@article{AndresBruttelFriedrichsen2022,
  author    = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa and Friedrichsen, Jana},
  title     = {How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion},
  series = {European economic review},
  volume    = {152},
  journal   = {European economic review},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0014-2921},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104331},
  pages     = {1 -- 18},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{AndresBruttelFriedrichsen2020,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friedrichsen, Jana},
  title     = {Choosing between explicit cartel formation and tacit collusion - An experiment},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {19},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-47388},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-473885},
  pages     = {55},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Numerous studies investigate which sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation but little is known as to how these sanctions work. We contribute to understanding the inner workings of cartels by studying experimentally the effect of sanctioning institutions on firms' communication. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are significantly less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing when sanctioning institutions are present. At the same time, average prices are lower when communication is less explicit. A mediation analysis suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but also by reducing the prevalence of explicit price communication.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{AndresBruttelFriedrichsen2022,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friedrichsen, Jana},
  title     = {How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-56223},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-562234},
  pages     = {67},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.},
  language  = {en}
}