TY  - JOUR
A1  - de Haas, Samuel
A1  - Paha, Johannes
T1  - Non-controlling minority shareholdings and collusion
T2  - Review of industrial organization
N2  - This article merges theoretical literature on non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS) in a coherent model to study the effects of NCMS on competition and collusion. The model encompasses both the case of a common owner holding shares of rival firms as well as the case of cross ownership among rivals. We find that by softening competition, NCMS weaken the sustainability of collusion under a greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. Such effects exist, in particular, in the presence of an effective competition authority.
KW  - collusion
KW  - common ownership
KW  - cross ownership
KW  - minority shareholdings
Y1  - 2020
UR  - https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/59598
SN  - 0889-938X
SN  - 1573-7160
VL  - 58
IS  - 3
SP  - 431
EP  - 454
PB  - Springer
CY  - Dordrecht
ER  -