@techreport{Wagner2004,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Wagner, Wolfgang},
  title     = {A simulation of segregation in cities and its application for the analysis of rent control},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14177},
  year      = {2004},
  abstract  = {Social segregation in cities takes place where different household groups exist and when, according to Schelling, their location choice either minimizes the number of differing households in their neighborhood or maximizes their own group. In this contribution an evolutionary simulation based on a monocentric city model with externalities among households is used to discuss the spatial segregation patterns of four groups. The resulting complex spatial patterns can be shown as graphic animations. They can be applied as initial situation for the analysis of the effects a rent control has on segregation.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{Schulze2004,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Schulze, Andreas},
  title     = {Alternative Liberalisierungsans{\"a}tze in Netzindustrien},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14068},
  year      = {2004},
  abstract  = {Inhalt 1 Einf{\"u}hrung und Grundlagen 1.1 Problemstellung und Vorgehensweise 1.2 Ordnungs{\"o}konomische Systematisierung 1.3 „Neue" Besonderheitenlehre f{\"u}r Netzindustrien 2 Ansatzpunkte zur Liberalisierung in Netzindustrien 2.1 Liberalisierung durch Privatisierung 2.1.1 Interdependenz von Privatisierung und Markt{\"o}ffnung 2.1.2 Privatisierungsstufen 2.2 Liberalisierung durch Deregulierung und Re-Regulierung 2.2.1 Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes: Netzinfrastruktur versus Netzdienstleistungen 2.2.2 Lokalisierung und Kontrolle von Marktmacht bei Netzinfrastruktur 2.3 Modelle zur Gew{\"a}hrleistung eines diskriminierungsfreien Netzzugangs 2.3.1 Verhandelter Netzzugang mit Missbrauchsaufsicht im Sinne der Essential-Facilities-Doktrin 2.3.2 Staatliche Regulierung des Netzzugangs 2.4 Theorie der vertikalen (Des-)Integration 2.4.1 Allokativ-statische, wohlfahrts{\"o}konomische Analyse vertikaler Integration 2.4.2 Institutionen{\"o}konomische Analyse vertikaler Integration 2.4.3 Dynamische, wettbewerbs{\"o}konomische Analyse vertikaler Integration 2.4.4 Konsequenz: Vertikale Desintegration 3 Institutionelle Ausgestaltung der Wettbewerbsaufsicht 3.1 Systematisierung der Tr{\"a}ger und Kompetenzabgrenzung 3.2 Kriterien f{\"u}r eine effiziente Wettbewerbsaufsicht 4 Schlussfolgerungen und intersektoraler Vergleich des Liberalisierungsprozessesin Netzindustrien},
  language  = {de}
}
@techreport{KsollSchoeler2001,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Ksoll, Markus and Sch{\"o}ler, Klaus},
  title     = {Alternative Organisation zweistufiger Stromm{\"a}rkte},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-13779},
  year      = {2001},
  abstract  = {Inhalt 1 Einleitung 2 Annahmen und Ausgangsmodell 3 Common Carrier-Modell 4 Third Party Access-Modell 5 Vergleich der Marktergebnisse 6 Schlußbetrachtung},
  language  = {de}
}
@techreport{KalkuhlFlachslandKnopfetal.2022,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Kalkuhl, Matthias and Flachsland, Christian and Knopf, Brigitte and Amberg, Maximilian and Bergmann, Tobias and Kellner, Maximilian and St{\"u}ber, Sophia and Haywood, Luke and Roolfs, Christina and Edenhofer, Ottmar},
  title     = {Auswirkungen der Energiepreiskrise auf Haushalte in Deutschland},
  publisher = {Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC) gGmbH},
  address   = {Berlin},
  pages     = {37},
  year      = {2022},
  language  = {de}
}
@techreport{Sanner2001,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Bargaining structure and regional unemployment insurance},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-13747},
  year      = {2001},
  abstract  = {This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the la- bor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self-financing unemployment insurance (UI) for workers, firms, and with reference to an efficiency criterion. For this purpose, we respectively nu- merically compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the size of the unions whether efficiency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{Sanner2005,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Bertrand Wettbewerb im Raum kann zu h{\"o}heren Preisen f{\"u}hren als ein Monopol},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14251},
  year      = {2005},
  abstract  = {In Mikro- und Industrie{\"o}konomik ist scheinbar gewiss, dassWettbewerb zu niedrigeren Preisen f{\"u}hrt und dass Konsumenten von Wettbewerb profitieren, w{\"a}hrend die etablierten Unternehmen einen Nachteil erleiden. Dieser Beitrag verwendet ein raumwirtschaftliches Standardmodell, um zu zeigen, dass dies nicht immer so sein muss. Der Grund ist, dass durch den Marktzutritt gerade die Konsumenten, deren Preiselastizit{\"a}t am gr{\"o}ßten ist, von dem Unternehmen bei der Preisbildung nicht ber{\"u}cksichtigt werden.},
