@phdthesis{Stolley2018, author = {Stolley, Florian}, title = {Four essays on altruism and compliance}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-42801}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-428013}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {ix, 129}, year = {2018}, abstract = {There are numerous situations in which people ask for something or make a request, e.g. asking a favor, asking for help or requesting compliance with specific norms. For this reason, how to ask for something in order to increase people's willingness to fulfill such requests is one of the most important question for many people working in various different fields of responsibility such as charitable giving, marketing, management or policy making. This dissertation consists of four chapters that deal with the effects of small changes in the decision-making environment on altruistic decision-making and compliance behavior. Most notably, written communication as an influencing factor is the focus of the first three chapters. The starting point was the question how to devise a request in order to maximize its chance of success (Chapter 1). The results of the first chapter originate the ideas for the second and third chapter. Chapter 2 analyzes how communication by a neutral third-party, i.e. a text from the experimenters that either reminds potential benefactors of their responsibility or highlights their freedom of choice, affects altruistic decision-making. Chapter 3 elaborates on the effect of thanking people in advance when asking them for help. While being not as closely related to the other chapters as the three first ones are, the fourth chapter deals as well with the question how compliance (here: compliance with norms and rules) is affected by subtle manipulations of the environment in which decisions are made. This chapter analyzes the effect of default settings in a tax return on tax compliance. In order to study the research questions outlined above, controlled experiments were conducted. Chapter 1, which analyzes the effect of text messages on the decision to give something to another person, employs a mini-dictator game. The recipient sends a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter makes a binary decision whether or not to give part of her or his endowment to the recipient. We find that putting effort into the message by writing a long note without spelling mistakes increases dictators' willingness to give. Moreover, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Furthermore, men and women seem to react differently to some message categories. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictator's power and responsibility. Building on this last result, Chapter 2 attempts to disentangle the effect of reminding potential benefactors of their responsibility for the potential beneficiary and the effect of highlighting their decision power and freedom of choice on altruistic decision-making by studying the effects of two different texts on giving in a dictator game. We find that only men react positively to a text that stresses their responsibility for the recipient by giving more to her or him, whereas only women seem to react positively to a text that emphasizes their decision power and freedom of choice. Chapter 3 focuses on the compliance with a request. In the experiment, participants are asked to provide a detailed answer to an open question. Compliance is measured by the effort participants spend on answering the question. The treatment variable is whether or not they see the text "thanks in advance." We find that participants react negatively by putting less effort into complying with the request in response to the phrase "thanks in advance." Chapter 4 studies the effect of prefilled tax returns with mostly inaccurate default values on tax compliance. In a laboratory experiment, participants earn income by performing a real-effort task and must subsequently file a tax return for three consecutive rounds. In the main treatment, the tax return is prefilled with a default value, resulting from participants' own performance in previous rounds, which varies in its relative size. The results suggest that there is no lasting effect of a default value on tax honesty, neither for relatively low nor relatively high defaults. However, participants who face a default that is lower than their true income in the first round evade significantly and substantially more taxes in this round than participants in the control treatment without a default.}, language = {en} } @article{KrauseGrosseDetersBaumannetal.2022, author = {Krause, Hannes-Vincent and Große Deters, Fenne and Baumann, Annika and Krasnova, Hanna}, title = {Active social media use and its impact on well-being}, series = {Journal of computer-mediated communication : a journal of the International Communication Association}, volume = {28}, journal = {Journal of computer-mediated communication : a journal of the International Communication Association}, number = {1}, publisher = {Oxford Univ. Press}, address = {Oxford}, issn = {1083-6101}, doi = {10.1093/jcmc/zmac037}, pages = {12}, year = {2022}, abstract = {Active use of social networking sites (SNSs) has long been assumed to benefit users' well-being. However, this established hypothesis is increasingly being challenged, with scholars criticizing its lack of empirical support and the imprecise conceptualization of active use. Nevertheless, with considerable heterogeneity among existing studies on the hypothesis and causal evidence still limited, a final verdict on its robustness is still pending. To contribute to this ongoing debate, we conducted a week-long randomized control trial with N = 381 adult Instagram users recruited via Prolific. Specifically, we tested how active SNS use, operationalized as picture postings on Instagram, affects different dimensions of well-being. The results depicted a positive effect on users' positive affect but null findings for other well-being outcomes. The findings broadly align with the recent criticism against the active use hypothesis and support the call for a more nuanced view on the impact of SNSs.
