@techreport{Nastasa2024, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Nastasa, Ruxandra}, title = {Germany and the EU's pursuit of gender equality in peace and security}, series = {Staat, Recht und Politik - Forschungs- und Diskussionspapiere}, journal = {Staat, Recht und Politik - Forschungs- und Diskussionspapiere}, number = {16}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam}, address = {Potsdam}, issn = {2509-6974}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-62850}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-628501}, pages = {15}, year = {2024}, abstract = {The Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPSA) is an international framework addressing the disproportionate impact of armed conflict on women and girls and promoting their meaningful participation in peacebuilding efforts. The Security Council called on Member States to develop National Action Plans (NAPs) to operationalize the four pillars of the Agenda. This study looks at the relevant steps undertaken by both Germany and the European Union. The author calls for improvements on either level and makes four recommendations.}, language = {en} } @techreport{KritikosMalirantaNippalaetal.2024, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Kritikos, Alexander and Maliranta, Mika and Nippala, Veera and Nurmi, Satu}, title = {Does gender of firm ownership matter?}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {76}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-63619}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-636194}, pages = {1 -- 39}, year = {2024}, abstract = {We examine how the gender of business-owners is related to the wages paid to female relative to male employees working in their firms. Using Finnish register data and employing firm fixed effects, we find that the gender pay gap is - starting from a gender pay gap of 11 to 12 percent - two to three percentage-points lower for hourly wages in female-owned firms than in male-owned firms. Results are robust to how the wage is measured, as well as to various further robustness checks. More importantly, we find substantial differences between industries. While, for instance, in the manufacturing sector, the gender of the owner plays no role for the gender pay gap, in several service sector industries, like ICT or business services, no or a negligible gender pay gap can be found, but only when firms are led by female business owners. Businesses in male ownership maintain a gender pay gap of around 10 percent also in the latter industries. With increasing firm size, the influence of the gender of the owner, however, fades. In large firms, it seems that others - firm managers - determine wages and no differences in the pay gap are observed between male- and female-owned firms.}, language = {en} } @techreport{EstrinKhavulKritikosetal.2024, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Estrin, Saul and Khavul, Susanna and Kritikos, Alexander and L{\"o}her, Jonas}, title = {Access to digital finance}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {72}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-62326}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-623261}, pages = {27}, year = {2024}, abstract = {Financing entrepreneurship spurs innovation and economic growth. Digital financial platforms that crowdfund equity for entrepreneurs have emerged globally, yet they remain poorly understood. We model equity crowdfunding in terms of the relationship between the number of investors and the amount of money raised per pitch. We examine heterogeneity in the average amount raised per pitch that is associated with differences across three countries and seven platforms. Using a novel dataset of successful fundraising on the most prominent platforms in the UK, Germany, and the USA, we find the underlying relationship between the number of investors and the amount of money raised for entrepreneurs is loglinear, with a coefficient less than one and concave to the origin. We identify significant variation in the average amount invested in each pitch across countries and platforms. Our findings have implications for market actors as well as regulators who set competitive frameworks.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BruttelPetrishcheva2024, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Petrishcheva, Vasilisa}, title = {Does communication increase the precision of beliefs?}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {74}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-62936}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-629367}, pages = {1 -- 33}, year = {2024}, abstract = {In this paper, we study one channel through which communication may facilitate cooperative behavior - belief precision. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, we show that communication not only makes individuals more optimistic that their partner will cooperate but also increases the precision of this belief, thereby reducing strategic uncertainty. To disentangle the shift in mean beliefs from the increase in precision, we elicit beliefs and precision in a two-stage procedure and in three situations: without communication, before communication, and after communication. We find that the precision of beliefs increases during communication.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BruttelEisenkopfNithammer2024, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Eisenkopf, Gerald and Nithammer, Juri}, title = {Pre-election communication in public good games with endogenous leaders}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {73}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-62395}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-623952}, pages = {28}, year = {2024}, abstract = {Leadership plays an important role for the efficient and fair solution of social dilemmas but the effectiveness of a leader can vary substantially. Two main factors of leadership impact are the ability to induce high contributions by all group members and the (expected) fair use of power. Participants in our experiment decide about contributions to a public good. After all contributions are made, the leader can choose how much of the joint earnings to assign to herself; the remainder is distributed equally among the followers. Using machine learning techniques, we study whether the content of initial open statements by the group members predicts their behavior as a leader and whether groups are able to identify such clues and endogenously appoint a "good" leader to solve the dilemma. We find that leaders who promise fairness are more likely to behave fairly, and that followers appoint as leaders those who write more explicitly about fairness and efficiency. However, in their contribution decision, followers focus on the leader's first-move contribution and place less importance on the content of the leader's statements.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BorckMulder2024, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Borck, Rainald and Mulder, Peter}, title = {Energy policies and pollution in two developing country cities}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {78}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-63847}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-638472}, pages = {37}, year = {2024}, abstract = {We study the effect of energy and transport policies on pollution in two developing country cities. We use a quantitative equilibrium model with choice of housing, energy use, residential location, transport mode, and energy technology. Pollution comes from commuting and residential energy use. The model parameters are calibrated to replicate key variables for two developing country cities, Maputo, Mozambique, and Yogyakarta, Indonesia. In the counterfactual simulations, we study how various transport and energy policies affect equilibrium pollution. Policies may be induce rebound effects from increasing residential energy use or switching to high emission modes or locations. In general, these rebound effects tend to be largest for subsidies to public transport or modern residential energy technology.}, language = {en} } @techreport{AndresBruttel2024, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa}, title = {Communicating Cartel Intentions}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {77}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-63846}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-638469}, pages = {36}, year = {2024}, abstract = {While the economic harm of cartels is caused by their price-increasing effect, sanctioning by courts rather targets at the underlying process of firms reaching a price-fixing agreement. This paper provides experimental evidence on the question whether such sanctioning meets the economic target, i.e., whether evidence of a collusive meeting of the firms and of the content of their communication reliably predicts subsequent prices. We find that already the mere mutual agreement to meet predicts a strong increase in prices. Conversely, express distancing from communication completely nullifies its otherwise price-increasing effect. Using machine learning, we show that communication only increases prices if it is very explicit about how the cartel plans to behave.}, language = {en} } @techreport{Andres2024, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Andres, Maximilian}, title = {Equilibrium selection in infinitely repeated games with communication}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {75}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-63180}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-631800}, pages = {38}, year = {2024}, abstract = {The present paper proposes a novel approach for equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma where players can communicate before choosing their strategies. This approach yields a critical discount factor that makes different predictions for cooperation than the usually considered sub-game perfect or risk dominance critical discount factors. In laboratory experiments, we find that our factor is useful for predicting cooperation. For payoff changes where the usually considered factors and our factor make different predictions, the observed cooperation is consistent with the predictions based on our factor.}, language = {en} }