



MASTER THESIS

Testing the Limits of Civil Society in Jordan

An Action-based Approach to the Study of Civil
Society in Authoritarian Regimes in the Middle
East

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“The most precise thing one can say about civil society is that it is an extremely vague idea.” (Ulrich Beck 2001)

Deutsche Zusammenfassung

Zivilgesellschaft wird entweder als förderlich für Demokratisierung oder als Stabilisator autoritärer Herrschaftsstrukturen gesehen. Dies ist zum Einen das Resultat der Dominanz bereichslogischer Definitionen des Konzepts, welche Zivilgesellschaft auf ein schmales Spektrum formal organisierter, unabhängiger und demokratisch orientierter NGOs von Bürgern reduziert. Zum Anderen wird Zivilgesellschaft in der Forschung meist als ‚black box‘ behandelt, ohne Differenzierung zwischen der potenziellen Wirkungsweise verschiedener Arten von gesellschaftlichen Akteuren vorzunehmen. Diese Arbeit stellt eine alternative Konzeptualisierung von Zivilgesellschaft als Interaktion gesellschaftlicher Akteure vor, um ein inklusiveres Verständnis zu ermöglichen. Die erarbeitete Operationalisierung dieses Ansatzes erlaubt die empirische Untersuchung einer großen Bandbreite an gesellschaftlichen Aktivitäten, welche je nach Interaktionsmuster innerhalb von vier Dimensionen eine sehr hohe bis sehr niedrige Eignung zum zivilgesellschaftlichen Handeln aufweisen können. Eine Fallstudie verschiedener Akteure im autoritären Regime Jordanien lässt annehmen, dass gesellschaftliche Akteure dort ein dominant tolerantes, demokratisches Interaktionsmuster aufweisen und nicht autoritäre Interaktionsmuster reproduzieren. Dennoch steht eine demokratische Gesinnung der Akteure nicht automatisch in Zusammenhang mit einer oppositionellen Position gegenüber dem autoritären Staat. Das Potenzial der Zivilgesellschaft zur politischen Herausforderung der bestehenden Herrschaftsstrukturen scheint somit gering.

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Introduction

Since the ‘third wave of democratization’, the concept of civil society saw an unprecedented revival as universal motor of democracy. It was seen as agent of mobilization and dissent in authoritarian regimes, to further the consolidation of democratic norms and practices in transitional contexts as well as to deepen and enhance democratic structures in consolidated democracies. During the 1990s, liberalization tendencies in the Middle East suggested that the third wave had finally reached this region of stable authoritarianism and strengthening civil society became the main focus of external democracy promotion programs, effective until today.

With the empirical reality of liberalized authoritarianism, research in contrast turned towards the analysis of authoritarian resilience and survival, questioning the democratizing potential of civil society in the process. Although during the last years, authoritarian regimes had to face some unprecedented political turmoil, neither civil society nor democracy promotion programs have contributed significantly to the events of the Arab Spring or changes in the authoritarian power structure in the region in general (Heydemann 2010; Challand 2011). Civil society organizations are rather accused of reproducing authoritarian practices and stabilizing authoritarian rule, while democracy promotion programs are criticized for their “civil society bias” (Heydemann/ Leenders 2011).

The debate over civil society seems to be caught in a deadlock: civil society as agent of democracy versus stabilizer of authoritarian rule. The reason for this can be found in the narrow understanding of civil society in mainstream domains-based conceptualizations: civil society as separable sphere between state, market, and family that manifests itself in the proto-typical civil society actor, the independent, democratically oriented non-governmental organization. This view especially prevails within democratization literature, in which civil society’s function is mainly seen as the “good” democratic societal counterpart to the “bad” authoritarian state.

Although there are various types of civil society organizations (CSOs) that are included into research and international promotion programs, definitions of borders of civil society vary greatly and decisions on which actors to include and exclude are mostly based on deterministic, normative criteria that want to ensure the virtuousness of the concept or fit the objectives of donor organization. Yet, recent works have come to the conclusion that research and practitioners alike would benefit from a more inclusive understanding of civil society encompassing a broad variety of activism (Cavatorta 2013; Heinrich 2013). Especially when it comes to analyzing civil society in authoritarian regimes, formally organized, independent

NGOs have proven that they are not able to successfully challenge political structures and push for democratic political reform. Looking at a broader variation of civic activism could thus yield better results at explaining or even reproducing events such as the Arab Spring.

Yet up to now, there are no theoretically founded proposals on how to achieve a more inclusive civil society understanding, specifying clear guidelines on which kind of civic activism and organizations to include into a broader concept. This goal therefore represents the global research question of this thesis: How can the concept of civil society be made more inclusive for the study of persistence and change of authoritarian regimes?

The analytical framework employed to this end is the action-based concept of civil society by Gosewinkel and Rucht (2004), which understands civil society in terms of interactions of actors instead of a pre-determined space or type of actor. Thus, the approach is especially suited for exploring limits of civil society in authoritarian contexts, because it doesn't presuppose any borders but specifies an explicit civil society mode of interaction (tolerance) that can be located within any sphere and for any actor. It was selected because of the belief that the constitutive factor of civil society should not be a specific type of organizational structure or membership in the public sphere, but rather how actors communicate and interact in public when they deal with issues related to power, violence, and exclusion. This analytical framework hence serves to answer two related sub-questions: (1) How can civil society be assessed in an empirical approach without predefined borders? (2) What are the dominant patterns of interaction of societal actors?

This thesis proposes an operationalization of the action-based concept that allows an empirical evaluation of societal actors on the ground to assess to which degree they are dominated by tolerant (=civil society-like) interactions. A dominance of tolerant interactions corresponds to a high civil society aptitude, a low degree of tolerant interactions corresponds to a low aptitude. Any actor that deals with issues of power, violence, and exclusion is considered as societal actor and thus part of civil society. In contrast to categorical decisions on civil society's borders based on predefined normative criteria, this approach yields a ranking of all societal actors along a continuum ranging from very low to very high civil society aptitude. Depending on how many actors are ranked in which category, conclusions can be drawn on the dominance of patterns of interaction between societal actors in a country.

This evaluative tool is then tested in a case study on civil society in Jordan, assessing the aptitude of four different types of civil society actors¹. Three of those actors have been

¹ As this thesis assumes that civil society is not only made up of collectively organized CSOs, but can also include other types of non-structured, informal civic activism, I will in the following use the term civil society actor or societal actor to refer to any kind actor that deals with issues of power, exclusion, and violence.

selected because they are typical cases of previously defined grey zones of civil society while the fourth case represents an NGO as typical civil society actor of domains-based concepts. Jordan has been selected as case because it represents the typical liberalized authoritarian Middle Eastern regime. The assessment is primarily based on qualitative interviews, conducted according to an interview method adapted from psychological aptitude testing (Westhoff 2009) and interview data is analyzed through a pre-developed rating scheme.

The advantages of such an empirical approach are evident: all types of civic activism are included into civil society research, which will in turn allow for a more differentiated and broader analysis on the correlation between different types of civic activism, civil society aptitude and potential impact on political structures. Instead of assuming that civil society in total either contributes to democratic change or stabilizes authoritarian rule, research could accordingly focus on which combination of factors (for example patterns of interaction, structural interrelatedness with the regime, relationship with state institutions, view on civil society's function, the political environment) leads to which type of impact. The interviews are directed at generating first hypotheses related to this third sub-question to assess if there is a connection between civil society aptitude and an actor's position vis-à-vis the authoritarian regime: How do different types of actors see the function of and relationship between themselves as civil society and the state? While this question is led by the assumption that the position of a civil society actor towards the authoritarian regime might influence its potential willingness and capability to have an impact on existing power structures, this thesis does not deal with the issue of impact. It will only attempt to generate hypotheses on correlations between factors that define an actor's position towards the state.

The results of the case study show that three of the four actors achieve high scores for the civil society aptitude and hence tolerance dominates their interactions. This suggests that many different types of actors and activism beyond the proto-typical independent NGO should be included into the concept of researchers and democracy promotion practitioners alike. The results also show that a high degree of tolerant interactions doesn't necessarily entail an oppositional position towards the authoritarian regime that is directed at challenging existing power structures. Even when the relationship between an actor and the state is described as difficult, its position vis-à-vis the regime can be defined as impartial or mediator. In contrast, interrelatedness with the regime and ensuing friendly relations probably ensues a position as partner of the regime in charge of implementing the state's agenda.

Following the assumption that tolerant interactions of an actor can in fact be equated with a general democratic (in the sense of pluralistic) disposition, this suggests two propositions: (1) just because a civil society actor has a general democratic disposition, it

doesn't automatically take an oppositional stance towards the authoritarian regime and potentially push for democratic political reform; (2) Jordan's civil society does not reproduce authoritarian practices on the societal level, but at the same time, its potential to change current authoritarian power structures is low.

