  series = {JCMS - Journal of common market studies},
  volume    = {56},
  journal   = {JCMS - Journal of common market studies},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Wiley},
  address   = {Hoboken},
  issn      = {0021-9886},
  doi       = {10.1111/jcms.12605},
  pages     = {368 -- 384},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {This article studies the perception of the EU Commission's Secretariat General in policy-making. Recently, research on EU institutions devotes increasing attention to analyzing structures and procedures of decision-making in EU institutions, most notably the EU Commission. Conventionally, the EU Commission is portrayed as a fragmented organization, divided along the lines of staff nationality, sectoral responsibilities and cabinets and General Directorates (DGs). The Secretariat General has long been viewed a weak actor that is hardly able or motivated to steer internal decision-making. However, recent research indicates a changing role of the Secretariat General as a pro-active broker and last arbiter. This article studies how the Secretariat General is perceived by the DGs in policy coordination and argues that this perception depends on the pattern of political authority, bureaucratic roles and the relevance and the alternatives prevailing in the policy field. The article is based on data from a survey among Commission officials.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{HustedtSeyfried2016,
  author    = {Hustedt, Thurid and Seyfried, Markus},
  title     = {Co-ordination across internal organizational boundaries: how the EU Commission co-ordinates climate policies},
  series = {Journal of European public policy},
  volume    = {23},
  journal   = {Journal of European public policy},
  publisher = {Springer Publishing Company},
  address   = {Abingdon},
  issn      = {1350-1763},
  doi       = {10.1080/13501763.2015.1074605},
  pages     = {888 -- 905},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {Through an analysis of climate policy-making in the European Commission (EU), this article argues that co-ordination in the Commission displays the same characteristics as the co-ordination across ministries in central governments, i.e., the properties of negative co-ordination. The article is based on a survey among Commission officials. Overall, the article reveals that a public administration perspective on the Commission proves invaluable to gain insights on how decisions are made at the European Union level. The article contributes to the emerging literature viewing the Commission as an ordinary bureaucracy - as opposed to a unique supranational organization.},
  language  = {en}
}