Is there a Gap in Kant's B Deduction?
- In 'Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content', Robert Hanna argues for a very strong kind of non-conceptualism, and claims that this kind of non-conceptualism originally has been developed by Kant. But according to 'Kant's Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects and the Gap in the B Deduction', Kant's non-conceptualism poses a serious problem for his argument for the objective validity of the categories, namely the problem that there is a gap in the B Deduction. This gap is that the B Deduction goes through only if conceptualism is true, but Kant is a non-conceptualist. In this paper, I will argue, contrary to what Hanna claims, that there is not a gap in the B Deduction.
| Author details: | Stefanie Grüne |
|---|---|
| DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2011.595196 |
| ISSN: | 0967-2559 |
| Title of parent work (English): | International journal of philosophical studies |
| Publisher: | Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group |
| Place of publishing: | Abingdon |
| Publication type: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Year of first publication: | 2011 |
| Publication year: | 2011 |
| Release date: | 2017/03/26 |
| Tag: | Kant; concepts; intuition; non-conceptualism; synthesis |
| Volume: | 19 |
| Issue: | 3 |
| Number of pages: | 26 |
| First page: | 465 |
| Last Page: | 490 |
| Organizational units: | Philosophische Fakultät |
| Peer review: | Referiert |
