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Does repression of campaigns trigger coups d’état?

  • Does complementarity between restrictions and violence stabilize authoritarian power-sharing in the face of popular rebellion? Scholars widely concur that the central political conflict in authoritarian regimes plays out between people on the inside of the regime. This chapter adds to the debate and studies coup attempts in light of two interconnected hypotheses. First, violence against campaigns destabilizes power-sharing because it exposes a weak leadership. Second, this adverse effect of violence declines as the routine level of restrictions increases, because restrictions act as a sorting mechanism for uncompromising political opposition. Both hypotheses are tested using Bayesian multilevel statistical analysis on a data set of 253 coup attempts in 198 authoritarian regimes between 1949 and 2007. This study design allows separation of repression’s time-dependent effects from its context effects, and it demonstrates the value of Bayesian methods for studying rare political phenomena such as coups d’état. The chapter’s conclusion,Does complementarity between restrictions and violence stabilize authoritarian power-sharing in the face of popular rebellion? Scholars widely concur that the central political conflict in authoritarian regimes plays out between people on the inside of the regime. This chapter adds to the debate and studies coup attempts in light of two interconnected hypotheses. First, violence against campaigns destabilizes power-sharing because it exposes a weak leadership. Second, this adverse effect of violence declines as the routine level of restrictions increases, because restrictions act as a sorting mechanism for uncompromising political opposition. Both hypotheses are tested using Bayesian multilevel statistical analysis on a data set of 253 coup attempts in 198 authoritarian regimes between 1949 and 2007. This study design allows separation of repression’s time-dependent effects from its context effects, and it demonstrates the value of Bayesian methods for studying rare political phenomena such as coups d’état. The chapter’s conclusion, however, is straightforward: Once citizens form campaigns, repression can only deteriorate the situation because it opens a frontline right at the center of authoritarian rule.zeige mehrzeige weniger

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Metadaten
Verfasserangaben:Dag TannebergORCiDGND
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35477-0_5
ISBN:978-3-030-35477-0
ISBN:978-3-030-35476-3
ISSN:2198-7289
Titel des übergeordneten Werks (Englisch):The politics of repression under authoritarian rule : how steadfast is the Iron Throne?
Verlag:Springer Nature
Verlagsort:Cham
Publikationstyp:Wissenschaftlicher Artikel
Sprache:Englisch
Datum der Erstveröffentlichung:03.01.2020
Erscheinungsjahr:2020
Datum der Freischaltung:09.01.2023
Freies Schlagwort / Tag:authoritarian rule; contentious politics; democracy; dictatorship; human rights; policy substitutes; political campaigns; political repression; political stability; state repression
Seitenanzahl:42
Erste Seite:121
Letzte Seite:162
Fördernde Institution:transnational E-RARE grant `CCMCURE (DFG)European Commission [SFB958]; E-RARE [ERL 138397]; Canadian; Institutes for Health ResearchCanadian Institutes of Health Research; (CIHR) [PJT 153000]; the E-RARE grant `CCMCURE
Organisationseinheiten:Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Sozialwissenschaften / Fachgruppe Politik- & Verwaltungswissenschaft
DDC-Klassifikation:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 32 Politikwissenschaft / 320 Politikwissenschaft
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