

Potsdamer Beiträge zur Sozialforschung

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Contents

- Structure
- 1. Capitalist societies as market-bargaining societies on the basis of resources of action: The idealtypical bargain between capital and labour; an alternative to Marx' theory of exploitation
 - Discussion of the model
- 2. A general typology of paths of societies in history and a characterisation of state socialism
 - People's capitalisms as perspective of development
 - What remains from Marx' ideas?
- 3. Variations of welfare capitalism after the decline of state socialism
- 3.1 National differences of welfare capitalism
- 3.2 Overall inequality of income and overall class consciousness
- 3.3 Explaining income inequality and variation in class consciousness by class and gender
- 3.3.1 A test of different class models in the FRG
- 3.3.2 Developing an international model of gendered occupational and employment status as bundles of resources of action
- 4. Summary

Structure

The decline of state socialism is taken here as point of departure to discuss perspectives for the old ideas of equality and solidarity.

1) „Thesis“: Marx' theory of exploitation cannot be maintained according to Roemer (1982, 1986). This thesis is asserted by me as well with a model, by which I suggest to analyse capitalist societies as bargaining societies structured by values, utility considerations, and bargaining power on the basis of resources of action. 2) „Antithesis“: Following Marx' analysis, the abolition of private property of means of production was realised in Soviet Russia by Lenin and others. This abolition was not only constitutive for state socialism, it also shared - besides the political factors e.g. of totalitarian dictatorship - in the responsibility for its failure, since the scarcity of capital was not adequately taken into the account of the costs of production. Marx' main error in my view consists in his interpretation of the means of production as means of appropriation of others' labour instead of return to capital as a price for scarce capital. Besides this error he uncritically pleaded for central planning instead of markets because he thought that markets had dissolved from their human inventors. He proposed to take markets again "under the conscious control" of people by which he inspired Lenin's central planning. What both did not realise is that the whole population can "plan" consumption by markets, and as experts of their preferences they are more authentic than any central planning avantgarde. - State socialism is supposed to be a more progressive stage of development than capitalism in the theories of Roemer (1982) and Wright (1985). Here it is argued, to the contrary, that one should distinguish types of societies by the main resources of action together with the political system as well as the main values and rights realised. By means of this new frame of reference, that is a typology of paths of societies in history, one can also understand the current development in former state socialism. - Instead of Marx' program to equality by the dictatorship of the proletariat, here an ethics of equal resources of action is proposed. People's capitalisms - these are models of capitalism with welfare state or in which everybody is simultaneously worker and shareholder - could be realised in a variety of ways as participatory projects in the bargaining societies. 3) „Synthesis“: The OECD societies until now empirically range from the liberal market-model of the USA to the Swedish welfare state which all could develop to the welfare regimes of people's capitalisms. - Wright's idea to analyse social inequality with regard to the principal assets can be realised by Wright's new class model, but since a model of occupational and employment status as bundles of resources of action performed empirically even better with respect to the hierarchy of income and the polarity capital versus labour in the FRG, it is suggested to use a corresponding model for the 10 countries, in which Erik O. Wright has stimulated his comparative project.

1. Capitalist societies as market-bargaining societies on the basis of resources of action: The idealtypical bargain between capital and labour; an alternative to Marx' theory of exploitation

Thesis: Marx' theory of exploitation cannot be maintained: Owners of capital essentially profit from the effectivity of capital intensive production, not from "exploitation", that is the "appropriation of others' labour".

Table 1a: Marx' theory of "exploitation"

Marx' valuation	Fictitious	Real
Type of class society		
Slavery	The slaves seem to work never "for themselves", but only "for others", namely the owners.	Part of the work of the slaves is necessary for the reproduction of the slaves.
Feudalism	The work of the serfs "for themselves" is separated in place and time from the work "for others", namely the lords.	In feudalism exploitation (appropriation of surplus work) can be overtly observed.
Capitalism	The workers seem to do only "payed work" for the capitalists.	Part of the work of the labourers is surplus work for the capitalist, what is hidden by the wage form of payment.

To prove that the wealth of capitalist society is based on "exploitation", Marx argues as follows (compare table 1a): In slavery the work of the slaves seems to be completely appropriated by the owners of the slaves, but, instead, part of the work of the slaves is necessary for their own reproduction. In feudalism exploitation can be overtly observed, since the work of the serfs "for themselves" is separated in place and time from the work "for others", namely the lords. In capitalism, finally, workers seem to do only "payed work" for the capitalists, but, instead, part of their work is "surplus work" (exceeding the work "necessary for the reproduction of the worker") for the capitalists, what is hidden by the wage form of payment. For Marx only labour power is able to create value, he believes that "a trumpet does not work without a trumpeter" - but, in my view, for good music a musician needs his instrument too. Marx models the labour market in the way that "labour power" is a commodity - similar to other commodities, but also different from them. He believes that the "value of labour power" is the value of the work "necessary for the reproduction of the worker". Either it is the assertion that a worker can never receive more than "the necessary" - a version of Malthus' thesis, which Marx sometimes writes and which is empirically falsified by

history. Or this value has a "historical and moral element", which Marx also writes and what means, that the actual wage of workers depends on the historical moment and "morale" (norms etc.) in a country. But with this interpretation, Marx could also say that the wage of the "labour power" is exogenous to his theory - he does not explain it. Then he would not need a construction of "labour power", but the usual definition of the wage of the workers which, in my model, is the result of bargaining processes dependent on the historical conditions, just as Marx also said.

Table 1b: The alternative to Marx: Capital and labour gain from their bargain which is based on values, utility considerations, and bargaining power on the basis of resources of action.

The following thought experiment shall show that the wealth in capitalism is essentially based on the capital intensive technique, not on the appropriation of others' labour. To simplify I suppose that there are only two techniques, capital and labour intensive, and that only the capitalist owns the capital necessary for the capital intensive technique.

Options of the first actor (<u>Capitalist</u>)	Options of the second actor (<u>Worker</u>)
A) To run the labour intensive technique with output k .	A) To run the labour intensive technique with output k .
B) To run the capital intensive technique with output mk ($m > 1$).	
B1) The capitalist works alone with output mk .	B1) Not possible for the labourer.
B2) The capitalist offers the worker to hire him for the capital intensive technique for the wage l ($k < l < mk - k$).	B2) The labourer can run the capital intensive technique of the capitalist for a wage l ($k < l < mk - k$).

