@techreport{BruttelPetrishcheva2024,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Petrishcheva, Vasilisa},
  title     = {Does communication increase the precision of beliefs?},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {74},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-62936},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-629367},
  pages     = {1 -- 33},
  year      = {2024},
  abstract  = {In this paper, we study one channel through which communication may facilitate cooperative behavior - belief precision. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, we show that communication not only makes individuals more optimistic that their partner will cooperate but also increases the precision of this belief, thereby reducing strategic uncertainty. To disentangle the shift in mean beliefs from the increase in precision, we elicit beliefs and precision in a two-stage procedure and in three situations: without communication, before communication, and after communication. We find that the precision of beliefs increases during communication.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BruttelGuethNithammeretal.2022,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and G{\"u}th, Werner and Nithammer, Juri and Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Inefficient cooperation under stochastic and strategic uncertainty},
  series = {Conflict resolution},
  volume    = {66},
  journal   = {Conflict resolution},
  number    = {4-5},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address   = {Thousand Oaks},
  issn      = {0022-0027},
  doi       = {10.1177/00220027211066614},
  pages     = {755 -- 782},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{BruttelGuethNithammeretal.2020,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and G{\"u}th, Werner and Nithammer, Juri and Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Inefficient Cooperation under Stochastic and Strategic Uncertainty},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {20},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-47550},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-475500},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Stochastic uncertainty can cause difficult coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can do so. To test this, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeatedly played Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not entail an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two main reasons for this finding: First, the stochastic uncertainty forces proposers to accept high strategic uncertainty if they intend to cooperate by claiming a low amount (which many proposers do not). Second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperative by transferring too little (which hinders cooperation in future periods).},
  language  = {en}
}