The thesis is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter, I trace the mainstream understanding of civil society within the relevant literature to identify a core meaning and grey areas of the concept and subsequently present the analytical framework used as alternative approach to a more inclusive understanding of civil society. In the second chapter, I outline the operationalization of the concept as well as the case study and qualitative interview methodology. The third chapter then presents the empirical case study, including a description of the political context of civic activism in Jordan, its civil society scene and evaluations of the four actors. The final fourth chapter then finishes with overall implications from the case study findings as well as an assessment of the suitability of the analytical framework and operationalization to study civil society in authoritarian contexts and a possible further research agenda based on the identified hypotheses.

I. Literature Review

Attempting to identify what is meant by civil society has been described as trying to nail a pudding to a wall (Fraune/ Schubert 2012, 9; Heinrich 2013). Especially on the theoretical level, there is such a huge variety of differing, only loosely connected conceptualizations of civil society under debate in all sub-disciplines of the social sciences, that the effort of compiling a complete review of all relevant literature on the topic would vastly exceed the possibilities of this thesis.

Therefore, the goal for this section will be to give an overview of the most important concepts of civil society, especially within the normative literature on democratic development and authoritarian resilience in the Middle East, as well as corresponding understandings of democracy promotion practitioners. This is preceded by a short synopsis on their foundation within political and democratic theory. The second part of this review will deal with empirical literature on civil society, including different measurement proposals and global indices.

Constantly guiding this review are the questions inferred from the overall goal of this thesis: What are the limitations within the differing concepts of civil society, who is defined as part of civil society and on what grounds? This analysis of borders of civil society will show how today's mainstream domains-based understanding of civil society as intermediary sphere between state, family and economy evolved. It then serves as a basis for presenting the alternative approach towards defining civil society actors in the second part of the chapter, based on the logic of action.

A. Evolvement of the Concept: Civil Society as Descriptive Category

Klaus von Beyme describes the evolvement of the civil society concept as shift from descriptive-analytical category to analyze social realities to a normative-idealized utopia of what society ought to be (Beyme 2000, 51ff.).

The roots of the concept date back to Aristotle's description of the Greek polis as *politike koinonia*, the community of free citizens united on the basis of rule of law to achieve a virtues 'good' life (Kaldor 2003, 584; Cohen/ Arato 1992, 84). Although *polis* is used in contrast to *oikos*, which describes the realm of private life and basic personal needs, within the *polis* there is no further differentiation into spheres, but rather all free citizens form one political society (Cohen/ Arato 1992, 85). This descriptive unity of state and society is upheld

all through Antiquity, where Aristotle's *politike koinonia* was first translated to *societas civiles* by Cicero, giving the term its current linguistic form (ibid., 86).

The development of analytical differentiation between society and state and further subdivision into spheres starts with social contract theory, which distinguishes between a status of natural law and the formation of the state through a social contract. Yet social contract theorists do not yet clearly distinguish between civil society and the state. Rather, civil society was equal to the political society, a type of state governed by a social contract and law (Kaldor 2003, 584). For Locke for example, the formation of the state represents uniting "into one society", consequently to him there is no difference between political and civil society (Beyme 2000, 52f.). According to some scholars such as Charles Taylor, Locke's focus on protecting the natural right to possession from state interference also leads to the equation of civil society and economic sphere (Taylor 1993, 133ff.). With Montesquieu, the separation of state and society progresses slowly, as he develops the model of separation of powers with intertwined *corps intermédiaires* that mediate interests between government and citizens (Cohen/ Arato 1992, 88). Rousseau as well as Kant subsequently can be credited with the first usage of the term *bourgeois* or *bürgerliche* society, a civil state of lawfulness contrasted to the immorality of natural society (ibid. 89). Until today, many German sources use the terms civil society and *Bürgergesellschaft* interchangeably.

According to Cohen and Arato, the first real theory of civil society can be found in Hegel's conceptualization of the *Bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, a translation of the term civil society as used by Ferguson in a pointed manner to describe a civilized way of life for the public good in contrast to barbaric, violent behaviors (Cohen/ Arato 1992: 91). Hegel's concept of *Sittlichkeit* shows the first explicit differentiation between the state, civil (= *bürgerliche*) society and family (Klein 2001, 298ff.). Within civil society as a public intermediary sphere, corporations and associations constitute the main anchor for integration and socialization as well as accumulation of public opinions and articulation of common interests (Kaldor 2003, 584). Thus, Hegel can be credited as the first to introduce today's common conception of civil society as intermediary sphere between state and private life, while still encompassing the economy.

With Marx's interpretation of *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* solely as sphere of interest-oriented economic elites, the term civil society was equalized with the economic sphere (Kaldor 1993, 584). Subsequently, the usage of the term *bürgerlich* got discredited in Europe through its contrast with the positively connoted term proletariat (von Beyme 2000, 56). During the same time, Tocqueville realized a positive description of the term civil society in his analysis of the sources of success of America's democracy. Recurring on Hegel's

description of the integrative functions of corporations, he created one of today's most prominent understandings of civil society as sphere of intermediary associations, securing social and political pluralism and serving as schools of virtue and democracy (Taylor 1993, 141f). Yet, only with the work of Antonio Gramsci did civil society finally come to be rid of the economic dimension and receive its current understanding of sphere outside the market, the state, and private life (Kaldor 2003, 584).

B. Normative Literature: Civil Society as Idealized Concept

1. Civil Society in Democratic Theory

Within the context of established Western democracies, a variously diagnosed crisis of liberal democracy at the end of the 20th century led to a normative re-politicizing and idealization of civil society as remedy that would realize a 'good societal order' by deepening participatory structures and furthering civic virtues to thus challenge the elite model of democracy (Klein 2001, 377ff.; Cohen/Arato 1992, 8f).

Democratic theorists of various schools have approached to overcome the crisis in different forms, normatively charging the analytical term in the process. Liberalists such as Dahrendorf (1992, 1995) following the "Locke-line" (Taylor 1993, 142) stress the importance of civil rights and negative freedom from state interventions upheld by the rule of law in realizing individual autonomy both as pre-condition for the existence of civil society and as its key function (Cohen/ Arato 1992, 9). Communitarians along the "Montesquieu-line" (Taylor 1993, 39), such as Waltzer (1995), Taylor himself (1993), or Putnam (1993), criticize this liberal focus on individualism. They argue that humans as social beings are part of a community integrated by civic virtues. Civil society is identical with society as a whole, realizing a common understanding of the 'good life' through civic engagement while being regulated by the state (Cohen/Arato 1992, 9f). Critical theory as postulated by Cohen/Arato (1992) and Habermas (1992) root civil society within the public sphere (next to an economic, administrative and private sphere), where it serves as mediator between private interests and political decision-making processes (Klein 2001, 315f., Beyme 2000, 61). Critical theory thus tries to unite both the Locke and Montesquieu line, conceptualizing civil society as sphere that articulates and protects individual interests while at the same time realizing a societal order of common civic virtues, both achieved through rationale public discourse and deliberation.

These strands of democratic theory follow domains-based approaches to civil society: a separable sphere defined in relation to the state or political sphere, normatively charged as the space of civic engagement for the realization of civic virtues and a good societal order. In

contrast to this negative definition of civil society, conceptualizations of civil society based on interactions between actors can be subsumed under the heading of action-based approaches. These concepts positively define civil society through a typical mode of interaction such as cooperation that differs from the dominant modes of interactions within the state, economy, and family (Gosewinkel 2003; Offe 2003). Further explanations about this approach to civil society will be given in section III. of this chapter when presenting the action-based concept used as analytical framework for this thesis.

2. Civil Society in Democratization Literature

The term civil society saw its global renaissance with the color revolutions in the Soviet Union. It was used by the popular citizen movements to theoretically legitimize their opposition to the totalitarian state by establishing a link to a Western model of democratic development (Taylor 1993, 118). This usage of the term led to the ensuing idealization of civil society within the democratic development literature. It expresses the hope for similar processes of gradual de-legitimization of authoritarian regimes as well as stabilization during the following transitional periods through the activities of civil associations and grassroots movements (Klein 2001, 35)². For democratization theory and practitioners alike, civil society became synonymous for “the opposite of despotism” (Hall 1995, 1) and the establishment effective, stable, and successful democracy itself (Sardamov 2005, 379).

Democratization literature is largely dominated by a neo-liberal development approach characterized by the Washington Consensus and the overall strive for good governance. Within this framework, civil society is mostly understood in a manner vis-à-vis the state, responsible for monitoring the state’s adherence to the neo-liberal reform agenda as well as serving as sphere to bundle a critical mass of civic actors able to defy and challenge the authoritarian state (Diamond 1999, Bellin 1994; Henry/ Springborg 2001, 30f.; Kubba 2000).