  language  = {de}
}
@techreport{CaliendoKuennWeissenberger2019,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Caliendo, Marco and K{\"u}nn, Steffen and Weißenberger, Martin},
  title     = {Catching up or Lagging Behind?},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {12},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-43701},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-437012},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {From an active labor market policy perspective, start-up subsidies for unemployed individuals are very effective in improving long-term labor market outcomes for participants. From a business perspective, however, the assessment of these public programs is less clear since they might attract individuals with low entrepreneurial abilities and produce businesses with low survival rates and little contribution to job creation, economic growth, and innovation. In this paper, we use a rich data set to compare participants of a German start-up subsidy program for unemployed individuals to a group of regular founders who started from nonunemployment and did not receive the subsidy. The data allows us to analyze their business performance up until 40 months after business formation. We find that formerly subsidized founders lag behind not only in survival and job creation, but especially also in innovation activities. The gaps in these business outcomes are relatively constant or even widening over time. Hence, we do not see any indication of catching up in the longer run. While the gap in survival can be entirely explained by initial differences in observable start-up characteristics, the gap in business development remains and seems to be the result of restricted access to capital as well as differential business strategies and dynamics. Considering these conflicting results for the assessment of the subsidy program from an ALMP and business perspective, policy makers need to carefully weigh the costs and benefits of such a strategy to find the right policy mix.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{Andree2011,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Andree, Kai},
  title     = {Collusion in spatially separated markets with quantity competition},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-55927},
  year      = {2011},
  abstract  = {This paper develops the incentives to collude in a model with spatially separated markets and quantity setting firms. We find that increases in transportation costs stabilize the collusive agreement. We also show that, the higher the demand in both markets the less likely will collusion be sustained. Gross and Holahan (2003) use a similar model with price setting firms, we compare their results with ours to analyze the impact of the mode of competition on sustainability of collusion. Further we analyze the impact of collusion on social welfare and find that collusion may be welfare enhancing.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{AndreeSchwan2012,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Andree, Kai and Schwan, Mike},
  title     = {Collusive market sharing with spatial competition},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-62146},
  year      = {2012},
  abstract  = {This paper develops a spatial model to analyze the stability of a market sharing agreement between two firms. We find that the stability of the cartel depends on the relative market size of each firm. Collusion is not attractive for firms with a small home market, but the incentive for collusion increases when the firm's home market is getting larger relative to the home market of the competitor. The highest stability of a cartel and additionally the highest social welfare is found when regions are symmetric. Further we can show that a monetary transfer can stabilize the market sharing agreement.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{Frohwerk2008,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Frohwerk, Sascha},
  title     = {Das Cluster-Modell bei sektoral unterschiedlichen Transportkosten},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-29005},
  year      = {2008},
  abstract  = {Das Cluster-Modell von Krugman und Venables (1996) erkl{\"a}rt im Rahmen der Neuen {\"O}konomischen Geographie die Bildung von Agglomerationen bei regional immobilen Arbeitskr{\"a}ften. Die resultierenden Gleichgewichte h{\"a}ngen von der H{\"o}he der Transportkosten ab, die allerdings in beiden Sektoren als gleich hoch unterstellt werden. Der vorliegende Beitrag erweitert dieses Modell um die M{\"o}glichkeit sektoral unterschiedlicher Transportkosten. Da eine analytische L{\"o}sung nichtm{\"o}glich ist, wird eine geeignete Simulationsmethode entwickelt. Anhand von Abbildungen wird dargestellt, welche Gleichgewichte sich bei verschiedenen Werten f{\"u}r die beiden Transportkostens{\"a}tze ergeben.},
  language  = {de}
}