TY  - JOUR
A1  - Khurana, Thomas
T1  - Gattungswesen
T2  - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung
N2  - In which sense can human beings be conceived as social animals? To elucidate this question, the present paper (I) distinguishes the logical sociality of all living beings from the material sociality of social animals and the political sociality of self-conscious social animals. (II) The self-conscious political sociality that characterises the human genus-being requires a complex interplay of first and second person through which alone we can participate in our form of life and determine its content. (III) The human form of life thus constituted is characterised by a particularly open, and at the same time precarious, membership which involves specific forms of vulnerability and power. (IV) Against this background, forms of objective spirit are necessary which grant us a generalized recognition and relieve us from the contingency of each particular second-personal recognition, without abandoning the openness of the sociality of the human form of life. This double requirement has led to paradoxical institutions in modern society which strive to protect and ensure the sociality of the human form of life precisely by naturalising and individualising our access to it.
KW  - sociality
KW  - recognition
KW  - species-being
KW  - G. W. F. Hegel
KW  - Karl Marx
KW  - Stanley Cavell
Y1  - 2022
UR  - https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/56391
SN  - 0012-1045
SN  - 2192-1482
VL  - 70
IS  - 3
SP  - 373
EP  - 399
PB  - De Gruyter
CY  - Berlin
ER  -