@article{Ganghof2013, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Equality-based comparison how to justify democratic institutions in the Real World}, series = {Politics}, volume = {33}, journal = {Politics}, number = {2}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}, address = {Hoboken}, issn = {0263-3957}, doi = {10.1111/1467-9256.12002}, pages = {101 -- 111}, year = {2013}, abstract = {Political scientists regularly justify particular democratic institutions. This article explores two desiderata for such justifications. The first is a formal equality baseline which puts the burden of justification on those who favour more unequal institutions. This baseline is seen as an implication of the rule of law. The second desideratum, the comparison requirement, builds on the first: adequate justifications of particular institutions must compare them to the best alternative, and this comparison must consider the costs for political equality. The two desiderata are applied to political science debates about the proportionality of the electoral system and bicameral systems of legislative decision-making.}, language = {en} } @article{Ganghof2015, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Is the "Constitution of Equality' Parliamentary, Presidential or Hybrid?}, series = {Political studies : the journal of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom}, volume = {63}, journal = {Political studies : the journal of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom}, number = {4}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}, address = {Hoboken}, issn = {0032-3217}, doi = {10.1111/1467-9248.12124}, pages = {814 -- 829}, year = {2015}, abstract = {What does the value of political equality imply for the institutional design of democracies? The existing normative literature highlights the importance of proportional representation and legislative majority rule, but neglects the choice of an executive format. This paper explores two potential egalitarian trade-offs in this choice. First, while presidential systems tend to achieve too little bundling of separable decision-making issues (within political parties), parliamentary systems often tend towards too much bundling (between political parties), thus establishing informal veto positions in the democratic process. This is a trade-off between the adversarial' and deliberative' aspects of equality. Second, there is a trade-off between horizontal' and vertical' equality. Neither pure presidentialism nor pure parliamentarism may be able to maximise both dimensions of equality simultaneously. The paper argues that certain hybrids between parliamentarism and presidentialism have the potential to mitigate both trade-offs. These hybrids establish power separation between the executive and legislature without allowing for popular executive elections. The argument also has potential implications for the democratisation of the European Union.}, language = {en} } @article{Ganghof2023, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Justifying types of representative democracy}, series = {Critical review of international social and political philosophy}, journal = {Critical review of international social and political philosophy}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, issn = {1369-8230}, doi = {10.1080/13698230.2022.2159665}, pages = {1 -- 12}, year = {2023}, abstract = {This article responds to critical reflections on my Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism by Sarah Birch, Kevin J. Elliott, Claudia Landwehr and James L. Wilson. It discusses how different types of representative democracy, especially different forms of government (presidential, parliamentary or hybrid), can be justified. It clarifies, among other things, the distinction between procedural and process equality, the strengths of semi-parliamentary government, the potential instability of constitutional designs, and the difference that theories can make in actual processes of constitutional reform.}, language = {en} } @article{Heinzel2022, author = {Heinzel, Mirko Noa}, title = {Mediating power?}, series = {The British journal of politics \& international relations : BJPIR}, volume = {24}, journal = {The British journal of politics \& international relations : BJPIR}, number = {1}, publisher = {Sage}, address = {London}, issn = {1467-856X}, doi = {10.1177/1369148121992761}, pages = {153 -- 170}, year = {2022}, abstract = {The selection of the executive heads of international organisations represents a key decision in the politics of international organisations. However, we know little about what dynamics influence this selection. The article focuses on the nationality of selected executive heads. It argues that institutional design impacts the factors that influence leadership selection by shaping the costs and benefits of attaining the position for member states' nationals. The argument is tested with novel data on the nationality of individuals in charge of 69 international organisation bureaucracies between 1970 and 2017. Two findings stand out: first, powerful countries are more able to secure positions in international organisations in which executive heads are voted in by majority voting. Second, less consistent evidence implies that powerful countries secure more positions when bureaucracies are authoritative. The findings have implications for debates on international cooperation by illustrating how power and institutions interact in the selection of international organisation executive heads.}, language = {en} } @article{SommererSquatritoTallbergetal.2021, author = {Sommerer, Thomas and Squatrito, Theresa and Tallberg, Jonas and Lundgren, Magnus}, title = {Decision-making in international organizations}, series = {The review of international organizations}, volume = {17}, journal = {The review of international organizations}, number = {4}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Boston}, issn = {1559-7431}, doi = {10.1007/s11558-021-09445-x}, pages = {815 -- 845}, year = {2021}, abstract = {International organizations (IOs) experience significant variation in their decision-making performance, or the extent to which they produce policy output. While some IOs are efficient decision-making machineries, others are plagued by deadlock. How can such variation be explained? Examining this question, the article makes three central contributions. First, we approach performance by looking at IO decision-making in terms of policy output and introduce an original measure of decision-making performance that captures annual growth rates in IO output. Second, we offer a novel theoretical explanation for decision-making performance. This account highlights the role of institutional design, pointing to how majoritarian decision rules, delegation of authority to supranational institutions, and access for transnational actors (TNAs) interact to affect decision-making. Third, we offer the first comparative assessment of the decision-making performance of IOs. While previous literature addresses single IOs, we explore decision-making across a broad spectrum of 30 IOs from 1980 to 2011. Our analysis indicates that IO decision-making performance varies across and within IOs. We find broad support for our theoretical account, showing the combined effect of institutional design features in shaping decision-making performance. Notably, TNA access has a positive effect on decision-making performance when pooling is greater, and delegation has a positive effect when TNA access is higher. We also find that pooling has an independent, positive effect on decision-making performance. All-in-all, these findings suggest that the institutional design of IOs matters for their decision-making performance, primarily in more complex ways than expected in earlier research.}, language = {en} }