The proto-typical definition representing this view is Larry Diamond’s understanding of civil society as “the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, self-supporting, autonomous from the State, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. It is distinct from society in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual

² Among a vast array of works linking civil society to democratization and the end of authoritarianism, see for example: Stepan (1985): *State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of South America*, Clark (1991): *Democratizing development. The role of voluntary organizations*, Loveman (1991): *NGOs and the transition to democracy in Chile*, Pérez-Díaz (1992): *The Return of Civil Society: The Making of Democracy in Spain*, Lewis (1992): *Political Transitions and the Dilemma of Civil Society in Africa*, Clarke (1998): *Nongovernmental organization (NGOs) and politics in the developing world*, Ottaway/ Carothers (2000): *Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion*, Newton (2001), *Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy*.

goals, make demands on the State and hold State officials accountable” (Diamond 1994, 5). Similarly, Huber, Rushemeyer, and Stephens see civil society as “the public sphere distinguished from the state, the economy, and the web of family and kin relations” (1993, 73) and Stepan defines it as “that arena where manifold social movements [...] and civic organizations from all classes [...] attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their interests” (1988, 3f.). In a comparable but rather actor-centered vein, Linz and Stepan define civil society as the collectivity of “self-organizing groups, movements and individuals, [that are] autonomous from the state” (Linz/ Stepan 1996, 7f.).

In an attempt to better utilize the civil society concept for the analysis of democratic transformations and de-contextualize the term from its historically European roots, Croissant et al. develop an alternative, structural-functionalist conceptualization of civil society (2000). Based on conceptualizations of civil society within political theory, the authors distill five main functions of civil society for democratization: protection from state interventions, serving as intermediary between private interests and political sphere, socialization and pluralization through voluntary associations, internalizing communal civic and democratic virtues, and communicating through deliberation and public discourse (ibid., 11ff.). Accordingly, civil society encompasses any actor that fulfills one of those functions while adhering to further normative criterias of non-violence and religious, political, and ideological tolerance (ibid., 18). Hence, this alternative conceptualization as well follows an actor-centered definition of civil society.

3. Civil Society in Middle Eastern Studies

These domains- or actor-oriented conceptions of civil society are especially dominant in Middle Eastern studies. The expansion of civic organizations in many Middle Eastern states together with liberalization policies during the 1990s led to a number of optimistic research on the “awakening of civil society” (Kubba 2000) and ensuing democratization (Norton 1993, 1995, 1996; Krämer 1992; Ghabra 1991; Sadowski 1993; Sivan 1990; Esposito et al. 1999; Bellin 1994; Ismael/ Ismael 1997; Salam 2002).

Although most of the authors do not explicitly state their definition of civil society, they implicitly follow the domains-based view. For Kubba for example, the sign for civil society growth is “the mushrooming NGO movement” (2000, 87) and Norton’s analysis of civil society focuses on the “mélange of groups, associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations, unions, parties, and groups come together to provide a buffer between state and citizen” (1993, 211). In most of these studies on civil society in the Middle East, the role of

civil society as the ‘good’ counter-weighting sphere to the un-democratic, ‘uncivil’ state is especially prominent: “civil society [is] made up of groups with a level of internal organization and assertiveness that enables them to challenge state power” (Sadowski 1993, 15).

Yet, defining who is considered as civil society actor represents a specific controversy within Middle Eastern studies. Authors within the debate on an Islamic resurgence³ searched for alternative civic groups more historically linked with Middle Eastern societies beyond what had been imported by Western models of societal organization. For this reason, many of the today very critically viewed groups of political Islam such as the Muslim Brotherhood or charitable Islamic societies were considered as viable civil society agents during the 1990s, capable of contributing to a democratic development (Sadowski 1993, 16f.; Sivan 1990; Esposito et al. 1999, 2). In contrast, for most of the Western researchers as well as the liberally oriented Arab research institutions, civil society actors had to be “secular in ideology, civil in their behavior, legally recognized, and supportive of democratic reform” (Yom 2005, 18).

Jordanian research and discourse on civil society mirrors this divide. Debate on the topic was initiated relatively late in the 1990s by the Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center (UJRC) through a publication series and research projects on civil society and democratic development (CIVICUS 2010, 22). Herein, they defined civil society as “the space or sphere where different movements and organizations [...] try to form and express opinions and bolster leverage and influence” (Hourani/ Shteivi 1996, 8f. as cited in CIVICU 2010, 23). Yet debate also revolved around the question, which typical Arab groups such as tribal clans or traditional forms of Bedouin assembly to include into the concept (CIVICUS 2010, 23). Additionally, discussions revolved around the issue, if official licensing from the state and independence from state institutions and the political sphere is necessary for inclusion (ibid.).

4. Civil Society in International Democracy Promotion

Under the heading of the EU’s Barcelona Process, the US freedom agenda or UNDP’s and the World Bank’s strive for good governance, strengthening and funding civic associations constitutes the key and for some time almost exclusive element in the growing business of democracy promotion in the Middle East (Yom 2005; Carothers/ Ottaway 2000; Carapico

³ Islamic resurgence or awakeing describes the revived search for an Arab identity based on religion instead of nationalism starting in the 1970s, today mostly associated with political and radical Islam (Esposito 1983). In contrast to today, discussions of this trend under the term Islamic fundamentalism were discredited as Neo-Orientalism. Instead, the trend was seen as a viable search for an Arab alternative of state-society relations and social order (Sadowski 1993).

1998; Carothers 2004; Bellin 1994). Bottom-up capacity building through cooperation with local NGOs is supposed to facilitate the synchronization of donor strategies and the needs of the people, as these organizations are considered to be in closer contact with society, consequently enhancing funding effectiveness (Menge 2011, 65). Although research programs have shifted due to empirical realities of failed democratization, democracy promotion practice still builds on the assumption of transitology, believing in the eventual democratizing effect of civil society (Heydemann 2010, 1).

The academic domains-based concepts with further normatively qualifying criteria are mostly mirrored in the definitions of international actors engaged in this field of democracy promotion. Exemplary for this approach, the actor-centered definition of the EU, which considers civil society as the collectivity of all civil society organizations, including “all non-State, not-for-profit structures, non-partisan and non-violent, through which people organize to pursue shared objectives and ideals, whether political, cultural, social or economic” (European Commission 2012, 3). Very similar definitions are used by the World Bank (2013) or USAID (2011, ii).

UNDP opts for a more sphere-centered approach, albeit still yielding to the logic of domains, defining civil society as arena “of voluntary collective actions around shared interests, purposes and values distinct from families, state and profit-seeking institutions” (UNDP 2009, 6). Comparable, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development describes civil society as “all forms of organized activity in which citizens engage [...] [including] all activities that are not profit-oriented and are independent of party-political interests.”⁴

Civil society strengthening receives the bulk of international funding. During 1991 to 2001, USAID alone set aside USD 150 million of a total of a USD 250 million democracy promotion budget for civil society strengthening projects in the Middle East (Brumberg et al 2004, Hawthorne 2005). OECD’s recent evaluation of development programs shows that international official development aid (ODA) channeled to and through CSOs increased to USD 19.3 billion in 2011, which is around 15.2% of overall ODA (OECD DAC 2013, 2). At the same time, the report suggests that most of the ODA channeled through CSOs in 2011 was directed towards NGOs active in social policy areas such as infrastructure and services delivery in support of the UN Millennium Development Goals, while only 37% went to NGOs working on political issues (ibid., 3). The same evaluation also reports that the primary reason of donors to fund CSOs is the implementation of aid programs, with democracy

⁴ BMZ, Lexikon der Entwicklungspolitik, accessible at <http://www.bmz.de/de/service/glossar/Z/zivilgesellschaft.html> (last access: 4.2.2014).

promotion and political stabilization only being subordinate (*ibid.*, 3). Of the funds that go into civil society, there are no numbers on how much is distributed to which types of CSOs. Yet, this report and a multitude of others over the course of the last two decades constantly use civil society, CSO and NGO interchangeably. The term CSO can mostly be found in more recent publications, possibly in an effort to appear more inclusive, yet the basic understanding of NGO as proto-typical civil society actor does not seem to have changed.

5. Civil Society in Authoritarian Resilience Literature

With the empirical reality of failed democratization (Carothers 2002) and stable, liberalized autocracy (Brumberg 2002) identified at the beginning of the new millennium, academia turned towards researching the reasons for this authoritarian resilience and the “darker” side of civil society. In the Middle East, the extreme growth of civic associations seemed not yet to have met a critical mass previously identified as necessary for toppling authoritarian regimes or not to have the same effect as civic activism in other regions of the world (Yom 2005, 19).

Thus, on the one hand, civil society’s ascription as prime agent of democratization underwent critical analysis, questioning the actual impact of CSOs during previous transitions in Eastern Europe (Tempest 1997), Latin America (Encarnacion 2003, Grugel 2000), in historical perspective (Forment 2003; Berman 1997) or from an overall perspective of democratic development (Carothers 2000; Encarnacion 2006). Furthermore, the assumption of an automatic link between a rising number of CSOs and a rising impact on political reform came under critique (Edwards/ Hume 1996, Yom 2005).

