@phdthesis{Heuberger2022, author = {Heuberger, Adrian}, title = {Das Erste ist das Letzte und das Letzte ist das Erste}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-54984}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-549846}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {224}, year = {2022}, abstract = {The following paper argues that Hegel's Science of Logic is a radical attempt to conceive the absolute as having no outside. This can already be noticed in the beginning of the Logic: If there can be nothing outside the absolute, then the beginning cannot be outside the absolute either. Consequently, the beginning must be made with the absolute itself. However, setting the beginning as absolute is at the same time testing the beginning of its absoluteness. And the beginning does not pass this test. For it is the nature of a beginning to be only a beginning and not the whole. And thus it is also not the absolute. The beginning is the most distant determination from being the whole and must therefore be considered as the most non-absolute in Logic. Consequently, the beginning is both: It is a beginning with the absolute and it is a beginning with the most non-absolute. The very beginning of the Logic is already a self-contradiction. The Logic must free itself from this contradiction. And this liberation is what makes the progress that leads beyond the beginning and in which the beginning is sublated. The progress develops subsequent determinations. Each of them is posited as absolute, but none of them can satisfy this absoluteness so that each of them is sublated again in subsequent determinations. Every determination that follows the beginning undergoes this movement of absolutisation, of failing to fulfill absoluteness, and of sublating itself, until - at the very end of Logic - this very movement is recognised as that which alone is capable of fulfilling absoluteness. For if every determination is submitted to this movement, then there is no outside to this movement. And therefore, it must be the absolute. On its progress to elaborate the true meaning of the absolute, the Logic returns repeatedly to the determination of its beginning, in order to catch up with presuppositions that had to be made for exposing its initial determination. The following passages will be of particular interest for catching up with these presuppositions: the transition into the science of Essence, the transition into the science of Notion and the concluding chapter of the Logic. For even at the very end, the Logic returns to its beginning. This led to the following statement by Hegel, which also inspired the title of this paper: The first is also the last and the last is also the first.}, language = {de} } @article{KayaKopshteyn2022, author = {Kaya, Gizem and Kopshteyn, Georgy}, title = {Die Impfpflicht-Debatte auf dem philosophischen Pr{\"u}fstand}, series = {MenschenRechtsMagazin : MRM ; Informationen, Meinungen, Analysen}, volume = {27}, journal = {MenschenRechtsMagazin : MRM ; Informationen, Meinungen, Analysen}, number = {2}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam}, address = {Potsdam}, issn = {1434-2820}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-57154}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-571541}, pages = {94 -- 110}, year = {2022}, language = {de} } @article{Khurana2022, author = {Khurana, Thomas}, title = {Gattungswesen}, series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, volume = {70}, journal = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, number = {3}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, address = {Berlin}, issn = {0012-1045}, doi = {10.1515/dzph-2022-0023}, pages = {373 -- 399}, year = {2022}, abstract = {In which sense can human beings be conceived as social animals? To elucidate this question, the present paper (I) distinguishes the logical sociality of all living beings from the material sociality of social animals and the political sociality of self-conscious social animals. (II) The self-conscious political sociality that characterises the human genus-being requires a complex interplay of first and second person through which alone we can participate in our form of life and determine its content. (III) The human form of life thus constituted is characterised by a particularly open, and at the same time precarious, membership which involves specific forms of vulnerability and power. (IV) Against this background, forms of objective spirit are necessary which grant us a generalized recognition and relieve us from the contingency of each particular second-personal recognition, without abandoning the openness of the sociality of the human form of life. This double requirement has led to paradoxical institutions in modern society which strive to protect and ensure the sociality of the human form of life precisely by naturalising and individualising our access to it.