@article{Sanner2005,
  author    = {Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Bertrand Wettbewerb im Raum kann zu h{\"o}heren Preisen f{\"u}hren als ein Monopol},
  year      = {2005},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Sanner2004,
  author    = {Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Economy vs. history : what does actually determine the distribution of firms' locations in cities?},
  year      = {2004},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Sanner2009,
  author    = {Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Economy vs. history : what does actually determine the distribution of shops' locations in cities?},
  issn      = {0570-1864},
  doi       = {10.1007/s00168-008-0221-3},
  year      = {2009},
  abstract  = {This study examines in which cases economic forces or historical singularities prevail in the determination of the spatial distribution of retail shops. We develop a model of location choice in discrete space. The main force towards an agglomerated structure is the reduction of transaction costs for consumers if retailers are located closely, whilst competition and transport costs work towards a disperse structure. We assess the importance of the initial conditions by simulating the resulting distribution of shops for identical economic parameters but varying initial settings. If the equilibrium distributions are similar we conclude that economic forces have prevailed, while dissimilarity indicates that 'history' is more important. The (dis)similarity of distributions of shops is calculated by means of a metric measure.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Sanner2006,
  author    = {Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Imperfect goods and labor markets, and the union wage gap},
  doi       = {10.1007/s00148-005-0010-6},
  year      = {2006},
  abstract  = {Existing theoretical literature fails to explain satisfactorily the differences between the pay of workers who are covered by collective agreements and others who are not. This study aims at providing a model framework that is amenable to an analysis of this issue. Our general-equilibrium approach integrates a dual labor market and a two-sector product market. The results suggest that the so-called "union wage gap" is largely determined by the degree of centralization of the bargains and, to a somewhat lesser extent, by the expenditure share of the unionized sector's goods},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Sanner2003,
  author    = {Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Optimal unemployment insurance in a federation},
  isbn      = {3-540-44004-6},
  year      = {2003},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Sanner2003,
  author    = {Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Self-financing unemployment insurance and bargaining structure},
  year      = {2003},
  abstract  = {This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the labor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self- financing unemployment insurance (UI) for workers, firms, and with reference to an efficiency criterion. For this purpose, we respectively numerically compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the size of the unions whether effciency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{SchoelerSanner1998,
  author    = {Sch{\"o}ler, Klaus and Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Spatial price discrimination in two-dimensional competitive markets},
  year      = {1998},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{SchoelerSanner1998,
  author    = {Sch{\"o}ler, Klaus and Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Spatial Price Discrimination in Two-Dimensional Competitive Markets},
  year      = {1998},
  language  = {en}
}