@article{Fruhstorfer2021, author = {Fruhstorfer, Anna}, title = {Constitutional revolutions under autocracy}, series = {Constitutional studies}, volume = {7}, journal = {Constitutional studies}, number = {1}, publisher = {University of Wisconsin Press}, address = {Madison}, issn = {2474-9427}, pages = {33 -- 47}, year = {2021}, abstract = {Gary Jacobsohn and Yaniv Roznai's (2020) book Constitutional Revolution offers a sophisticated conceptual framework with a fascinating description of empirical occurrences of substantive revolutions in the practice and understanding of constitutionalism in Germany, India, Hungary, and Israel. While the conceptualization in the book and its empirical illustration clearly draw from regime transformations or substantive changes within democratic regimes, we know little about the extent to which substantive constitutional reforms are possible and meaningful in autocratic regimes. As their concept of constitutional revolution is ambiguous and requires a substantive engagement with an individual case at hand, we cannot sim- ply expect concept equivalence when expanding its use beyond a transitory or democratic context. Hence, in this contribution I ask, What constitutes a constitutional revolution in an autocratic regime? To shed light on this question, I rely on the expectation that we do not find important differences in the substance of autocratic constitutions compared to democratic constitutions. Autocratic elites, also, under- stand the possibilities of constitutional change and respond to them as they offer regime stability and simply more power, but that is not a revolution. Therefore, I argue that the substantive meaning of an amendment must be a departure from the inherent logic of the constitution, especially outside the standard procedures for autocratic ruling. Thus, in this paper I discuss the theoretical implications of a constitutional revolution under autocracy without a regime transition and provide empirical evidence from various constitutional amendments and de facto reforms in Russia. I show that a constitutional revolution is not always the most important or most discussed constitutional change—at least, not in an autocratic context. This discussion has important implications for understanding constitutionalism and autocratic stability and the largely overlooked relationship between substance and process in nondemocratic settings.}, language = {en} } @article{KuhlmannFranzke2022, author = {Kuhlmann, Sabine and Franzke, Jochen}, title = {Multi-level responses to COVID-19}, series = {Local government studies}, volume = {48}, journal = {Local government studies}, number = {2}, publisher = {Taylor \& Francis}, address = {London}, issn = {0300-3930}, doi = {10.1080/03003930.2021.1904398}, pages = {312 -- 334}, year = {2022}, abstract = {This article is aimed at analysing local and intergovernmental responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in Germany during the 'first wave' of the pandemic. It will answer the question of how the intergovernmental system in Germany responded to the crisis and to what extent the pandemic has changed patterns of multi-level governance (MLG). The article argues that the coordination of pandemic management in Germany shifted between two ideal types of multi-level governance. While in the first phase of the pandemic the territorially defined multi-level system with the sub-national and local authorities as key actors of crisis management was predominant, in the second phase a more functional orientation with increased vertical coordination gained in importance. Later on, more reliance was given again on local decision-making. Based on this analysis, we will draw some preliminary conclusions on how effective MLG in Germany has been for coordinating pandemic management and point out the shortcomings.}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{Heuberger2022, author = {Heuberger, Moritz}, title = {Coordinating digital government}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-56269}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-562691}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {xiii, 136}, year = {2022}, abstract = {This thesis is analyzing multiple coordination challenges which arise with the digital transformation of public administration in federal systems, illustrated by four case studies in Germany. I make various observations within a multi-level system and provide an in-depth analysis. Theoretical explanations from both federalism research and neo-institutionalism are utilized to explain the findings of the empirical driven work. The four articles evince a holistic picture of the German case and elucidate its role as a digital government laggard. Their foci range from macro, over meso to micro level of public administration, differentiating between the governance and the tool dimension of digital government. The first article shows how multi-level negotiations lead to expensive but eventually satisfying solutions for the involved actors, creating a subtle balance between centralization and decentralization. The second article identifies