On the other hand, civil society’s actual role as the ‘good’ democratizing actor within authoritarian regimes received critical consideration, leading to findings of co-opted CSOs that have no effect on democratization but rather strengthen authoritarian rule, especially in the Middle East (Wiktorowicz 2002, Albrecht 2005, Cavatorta/ Durac 2010, Cavatorta 2013, Liverani 2008, Gengler et al. 2011). Through a combination of allowing limited space mostly for charitable and social civic activism yet at the same time co-opting, controlling or repressing politically critical civil society actors, authoritarian regimes have been credited with creating an image of liberalization and pluralism while simultaneously de-politicizing civil society (Cavatorta 2013, 3f, Wiktorowicz 83ff). Civil society actors themselves were further identified as rent-seeking organizations only existent to compete for foreign funding (Carapico 2000) or as actors that misuse the term to promote Islamist’s or other radical values (Berman 2003, Kelsey 2002). They might also give further salience to ethnic and sectarian divisions (Whittington 1998) or act as associations that reproduce the state’s patrimonial style of rule and further diffuse it within society (Jamal 2007, Heydemann/ Leenders 2011).

Conceptions of civil society within this strand of literature follow mostly the mainstream sphere- and actor-oriented understanding. Although again many of the researchers don't explicitly state a formal definition of civil society, their works focus mainly on the activities of formally organized non-governmental organizations and civic associations, implying their accordance with such approaches.⁵ Yet, the disillusionment of failed democratization has also produced research with slightly different perspectives on civil society conceptualization. MacDonald for example, defines civil society in the Middle East in terms of its civil character in contrast to the highly militarized regimes: "It is a form of society that is contrasted with, and juxtaposed to, war, military society, armed struggle and the logic of absolute victory. Rather, it is committed to a self-image of peaceful internal change and social tolerance, and to external relationships rooted in commercial transactions and conflict resolution" (MacDonald 1998, 28). Volpi in a slightly different manner, frames civil society in terms of the communication and practice of civility within the Arab societies embodied in everyday interpersonal and inter-communal interactions (2011). Cavatorta in contrast propagates a concept of civil society as 'activated citizenship', disbanding overtly normative approaches and instead researching civic activism beyond traditional formal organizations (Cavatorta 2013, 8f; Aarts/ Cavatorta 2013, 6f). Although not yielding a formal definition of what is meant by activated citizenship, civic activism that is covered by their research includes examples such as individual writings, mass participation, non-political activism, global networks or non-autonomous state-related organization (Aart/ Cavatorta 2013).

6. Civil Society and Related Concepts

Apart from explicit theories on civil society, there are numerous related concepts with fluent borders to civil society. First, this includes research on organized interests labeled third or non-profit sector, in which civil associations represent one type of actor to organize and voice interests next to actors such as professional associations, trade unions, welfare organizations, sports clubs, religious and cultural associations, or political parties (Alemann 1989; Streeck/ Schmitter 1985; Fraune/ Schuber 2012). Secondly, the concept of social capital is closely related to civil society, as it describes the outcome of associational relations and civic engagement in the form of valuable social networks and social trust (Putnam 2000). Social capital is seen as key component of democracy and sometimes used synonymously with civil

⁵ In their studies of civil society, Jamal for example focuses on researching associational life in Palestine (2007) and Liverani that of Algeria (2008), Witorowicz exclusively looks at NGOs in Jordan (2002), Gengler discusses the relationship between attitudes towards democracy and engagement in civic associations in Qatar (2011), Heydemann and Leenders study how formal civic organizations reproduce authoritarian norms and practices of regimes (2011) and Berman traces the development of formal Islamist organizations in Egypt (2003).

society or even employed to operationalize and measure civil society (Woolcock 2011). A third concept with close ties to civil society is social movement theory, which deals with informal networks created by individuals, groups, and organizations, which are engaged in political or cultural conflict based on collective identities (Diani 1992). Although the concepts theoretically overlap, there is little dialogue between the two research areas in practice (della Porta/ Diani 2011). Lastly, civil society is often conflated with the concept of civility, a term to describe a set of moral virtues or manner of polite interaction (Boyd 2006; Calhoun 2000) often dubbed as basis of democracy (Hefner 1998). Civil society by virtue of its name is consequently defined both as the space of ‘good’ civil behavior as well as the responsible sphere for furthering and ensuring democratic civility (Rucht 2009; Beyme 2000; Volpi 2011; Eliasoph 2011, Hefner 1998).

C. Empirical Literature: The Gap between Reality and Expectations

While the theoretical debate about conceptions of civil society is almost unmanageably large, comprehensive, empirically grounded attempts at measuring what civil society actually is and how it impacts democratic governance and development are rather rare (Anheier 2004, 6f; Heinrich 2013, 2). The limited empirical literature on civil society that has been developed addresses this normative-empirical gap, trying to assess the strength, shape or quality of civil society in different countries and world regions in a comparative way.

1. Proposals for Operationalization and Measurement

Most of the empirical literature on civil society is concerned with constructing measurement tools to determine strength, shape, or impact of national or global civil society. For the largest part, it only presents theoretical proposals or case studies that have not been applied to a larger set of countries. This is mostly due to the fact that data on civic activism of any kind isn’t readily available through secondary sources, but for the most part needs to be collected first-hand on the ground, requiring above all a lot of funding and expert staff.

At the Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics (LSE), Anheier developed a measurement proposal to assess the strength and possible impact of civil society on a national level, the Civil Society Diamond (CSD) (Anheier 2004). This diamond measures four dimensions of civil society – structure, space, values, and impact – so that the state of civil society in any country can be depicted and graphically compared. Each dimension is made up of preferred, standard, optional and other indicators, so that any user of

the CSD guide can measure civil society only with little core indicators or an extended list, depending on availability of data (ibid., 35ff).

Anheier follows the mainstream domains-based approach, defining civil society as “sphere of institutions, organizations and individuals located between the family, the state and the market in which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests” (2004, 22), explicitly stating that it is neither synonymous with society as a whole nor identical to the non-profit sector. He includes an open list of organizations and actors that are in- and excluded from civil society (ibid., 27), however tolerating the fact that civil society may always include ‘uncivil’ actors (ibid., 28).

Additionally, the LSE Center for Civil Society under Anheier developed annual methodological approaches for measuring the strength of global civil society in LSE Yearbooks. In 2002 for example, Anheier and Stares suggested a methodology for a Global Civil Society Index that would allow a comparative ranking of countries and regions based on their interrelations with global civil society to fill a gap in empirical globalization research (Anheier/ Stares 2002). The index would measure two units of analysis, the unit of individuals and their ideas, values, identities, opinions, actions, and participation, and the unit of organizations and the density of their infrastructure, both in relation to global civil society organizations and aggregated on national levels (ibid., 243ff).

The understanding of global civil society in the LSE Yearbooks again follows a domains-based approach, describing the “socio-sphere of ideas, values, organisations, networks, and individuals located primarily outside the institutional complexes of family, market, and state” with the additional criteria of being “beyond the confines of national societies, polities, and economies” (Anheimer/ Stares 2002, 243).

A different way of measuring civil society strength on a national level is presented by Uphoff and Krishna’s functionalist approach similar to Croissants’ structural-functionalist conceptualization of civil society (Uphoff/ Krishna 2004). They try to evaluate the scope and effectiveness of civil society and map its shape by assessing how well a continuum of institutions – ranging from those embedded in the state and autonomous from society to those autonomous from the state and embedded in society – perform central civil society functions (ibid., 359ff). This continuum encompasses any institution that can contribute to the advancement of citizen interests, to the protection of citizen rights, and the fulfillment of citizen needs in a direct way against the state and on its own behalf (ibid., 368). Their understanding of civil society is thus not that of an intermediary sphere, the authors rather concentrate on what civil society does instead of asking what it is. Uphoff and Krishna’s

approach is also one of the few that specifies empirically assessable criteria for civil society membership instead of deciding on a normative basis.

An encompassing operationalization of an action-based approach to identify the disposition and impact of civic organizations is put forward by Wischermann (2010; 2013). Interactions of civic organizations are evaluated through standardized interviews assessing internal practices of decision-making and attitudes of the leadership towards ‘difference’ such as societally excluded minority groups (ibid. 2010). This assessment is based on the assumption that interactions following the theoretical notion of ‘mutual recognition of the other’ exemplify democratically oriented dispositions and practices. A lack of tolerance for diverging views and differences represents patterns of authoritarianism (ibid. 2013, 10). In a new research project, the impact of CSOs, their relationship and interdependencies with the state are assessed through analyzing their influence on the infrastructural and discursive power of the state.⁶

A proposal to assess the quality of civil society is proposed by Klaus von Beyme through the operationalization of his concept of civil society as the “just society” (von Beyme 2000, 67). According to this approach, a society’s civil quality can be judged with the indicator ‘civil rights’, by analyzing the degree to which national legal systems grant political and social rights in an inclusionary manner for a broad base of society (ibid.).