The actual wage depends on values, utility considerations and bargaining power (on the basis of resources of action).

As alternative to the Marxian analysis I want to furnish evidence that capital and labour both gain from their bargain which is structured by values, utility considerations and bargaining power on the basis of resources of action (compare table 1b): The following thought experiment, which models as ideal type the relation between capital and labour, shall show, that the central basis of wealth in capitalism cannot be found in the appropriation of other's labour. To simplify the model, imagine a society with only two techniques of production, the "labour intensive" with output k - this shall be a quantity of the central food, for simplification -, which is accessible to everybody, whereas the "capital intensive" technique with output mk ($m > 1$) is only accessible to the owner of capital, the capitalist. The capitalist has the options to work alone with the capital intensive technique with output mk (if not, see below) or, for instance, not to work at all, but to hire the worker for a wage l with $k < l < mk - k$. (The wage must be bigger than k for the worker to improve, and smaller than

mk-k for the capitalist to gain from “developing and lending“ his capital - compared to the labour intensive mode.) The worker has the option of the labour intensive technique with output k or the option of a wage contract with the capitalist for a wage l with $k < l < mk-k$. The model shall show that the profit of the capitalist can not be explained by the appropriation of other's labour: Without the capital intensive technique there would be less to be distributed; without gain the owner of the scarce capital would not bring it in; the price for capital must indicate the scarcity of capital, otherwise there is no rational accounting of the costs of production and no optimal resource allocation (investment). Capital and labour only join if both sides agree. About the conditions, under which they join, the actors bargain. The actual wage depends on the values, utility considerations, and the bargaining power of the actors. Both sides gain from the bargain, but the unequal bargaining power of the contractors is important for the resulting wage. If for the capital intensive technique more than one person is needed, then the capitalist is dependent on labour supply; that is as well the case, if the capitalist wants to enlarge the production (Marx: accumulation); furthermore, workers with skill - if it is scarce - have more bargaining power. These factors increase the bargaining power of the workers, but technique before all economises labour and, world-wide, capital is scarce relative to the labour supply, which increases the bargaining power of the capitalists.

Discussion of the model

One could object that in modern capitalism workers cannot withdraw to the labour intensive technique. Let us distinguish between dictatorial and democratic conditions. In a dictatorship with capitalist market economy as for instance in Chile under Pinochet government control can restrict the “liberty“ of the contract bargaining. But in the proper form of capitalism, which Marx analysed in his time with Great Britain as example, the government guarantees the liberty of contract. Even in the formal democratic capitalism in the early liberal variant (“Manchester-capitalism“) the alternative to wage labour is no idyll for the worker, at last there remains the work of begging. The threat of unemployment has the function of disciplining. Only at the other pole of the continuum of democratic capitalism - namely with developed welfare state or welfare participation of all workers - unemployment insurance, welfare-support or own welfare share take a similar function as the possibility to withdraw to the labour-intensive technique or, formulated as idyll: The freely accessible primeval forest of bananas, not yet parcelled in private property. ("La propriété c'est le vol", Proudhon.)

The thought experiment models the typus „artisan who develops a machine on the basis of his labour force alone“ to discuss the consequences of such legitimate property. One cannot start from the point that all property is only the result of the “original expropriation“, e. g. of appropriation,

robbery, and plundering. In Marx' analysis this "expropriation" is only an excursus as it ought to be, the kernel of his analysis is the theory of exploitation.

The idea to analyse capitalism by means of the distinction of differing techniques goes back to Roemer (1982, 1986) who elaborates this with complicated mathematical models. The same type of arguments are appropriate to furnish evidence that the "exploitation" of the "third world" is no necessary condition for the wealth of the "first world", but that the industrialised countries essentially profit from their capital intensive techniques. Imagine, for instance, trade of food with the same calories - to "objectify" fair trade -, but with capital intensive and labour intensive technique. Compare Roemer (1983) for similar, more elaborated models concerning the problem of the exchange with the "third world".

"Appropriation of other's labour", as Marx defines exploitation, exists, but the wealth in capitalism is not essentially dependent on this phenomenon. Slaves and serfs had no option for a bargaining process concerning the wage of their labour power. In this sense slavery and feudalism are similar, they are essentially based on coercion. (State socialism, as well, is based on coercion.) Instead, capitalism, in principle, is possible as free bargain without coercion. That is not to deny that there are important social inequalities in capitalism, for it is of course a privilege to have more options of action as the capitalist has on the basis of his resources of action in comparison to the worker. With equal property of means of production there would be a symmetric situation of bargaining.

The exploitation-error in Marx' analysis also leads to false political consequences. The postulate of abolition of private property of means of production was caught on by Lenin and realised in Russia and other countries. This abolition was not only constitutive for state socialism, it also shared in the responsibility for the decline of state socialism (see part 2).

Capitalism presupposes the institution of private property of the means of production. In a democratic capitalist society people, in principle, also have the option to vote for a model like state socialism, that is for the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production. But the revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe furnishes evidence that this type of society exhibits more problems than capitalism does. In the following I want to discuss the models of Roemer (1982) and Wright (1985) to analyse state socialism and to propose a new frame of reference to understand the developments in Eastern Europe.

2. A general typology of paths of societies in history and a characterisation of state socialism

Roemer (1982) characterises socialism by two types of "exploitation"¹ (compare table 2): A coalition is defined as "socialistically exploited" if it would do better to withdraw with its per capita share of inalienable assets (skills) and to work alone. If one may guess from the name "socialist exploitation" that this shall be the primary line of conflict in state socialism, then one should object that the inequality of skills is an important social problem in state socialism (as well as in capitalism), but it is not the primary conflict to be observed before and during the revolution in Eastern Europe. But with his second type of exploitation Roemer characterizes the central conflict in state socialism: A coalition is defined as "status-exploited" if it would do better to withdraw from the dues of status (on the basis of bureaucratic positions) and to work alone. This concept models the conflict between the incumbents of state-bureaucratic positions - the membership in the communist party is a necessary condition - and those without the privilege of such a position. (But for coercive systems like state bureaucratic socialism, just as for slavery and feudalism, Roemer's idea of a possible withdrawal is not adequate, these systems are no bargaining societies in these core questions.)