legal, technical, and organizational barriers for cross-organizational service provision, highlighting the importance of inter-organizational and inter-disciplinary exchange and both a common language and trust. Institutional change and its effects on the micro level, on citizens and the employees in local one-stop shops, mark the focus of the third article, bridging the gap between reforms and the administrative reality on the local level. The fourth article looks at the citizens' perspective on digital government reforms, their expectations, use and satisfaction. In this vein, this thesis provides a detailed account of the importance of understanding the digital divide and therefore the necessity of reaching out to different recipients of digital government reforms. I draw conclusions from the factors identified as causes for Germany's shortcomings for other federal systems where feasible and derive reform potential therefrom. This allows to gain a new perspective on digital government and its coordination challenges in federal contexts.}, language = {en} } @article{EbingerRichter2016, author = {Ebinger, Falk and Richter, Philipp}, title = {Decentralizing for performance? A quantitative assessment of functional reforms in the German Lander}, series = {International review of administrative sciences : an international journal of comparative public administration}, volume = {82}, journal = {International review of administrative sciences : an international journal of comparative public administration}, publisher = {Sage Publ.}, address = {London}, issn = {0020-8523}, doi = {10.1177/0020852315586916}, pages = {291 -- 314}, year = {2016}, abstract = {In the last 10 years, the governments of most of the German L{\"a}nder initiated administrative reforms. All of these ventures included the municipalization of substantial sets of tasks. As elsewhere, governments argue that service delivery by communes is more cost-efficient, effective and responsive. Empirical evidence to back these claims is inconsistent at best: a considerable number of case studies cast doubt on unconditionally positive appraisals. Decentralization effects seem to vary depending on the performance dimension and task considered. However, questions of generalizability arise as these findings have not yet been backed by more 'objective' archival data. We provide empirical evidence on decentralization effects for two different policy fields based on two studies. Thereby, the article presents alternative avenues for research on decentralization effects and matches the theoretical expectations on decentralization effects with more robust results. The analysis confirms that overly positive assertions concerning decentralization effects are only partially warranted. As previous case studies suggested, effects have to be looked at in a much more differentiated way, including starting conditions and distinguishing between the various relevant performance dimensions and policy fields.}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{Schukraft2018, author = {Schukraft, Stefan}, title = {Legislativer Konflikt in den deutschen L{\"a}ndern}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam}, address = {Potsdam}, isbn = {978-3-86956-450-0}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-42216}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-422162}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {563}, year = {2018}, abstract = {Gesetzgebungsmehrheiten in parlamentarischen Systemen mit ihrem Dualismus aus Regierungslager und Oppositionsparteien bilden sich nicht frei. Vielmehr findet ihre Koordination in einem Spannungsfeld aus den programmatischen Positionen der Akteure und ihrem opportunistischen Wettbewerb untereinander statt. Diese Problematik bricht die Arbeit auf drei konkrete Fragestellungen herunter, im Rahmen derer sie die Konfliktmuster zwischen Akteuren bei der legislativen Mehrheitskoordination unter Mehrheitsregierungen in den deutschen Landesparlamenten untersucht: 1) Inwieweit h{\"a}ngt es von programmatischen Positionen oder vom opportunistischen Wettbewerb des Neuen Dualismus zwischen Regierungslager und Oppositionsparteien ab, ob Oppositionsparteien und Regierungslager bei der Bildung von Gesetzgebungsmehrheiten kooperieren oder konfligieren? 2) Inwieweit kommt es vor dem Hintergrund unterschiedlicher programmatischer Positionen und opportunistischer {\"U}berlegungen zu Konflikt statt Kooperation zwischen Koalitionsakteuren bei der Bildung gemeinsamer Gesetzgebungsmehrheiten? Letztere Fragestellung wird sodann auch in den Kontext des bundesrepublikanischen Kooperativf{\"o}deralismus eingebettet: 3) Inwieweit geht die Bildung von Gesetzgebungsmehrheiten bei der Ausf{\"u}hrung von Bundesgesetzen in Mischkoalitionen (bestehend aus Parteien, die sich auf Bundesebene in konkurrierenden Lagern gegen{\"u}berstehen) mit mehr Konflikt einher als in ebenen{\"u}bergreifend kongruenten Regierungskoalitionen? Theoretisch wird ein rationalistisches Modell der grundlegenden Handlungsanreize bei der Bildung von Gesetzgebungsmehrheiten in den deutschen Landesparlamenten erarbeitet. Auf