2. Global Indices

There are two projects that not only theoretically propose measurement tools and present case studies, but also compile large-N data sets to construct indices of civil society with near global reach:

- (1) The Global Civil Society Index (GCSI) evolved out of the Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (CNP) at the Center for Civil Society Studies at John Hopkins University (Salamon/ Sokolowski 2004)
- (2) The Civil Society Index (CSI) developed by the International Alliance for Citizen Participation CIVICUS (Heinrich 2007, 2013)

a) *The Global Civil Society Index (GCSI)*

The CNP project was designed by Salomon and Anheier in 1991 to measure the nonprofit sector in 12 countries, leading to a common definition, a classification system, as well as a

⁶ As put forward in the research design of the project “Civil Society Organizations as supporter of Authoritarian Rule? A Cross-Regional Comparison (Vietnam, Algeria, Mozambique), <http://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/project/civil-society-organizations-as-supporters-of-authoritarian-rule-a-cross-regional-comparison> (last accessed: 3.3.2014).

standardized set of guidelines of recording the activities of the non-profit sector in national economic accounts, vested in a central database called *Nonprofit Satellite Accounts* (Lyons 2009, 74f., United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Statistics Division 2003). With the growing popularity of the civil society term during the 1990s, the project changed its objectives during the second phase to research the scope, structure and role of the civil society sector and the impact of CSOs. However, they basically only interchanged the term nonprofit with civil society without other major revisions in methodology (ibid., 75, Salamon et al. 1999).

In 2002, the Global Civil Society Index (GCSI) was developed to measure and compare the civil society sectors worldwide by aggregating data already collected during the CNP project (Salamon/ Sokolowski 2004). The index captures 12 indicators within three dimensions – capacity (size and mobilized activity), sustainability (legal, financial, and social survival over time), and impact (contribution of the civil society sector to the social, economic, and political life) – normalized and expressed as percentage of the highest score achieved by one country ranging between 0 and 100%. These scores within each dimension are then totaled and averaged to a single index, with the Netherlands receiving the highest score of 74 and Pakistan the lowest with 19 out of 36 states analyzed (ibid., 78ff.). The GCSI was only compiled once in 2004, but is planned to go into a third volume with revised objectives and methodology starting in 2014.⁷

For the UN Handbook, non-profit institution (NPIs) were defined as “legal or social entities created for the purpose of production of goods and services whose status does not permit them to be a source of income, profit, or other financial gain [...], created to provide services [...], for charitable, philanthropic or welfare reasons or to provide goods [...] to other persons in need” (United Nations 2003, 12f.). The report further distinguishes NPIs from government agencies and households, resembling the domains-based conceptions of civil society. The title of the report about the second phase of the project, *Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the nonprofit Sector* (Salamon et al. 1999) suggests a simple amendment of the original project with the now popular civil society term. This led to one of the biggest criticisms of the project: the conflation of the non-profit sector and civil society (Lyons 2009, 81). In the first chapter of the report, the term civil society is interchangeably used with voluntary, third, independent and non-profit sector, specifying organizations that are institutionalized, private, non-profit, self-governing, and voluntary (Salamon et al 1999, 3f.). The GCSI uses this same domains-based conceptualization, defining civil society as “the


⁷ Compare <http://ccss.jhu.edu/beatng-the-odds-the-center-in-2013> (last access: 8.2.2014).

basic private associational life of a society”, a separated sector encompassing all active non-profit organizations (Salamon/ Sokolowski 2004, 65).

b) CIVICUS: The Civil Society Index (CSI) and the Enabling Environment Index (EEI)

The *Civil Society Index* developed by CIVICUS is loosely based on a slim version of Anheier’s Civil Society Diamond. Developed out of a compilation of 60 civil society country profiles collected in *The New Civic Atlas* (CIVICUS 1997), CIVICUS subsequently opted for the publication of an index based on standardized methodology (Heinrich 2007). The CSI is meant to provide a “contextually valid assessment of the state of civil society in a given country” as well as achieving “cross-country comparability of its findings (ibid., 3). The index assesses Anheier’s four dimensions of the civil society diamond:

Figure 1: A Sample Civil Society Diamond



(Source: Heinrich 2013, 8)


- (1) Civil society structure (strength and depth of citizen participation, diversity and resources)
- (2) Values (extent of commitment and practice of certain values within civil society organizations, for example democracy, transparency, gender equity, poverty eradication)
- (3) External environment (political context, basic freedoms, state-civil society relations) impact
- (4) Impact (civil society influence on public policy, responsiveness to social needs, empowering of citizens) (Heinrich 2013)

In total, there are 74 indicators which are scored on a 0 to 3 scale by an advisory group based on different secondary data, media analysis, regional stakeholder consultations, and population surveys and then aggregated into 25 sub-divisions and the four dimensions to depict specific civil society diamonds (Heinrich 2013, 17f). During the two phases of the project, from 2003-2006 and from 2008-2010, around 70 countries were recorded. Additionally, CIVICUS announced the development of a new *CSI Rapid Assessment* tool in 2012 to account for the highly volatile state of civil society in many countries as well as new forms of civic activism, such as social and protest movements or online activists.⁸

⁸ Compare the announcement on CIVICUS’ website at <http://www.civicus.org/what-we-do-126/csi/csi-ra> (last access: 14.3.2014).

In 2013, CIVICUS also launched the *Enabling Environment Index* (EEI), measuring not civil society itself, but the long-term conditions affecting the capacity of citizens to participate in the civil society arena (CIVICUS 2013, 7). The index is designed along three dimensions (socio-economic, socio-cultural and governance), with 17 sub-divisions and 53 indicators, aggregated on national and regional levels to rank 109 countries on a scale from 0 (least enabling) to 1 (most enabling) (ibid., 9ff). Similar to global-scale indices such as Freedom House’s *Freedom in the World* or the *Bertelsmann Transformation Index*, the EEI offers the possibility of an interactive online map, country reports, data sets and plans an annual report on the state of the enabling environment.

Figure 2: EEI Enabling Map



(Source: <http://civicus.org/eei/>)

CIVICUS’ understanding of civil society represents the evolvement of the concept during the last years along the trend of broadening the term beyond the formally organized, voluntary sector. Although CIVICUS still follows a so-called “arena-approach”, defining civil society as “the arena outside the family, the state and the market where people associate to advance common interests” (Heinrich 2013, 13), it acknowledges that boundaries between these arenas are fuzzy and actors within other arenas such as the economy or family, non-formal actors as well as individuals may also belong to civil society when performing a civil society function (ibid., 14). Also, the term is explicitly not understood in a normative way, encompassing any actor that advances common interests, no matter if their actions are ‘civil’ in nature (ibid., 16).

II. Interim Conclusion

A. Borders of Civil Society in Domains-based Conceptualization


As the preceding analysis shows, there is a multitude of theoretical approaches on how to conceptualize civil society. Yet, both the normative and empirical literature is dominated by the domains-based understanding of civil society. Following the logic of spheres, civil society is depicted as intermediary zone between family, state, and economy and understood as the collective of civil society actors, voluntarily associated in formal organizations. Above all, civil society is mostly negatively defined by non-ism: non-governmental, non-profit, not state, not market, not family. Polemically speaking, it is the “social residue that is left behind when the state is subtracted” (Gellner 1994, 212).

Additionally, many approaches following the logic of domains, especially within democratization literature, use normatively charged idealized understandings of civil society. To them, it is the good sphere of civil, non-violent actors challenging the uncivil “bad” political sphere of state institutions. In practice, this culminates in a definition of civil society actors in terms their hoped for effect as “organizations that can or have the potential to champion democratic/ governance reforms” (Hansen 1996, 3).

In a nutshell, defining characteristics and borders of mainstream domains-based approaches to civil society can be summarized as follows:

- Autonomous sphere separate from state, market, economy
- Made up of collective actors, formally and voluntarily organized
- Actors advance common interests of public welfare/ good
- Normative understanding of actors as good, civil, non-violent, and democratic
- Functions as mediator between society and state interests (democratic theory) or opposition to the state (democratization literature)


Figure 3: Domains-based Model of Society



(Source: Author's own illustration)

In practice, this core understanding of civil society as non-state, voluntary, formally organized collective actor working for the public good manifests in the format of the independent NGO as proto-typical civic association. Other types of civil society organizations (CSOs) are included or excluded depending on concept, almost exclusively on the basis of normative decisions. Thus, CSOs such as professional associations, political parties, media, religious and welfare associations, trade unions, local governments, community-based organizations, state-led agencies, government organized NGOs (GONGOs), or philanthropic and non-profit companies together with less formally organized types of civic activism such as social networks, internet blogs and social media, popular protest movements, individual political activism, dissident writings, global and diaspora activities, artistic performances or tribal activities form a grey area of civil society. Although domains-based approaches imply definite borders of a civil society sphere, the decisions on where to draw the lines vary greatly.

