@article{TomaszewskaSchuster2019,
  author    = {Tomaszewska, Paulina and Schuster, Isabell},
  title     = {Comparing sexuality-related cognitions, sexual behavior, and acceptance of sexual coercion in dating app users and non-users},
  series = {Sexuality research \& social policy},
  volume    = {17},
  journal   = {Sexuality research \& social policy},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {1868-9884},
  doi       = {10.1007/s13178-019-00397-x},
  pages     = {188 -- 198},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Using dating apps has become popular for many young adults worldwide, promising the chance to meet new sexual partners. Because there is evidence that using dating apps may be associated with risky sexual behavior, this study compared users and non-users concerning their sexuality-related cognitions, namely their risky sexual scripts and sexual self-esteem, as well as their risky and sexually assertive behavior. It also explored the link between dating app use and acceptance of sexual coercion. A total of 491 young heterosexual adults (295 female) participated in an online survey advertised in social media and college libraries in Germany. Results indicated that users had more risky sexual scripts and reported more risky sexual behavior than non-users. Furthermore, male dating app users had lower sexual self-esteem and higher acceptance of sexual coercion than male non-users. In both gender groups, dating app use predicted casual sexual activity via a more risky casual sex script. Gender differences, potential underlying mechanisms, and directions for future research are discussed.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Ganghof2013,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Does public reason require super-majoritarian democracy? Liberty, equality, and history in the justification of political institutions},
  series = {Politics, philosophy \& economics},
  volume    = {12},
  journal   = {Politics, philosophy \& economics},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address   = {Thousand Oaks},
  issn      = {1470-594X},
  doi       = {10.1177/1470594X12447786},
  pages     = {179 -- 196},
  year      = {2013},
  abstract  = {The project of public-reason liberalism faces a basic problem: publicly justified principles are typically too abstract and vague to be directly applied to practical political disputes, whereas applicable specifications of these principles are not uniquely publicly justified. One solution could be a legislative procedure that selects one member from the eligible set of inconclusively justified proposals. Yet if liberal principles are too vague to select sufficiently specific legislative proposals, can they, nevertheless, select specific legislative procedures? Based on the work of Gerald Gaus, this article argues that the only candidate for a conclusively justified decision procedure is a majoritarian or otherwise 'neutral' democracy. If the justification of democracy requires an equality baseline in the design of political regimes and if justifications for departure from this baseline are subject to reasonable disagreement, a majoritarian design is justified by default. Gaus's own preference for super-majoritarian procedures is based on disputable specifications of justified liberal principles. These procedures can only be defended as a sectarian preference if the equality baseline is rejected, but then it is not clear how the set of justifiable political regimes can be restricted to full democracies.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Ganghof2012,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Does public reason require super-majoritarian democracy?},
  series = {Politics, philosophy \& economics},
  volume    = {12},
  journal   = {Politics, philosophy \& economics},
  number    = {2},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-477860},
  pages     = {18},
  year      = {2012},
  abstract  = {The project of public-reason liberalism faces a basic problem: publicly justified principles are typically too abstract and vague to be directly applied to practical political disputes, whereas applicable specifications of these principles are not uniquely publicly justified. One solution could be a legislative procedure that selects one member from the eligible set of inconclusively justified proposals. Yet if liberal principles are too vague to select sufficiently specific legislative proposals, can they, nevertheless, select specific legislative procedures? Based on the work of Gerald Gaus, this article argues that the only candidate for a conclusively justified decision procedure is a majoritarian or otherwise 'neutral' democracy. If the justification of democracy requires an equality baseline in the design of political regimes and if justifications for departure from this baseline are subject to reasonable disagreement, a majoritarian design is justified by default. Gaus's own preference for super-majoritarian procedures is based on disputable specifications of justified liberal principles. These procedures can only be defended as a sectarian preference if the equality baseline is rejected, but then it is not clear how the set of justifiable political regimes can be restricted to full democracies.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Schrenk2005,
  author    = {Schrenk, Judith Katharina},
  title     = {Aushandlungen unter Kindern : Einsatz verschiedener Taktiken im Verlauf einer Aushandlung und Stellung in der Peergruppe},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-12580},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  year      = {2005},
  abstract  = {Die folgenden Fragen standen im Mittelpunkt der Dissertation: Wie handeln Grundschulkinder aus, wenn sie von ihren Peers ungerecht behandelt werden? Welche unmittelbaren Wirkungen hat ihr Vorgehen? In welchem Zusammenhang steht das Vorgehen in der Konfliktsituation mit der Stellung unter den Peers? Theoretische Grundlage waren die Entwicklungsmodelle zum Aushandeln von Yeates und Selman (1989) sowie Hawley (1999). Es nahmen 213 Dritt- und F{\"u}nftkl{\"a}ssler an der Untersuchung teil. Eine Kombination qualitativer und quantitativer Methoden wurde verwendet. In einem individuellen Interview wurde erhoben, welche Taktiken (eine Handlungseinheit) sowie welche Strategien (Abfolge von Taktiken) die Kinder in einer hypothetischen Normbruchsituation einsetzen w{\"u}rden. Die Kinder wurden auch gefragt, welche unmittelbaren Wirkungen sie erwarten, wenn sie die vorgeschlagene Taktik einsetzen. Die Stellung der Kinder wurde sowohl bez{\"u}glich ihres Einflusses (Peerrating) als auch bez{\"u}glich ihrer Akzeptanz (Soziometrie) unter den Klassenkameraden erhoben. Die von den Kindern genannten Taktiken wurden vier {\"u}bergeordneten Kategorien zugeordnet: Verhandeln, Erzwingen, Ausweichen und Aufgeben. Nach den Erwartungen der Kinder f{\"u}hren sowohl Verhandlungstaktiken als auch erzwingende Taktiken in um die H{\"a}lfte der F{\"a}lle zur Durchsetzung. Erzwingende Taktiken gehen jedoch h{\"a}ufig mit unfreundlichen Reaktionen einher. Einfluss und Akzeptanz der Kinder waren davon abh{\"a}ngig, welche Kombination und Sequenz von Taktiken (Strategie) sie w{\"a}hlten. Beispielsweise waren Kinder einflussreich und beliebt, die eine Reihe von Verhandlungstaktiken generierten oder die zun{\"a}chst Verhandlungstaktiken vorschlugen und danach erzwingende Taktiken. Kinder, die sofort Zwang einsetzen w{\"u}rden, hatten wenig Einfluss und wurden abgelehnt. Außerdem fanden sich Geschlechts- und Altersunterschiede hinsichtlich des Vorgehens in der hypothetischen Normbruchsituation sowie der Zusammenh{\"a}nge zwischen Taktiken und Stellung unter Peers.},
  subject      = {Soziale Ungleichheit},
  language  = {de}
}