@phdthesis{Janetschek2016,
  author    = {Janetschek, Hannah},
  title     = {Water development programs in India},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-401337},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {279},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {In the past decades, development cooperation (DC) led by conventional bi- and multilateral donors has been joined by a large number of small, private or public-private donors. This pluralism of actors raises questions as to whether or not these new donors are able to implement projects more or less effectively than their conventional counterparts. In contrast to their predecessors, the new donors have committed themselves to be more pragmatic, innovative and flexible in their development cooperation measures. However, they are also criticized for weakening the function of local civil society and have the reputation of being an intransparent and often controversial alternative to public services. With additional financial resources and their new approach to development, the new donors have been described in the literature as playing a controversial role in transforming development cooperation. This dissertation compares the effectiveness of initiatives by new and conventional donors with regard to the provision of public goods and services to the poor in the water and sanitation sector in India. India is an emerging country but it is experiencing high poverty rates and poor water supply in predominantly rural areas. It lends itself for analyzing this research theme as it is currently being confronted by a large number of actors and approaches that aim to find solutions for these challenges . In the theoretical framework of this dissertation, four governance configurations are derived from the interaction of varying actor types with regard to hierarchical and non-hierarchical steering of their interactions. These four governance configurations differ in decision-making responsibilities, accountability and delegation of tasks or direction of information flow. The assumption on actor relationships and steering is supplemented by possible alternative explanations in the empirical investigation, such as resource availability, the inheritance of structures and institutions from previous projects in a project context, gaining acceptance through beneficiaries (local legitimacy) as a door opener, and asymmetries of power in the project context. Case study evidence from seven projects reveals that the actors' relationship is important for successful project delivery. Additionally, the results show that there is a systematic difference between conventional and new donors. Projects led by conventional donors were consistently more successful, due to an actor relationship that placed the responsibility in the hands of the recipient actors and benefited from the trust and reputation of a long-term cooperation. The trust and reputation of conventional donors always went along with a back-up from federal level and trickled down as reputation also at local level implementation. Furthermore, charismatic leaders, as well as the acquired structures and institutions of predecessor projects, also proved to be a positive influencing factor for successful project implementation. Despite the mixed results of the seven case studies, central recommendations for action can be derived for the various actors involved in development cooperation. For example, new donors could fulfill a supplementary function with conventional donors by developing innovative project approaches through pilot studies and then implementing them as a supplement to the projects of conventional donors on the ground. In return, conventional donors would have to make room the new donors by integrating their approaches into already programs in order to promote donor harmonization. It is also important to identify and occupy niches for activities and to promote harmonization among donors on state and federal sides. The empirical results demonstrate the need for a harmonization strategy of different donor types in order to prevent duplication, over-experimentation and the failure of development programs. A transformation to successful and sustainable development cooperation can only be achieved through more coordination processes and national self-responsibility.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Feil,
  author    = {Feil, Hauke},
  title     = {God, bad, or ugly: Does it really matter?},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {XII, 224},
  abstract  = {Each year, donor countries spend billions of Euros on development cooperation. Not surprisingly, a large strand of research has emerged which examines the impact of development cooperation. A sub-discipline within this strand of the literature deals with the question of whether the impact or effectiveness of development cooperation depends on the quality of the recipient country's policy and institutional environment. Over hundreds of studies have assessed this question at the macro level. In so doing, most of these studies test whether a potential effect of aid on the growth of a recipient country's gross domestic product (GDP) is conditional on the country's policy and institutional environment. However, even after decades of research and hundreds of studies, no conclusive result has been found. One of the main reasons for the inconclusive state of the literature is that most macro-level studies have to deal with a high risk of endogeneity, treat aid as nothing but a pure income transfer, and rely on low-quality GDP data. To solve these three methodical issues, some authors have started to change the analytical focus from the macro to the micro level. Thus, these authors assess the determinants for the performance of individual development projects instead of the determinants for an effect of aid on GDP. Yet, even though the number of studies focusing on the micro level has increased steadily over the last few years, the state of the literature on the determinants for the performance of development projects still contains multiple highly relevant research gaps. The present thesis seeks to address three of these research gaps. The first research gap addressed by this thesis is related to the specific type of development cooperation. So far, nearly all existing studies