Asymmetric voluntary cooperation
- This paper tests the robustness of voluntary cooperation in a sequential best shot game, a public good game in which the maximal contribution determines the level of public good provision. Thus, efficiency enhancing voluntary cooperation requires asymmetric behavior whose coordination is more difficult. Nevertheless, we find robust cooperation irrespective of treatment-specific institutional obstacles. To explain this finding, we distinguish three behavioral patterns aiming at both, voluntary cooperation and (immediate) payoff equality.
| Author details: | Lisa Verena BruttelORCiDGND, Werner Gueth |
|---|---|
| DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0633-y |
| ISSN: | 0020-7276 |
| ISSN: | 1432-1270 |
| Title of parent work (English): | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Subtitle (English): | a repeated sequential best-shot experiment |
| Publisher: | Springer |
| Place of publishing: | Heidelberg |
| Publication type: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Date of first publication: | 2018/06/20 |
| Publication year: | 2018 |
| Release date: | 2021/10/05 |
| Tag: | Best shot game; Coordination; Experiment; Refund; Transfer |
| Volume: | 47 |
| Issue: | 3 |
| Number of pages: | 19 |
| First page: | 873 |
| Last Page: | 891 |
| Organizational units: | Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Fachgruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre |
| DDC classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