Figure 4: Circle Model of Civil Society Grey Zones



(Source: Author's own illustration)

B. Problems for the Analysis of Civil Society in Authoritarian Contexts

A multitude of problems ensues from this domains-based view of civil society, especially for the analysis of civil society in authoritarian contexts. In social reality, there is no clear division of “bad” authoritarian government and “good” democratic society (Heydemann/Leenders 2011, 4). Civil society per se is neither good nor bad but rather formed by context (Browsers 2006) and civil society actors don't operate within a sealed vacuum of virtues behavior. They are influenced and defined by social, political, cultural, and economic factors of their surrounding environment and may reproduce patterns of norms and practices of the

regime (Heydemann/ Leenders 2011, 4). Therefore, the term civil society should be seen as neutral analytical concept instead of normative ideal to keep analysis separate from hope (Roy 1998, 30).

State-society relations are never clearly separable in any political system, be it democratic or authoritarian. “The three-sector model of society implies that states, markets and non-profit groups are separate from and independent of each other – hermetically sealed, perhaps, in their own rationalities and particular way of working. Yet even a glimpse at real institutions demonstrates that this is nonsense” (Edwards 2004, 24).

There are great ambivalences even within the theoretical debate on the relationship between state and civil society (Foley/ Edwards 1996). While democratic theory sees the state as enabler of a strong civil society, ensuring a democratic environment, rule of law and autonomy of the public sphere so that civic engagement is possible in the first place, democratization literature depicts civil society in opposition to the state tasked with initiating a transformation towards democracy. But if a strong civil society requires a democratic and responsive state, then there can be no civil society in transformative or authoritarian settings according to the domains-based approaches (*ibid.*, 48ff).

In practice, there is a multitude of interrelatedness between civil actors and state institutions even in established democracies when looking at structures and funding (Menge 2011, 59). In the Middle Eastern authoritarian contexts, the boundaries between spheres are even fuzzier. In this region, political, social, and economic spheres are vastly interrelated with an overpowering state dominating and interfering in all the other spheres (Kreitmeyr/ Schlumberger 2010).

In democratization and development practice, the domains-based approach leads to a conceptual restriction that only recognizes a specific type of non-governmental organization as proto-typical civil society actor (Menge 2011, 61, Cavatorta 2013, 8). Yet many of these NGOs have been identified as highly professionalized organizations, greatly dependent on donors and funds. This casts doubt on their postulated voluntary, autonomous nature and goal of furthering common public interests (Edwards 2004, 35). Instead, civic associations are often specifically founded to fit the donors’ narrow civil society understanding and objectives. They are thus more a product and part of the international democracy promotion scene instead of accumulating the interests of the local population (Edwards 2004, 103ff). The domains-based approach applied by democracy promotion to further bottom-up participation and bring donors closer to the interests of local populations thus leads to paradox outcomes: donors promote a rapidly rising number of formally organized NGOs which are far removed from the society they are supposed to be engaged for (*ibid.*).

Last but not least, the domains-based approach leads to ambivalent debates on who should be considered a civil society actor. Decisions on where to draw the borders are mostly made on normative grounds to safeguard the idealized picture of civil society as the “good” sphere, leaving the door open for interpretation and grey zones. As shown, actors alternately have to be “civil”, non-violent, tolerant, democratic, or all of the above to qualify as being labeled a CSO. Depending on researcher and study, the borders between which actors are included and excluded within the civil society sphere may thus vary significantly and are often far removed from empirical realities. Instead of analyzing empirical expressions of civic activism, practitioners and research rather pre-define civil society in accordance with the liberal-democratic agenda, sometimes including organizations from the grey zones to fit their funding profile. Yet, most of this is done without much consideration for the situation on the ground (Edwards 2004, 103).

III. Analytical framework

A. The Action-based Conceptualization of Civil Society


An alternative approach of conceptualizing civil society which is better suited for the analysis of authoritarian contexts is the action-based understanding of civil society as specific mode of interaction developed by Gosewinkel and Rucht (2004). Recent publications on civil society such as those by Cavatorta (2013) or CIVICUS attempt to reframe the concept to broaden the understanding of who is considered a civil society actor. Yet, neither mainstream domains-based conceptualizations nor Cavatorta’s concept of “activated citizenship” or CIVICUS’ “arena” approach offer clear theoretical foundations and empirical guidelines on who should be considered a civil society actor. The action-based approach of Gosewinkel and Rucht offers a remedy for this dilemma.

Gosewinkel and Rucht’s understanding of civil society “as process” is a historically relative, fluid concept, with actors and borders of civil society dependent on context and time. Their work is linked to theoretical foundations of systems theory (Parsons 1971; Luhmann 1984), building upon the assumption of functionally differentiated societies, organized within different sub-systems that are integrated through respective modes of interaction (Gosewinke/ Rucht, 41ff).⁹

⁹ This thesis is not a theoretical work on systems theory and will thus neither offer an explanation of the theory itself, nor an account of the extensive debate on its pros and cons. For further information, see for example Baecker (2005): *Schlüsselwerke der Systemtheorie*, Lee/ Brosziewski (2009): *Observing Society: Meaning, Communication, and Social Systems*, or Luhmann (2009): *Einführung in die Systemtheorie*.

Gosewinkle and Rucht identify four characteristic sub-systems of such functionally differentiated societies: the state, the economy, the community and civil society. Yet, the four sub-systems are not mutually exclusive and easily tangible categories with definite borders, but rather mutually dependent and interpenetrating each other (ibid., 51). Constitutive for each sub-system is a characteristic mode of interaction which defines how actors mainly coordinate and deal with each other. For the state, the dominant mode of interaction is power expressed through law and use of force within hierarchical administrative structures, economy is characterized by the transfer of money through the market mechanism and community is defined by affective solidarity present in kin relations and social closeness (ibid., 48).

Figure 5: Action-based Model of Society



(Source: Author's own illustration)

Civil society is defined as the societal sub-system “where goal-oriented individuals, groups, and associations cooperate and coordinate peacefully in the public sphere based on mutual recognition of the other” (ibid., 45). This rather abstract definition of the civil society mode of interaction as mutual recognition of the other can in essence be described with the more common term tolerance. It refers to a form of interaction that accepts “the principle of equality in spite of difference, hence the autonomy and right to free development of all groups and associations” (ibid., 49).

In practice, the civil society mode of interaction implies “respect without like-mindedness and social closeness, acceptance of procedural rules without common ideologies,

willingness to compromise without convergence of interests, empathy, without unconditional identification” (ibid., 50). It can thus be equated with the concept of tolerance, which usually describes the respect, acceptance and appreciation of differences in culture, background, opinion and lifestyle.¹⁰

Civil society interaction evolves out of public discourse, deliberation and negotiation on issues related to power, violence and exclusion (ibid., 51). Although it is the dominant integrative mechanism of the civil society sub-system, it is not confined to it, but can be found in any other sub-system (ibid., 52). To define who is considered as civil society actor, it is thus not important to look for a specific type of actor (formally organized, voluntary, autonomous association) or a fixed space (sphere between state, market, family), but rather to search for societal actors that dominantly interact according to the civil society mode of interaction (tolerance). Yet empirically, all societies include uncivil elements and can never be completely “civil” or “uncivil” in nature, but are rather characterized by actors and interactions that are more or less civil society-like (ibid., 50). Therefore, the degree to which tolerance is dominant in the interactions of an actor and civil society as a whole is open to measurement.

B. Application of the Framework

The last point mentioned has to be especially stressed in the attempt to realize a more analytical approach to civil society. Gosewinkel and Rucht do not frame their concept in a normative way, creating ideal-typical forms of interaction that have to be fulfilled to consider an actor as part of civil society. “Our understanding of civil society is not in itself normative, but rather raises the empirical validity of certain norms to a criterion” (ibid., 49; translation by Wischermann 2010, 11). Therefore, depending on historical context, different norms have been characteristic for civil society interactions with the specific mode of interaction identified by Gosewinkel and Rucht referring to the current forms of interaction in functionally differentiated, modern societies.

In contrast to normative approaches to civil society conceptualizations that identify qualifying criteria to normatively predefine borders of civil society on paper and then don’t study empirical realities that fall outside these borders, this thesis attempts the opposite: To begin with, any societal actor that deals with issues related to power, violence, and exclusion qualifies as civil society, no matter if they may be part of grey zones or “bad” civil society. Only by empirically exploring how all of these actors interact in the real world, valid

¹⁰ Compare for example the definition of tolerance by the UNESCO Declaration of Principles on Tolerance (1995), Art. 1. http://www.unesco.org/webworld/peace_library/UNESCO/HRIGHTS/124-129.HTM.

conclusions can be drawn to what degree any of the actors is dominated by the civil society mode of interaction. All of the empirically studied actors will be found to interact more or less civil society-like, none of them will ever be found to interact completely civil or uncivil and thus be either part of civil society or be outside.