Roemer is a critic of state bureaucratic socialism in characterising it by the two mentioned types of exploitation. But Roemer votes for some kind of socialism instead of capitalism: "I believe that democratic control of economic surplus is a necessary condition for liberating education and culture from the capitalist bonds that fetter them: that is, that socialism is necessary for the self-realisation of the many" (Roemer 1989). It cannot be state bureaucratic socialism which shall be better for the self-realisation of the many as one can observe by the numerous exodus out of the GDR as soon as it was possible. One has to take notice of the fact that the large majority of people in the GDR saw better chances of self-realisation in democratic capitalism with welfare state. And it is the elementary right of the people in a democracy to vote for their preferences. There is no elite who has the right to define the needs of the other people as it has been tried by the top of the communist parties.

Table 2: Roemer's theory of "exploitation" on the basis of a generalised, game theoretical definition of "exploitation"

Definition: A coalition is "exploited" (Roemer) if it would do better to withdraw and to work alone.

Withdrawal rule and classes	Withdrawal rule	Classes
Type of exploitation		
Feudal exploitation	A coalition is feudally exploited if it would do better to withdraw with its <u>own</u> alienable assets and to work alone.	Exploiter: Lords Exploited: Serfs
Capitalist exploitation	A coalition is capitalistically exploited if it would do better to withdraw with its <u>per capita share</u> of the society's alienable assets and to work alone.	Exploiter: Owners of the means of production Exploited: Workers without means of production Neither-Nor: Petty Bourgeoisie with average stock of capital
Socialist exploitation (One of the two central types of exploitation in state socialism)	A coalition is socialistically exploited if it would do better to withdraw with its per capita share of <u>inalienable</u> assets (skills) and to work alone.	Exploiter: Experts (skilled) Exploited: Unskilled
Status exploitation (The other of the two central types of exploitation in state socialism)	A coalition is status-exploited if it would do better to withdraw from the <u>dues to status</u> (on the basis of bureaucratic positions) and to work alone.	Exploiter: Incumbents of state bureaucratic positions Exploited: The rest of the society

Source: Roemer 1982

Wright (1985) unifies Roemer's framework in characterising the different class structures by the principal asset that is unequally distributed (compare table 3). Thus, "skill" and "organisation" model Roemer's concepts of "socialist" and "status-exploitation". For Wright's analysis of state bureaucratic socialism the following is important: Gouldner and others hinted to the point that the winner of the class struggle between lords and serfs in feudalism were not the underprivileged serfs, but a third class, the bourgeoisie. Wright generalises this idea by his concept of principal contradictory location. In capitalism, managers/bureaucrats will profit from the class struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat. In state bureaucratic socialism, the intelligentsia/experts will profit from the class struggle between managers/bureaucrats and non-managers. But this

generalisation of Wright cannot be maintained. The good idea of the profiting "third" exactly suits to the analysis of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The leaders of the communist party were no former capitalist managers. Furthermore, in the state bureaucratic countries the intelligentsia/experts never arrived at becoming the ruling class in the transition to socialism.

Table 3: Wright's typology of class structures as modification of Roemer's theory

Characteristics Type of class structure	Principal asset that is unequally distributed	Mechanism of exploitation	Basic classes	Principal contradictory location
Feudalism	Labour power	Coercive extraction of surplus labour	Lords and serfs	Bourgeoisie
Capitalism	Means of production	Market exchanges of labour power and commodities	Bourgeoisie and Proletariat	Managers/ bureaucrats
State bureaucratic socialism	Organisation	Planned appropriation and distribution of surplus based on hierarchy	Managers/ bureaucrats and non-management	Intelligentsia/ experts
Socialism	Skills	Negotiated redistribution of surplus from workers to experts	Intelligentsia/ experts and workers	-

Source: Wright 1985: 83 and 89

Instead of Roemer's and Wright's characterisation of state bureaucratic socialism I want to propose an alternative frame of reference for a typology of paths of societies in history (compare table 4). I separate the analysis of the "West" and of the "East". State bureaucratic socialism is not the future of capitalism, as one might conclude from Wright's sequence of class societies, but rather conversely. The Russian revolution did not grow out of a mature capitalist society. State bureaucratic socialism arose in the essentially feudal society of Russia.

State bureaucratic socialism is no monolithic block. In the following the example of the peaceful revolution in the GDR shall be analysed where – by the particularity of „two states in one nation“ – the „national“ and the „system“ question became virulent at the same time. If one periods the development of the peaceful revolution in the GDR, it started with the exodus of numerous people

from the GDR, when the sudden possibility to emigrate via Hungary arose. These events support to conceptualise state bureaucratic socialism as coercive, that is the individual human rights were not realised. The more precise informations about state bureaucratic socialism now widespread accessible furnish further evidence that state bureaucratic socialism may be characterised as a totalitarian dictatorship of one party: In the GDR one or two persons took the main decisions, the politbureau was the next small group at the top etc. More than 50.000 persons ("StaSi") were spying the own population.

