@article{Ganghof2016,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {The Regime-Trilemma: On the Relationship between the Executive and Legislature in advanced Democracies},
  series = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift : Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung f{\~A}¼r Politische Wissenschaft},
  volume    = {57},
  journal   = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift : Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung f{\~A}¼r Politische Wissenschaft},
  publisher = {Nomos},
  address   = {Hannover},
  issn      = {0032-3470},
  doi       = {10.5771/0032-3470-2016-1-27},
  pages     = {27 -- +},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {A comprehensive typology of basic executive formats is presented and linked to a discussion of tradeoffs in the design of executive-legislative relations. The focus is on the tradeoffs between three goals: (1) programmatic parties, (2) identifiable cabinets and (3) issue -specific legislative coalitions. To include semi-presidentialism into the typology in a logically consistent manner, a heretofore neglected executive format has to be defined, which is labelled semi-parliamentarism. Based on a discussion of Australian states, it is argued that semi-parliamentarism has the potential to mitigate the trilemma.},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Ganghof2018,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {A new political system model},
  series = {European Journal for Political Research},
  volume    = {57},
  journal   = {European Journal for Political Research},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Wiley},
  address   = {Hoboken},
  issn      = {0304-4130},
  doi       = {10.1111/1475-6765.12224},
  pages     = {261 -- 281},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {Semi-parliamentary government is a distinct executive-legislative system that mirrors semi-presidentialism. It exists when the legislature is divided into two equally legitimate parts, only one of which can dismiss the prime minister in a no-confidence vote. This system has distinct advantages over pure parliamentary and presidential systems: it establishes a branch-based separation of powers and can balance the 'majoritarian' and 'proportional' visions of democracy without concentrating executive power in a single individual. This article analyses bicameral versions of semi-parliamentary government in Australia and Japan, and compares empirical patterns of democracy in the Australian Commonwealth as well as New South Wales to 20 advanced parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. It discusses new semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require formal bicameralism, and pays special attention to semi-parliamentary options for democratising the European Union.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Ganghof2023,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Justifying types of representative democracy},
  series = {Critical review of international social and political philosophy},
  journal   = {Critical review of international social and political philosophy},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {1369-8230},
  doi       = {10.1080/13698230.2022.2159665},
  pages     = {1 -- 12},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {This article responds to critical reflections on my Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism by Sarah Birch, Kevin J. Elliott, Claudia Landwehr and James L. Wilson. It discusses how different types of representative democracy, especially different forms of government (presidential, parliamentary or hybrid), can be justified. It clarifies, among other things, the distinction between procedural and process equality, the strengths of semi-parliamentary government, the potential instability of constitutional designs, and the difference that theories can make in actual processes of constitutional reform.},
  language  = {en}
}