The action-based approach thus serves as theoretical foundation for a more inclusive understanding beyond the proto-typical NGO. Instead of dichotomic categorizations of civil society membership, a broad range of civic activism is studied on the ground without being limited to predefined borders. Gosewinkel and Rucht neither define borders of a civil society sphere nor do they identify a specific type of actor as proto-typical. Rather, any actor in any sub-system can be part of civil society when publicly dealing with issues of power, violence and exclusion.

Through operationalization of the concept, an evaluative tool is developed to empirically assess the civil society aptitude of an actor, meaning the degree to which an actor interacts according to a pattern of tolerance. A dominant pattern of tolerance means that the actor interacts very civil society-like (high aptitude), while a low degree means that the actor only rarely interacts tolerantly (low aptitude). Yet, all of the actors are considered as part of civil society, just with differing degrees of tolerant interactions. The approach can hence fruitfully be employed in authoritarian contexts to explore different kinds of civic activism and societal actors often viewed critically as grey zones.

Additionally, the exploration of different types of civic activism is not only directed at identifying patterns of interaction, but also at generating hypotheses about a correlation between an actor's civil society aptitude and its position towards the authoritarian regime. This position may be defined by varying factors, but in this thesis, I will concentrate on the interrelatedness with the state (connections), the relationship to state entities and the view of civil society's function. This exploration is based on the assumption that some types of activism and interactions result in a more oppositional disposition towards an authoritarian regime than others. Such an oppositional disposition in turn might be indicative for a higher potential and readiness to question existing power structures and attempt to impact political decisions. Thus, the generation of hypotheses on the correlation between characteristic facets of a societal actor can further future research on the questions which combination of features of civic activism might impact political structures of power instead of assuming that all civil society organization in total either further democratization or stabilize authoritarian rule.

Chapter 2: Methodology

The following chapter will explain how Gosewinkel and Rucht's approach is operationalized to empirically evaluate an actor's civil society aptitude and how this measurement tool is tested in a case study on different types of civic actors in Jordan that are situated within grey zones of the mainstream civil society concepts. These tests will enable first conclusions on the question, to what degree different types of actors and activism are dominated by tolerant interactions, as well as the formulation of first hypotheses about the causal links between the civil society aptitude of actors and their connections with and orientation towards the state.

I. Research Method: The Qualitative Case Study

To explore these research objectives, I will employ a qualitative case study design. Although case studies are a widely used tool in qualitative research, there is only slim literature on methodological implications as well as wide-spread skepticism about their legitimacy as separate scientific research method (Yin 2012, xix; Gerring 2007, 93). The critique mostly stems from the wide variety of definitions and understandings of case studies as well as lax application of and adherence to methodological procedures. An additional concern is their low degree of generalizability and external validity. To counter these concerns and problems, the case study presented in this thesis will follow the steps proposed by Robert Yin (2009), developed to bring a higher degree of standardization and rigorousness to the case study research method.

Depending on researcher, case studies are either described in contrast to variable-centered designs (Ragin 2004, 136) or to cross-case research designs that model observations across multiple cases instead of focusing on a single case (Gerring 2007, 116).

In this thesis, case studies are understood as research design employed for descriptive and exploratory research questions that focus on deep analysis of a small-n sample and the interpretation of social structures and processes (Blatter/ Janning/ Wagemann 2007, 126ff.; Yin 2009, 8ff.). Case study designs are the most useful research method for generating new hypotheses instead of testing working hypotheses (Gerring 2007, 98). This is mostly because the goal of case studies is analytical generalization, meaning the generalization of results to theoretical propositions instead of statistical generalization, the increase of frequencies and probabilities (Yin 2009, 15). Additionally, case study designs are the preferred research method over other approaches such as historical analysis or experiments when studying behavioral aspects of contemporary events with access to the persons involved (ibid., 11). Thus every case study consists of multiple non-standardized observations that gain

importance through comparison with theoretical expectations (Blatter/ Jannig/ Wagemann 2007, 125).

A case study can thus be defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident [...], copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as [...] result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin 2009, 18). These characteristics of case study designs mostly entail a preference for qualitative research methods, although not limited to them (Yin 2009, 19; Gerring 2007, 115).

The following sections cover the main methodological steps of this case study as proposed by Yin: Case selection and design, operationalization of theoretical framework, data collection, data analysis, and quality of research design and data.

II. Case Selection and Design

The case study design used in this thesis is a single-case embedded design with four embedded units of analysis (Yin 2009, 46). The unit of analysis (case) is civil society in Jordan, which encompasses all societal actors that are publicly engaged in issues of power, violence and exclusion. Furthermore, the case under analysis focuses on only those actors engaged in the area of gender issues. The four embedded units are the four societal sub-systems identified above. For each embedded unit, one actor that falls within a grey (overlapping) zone of civil society is be studied.

Case selection in case study analysis does not have to follow random sampling logic as most quantitative analyses and experimental study designs do. Cases can rather be selected in purposive selection for their characteristics as typical, extreme, deviant, crucial or other reason (Gerring 2008, 645ff.; Yin 2009, 47ff.).

As the thesis is directed at exploring the limits of civil society in authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, the appropriate unit of analysis is civil society as a whole within the nation-state context. Thus, Jordan is the case under analysis. The four actors studied within each sub-system constitute representative examples of the embedded sub-unites of the case and not each a separate independent case in themselves. Findings from the case of Jordan could then be compared to other Middle Eastern states in a multiple-case design of cross-case comparison.

Jordan is selected as the unit of analysis as it represents the typical liberalized Middle Eastern autocracy (see chapter 3). After political liberalization in the 1990s, a broad

associational scene and greater liberty for critical public debate developed, while at the same time the regime managed to uphold political control and limitations. Other liberalized authoritarian regimes in the region either don't have such a variety of possible civil society actors for analysis (Morocco) or have experienced recent breaks in authoritarian rule or are unfit for field research because of political instability (Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Yemen). Other Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes such as the Gulf States can't be classified as liberalized.

The focus on activism in the thematic area of gender has been selected because issues such as women empowerment, women's rights, and sexual orientation are integrally related to the categories of power, violence, and exclusion, especially in the region of the Middle East (Zaatari 2013). Middle Eastern societies are still found to be highly dominated by 'masculine', traditional practices and discriminatory legal systems with limited ability for women to participate politically and economically and to exercise power (ibid.). The fight for gender equality is hence even postulated as a necessary precondition for democratic change in Arab Middle Eastern countries (Rizzo/ Abdel-Latif/ Meyer 2007). Furthermore, the topic of sexual orientation is not only socially shunned in public debate, but homosexuality is also an illegal punishable offense all over the Middle East.¹¹

The four embedded units are each represented by one actor. The term actor may refer to any kind of activism that is publicly undertaken by individuals or collective actors, no matter if and in which way it is formally organized. Through purposive selection, the actors within the sub-systems of state, economy, and community are each representative for activism identified as grey area of civil society by the domains-based concepts. Namely these are: a Royal NGO (state) (Actor A), a limited liability company (economy) (Actor B), and a gathering space for liberal and gay Amman citizens (community) (Actor C). The civil society sub-system is represented by a proto-typical civil society actor, namely an independent NGO (Actor D).¹²

The selected actors all represent formally organized organizations within the first grey zone circle of Figure 4 and all of them are situated in the Jordanian capital of Amman. These decisions are based on practical reasons of field research. Most organizations outside Amman are difficult to reach, because they are situated in tribal areas that can't be easily accessed by foreigners and there are no English-speaking interview partners available. Formally organized

¹¹ While homosexuality in theory is legal in Jordan, LGBTs receive highly discriminatory treatment in all areas of public life, although during the research stay in Amman, I witnessed a prudent gay scene that has established in Amman. Compare also Finaldi (2012): *Gay Amman: A scene is slowly emerging.*

¹² For the purpose of anonymity, neither the organizations selected for the study nor the interview partners will be named here explicitly.

actors have are selected because it is easier to establish contact with them in advance and the framework of a Master Thesis doesn't allow for long times of field research.

The Royal NGO is selected because the civil society character of those government organized GONGOs is often doubted based on their closeness to the royal family and state (see Chapter 3, part D.). Likewise, as limited liability company Actor B is situated somewhere between civil society actor engaged in achieving top-down economic empowerment of women and private sector money-oriented business company. Possible cases for the community sub-unit are manifold in Jordan, as there are many formally organized CBOs or less formalized examples of tribal associations or almsgiving committees. Yet, as the case study focuses on formally organized groups, the latter examples are excluded. CBOs in Jordan are mostly a phenomenon either found in poor rural tribal communities or within the various Palestinian refugee camps, which again are not easily accessible. Those CBOs located in Amman are mostly Islamic welfare and charity societies, often with doubtful connections to political Islam. While the issue of religion, political Islam, and civil society certainly is an important topic that has to be addressed, it is too big a topic to be dealt with just on the side of this thesis. Therefore, Actor C was chosen, as it represents a community-based project that provides the liberal and gay Amman citizens with a place to gather, discuss their problems and interests and network. It is thus also situated in a grey zone, characterized on the one hand by the social closeness and solidarity of the private sphere, on the other hand by its civic engagement for gender issues. Yet it is formally organized as neighborhood café and thus better accessible for research.