dieser Basis besch{\"a}ftigt sich die Arbeit damit, wie die Akteure strategisch programmatische und opportunistische Anreize zu Konflikt und Kooperation abw{\"a}gen. Die Arbeit leitet dann konkrete Determinanten ab, die vorwiegend - aber nicht nur - mittels quantitativer Methoden getestet werden. Die Arbeit st{\"u}tzt sich dabei auf eine gr{\"o}ßtenteils neu zusammengestellte Gesetzgebungsdatenbank aus 3.359 Gesetzgebungsvorg{\"a}ngen aus 23 Legislaturperioden zwischen 1990 und 2013 in den L{\"a}ndern Hamburg, Hessen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Nordrhein-Westfalen und Sachsen-Anhalt. Die Analyse der Konfliktmuster zwischen Oppositionsparteien und Regierungslager zeigt, dass programmatische Distanz einer Oppositionspartei zum Regierungslager f{\"u}r Oppositionsverhalten eine Rolle spielt; dies gilt jedoch auch f{\"u}r opportunistische Aspekte (so l{\"a}sst sich beispielsweise ein kompetitiveres Oppositionsverhalten beobachten, wenn nach der letzten Wahl ein vollst{\"a}ndiger Regierungswechsel erfolgte). Oppositionsverhalten erscheint dabei recht kleinteilig ausgepr{\"a}gt. Neben Unterschieden zwischen Legislaturperioden treten solche auch innerhalb von Legislaturperioden zwischen Akteuren sowie zwischen Gesetzentw{\"u}rfen auf. Die Analyse generellen Koalitionskonflikts weist darauf hin, dass ein nicht unerheblicher Teil von Koalitionskonflikt strukturell bedingt ist. Handelt es sich bei einer gebildeten Regierungskoalition um die Wunschkoalition der beteiligten Parteien, so ist dies Koalitionskonflikt abtr{\"a}glich. Selbiges gilt f{\"u}r eine gr{\"o}ßere Mehrheitsmarge des Regierungslagers. Dar{\"u}ber hinaus ergeben sich Hinweise, dass die Ausf{\"u}hrung von Bundesgesetzen unter Mischkoalitionen bei bundespolitischer Abgrenzung der Koalitionspartner mit mehr Koalitionskonflikt einhergeht als eine Ausf{\"u}hrung unter kongruenten Koalitionen. Der Beitrag der Arbeit ist polymorph angelegt. Sie hilft zun{\"a}chst, die Strategien von Akteuren im Gesetzgebungsprozess besser zu verstehen. Als normativer Beitrag tritt auf einer zweiten Ebene die bessere Erforschung etwaiger nachteiliger Effekte des Neuen Dualismus unter Mehrheitsregierungen hinzu. Gleichzeitig soll die Arbeit drittens in der Zusammenschau helfen, die Mechanik der parlamentarischen Systeme in den L{\"a}ndern selbst zu erhellen und besser normativ bewerten zu k{\"o}nnen. Hintergrund sind hier die jahrzehntealten Debatten um das beste Regierungssystem und -format der deutschen L{\"a}nder als subnationale Entit{\"a}ten. Die dritte Fragestellung dieser Arbeit konnte diese Debatte zudem mit einem neuen Aspekt bereichern. Wissen dar{\"u}ber, inwieweit die Ausf{\"u}hrung von Bundesgesetzen in den L{\"a}ndern je nach ebenen{\"u}bergreifendem Koalitionsmuster in unterschiedlichem Ausmaß mit einem ‚coalition governance'-Problem verbunden ist, f{\"u}gt der Forschung zum f{\"o}deralen Entscheiden in der Bundesrepublik eine neue und beachtenswerte Facette hinzu. Denn dabei handelt es sich um eine f{\"o}deral bedingte mechanische Beeintr{\"a}chtigung der Mehrheitskoordination in den Landesparlamenten selbst, die die potenziell gegebene f{\"o}derale Flexibilit{\"a}t bei der Ausf{\"u}hrung von Bundesgesetzen hemmt. Dies ebnet den Weg zu neuen Debatten dar{\"u}ber, wie in den deutschen L{\"a}ndern mehr legislative Abstimmungsflexibilit{\"a}t erm{\"o}glicht werden kann als unter den bisher {\"u}blichen Mehrheits-Koalitionsregierungen.}, language = {de} } @misc{EbingerRichter2015, author = {Ebinger, Falk and Richter, Philipp}, title = {Decentralizing for performance?}, series = {International review of administrative sciences}, journal = {International review of administrative sciences}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-405158}, pages = {24}, year = {2015}, abstract = {In the last 10 years, the governments of most of the German Lander initiated administrative reforms. All of these ventures included the municipalization of substantial sets of tasks. As elsewhere, governments argue that service delivery by communes is more cost-efficient, effective and responsive. Empirical evidence to back these claims is inconsistent at best: a considerable number of case studies cast doubt on unconditionally positive appraisals. Decentralization effects seem to vary depending on the performance dimension and task considered. However, questions of generalizability arise as these findings have not yet been backed by more 'objective' archival data. We provide empirical evidence on decentralization effects for two different policy fields based on two studies. Thereby, the article presents alternative avenues for research on decentralization effects and matches the theoretical expectations on decentralization effects with more robust results. The analysis confirms that overly positive assertions concerning decentralization effects are only partially warranted. As previous case studies suggested, effects have to be looked at in a much more differentiated way, including starting conditions and distinguishing between the various relevant performance dimensions and policy fields.}, language = {en} }