@techreport{BruttelFelgendreherGuethetal.2019,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Felgendreher, Simon and G{\"u}th, Werner and Hertwig, Ralph},
  title     = {Strategic ignorance in repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments and its effects on the dynamics of voluntary cooperation},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {10},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-43188},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-431881},
  pages     = {30},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Being ignorant of key aspects of a strategic interaction can represent an advantage rather than a handicap. We study one particular context in which ignorance can be beneficial: iterated strategic interactions in which voluntary cooperation may be sustained into the final round if players voluntarily forego knowledge about the time horizon. We experimentally examine this option to remain ignorant about the time horizon in a finitely repeated two-person prisoners' dilemma game. We confirm that pairs without horizon knowledge avoid the drop in cooperation that otherwise occurs toward the end of the game. However, this effect is superposed by cooperation declining more rapidly in pairs without horizon knowledge during the middle phase of the game, especially if players do not know that the other player also wanted to remain ignorant of the time horizon.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{AndresBruttelFriedrichsen2021,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friedrichsen, Jana},
  title     = {The Leniency Rule Revisited: Experiments on Cartel Formation with Open Communication},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {24},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-49169},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-491696},
  pages     = {62},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel, sanctioning only the latter. To this aim, we introduce a participant in the role of the competition authority, who is properly incentivized to judge communication content and price setting behavior of the firms. Using this novel design, we revisit the question whether a leniency rule successfully destabilizes cartels. In contrast to existing experimental studies, we find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization. We discuss potential explanations for this contrasting result.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{BruttelNithammerStolley2019,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Nithammer, Juri and Stolley, Florian},
  title     = {"Thanks in Advance"},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {7},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-42770},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427706},
  pages     = {18},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {This paper studies the effect of the commonly used phrase "thanks in advance" on compliance with a small request. In a controlled laboratory experiment we ask participants to give a detailed answer to an open question. The treatment variable is whether or not they see the phrase "thanks in advance." Our participants react to the treatment by exerting less effort in answering the request even though they perceive the phrase as polite.},
  language  = {en}
}