@article{Gruene2011,
  author    = {Gr{\"u}ne, Stefanie},
  title     = {Is there a Gap in Kant's B Deduction?},
  series = {International journal of philosophical studies},
  volume    = {19},
  journal   = {International journal of philosophical studies},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Abingdon},
  issn      = {0967-2559},
  doi       = {10.1080/09672559.2011.595196},
  pages     = {465 -- 490},
  year      = {2011},
  abstract  = {In 'Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content', Robert Hanna argues for a very strong kind of non-conceptualism, and claims that this kind of non-conceptualism originally has been developed by Kant. But according to 'Kant's Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects and the Gap in the B Deduction', Kant's non-conceptualism poses a serious problem for his argument for the objective validity of the categories, namely the problem that there is a gap in the B Deduction. This gap is that the B Deduction goes through only if conceptualism is true, but Kant is a non-conceptualist. In this paper, I will argue, contrary to what Hanna claims, that there is not a gap in the B Deduction.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Albertini2012,
  author    = {Albertini, Francesca Yardenit},
  title     = {Peace and war in Moses Maimonides and Immanuel Kant a comparative study},
  series = {The journal of Jewish thought \& philosophy},
  volume    = {20},
  journal   = {The journal of Jewish thought \& philosophy},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Brill},
  address   = {Leiden},
  issn      = {1053-699X},
  doi       = {10.1163/1477285X-12341238},
  pages     = {183 -- 198},
  year      = {2012},
  abstract  = {Francesca Y. Albertini (1974-2011) compares Maimonides' idea of peace, as developed in MT Sefer shofetim (Book of Judges), with Kant's work on the notion of "eternal peace" (Zum ewigen Frieden). Both authors develop a historical vision pointed against the use of force and war in light of a framework not limited by historical time (messianic age, eternity). Despite all differences in method and historical context, the authors agree on the notion that universal ethics provides the basis of a determination of right grounded in the will. Maimonides' universal messianism as well as Kant's universal history emphasize the pivotal role and decisive responsibility of the human being in realizing, through reason, the reign of peace and prosperity on earth first envisioned by the biblical prophets. These utopias continue to challenge us, especially in this day and age.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Haag2017,
  author    = {Haag, Johannes},
  title     = {Analytic Kantianism},
  series = {Con-textos kantianos : international journal of philosophy},
  journal   = {Con-textos kantianos : international journal of philosophy},
  publisher = {Instituto de Filosof{\´i}a del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cient{\´i}ficas},
  address   = {Madrid},
  issn      = {2386-7655},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.1092766},
  pages     = {18 -- 41},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell can both be read as proponents of Analytic Kantianism. However, their accounts differ in important detail. In particular, McDowell has criticized Sellars's account of sensory consciousness in a number of papers (most notably in LFI and SC), both as a reading of Kant and on its systematic merits. The present paper offers a detailed analysis of this criticism and a defense of Sellars's position against the background of a methodology of transcendental philosophy.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{GodessRiccitelli2017,
  author    = {Godess-Riccitelli, Moran},
  title     = {The final end of imagination},
  series = {Filosofia unisinos},
  volume    = {18},
  journal   = {Filosofia unisinos},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos},
  address   = {S{\~a}o Leopoldo},
  issn      = {1519-5023},
  doi       = {10.4013/fsu.2017.182.05},
  pages     = {107 -- 115},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {One main quandary that emerges in the context of Immanuel Kant's moral ideal, The Highest Good, is that on the one hand Kant sets it as a moral demand, that is, as a principle that must be comprehended as an attainable end for man in practice while, on the other hand, it is set as a moral ideal, i.e. as something that cannot be concretized and realized within the empirical world. The main goal of this paper is to argue for the realizability of the moral ideal by means of the principle of reflective judgment as a form of judgment that in fact clarifies human limitation. I assert that the very recognition of this limitation constitutes the possibility for hope in that ideal, or for striving towards it, and that this striving is the only way that the moral ideal can be concretized. I examine man's recognition of self-limitation as a response to the moral demand to realize the moral ideal and the necessity of the power of imagination for this, used reflectively.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{HaagHoeppner2019,
  author    = {Haag, Johannes and Hoeppner, Till},
  title     = {Denken und Welt - Wege kritischer Metaphysik},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  volume    = {67},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {0012-1045},
  doi       = {10.1515/dzph-2019-0006},
  pages     = {76 -- 97},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Wird Metaphysik realistisch verstanden, so ist sie mit dem Anspruch verbunden, in objektiver Weise von der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung der Welt (oder Realit{\"a}t, Wirklichkeit etc.) zu handeln. Damit beansprucht sie die M{\"o}glichkeit von Objektivit{\"a}t, d. h. die M{\"o}glichkeit der Repr{\"a}sentation der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung einer Welt, die von uns und unserer Repr{\"a}sentation verschieden ist. Realistisch verstandene Metaphysik verf{\"a}hrt dogmatisch, wenn sie ihre eigene M{\"o}glichkeit einfach voraussetzt. Eine dogmatische Metaphysik ist unkritisch, weil sie ohne eine Untersuchung der Frage betrieben wird, wie eine objektive und ad{\"a}quate Repr{\"a}sentation der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung der Welt {\"u}berhaupt m{\"o}glich ist. Im Unterschied dazu nennen wir eine realistische Metaphysik in einem vorl{\"a}ufigen Sinne kritisch, sofern sie ihren Ausgang von einer Untersuchung dieser M{\"o}glichkeit nimmt und erst auf der Grundlage positiver Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchung einen - vor diesem Hintergrund nunmehr gerechtfertigten - Objektivit{\"a}tsanspruch erhebt.},
  language  = {de}
}