Table 4: A new frame of reference for a typology of paths of societies in history

Characteristics Types of societies (polit-economical)	Political system	Values/ Ideas/ Political rights	Main problems	Main resources of action that are unequally distributed	Main social division
a) "West"					
Old Age (Slavery)	Greece: Early federal aspects Rome: Imperium with early law for the free	Political rights on the basis of landed property and gender	Social cleavages between fractions of the free	Property in land and persons connected with rights	Higher vs. lower nobility Slave owner with family vs. slave
Middle Age (Feudalism)	Feudal state	Political rights on the basis of landed property and gender	Ideological cleavages: Pope vs. emperor vs. princes	Landed property connected with rights (feudal service)	Lord with family vs. serf
	Absolute monarchy				
Modern Times (Capitalism) (Market as mechanism of regulation: Economic efficiency)	Dictatorship or Constitutional monarchy/ Bourgeois Democracy	- Political rights on the basis of property of capital and gender	Social question (capital vs. labour)	Capital (means of production)	Bourgeoisie with family vs. worker with family
	Dictatorship or Republic/ Democracy	- Common political rights	Unequal distribution of resources of action (also by gender, ethnicity etc.)	Capital (means of production), management- resources (decision and supervision), skills	Bourgeoisie with family, management with family, experts with family, workers with family
b) "East" (No decomposition of belief systems (church, ML) and state)					
Feudalism	Feudal state	Political rights on the basis of landed property and gender	Social cleavages between monarchy and aristocracy	Landed property connected with rights (feudal service)	Lord with family vs. serf
	Absolute monarchy				

State bureaucratic socialism (Plan as mechanism of regulation: No economic efficiency)	One party's dictatorship	Special rights on the basis of bureaucratic positions	1) Totalitarianism -i.e. the individual human rights are not realised 2) Lack of economic efficiency 3) Unequal distribution of resources of action	Management-resources/ bureaucratic positions, skills	Bureaucrats (nomenclatura) with family, experts with family, workers with family
or					
Fundamentalist clerical states	One religion's dictatorship	Special rights for the exegetes	Totalitarianism - i.e. the individual human rights are not realised	Exegetic positions	Exegetic positions vs. others
c) "South": Development dependent on the institutions of the world market or slower development					

The outcomes of the elections in the GDR - the beginning of another phase of the revolution in the GDR - were not foreseen, but, in the meanwhile, the analyses say that the majority of people – after seeing the main points concerning human rights and democracy to be initiated in the right way - voted for parties promising economic efficiency and higher standard of living, which had not been arrived at by central planning as mechanism of regulation. The market as mechanism of regulation is more „democratic“ - for the (moneyed) demand of the whole population regulates the production, not the decisions of a small central planning staff - and also more efficient by the general competition of independent producers. In the state socialism of the GDR labour power was scarce and job security guaranteed whence the informal bargaining power of the workers was high. This led to lower work intensity which contributed to the lower work productivity. The hardness of the labour market in capitalism must be supplemented by measures of social precaution. This became articulate once again by the consequences of the shock-therapy of the currency-union from July 1990 – the beginning of another phase of the revolution in the GDR.

It cannot be decided if the people in the GDR could have been pacified by a better standard of living, anyhow, revolutions only out of non-materialistic motives can be imagined.

People's capitalism as perspective of development

As in the West, in the post-communist countries solutions for the problem of the unequal distribution of resources of action had to be developed. For instance, these countries had the chance, after the revolutions beginning in 1989, to start "people's capitalism" by socialising the state property in the sense that everybody gets his per capita share of the national capital , since before the population was not the real owner of the state property: There was no participation of the whole population in the decisions of the state bureaucracy, and many privileges were reserved to the communist ruling class. (In my opinion „people's capitalism "needs not take the form of state intervention. In Western societies people increasingly become simultaneously worker and

shareholder which is a more participatory version of people's capitalism.) - In "Free to lose" (1988) Roemer argues against "people's capitalism", but I would not follow his arguments: 1) Contrary to Roemer, who accentuates unemployment as ingredient of capitalism, markets are efficient: The competition of independent producers leads to efficient production, guided by the demand of the consumers (in the limits of the unequal budgets of the consumers). The hardness of the labour market can be tempered by measures of social precaution. Problems like unemployment and illness should not be left to the economy alone, they are to be dealt with as well in the parliaments. 2) Roemer argues that within a generation there would be new inequalities, surely. But for the motivation of the individuals and the dynamics of economic development incentives seem helpful. Each generation in the estatist version of people's capitalism, however, would start with the same chances. – The following two arguments are – rightly – denoted as „illiberal“ by Roemer himself. 3) The preferences and values of people in the market system would be „false“. It is a very problematic point that for instance the communist leaders in central planning wanted to decide which values and preferences are good for the people, but everybody is the authentic expert of these – in the limits of qualifications etc., surely, but in any case as democratic principle. Minorities have to convince the others by their behaviour in every day life, if they believe to be in advance in a discussion. 4) Finally Roemer argues that the inequality of talents is mere luck in the „birth lottery“, surely. But whereas one can equalise the returns to talents, one cannot completely equalise the talents themselves.

What remains from Marx' ideas?

It is the ethics of equal resources of action in the spirit of Marx, for which Roemer (1982, 1986) – though in the collective variant - implicitly pleads. The capital rich should let the capital poor participate in the wealth produced on the basis of the capital intensive technique, or, more consequently, every one – world-wide – should own his or her per capita share of capital.

Until now, the ethics of equal resources of action is only formulated for one dimension, namely the resource of capital („people's capitalism“). Already in Roemer (1982) the dimension of skill and positions in the hierarchy (of bureaucracy, one should add: in factories etc.) are called to notice. Furthermore, I would consider the dimensions of income, political rights, and material and psychic reproduction. Even ecologically favourable conditions have the aspect of a resource. Gender, class of origin, ethnicity/race/nation, age, health etc. are structuring the access to resources of action. The program of equal resources of action consists in 1) removing the discrimination of access to resources („strong version“) or 2) equalising the returns („very strong version“, which could conflict with efficiency).

In the following, ten Western countries are empirically investigated to see which variant of capitalism comes closest to the ethics of equal resources of action.