}, language = {de} } @misc{Khurana2022, author = {Khurana, Thomas}, title = {Ein Recht gegen das Recht}, series = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe}, journal = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe}, editor = {Berger, Christian and Frey, Michael and Priesemuth, Florian}, isbn = {978-3-11-078466-4}, issn = {1866-8380}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-60006}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-600060}, pages = {18}, year = {2022}, language = {de} } @incollection{Khurana2022, author = {Khurana, Thomas}, title = {Ein Recht gegen das Recht}, series = {Rechte des K{\"o}rpers}, booktitle = {Rechte des K{\"o}rpers}, editor = {Berger, Christian and Frey, Michael and Priesemuth, Florian}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, address = {Berlin, Boston}, isbn = {978-3-11-078466-4}, doi = {10.1515/9783110784985-004}, pages = {45 -- 60}, year = {2022}, language = {de} } @phdthesis{OmerbasicSchiliro2022, author = {Omerbasic-Schiliro, Alina}, title = {Das Problem der Nicht-Identit{\"a}t und die Grenzen der personenbezogenen Moral}, publisher = {Brill}, address = {Paderborn}, isbn = {978-3-95743-228-5}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {326}, year = {2022}, abstract = {Dass das Wohlergehen k{\"u}nftig lebender Individuen moralische Ber{\"u}cksichtigung verdient, ist unbestritten. Sowohl im Rahmen des {\"o}ffentlichen Diskurses als auch in der akademischen Umwelt- oder Zukunftsethik wird diese Ansicht vertreten.Durch das Problem der Nicht-Identit{\"a}t wird sie jedoch auf empfindliche Weise in Frage gestellt: Wie kann eine Handlung wie die Verschwendung begrenzt verf{\"u}gbarer Ressourcen falsch sein, wenn die faktisch davon betroffenen k{\"u}nftig lebenden Individuen nur durch sie in die Existenz gelangen konnten? Gilt dann nicht, dass diese Handlung f{\"u}r niemanden schlecht ist und keine Sch{\"a}digung darstellt? Dieses Buch verfolgt das Ziel zu verdeutlichen, wie das moralische Unrecht, das k{\"u}nftig lebende Individuen durch Handlungen gegenw{\"a}rtig lebender Akteur:innen erfahren - trotz des Faktums der Nicht-Identit{\"a}t - mithilfe eines nicht-personenbezogenen Prinzips identifiziert und das Problem der Nicht-Identit{\"a}t somit gel{\"o}st werden kann.}, language = {de} } @article{Spiegel2022, author = {Spiegel, Thomas Jussuf}, title = {Verschw{\"o}rungstheorien und das Erbe der Aufkl{\"a}rung}, series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, volume = {70}, journal = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, number = {2}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, address = {Berlin}, issn = {0012-1045}, doi = {10.1515/dzph-2022-0015}, pages = {253 -- 273}, year = {2022}, abstract = {Conspiracy theories are currently all the rage in philosophy and broader intellectual culture. One of the most common background assumptions in the discourse on conspiracy theories is that conspiracy theorists exhibit certain epistemic vices in the sense of cognitive misconduct. This epistemic vice is mostly seen as a form of irrationality; the corresponding "remedy", as suggested by some commentators, is a return to the ideals of the Enlightenment. This article argues that this idea is wrongheaded. Upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that conspiracy theorists are actually motivated by the rational Enlightenment ideal of self-thinking in the first place. In contrast to the standard discourse, the article posits that conspiracism is based on a certain form of social scepticism, according to which conspiracy theorists radically mistrust a certain form of expert testimony, namely "official" statements. This form of social scepticism in turn facilitates a naive appropriation of the Enlightenment ideal of self-thinking. The article closes by drawing connections to the ethical and epistemological debate on trust and offers the pessimistic assessment that there are no easy solutions based on individual epistemic virtues.}, language = {de} } @book{Tolksdorf2022, author = {Tolksdorf, Stefan}, title = {Wissen als ad{\"a}quate Information}, publisher = {Brill}, address = {Paderborn}, isbn = {978-3-95743-258-2}, pages = {XXX, 407}, year = {2022}, abstract = {Die vorliegende Arbeit verteidigt die von Richard Foley entwickelte Wissenstheorie, der zufolge propositionales Wissen nicht mehr, aber auch nicht weniger als ad{\"a}quate Information ist. Wissen ist eine Funktion der G{\"u}te von Informationszust{\"a}nden. Glaubt ein Subjekt wahrerweise, dass p, ohne zu wissen, dass p, so fehlt dem Subjekt mindestens eine wichtige Information im Umfeld der Ziel{\"u}berzeugung. Die Ad{\"a}quatheitstheorie ist eine minimalistische und pragmatische Wissenstheorie. Sie ist minimalistisch, weil es {\"u}ber wahre {\"U}berzeugung hinausgehend keiner weiteren epistemischen Schl{\"u}sseleigenschaft bedarf. Sie ist pragmatisch, weil Ad{\"a}quatheit epistemische Signifikanz voraussetzt. Klassische Zusatzbedingungen f{\"u}r Wissen, beispielsweise Rechtfertigung oder verl{\"a}ssliche Meinungsbildung, sind lediglich Begleitph{\"a}nomene.}, language = {de} }