TY  - UNPD
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
A1  - Güth, Werner
A1  - Nithammer, Juri
A1  - Orland, Andreas
T1  - Inefficient Cooperation under Stochastic and Strategic Uncertainty
T2  - CEPA Discussion Papers
N2  - Stochastic uncertainty can cause difficult coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can do so. To test this, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeatedly played Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not entail an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two main reasons for this finding: First, the stochastic uncertainty forces proposers to accept high strategic uncertainty if they intend to cooperate by claiming a low amount (which many proposers do not). Second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperative by transferring too little (which hinders cooperation in future periods).
T3  - CEPA Discussion Papers - 20 
KW  - stochastic uncertainty
KW  - strategic uncertainty
KW  - cooperation
KW  - Ultimatum Game
KW  - experiment
Y1  - 2020
UR  - https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/47550
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-475500
SN  - 2628-653X
IS  - 20
ER  -