3. Variations of welfare capitalism after the decline of state socialism

3.1 National differences of welfare capitalism

Table 5: International variations: Value orientation, social inequality, participation at the work place, class consciousness, social security, and economic efficiency

Individualism	Individualistic socialism <i>e. g. Sweden</i> - Low inequality - Participation at the work place - High class consciousness - Welfare state as safety net for <u>individuals</u> (individual taxation)		Economic liberalism <i>e. g. USA</i> - High inequality - Direct control at the work place - Low class consciousness - Residual welfare state - Military power transformable in economic power
		Group solidarity by occupation/employment sector <i>e. g. FRG</i> - Moderate inequality - Worker-participation ("Mitbestimmung") - Moderate class consciousness - Moderate welfare state	

Collectivism	State socialism <i>e. g. Former Soviet Russia</i> or Fundamentalist clerical states <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Low inequality - Participation at the work place - "Missionary" avantgarde consciousness of the leaders - Authoritarian welfare state 		In-group solidarity (nation, enterprise, family) <i>e. g. Japan</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - High inequality - Working groups (optimising) - Low class consciousness - Enterprise welfare - Economic efficiency by regulation (Toyotism)
	State net for material security	Societal net for material security	Private or enterprise net for material security

Capitalism – successful in the system competition – is no monolithic block. As theoretical model to explain the variations of existing capitalism I want to distinguish the following dimensions (see table 5): As to value orientation, I contrast the pole of community orientation and the pole of economic liberalism with the USA as prototype of the latter. Economic liberalism is compatible with equal opportunities, but unequal outcomes, namely strongly marked social inequalities. If there is not enough equality, one needs e. g. direct control at the work place. Lipietz (1991) makes the distinction of the industrial relations of „Fordism“ (old model in the USA), „Neo-Taylorism“ (new model in the USA), „Kalmarism“ (participation at the work place as means of motivation in the Swedish case), and „Toyotism“ (participation in the enterprises in Japan). This is a partly good idea, but I think that the general value orientation of a society is even more fundamental. On the other hand, nations differ at the degree of class consciousness: In an economic liberal country like the USA people did less organise around classes. In Japan, the enterprise, the family, and the nation form the centre of community orientation. US-politics after 1947 ("Cold War") encouraged shop trade unions in Japan. In the USA and Japan one finds less consciousness and organisation along classes and less welfare state regulations. In Sweden, on the other hand, class consciousness and labour movement reinforced the energy towards welfare state democracy. Finally, the riot of the communist minority in Russia led to coercive egalitarianism, the failure of which, by meanwhile, has been frankly declared by Gorbatschow. As a result of class consciousness, nations differ at the polarity of flexibility of enterprises (non-regulation) vs. social security for all. The coercive egalitarianism of Soviet Russia has failed at economic efficiency. Sweden is the prototype of welfare state democracy with social security for all, which means „rigidity“ or „regulation“ from the perspective of the enterprises. The USA are the prototype of non-regulation. Japan is the adapted combination of community orientation (in traditional national and family roles, in the enterprises as „second families“) and flexibility of enterprises: Within the enterprises there is few material inequality, which is a good basis for the participation at the workplace in form of optimising working groups and the identification with the enterprise. The social costs of the

flexibility of the enterprises have to be borne privately by the small firms as contractors of the enterprises, those dismissed at the age of 55, and further peripheral workers. The integration of the core in the big enterprises and the flexibility of the small firms as contractors („Toyotism“) were the most successful adaptation as to export efficiency up to 1997/98. But if one sees in social security for all a value of its own and in goal conflict with economic liberalism, the Swedish and German paths can claim reasonable middle courses between the individualism of the USA and the coercive egalitarianism of the Soviet Russian path. As to " sustainability " between the generations the German "conservative" path can claim a middle course in the goal conflict between self-realisation of the individual and responsibility for the family ties.

In his well known analysis Esping-Andersen (1990) distinguished “three worlds of welfare capitalism”: The liberal world with the USA as prototype, the social democratic model with Sweden as prototype, and the conservative world, which shall mean the conservation of occupational status. Examples for the latter model are Austria and the FRG. As Ilona Ostner (1995) pointed out, the latter case can be understood as “strong male bread winner model” in which the role of women is more centred around care work in the family. Correspondingly, Sweden is characterised as “weak male bread winner model”. – Bornschieer (1998) claimed that the export efficiency of a nation can profit from the acceptance of the social order of a nation. In this sense, nationalism partly contributes to the success of the Japanese economy until 1997/98. But in international markets, I think that pure national paths get difficulties, in this case partly by the pressures of the world power USA. – My own model contains elements of these ideas.

Data

Since I have only data for Western societies, I can only partially test the new frame of reference. And it will be primarily the inequality of resources of action and the degree of class consciousness that are analysed in the following.

Between 1985 and 1987 we conducted a study on the class structure and class consciousness of the FRG based on a representative sample of the West German labour force. It was funded by the German Science Foundation (DFG) and carried out at the University of Duisburg. The study is embedded in the context of a comparative project initiated by Erik Olin Wright (University of Wisconsin, Madison) in which a number of nationally funded research teams run essentially comparable surveys. Besides West Germany the Scandinavian countries Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden as well as Great Britain, USA, Canada, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand have taken part. We could not yet take into account the latter case since the data were not available in the merged country file. After completing the national study on West Germany (cf. Erbslöh et al. 1987, 1988, 1990), a new project under my direction was funded by the German Science Foundation to analyse the similarities and differences of the German findings with respect to the countries mentioned above.²⁾

3.2 Overall inequality of income and overall class consciousness

To characterise central features of the social structure on the basis of the data under consideration, I choose as hierarchical dimension income³ as a central indicator of social inequality. Among several indicators for the vertical dimension income proved to be the best in the FRG (see Holtmann 1990). As second dimension, class consciousness is chosen so that one has a vertical “objective” dimension and a kind of “horizontal subjective left-right continuum”, which together form a two-dimensional frame of reference. Class consciousness is measured by an index for the polarity of capital vs. labour.⁴

National differences in overall inequality of income and overall class consciousness:

- 1) Sweden exhibits a relatively strong amount of class consciousness and a low amount of inequality of income.
- 2) The FRG is characterised by moderate levels of class consciousness as well as income inequality.
- 3) The USA shows relatively weak class consciousness and a pronounced inequality of income.
- 4) Japan exhibits a relatively low amount of class consciousness. As to inequality of income the data show very pronounced inequality of income for the area of Tokyo and its surroundings; newer data support the picture of high and increasing inequality of income in Japan – contrary to Bornschier 1988 and Kerbo 1991.

The results are roughly compatible with the theoretical configuration and the main types: 1) Welfare state democracy with Sweden as example. 2) The FRG as moderate in the middle. 3) Economic liberalism with the USA as example. 4) Japan as integrated by traditional roles, low class consciousness, though there is a rising income inequality.