focus on projects by Multilateral Development Banks. Research on the determinants for the performance of bilateral development projects is still rare. Thus, even though donors pledge to implement effective development projects, there are hardly any micro-level studies on bilateral projects. So far, only three studies use a sample which includes bilateral projects. Yet, none of the three studies assess the determinants for the performance of bilateral technical development projects. The first paper in the present thesis (GIZ paper) seeks to address this research gap by assessing the determinants for the performance of projects by the Deutsche Gesellschaft f{\"u}r Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), a bilateral state-owned aid agency active in the area of technical cooperation. The results of the paper indicate that some but not all of the existing theoretical arguments can be extended to bilateral technical projects as well.. For example, the level of market interventions in the recipient county only affects the performance of financial development projects, while the recipient country's government capacity affects both technical and financial development projects. The paper also indicates that effects of determinants may vary among project sectors. The paper also highlights a dilemma of technical development cooperation. The countries with low government capacity are usually the ones most in need of technical cooperation projects. But, at the same time, they are also the countries in which these projects have the poorest performance The second research gap addressed by this thesis is related to one specific factor in the policy and institutional environment of recipient countries, namely corruption. This determinant is often cited as essential for project performance but has gained surprisingly little coverage in empirical studies. The few existing studies on the effect of corruption on project performance are inconclusive. Some find a statistically significant correlation, while others do not. Furthermore, so far, all existing studies use corruption perception indices as a measurement for corruption, despite the fact that these indices have well-known deficits when it comes to this research topic. One of these deficits is that such indices do not distinguish between different forms of corruption, even though it is likely that the effect of corruption will vary depending on the type of development project and form of corruption. The second paper in this thesis (Corruption paper) seeks to address this inconclusive state of the research while focusing on one specific form of corruption, namely bribery between private firms and public officials. The paper finds a small but statistically significant correlation between the corruption level and the performance of World Bank projects. The systematic effect of corruption on project performance confirms the need to consider the risk of corruption in the design and during the implementation of projects. Nonetheless, the relatively small effect of corruption and the low pseudo R-squareds advise not to overestimate the relevance of corruption for project performance. At least for the project level, the paper finds no indication that corruption is a primary obstacle to aid effectiveness. The third research gap addressed by this thesis is related to one specific sample, namely recipient countries of the International Development Association (IDA). The question of whether the policy and institutional environment affects project performance is of particular relevance for these countries, given that the World Bank's ratings on a country's policy and institutional environment decide how much IDA resources it receives. One core justification of such an allocation system is that it helps to steer more resources to places where they are most effective. However, so far, there is no conclusive empirical evidence for this statement. The only study specifically focusing on this topic, a study by the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank from 2010, has essential methodological limitations. The third paper of this thesis (CPR paper) seeks to address this research gap by testing whether a more refined analysis confirms the assumption of previous studies that the policy and institutional environment of IDA-recipient countries, measured by the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment ratings, has an effect on the performance of World Bank projects. Overall, neither the main regression models nor any of the robustness tests indicate a substantial correlation between the policy and institutional environment and project performance. Only for Investments Loans is the coefficient large enough to assume some effect. The overall results not only contradict the results of previous studies, but also raise strong doubts around one of the core justifications for the allocation system of the IDA. All three papers rely on a statistical large-N analysis of the performance ratings of individual development projects. These ratings are usually assigned based on the final evaluation of a project and indicate the merit or worth of an activity. The merit or worth of an activity itself is measured by criteria like relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency. In the case of the two papers on World Bank projects, the needed data stem from different databases of the World Bank. The relevant data for the GIZ paper are gathered from internal evaluation reports of the GIZ. Logistic regressions are applied as the main analytical tool. Overall, the three papers show that the policy and institutional environment of recipient countries matters for project performance, but only to a small degree and under certain circumstances. This result highlights that many researchers and practitioners tend to overestimate the role that the policy and institutional environment of recipient countries plays in project performance. Furthermore, the thesis shows that authors of future studies should consider possible interactions between project- and country-level determinants whenever possible, both in their theoretical arguments and statistical models. Otherwise, the debate on the determinants for project performance is at risk of degenerating into a statistics tournament without any connection to reality.},
  language  = {en}
}