Lay Summary Active use of social networking sites (SNSs) has long been assumed to benefit users' well-being. However, this established assumption is increasingly being challenged, with scholars criticizing its lack of empirical support and the imprecise conceptualization of active use. Nevertheless, with great diversity among conducted studies on the hypothesis and a lack of causal evidence, a final verdict on its viability is still pending. To contribute to this ongoing debate, we conducted a week-long experimental investigation with 381 adult Instagram users. Specifically, we tested how posting pictures on Instagram affects different aspects of well-being. The results of this study depicted a positive effect of posting Instagram pictures on users' experienced positive emotions but no effects on other aspects of well-being. The findings broadly align with the recent criticism against the active use hypothesis and support the call for a more nuanced view on the impact of SNSs on users.}, language = {en} } @misc{HeuerOrland2019, author = {Heuer, Leonie and Orland, Andreas}, title = {Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma}, series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, journal = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, number = {107}, issn = {1867-5808}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-43592}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-435929}, pages = {9}, year = {2019}, abstract = {Cooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts' level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects' level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperative behaviour more closely on their beliefs than in the pure-strategy group. In the mixed-strategy group, most subjects choose intermediate levels of cooperation.}, language = {en} } @article{HeuerOrland2019, author = {Heuer, Leonie and Orland, Andreas}, title = {Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma}, series = {Royal Society Open Science}, volume = {6}, journal = {Royal Society Open Science}, publisher = {Royal Soc. Publ.}, address = {London}, issn = {2054-5703}, doi = {10.1098/rsos.182142}, pages = {9}, year = {2019}, abstract = {Cooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts' level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects' level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperative behaviour more closely on their beliefs than in the pure-strategy group. In the mixed-strategy group, most subjects choose intermediate levels of cooperation.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BruttelNithammerStolley2019, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Nithammer, Juri and Stolley, Florian}, title = {"Thanks in Advance"}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {7}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-42770}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427706}, pages = {18}, year = {2019}, abstract = {This paper studies the effect of the commonly used phrase "thanks in advance" on compliance with a small request. In a controlled laboratory experiment we ask participants to give a detailed answer to an open question. The treatment variable is whether or not they see the phrase "thanks in advance." Our participants react to the treatment by exerting less effort in answering the request even though they perceive the phrase as polite.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BruttelGuethHertwigetal.2020, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and G{\"u}th, Werner and Hertwig, Ralph and Orland, Andreas}, title = {Do people harness deliberate ignorance to avoid envy and its detrimental effects?}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {17}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-44446}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-444463}, year = {2020}, abstract = {Envy is an unpleasant emotion. If individuals anticipate that comparing their payoff with the (potentially higher) payoff of others will make them envious, they may want to actively avoid information about other people's payoffs. Given the opportunity to reduce another person's payoff, an individual's envy may trigger behavior that is detrimental to welfare. In this case, if individuals anticipate that they will react in a welfare-reducing way, they may also avoid information about other people's payoffs from the outset. We investigated these two hypotheses using three experiments. We found that 13\% of our potentially envious subjects avoided information when they did not have the opportunity to reduce another participant's payoff. Psychological scales do not explain this behavior. We also found that voluntarily uninformed subjects did neither deduct less of the payoff nor less frequently than subjects who could not avoid the information.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BruttelFelgendreherGuethetal.2019, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Felgendreher, Simon and G{\"u}th, Werner and Hertwig, Ralph}, title = {Strategic ignorance in repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments and its effects on the dynamics of voluntary cooperation}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {10}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-43188}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-431881}, pages = {30}, year = {2019}, abstract = {Being ignorant of key aspects of a strategic interaction can represent an advantage rather than a handicap. We study one particular context in which ignorance can be beneficial: iterated strategic interactions in which voluntary cooperation may be sustained into the final round if players voluntarily forego knowledge about the time horizon. We experimentally examine this option to remain ignorant about the time horizon in a finitely repeated two-person prisoners' dilemma game. We confirm that pairs without horizon knowledge avoid the drop in cooperation that otherwise occurs toward the end of the game. However, this effect is superposed by cooperation declining more rapidly in pairs without horizon knowledge during the middle phase of the game, especially if players do not know that the other player also wanted to remain ignorant of the time horizon.}, language = {en} } @techreport{Bruttel2019, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena}, title = {Is There a Loyalty-Enhancing Effect of Retroactive Price-Reduction Schemes?}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {5}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-42768}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427688}, pages = {25}, year = {2019}, abstract = {This paper presents an experiment on the effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes on buyers' repeated purchase decisions. Such schemes promise buyers a reduced price for all units that are bought in a certain time frame if the total quantity that is purchased passes a given threshold. This study finds a loyalty-enhancing effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes only if the buyers ex-ante expected that entering into the scheme would maximize their monetary gain, but later learn that they should leave the scheme. Furthermore, the effect crucially hinges on the framing of the price reduction.}, language = {en} }