As preliminary explanation for this structurations I propose the following: In Sweden enough class consciousness has developed to put forward a strong labour movement with corresponding trade unions and a political party that succeeded in arriving with their bargaining power at a pronounced welfare state and low inequality of income. - In the FRG, radical political options are blocked by capital and labour as strong veto players, whence the FRG is to be found in the middle. - How can one explain the weaker class consciousness and the connected weaker labour movement in the USA as compared to Sweden, for instance ? One factor for the low class consciousness in the USA is the cultural heterogeneity of an immigration society. Often the USA are characterised as a society with higher social mobility, which could be another factor; but Erikson and Goldthorpe (1985) call in question that the American rates of mobility are exceptionally high. However, already the common belief in the task of the individual (instead of the state) could be an important factor: This could explain that one finds at the same time a strong amount of income inequality, but few class

consciousness. - Japan is culturally the most deviant case from the Western countries considered here: There is a strong gendered occupational stratification of income in the metropolitan area of Tokyo, but, furthermore, seniority as well as the kind and size of enterprise play important roles in the Japanese labour market. The integration in the enterprise and the weak unions split by shops could be causes of the low level of class consciousness, whereas the traditional sex roles are a potential source of conflict.

3.3 Explaining income inequality and variation in class consciousness by class and gender

At first I want to present the results of a test of different class models for the FRG (compare Holtmann 1990). Since I found for the FRG that Wright's new model and a model of employment status perform best in the statistical explanation of the variation in class consciousness and the model of employment status performs best in the statistical explanation of the hierarchy of income I begin by elaborating these two models for the FRG.

3.3.1 A test of different class models for the FRG

In the analysis of the social structure of the FRG I have concentrated on the aspect whether the class models selected define satisfactorily social locations that are homogenous with respect to the following dimensions (compare Holtmann 1990): The hierarchy of material locations (net income turned out to be the best of the available indicators) and the class consciousness as an indication of future action of some probability (measured by a simple additive index of attitudes toward capital versus labour issues).

Although the surveys of the comparative project are especially suited to test Wright's models, I did not confine the analysis to those models but considered a series of class models for the FRG. According to my criteria, a model of occupational and employment status on the basis of the German social statistics performed best with respect to the hierarchy of material location and a modified version of Wright's new model (here named Wright II) and the occupational model performed best with regard to the index of class consciousness. That is one of the reasons why I prefer Wright II over his older model (Wright I).

Since some of the national project teams have made comparisons on the basis of Wright I, I briefly summarise the rationale of both of Wright's class models (cf. Table 6): Beyond the simple Marxian dichotomy of bourgeoisie and proletariat, Wright emphasised in his first model the "revolution of the managers". He conceptualised the positions of managers as "contradictory class locations", as they share common features with both main classes: they are employees, but decide and direct at the work place; the extent of this authority distinguishes top and advisory managers from supervisors. The petty bourgeoisie owns the means of production but is not an employer, while

small employers range between bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie in that they - unlike the bourgeoisie - work themselves in office and factory. Finally the semi-autonomous wage-earners do not decide and control at the work place, but have more or less autonomy in determining how to carry out work. Wright thought of this group as ranging between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. However, as I expected, in the countries investigated this group is empirically located between the proletariat and the different types of managers. But this location is rather heterogeneous which is one reason why Wright used "skill" instead of "autonomy" in his new model.

Table 6: Wright's class models

Wright I	Wright II			Means of production
1: Bourgeoisie	1: Bourgeoisie			
2: Small Employers	2: Small Employers			
3: Petty Bourgeoisie	3: Petty Bourgeoisie			
4: Managers	4a: Expert manager	4b: Skilled manager	4c: Unskilled manager	+
5.1: Advisory Managers 5.2: Supervisors	5a: Expert supervisor	5b: Skilled supervisor	5c: Unskilled upervisor	Organisational assets
6.1: Semi-autonomous Wage-earners 6.2: Proletariat	6a: Expert	6b: Skilled worker	6c: Worker	
+		-		
Skill assets				

The major shift to the new model came about by integrating Roemer's concept of asset exploitation (Roemer 1982), based on game theory, into Wright II. Besides the assets of the means of production Wright considers organisational assets (as in Wright I) as well as skill assets (different from Wright I). Since there is no mechanism explicated by which, for instance, the skilled exploit the unskilled, I prefer to characterise Wright's new model as one of resource inequality, and not of asset exploitation. This is also in line with the later contribution of Roemer (1986), according to which a critical analysis of society should abandon the problematic concept of exploitation and concentrate on the inequality of assets.

As a test of the different class models I used simple variance analyses of the criteria by the class models and to evaluate propositions about orderings or about the configuration of a crosstabulation in Wright II, I constructed a graphical frame of reference in which income is used as vertical axis and the index of consciousness as horizontal axis. Unlike factor analysis or multidimensional scaling I chose my two main criteria as orthogonal axes of reference, even though they slightly

correlate ($r=0,25$). The graphical method is equivalent to multivariate analysis of variance, for there are two criteria analysed at the same time. The effects in the sense of the variance analysis can be inspected in the graph by the reference to the middle, i.e. the centre of gravity, which is defined by the means of the two criteria.

In Figure 1 I examine whether Wright II sheds some light on the social structure of the FRG. Wright's new model consists of a kind of cross-classification of management resources and skills, as far as employees are concerned. In my graph one should find the parallels of this crossclassification, if Wright's model perfectly fits the German data. I think that the most interesting result on the basis of Wright II is the way in which it is not suited to the German data, the reason being that skill and consciousness are not related in a linear fashion, as one should expect according to Wright's model. Instead, they are related in a curvilinear way. The unskilled workers show the most pronounced attitude "pro labour" (mean 5,63), the skilled the strongest attitude "pro capital" (mean 5,14), whereas the experts range approximately in the middle (mean 5,26). This phenomenon is stable for other definitions of skill and other indicators of consciousness. Figure 1 shows that this curvilinearity is essentially linked to the unskilled: There is an interaction according to which the curvilinearity shifts with increasing organisational assets in the direction of the linearity expected for all subgroups (non-management, supervisors, managers) on the basis of Wright II. The skilled range ideologically more to the right than their income - compared to the other locations - should make us believe. As an explanation I suggest that there are remarkable differences in consciousness between manual and non-manual occupations even if their material situation is similar.

