@techreport{AndreeSchwan2012,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Andree, Kai and Schwan, Mike},
  title     = {Collusive market sharing with spatial competition},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-62146},
  year      = {2012},
  abstract  = {This paper develops a spatial model to analyze the stability of a market sharing agreement between two firms. We find that the stability of the cartel depends on the relative market size of each firm. Collusion is not attractive for firms with a small home market, but the incentive for collusion increases when the firm's home market is getting larger relative to the home market of the competitor. The highest stability of a cartel and additionally the highest social welfare is found when regions are symmetric. Further we can show that a monetary transfer can stabilize the market sharing agreement.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Andree2013,
  author    = {Andree, Kai},
  title     = {A note on merger in mixed duopoly - Bertrand versus Cournot},
  series = {Journal of economics},
  volume    = {108},
  journal   = {Journal of economics},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Wien},
  issn      = {0931-8658},
  doi       = {10.1007/s00712-012-0280-x},
  pages     = {291 -- 298},
  year      = {2013},
  abstract  = {In this note we analyze the incentives to merge in a mixed duopoly if firms compete in prices or quantities. Our model framework mainly follows Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (J Econ 80:27-42, 2003) who set up the model with quantity competition. We extend their analysis by analyzing the case of competition in prices. Further we compare the incentives to merge with Bertrand and Cournot competition. Comparing quantity with price competition we can show that a merger is more likely with Cournot competition than with Bertrand competition.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{Andree2011,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Andree, Kai},
  title     = {Collusion in spatially separated markets with quantity competition},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-55927},
  year      = {2011},
  abstract  = {This paper develops the incentives to collude in a model with spatially separated markets and quantity setting firms. We find that increases in transportation costs stabilize the collusive agreement. We also show that, the higher the demand in both markets the less likely will collusion be sustained. Gross and Holahan (2003) use a similar model with price setting firms, we compare their results with ours to analyze the impact of the mode of competition on sustainability of collusion. Further we analyze the impact of collusion on social welfare and find that collusion may be welfare enhancing.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{Andree2010,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Andree, Kai},
  title     = {Spatial discrimination, nations' size and transportation costs},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-48117},
  year      = {2010},
  abstract  = {In this paper we develop a spatial Cournot trade model with two unequally sized countries, using the geographical interpretation of the Hotelling line. We analyze the trade and welfare effects of international trade between these two countries. The welfare analysis indicates that in this framework the large country benefits from free trade and the small country may be hurt by opening to trade. This finding is contrary to the results of Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) as well as Tharakan and Thisse (2002), who use related models to analyze size effects in international trade, where the small country usually gains from trade and the large country may lose.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Andree2014,
  author    = {Andree, Kai},
  title     = {Horizontale Fusionen bei r{\"a}umlichem Wettbewerb},
  series = {Potsdamer Schriften zur Raumwirtschaft},
  journal   = {Potsdamer Schriften zur Raumwirtschaft},
  number    = {6},
  publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  isbn      = {978-3-86956-279-7},
  issn      = {2190-8702},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-69209},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {xi, 227},
  year      = {2014},
  abstract  = {Fusionen stellen einen zentralen Baustein der Industrie{\"o}konomik dar. In diesem Buch wird der Frage nachgegangen, welchen Einfluss die r{\"a}umliche Dimension auf eine Fusion aus{\"u}bt. Dabei wird ein Grundmodell entwickelt und {\"u}ber dieses hinaus eine Vielzahl Erweiterungen pr{\"a}sentiert. Der Leser erh{\"a}lt somit die M{\"o}glichkeit ein tiefes Verst{\"a}ndnis f{\"u}r Fusionen bei r{\"a}umlichem Wettbewerb zu erlangen.},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Andree2011,
  author    = {Andree, Kai},
  title     = {Wohlfahrtseffekte horizontaler Unternehmensfusionen in einem r{\"a}umlichen Cournot-Modell mit asymmetrischer Nachfrage},
  series = {Beitr{\"a}ge zur sektoralen und regionalen {\"O}konomie},
  journal   = {Beitr{\"a}ge zur sektoralen und regionalen {\"O}konomie},
  publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-58511},
  pages     = {127 -- 145},
  year      = {2011},
  abstract  = {In diesem Beitrag wird die Profitabilit{\"a}t und Wohlfahrtseffekte einer horizontalen Unternehmensfusion in einem r{\"a}umlichen Wettbewerbsmodell mit asymmetrischer Nachfrage untersucht. Die Untersuchung wird f{\"u}r drei Unternehmen durchgef{\"u}hrt, von denen zwei miteinander fusionieren und eins unabh{\"a}ngig von dem fusionierten Unternehmen agiert. Die Standardtheorie {\"u}ber Unternehmensfusionen impliziert, dass Fusionen auf Grund des "business stealing effect" in integrierten M{\"a}rkten h{\"a}ufig nicht profitabel sind. Die Resultate der Analyse im r{\"a}umlichen Modell mit asymmetrischer Nachfragestruktur zeigen, dass dies in diesem Modellrahmen nicht zwingend so ist; eine Unternehmensfusion kann profitabel und wohlfahrtssteigernd sein, falls der Transportkostensatz relativ hoch ist und die M{\"a}rkte eine nicht zu asymmetrische Gr{\"o}ße aufweisen.},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{AbelerCalakiAndreeetal.2010,
  author    = {Abeler, Johannes and Calaki, Juljana and Andree, Kai and Basek, Christoph},
  title     = {The power of apology},
  issn      = {0165-1765},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.econlet.2010.01.033},
  year      = {2010},
  abstract  = {How should firms react to customer complaints after an unsatisfactory purchase? In a field experiment, we test the effect of different reactions and find that a cheap-talk apology yields significantly better outcomes for the firm than offering a monetary compensation.},
  language  = {en}
}