FIGURE 1 HERE

These kinds of differentiation will be elaborated now by using a model based on the German social statistics (cf. Figure 2) which, at the moment, is probably best suited to picture the German social structure: The self-employed professionals and other self-employed have the more income and range the more to the "right" (more precisely "pro capital") the more workers they employ. The three locations of other self-employed nearly range on a linear trend. The self-employed professionals range less to the right (relative to their income); this suggests that they are influenced by the high educational level indicating more liberal attitudes formed by their university experience. The farmers range farther to the right than they would be expected on the basis of their income alone. The assisting family members of the self-employed receive lower income than the self-employed themselves (according to the social statistics these family members are supposed to have no income but most of them answer the question concerning income). Among the non-manual workers in the FRG the officials or civil servants are the most privileged with respect to social security

(not always with regard to income). In the FRG the educational system allocates fairly rigidly the access to the occupational system; this holds especially for the civil service (cf. Müller 1986). Ideologically, the officials are located in the middle of the two extremes even if they are high in rank and therefore also in income. This may be explained by the neutral position of the state and the civil service concerning capital versus labour issues, apart from the fact that a civil servant does not directly depend on a private capitalist. Furthermore, there are a lot of professional wage earners in the civil service, and professionals range less to the right. The other non-manual workers show different attitudes: There is a nearly perfect linear trend according to which the non-manual workers receive more income the higher their management position is and are located more to the right. The manual workers range left from the middle and are fairly homogenous with the exception of the factory stewards or masters who, ideologically, range close to the employers. (The masters who are non-workers in the sense of the German social security system are located close to the foremen.) Finally, the unemployed range close below the unskilled workers; and being still an apprentice naturally leads to still low income.

FIGURE 2 HERE

3.3.2 Developing an international model of occupational and employment status as bundles of resources of action

I think that the inequality of resources of action is one of the central problems of Western societies. Wright's model II can be interpreted as one possible operationalization of the differentiation of resources of action to capture the new developments since Marx' analysis of capitalism by the simple dichotomy of capital versus labour. But conceptually a cross classification of organisational assets and skill assets is a deductive formalism that has more difficulties to capture the main features of the social structure of Western societies than categories that have historically grown and are inductively developed by the social statistics as, for instance, the German one. In the FRG, it is, for example, informative to know that someone is a civil servant, because this is an important bundle of resources of action: job security, mobility chances, income etc. The differentiation of resources of action in the FRG can be best captured by a model of occupational and employment status as operationalization of bundles of resources of action. This not only holds conceptually, but also empirically.

That is why I developed in collaboration with Brigitte Hamm, student at the University of Duisburg, a model of occupational and employment status for comparative analyses, which shall capture the main features of the model of employment status of the German social statistics, which performed best in the extensive test of models that I carried out for the FRG (compare Holtmann 1990).

Since the access to resources of action is highly structured by gender (compare Holtmann/Strasser 1990), the categories developed are systematically split by gender.

At first the self-employed are structured by their type of capital: land, skill, and other capital. In the FRG, farmers tend more to the right than other self-employed of the same income, self-employed professionals tend more to the left than other self-employed of the same income. As the "other self-employed" form the largest of the groups of self-employed, they can be further structured by the numbers of workers they employ: For men, it is possible to differentiate other self-employed with ten workers or more, those with one to nine workers and finally those with no worker. For women, one has to merge the two upper groups because of the sample sizes.

As for the employees, lower white collar (or non-manual) is defined by clerical and sales (as well as white collar service). The top of white collar is defined either by professional positions with BA or by managerial positions. Top and basis of the white collar area are distinguished by the dichotomy of private versus public sector (that is working for a government agency).

The blue collar or manual area is structured by unskilled and skilled manual, with the "leading manual" at the top (defined as supervisors); the last differentiation is not possible for women because of the sample sizes. In the manual area we further distinguish the manual service to investigate whether it ranges below the other manual groups in the hierarchy of income.

Just as for the German model of employment status I want to present the generalized model of occupational and employment status in a graphical framework. In the following graphs the hierarchy of income forms the vertical axis. As horizontal axis the polarity in capital versus labour issues is chosen.

FIGURE 3 HERE

As to the graphs (compare figures 3), the most remarkable inequality of income is that structured by gender: Essentially, in all countries considered here, the income hierarchy of women ends, where that of men begins. As to class consciousness, in most countries women have a smaller range, in that they reach the left side of the men's range, but not the right side. That is, women are more moderate in their attitude pro capital.

Essentially, in all ten countries the following basic pattern⁵ can be detected for the men: The self-employed form the right wing of the ideological polarity. As to the non-manual area, the public sector ranges more to the left than the private sector. The manual workers form the left wing of the ideological polarity. The pattern for the women is analogous, with the remarkable income discrimination as main difference.

Because of the sample sizes, we cannot differentiate the top of the non-manuals of the private and public sector in the professionals, on the one hand, and the managers, on the other hand, in all ten countries. But, overall, one may say that the professionals ideologically range left from the managers; perhaps, the managers more strongly identify with the top of the hierarchy of the factories, shops and offices.

4. Summary

1) Here it is argued that Marx' theory of exploitation as explanation of the return to capital cannot be maintained. As an alternative to Marx, capitalist societies are conceptualised as bargaining societies structured by utility valuation and bargaining power on the basis of resources of action. An actor can profit in bargaining processes, if he has more resources and options. One can profit from one's resources.

2) In "A general theory of exploitation and class" (1982) John E. Roemer generalised Marx' theory of exploitation by means of the concept of "asset exploitation" on the basis of game theory to include "socialist" and "status exploitation" in state socialism. In "Classes" (1985) Erik O. Wright distinguished the class structures of feudalism, capitalism, statism, and socialism on the basis of the principal exploitative asset that is unequally distributed. Concerning Roemer's question "Should Marxists be interested in exploitation?" (1986) one can conclude that Marx' theory of exploitation cannot be maintained, but, in my view, only the ethics of equal resources of action in the spirit of Marx. In the taxonomies of Roemer and Wright state socialism is supposed to be a more progressive stage of society than capitalism. Here it is argued, to the contrary, that one should distinguish types of paths of societies in history by the main resources of action together with the political system as well as the main values and rights realised. By this new frame of reference one can also understand the current development in Eastern Europe.

3) Western societies until now range from the economic liberalism of the USA to the Swedish welfare state which all could develop to people's capitalisms which are proposed here as new egalitarian projects in direction of an ethics of equal resources of action. For me it seems more reasonable to think of egalitarian perspectives starting from real capitalism instead of constructing blueprints for an utopia. The two most feasible perspectives seem to me the following: On one hand, the social democratic welfare state which is continuously in bargain between capital and labour concerning the actual kinds of adaptations to new challenges and conditions. On the other hand, people in capitalism increasingly become at the same time worker and (at first small) shareholder. The goal conflicts of capital and labour could be in that way incorporated in every person who would develop responsibility for the decisions between consumption and investment,

return to capital and wage of labour. Just as the ambivalence of self-realisation of the individual and family-ties belongs to the responsibility of every person.

As a partial test of the proposed frame of reference for comparative analyses, as a member of the comparative project initiated by Wright, I analysed the similarities and differences of the social structures of ten Western societies on the basis of a model of resources of action.

In the FRG the differentiation of resources of action was better captured by a model of occupational and employment status than by Wright's model of asset inequality. (The power of explanation of the models is judged by explained variance as to the main criteria, e.g. the hierarchy of material location and the polarity of an index of consciousness.) That is why an international model of occupational and employment status is developed here to analyse ten Western societies. Essentially, the self-employed are distinguished by their kind of capital, the top of the non-manual area is defined by professional or managerial positions and top as well as basis of the non-manual area are distinguished by the dichotomy of private versus public sector. The locations are systematically split by gender.

In a graphical frame of reference (equivalent to multivariate analysis of variance) it is shown that gender is structuring the access to resources of action and the outcomes for the main criteria: For instance, the most remarkable inequality of income is that structured by gender. And this discrimination considerably varies in the ten Western countries looked at here.

A typology of social structures is generated on the basis of the overall amount of income inequality and the overall amount of class consciousness. The results are roughly compatible with the asserted main types: An open society with economic liberalism (USA); state socialism or fundamentalist clerical states as totalitarian variants of collectivism; the Swedish welfare state as a middle path between the unfettered individualism of the USA and the coercive egalitarianism of state socialism; Japan as capable combination of integration of workers with few conflicts along class lines, but with the risk of closure on the basis of in-group solidarities; the FRG as more moderate in the middle, but also with the risk of closure: The development of the European Union (see also Holtmann/Riemer-forthcoming) is the feasible next step of the European nations to open societies as community of equal-sovereign states with regional and local cultural autonomy on the basis of federalism and with the half Christian, half socialist idea of solidarity.

Notes

1. In 1982 Roemer still speaks about “exploitation”. In 1986 he rightly concludes that his analysis implicates that one should talk about the unequal distribution of assets for which I propose the more general notion of resource of action.
2. Results concerning the other countries can be found in the following papers: For Sweden, compare Ahrne (1981); the class structure of the USA in comparison to Sweden is discussed in Wright et al. (1982) and Wright (1985). For gender issues concerning Norway compare Birkelund (1986); for Finland see the report of the Finnish class project (1985); a comparison of the class structures of Finland, Norway, and Sweden can be found in Ahrne et al. (1988). The social structure of Great Britain is analysed in Marshall et al. (1988). For Canada compare Black and Myles (1986); for New Zealand see Wilkes et al. (1985); for Australia compare Baxter et al. (1988); Boreham et al. (1988) discuss theses summarizing the configurations of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand: Wallerstein's (1976) concept of semi-periphery, dominion capitalism (Ehrensaft and Armstrong, 1987), Americanization and purely endogeneous determination. Part of these discussions are continued in a first comparison of the countries mentioned above in Holtmann and Strasser (1989); and the theses of Haller (1988) and Bornschier (1988, 1989) are discussed in this paper.
3. Gross income serves as a criterion for the international comparison, since this indicator was available for all countries besides the FRG. For the FRG net income was transformed to gross income.
4. The four items of the German index are the following: "Corporations benefit owners at the expense of workers and consumers." "During a strike, management should be prohibited by law from hiring workers to take the place of strikers." "If given the chance, the non-management employees at the place where you work could run things effectively without bosses." "Workers in our society need trade unions to accomplish their interests." (See my chapter 2 in Erbslöh et al., 1987) - The indices of class consciousness measuring the polarity of capital vs. labour were developed by Thomas Hagelstange in analogy. In essence, five labour versus capital issues were combined to a simple additive index. (See Hagelstange et al. 1990)
5. Some details of the samples and the model are country specific: Only for Canada and for Finland there were enough female farmers. For Finland there were not enough male self-employed professionals, for Sweden and Japan there were not enough female self-employed professionals. For Australia we had to merge the big and small employers as well for men (what we generally did for women). For Japan we had to merge the public non-manual area for the women. For the FRG we assigned "Meister" to "leading manual" and "Facharbeiter/Vorarbeiter" to "skilled manual", since the solution on the basis of the occupational titles alone is not adequate. One implicit assumption of our model is that higher occupational and employment

status must lead to higher income. In four cases we interpret the data to be not good enough to show this monotony. That is why we merge the two groups of female self-employed in Denmark, the two groups of female skilled and unskilled manuals in Denmark as well as Japan, and the private non-manual area in Japan. Further informations are to be found in the graph.

Figure 3: Model of gendered occupational and employment status (Ten countries altogether)




Figure 2: Model of employment status for the FRG by income and index of consciousness

Income: $\text{Eta}^2 = 39,3 \%$

Index: $\text{Eta}^2 = 17,1 \%$

Middle: \oplus

(Percentage of the location on the basis of the 1815 respondents)





Figure 1: Wright's class model II for the FRG by income and index of consciousness

Income: $Eta^2 = 32,6 \%$

Index: $Eta^2 = 17,5 \%$

Middle: ●

(Percentage of the location on the basis of the 1815 respondents)



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