III. Operationalization: The Civil Society Mode of Interaction

At the center of Gosewinkel and Rucht's action-based approach is the civil society mode of interaction described as mutual recognition of the other or in a simpler term tolerance. This mode of interaction is defined by four characteristics:

- (1) Respect without like-mindedness and social closeness
- (2) Willingness to compromise without convergence of interests
- (3) Empathy without unconditional identification
- (4) Acceptance of procedural rules without common ideologies

According to the framework, civil society comes into existence through public discourse, deliberation and negotiation on issues related to power, violence, and exclusion. This factor is included as a necessary pre-condition for being considered as possible civil society actor in the first place.

The four characteristics (except to some extent number 4) each represent rather vast socio-psychological constructs. In the following section, I will describe how each of these constructs is operationalized by explaining their meaning and working definition as well as the set of two indicators that is employed to evaluate them.

A. Respect without Like-mindedness and Social Closeness

Respect both in philosophical discourse and social psychology generally refers to the inclination of a person to show consideration for another person and is thus defined as “willingness to include another person as a factor in the equation that regulates one’s actions” (Simon 2007, 310). Psychologists are mostly concerned with respect as an attitude, exploring correlations between vertical and horizontal respect received from others or authorities and behavioral, affective, cognitive, and motivational consequences (*ibid.*, 313). Philosophers are more concerned with normative and moral questions of application and importance of the concept (Dillon 2007, 202f).

Respect can be operationalized in two different forms: recognition respect and appraisal respect (Darwall 1977). Recognition respect describes the form of respect that is shown to others based on the equality of every person as a human being while appraisal respect is shown because of a positive grading assessment of another person and their achievements (Simon 2007, 311). For this study, both aspects of respect are to be used. The two indicators defining respectful interactions are (1) treating others as equals and (2) valuing them and their work and achievements. Both of these types of respect are independent of social closeness or like-mindedness, because they can be shown to any person no matter if there is a shared social bond of friendship, family or other kind of personal bias.

B. Willingness to Compromise without Convergence of Interests

Compromise describes a way of reaching an agreement in which each group or person gives up something that was wanted in order to end an argument or dispute and find a middle ground (Van de Vliert 1997, 34ff). In conflict research, compromise represents one of the core strategies of conflict resolution, described as a communicative way of reaching an agreement through deliberation and negotiation when more than one party and differing positions are involved (*ibid.*). Compromise is thus a result of conflict resolution that is characterized by mutual tradeoffs achieved by bargaining on the facets of the issue at hand. It does not require an argumentative mode of negotiation which is directed at changing fixed preferences of the other party in order to win them over or achieve a convergence of interests

through consensus (Ulbert/ Risse/ Müller 2004). Compromise is thus encompasses the two indicators (1) mutual concessions to solve disagreement and (2) a communicative style of reaching the solution.

C. Empathy without Unconditional Identification

The construct of empathy represents one of the most vastly studied within social-psychology in recent years. Therefore, definitions and operationalization of the construct are manifold. One of the most basic understandings of empathy is that of a reaction of one individual to the observed experiences of another person, the transformational psychological process that connects the self and other (Davis 2004, 19f). Empathy is consequently not considered as an emotion in itself, but rather as the reaction to another person's emotions. Social psychology has operationalized empathy as a multidimensional phenomenon with cognitive as well as emotional components: "In cognitive empathy we recognize what another person is feeling. In emotional empathy we actually feel what that person is feeling" (Ekman 2003, 197).

Mark Davis has developed the most commonly employed measuring instrument to assess the empathic abilities of an individual, the *Interpersonal Reactivity Index* (Davis 1980). Following Davis, this study will operationalize empathy to necessarily consist of both cognitive and emotional aspect. The cognitive facet of empathy is expressed by the perspective-taking ability of a person, describing "attempts to adopt the perspectives of other people and see things from their points of view" (ibid., 2). The emotional component is assessed through the empathic concern scale, evaluating the "respondents' feelings of warmth, compassion, and concern for others" (ibid.). While Davis Index includes further aspects such as the ability to identify with fictional characters (fantasy scale) or personal feelings of discomfort resulting from negative experiences of others (personal distress scale), these aspects of empathy require a degree of emotional and cognitive synchrony requiring unconditional identification with the other person that goes beyond the understanding of the term in the analytical framework. Thus, empathy in this study is expressed through two indicators: (1) the cognitive ability to take the perspective of another person and (2) the emotional ability to show sympathy for their concerns.

D. Acceptance of Procedural Rules without Common Ideologies

This dimension of the civil society mode of interaction is one not consisting of a specific psychological construct. In simple terms, procedural rules describe an established series of actions that are regularly done in a specific manner or sequence and are previously agreed-

upon by all involved parties (Merriam-Webster's online dictionary, n.d.). Procedural rules usually consist of a basic written document (by-laws) development by the parties themselves to regulate their internal and external interactions (Oxford English Dictionary, n.d.).

Procedural rules do not require common ideologies expressed in cultural or social norms of conduct, but rather refer to the more technical dimension of how activities involving more than one person such as decision-making are generally organized. They do however involve the psychological requirement of reliability, meaning that rules are dependently followed by everybody. Thus, acceptance of rules of procedure can be defined as the ability to reliably adhere to previously agreed-upon rules in collective settings.

For the purpose of this study, acceptance of procedural rules thus implies two aspects. One the one hand, it involves the question if actors do have an established set of rules that guide their interactions, decision-making procedures and organization of activities (1). On the other hand, the dimension is characterized by the reliability of actors to adhere to these established rules, meaning that all involved parties and persons dependently follow the procedures and only depart in rare extraordinary cases (2).

Table 1: Summary of Definitions and Indicators

	Respect	Compromise	Empathy	Rules of Procedure
Definition	Willingness to include another person as a factor in the equation that regulates one's actions based on recognition as equal or appraisal	Communicative way of reaching an agreement in which each group or person gives up something that was wanted in order to end an argument or dispute	Reaction of one individual to the observed experiences of another person	Ability to reliably adhere to previously agreed-upon rules in collective settings
Limitations	No like-mindedness / social closeness → no personal bonds / feelings	No convergence of interests → no argumentative change of fixed preferences	No unconditional identification → no cognitive / emotional synchrony	No common ideologies → no common social / cultural norms of conduct
Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Recognition of others as equal ○ Appraisal of other persons or their work/ achievements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Mutual concessions ○ Communication (Deliberation/ Bargaining) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ perspective-taking ○ Sympathy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Established procedures and rules ○ Reliability

IV. Data Collection

Because civil society is understood in terms of concrete interactions, data is primarily collected through qualitative in-depth interviews with a representative of each of the four actors. They are directed to gather information on the actors' behavior in specific situations that typically involve the dimensions and indicators described above. This decision is based on the understanding of interactions as steady behavior of individuals towards others, with the assumption that past and usual behavior accurately predicts the behavior in the future. Therefore, past behavior can be accumulated to describe the character traits involved in the psychological constructs of the four dimensions (Westhoff 2009, 19). Character traits in psychology usually refer to features of individuals and not of collective actors such as organizations. Yet, this study is guided by the view that analogue to individuals, collective actors can be defined as possessing a distinct organizational culture and enduring attributes which is shaped by the behavior and views of the majority of individuals of the group (Albert/Whetten 1985). Therefore, questions are formulated to assess if the experiences described by the interviewee correspond to the usual behavior of the majority of people involved in the group or the usual behavior encouraged within the organization.

This interview method is employed in the main part of the interview to evaluate the civil society aptitude of actors. To generate propositions about the correlations between civil society aptitude and the various aspects of their position vis-à-vis the state, questions directed at structural and financial connections between the actor and state entities, the relationship between the actor and government, and their view of civil society's function are included into an opening and closing part of the interview. Generally, all answers given during the interviews are considered as facts that represent the reality of behaviors and attitudes following the naturalistic paradigm of qualitative research (Silverman 2001, 57).

A. Interview Method

Literature on concrete interview methods in the social sciences is rather rare and mostly only defines the type of standardization or the overall type of setting, without much consideration for the types of questions or their structuring. Therefore, the in-depth interviews are semi-standardized and constructed according to an interview method developed in psychology to assess the occupational aptitude of a person through behavior description (Westhoff 2009). The method is direct towards gathering information about the specific behavior of the individual in a pre-defined critical situation he or she experienced in the past that yields information on steady behavior and character traits. Critical situation refers to a typical and

important situation in which a clear differentiation between varying behaviors is possible (ibid., 23). This form of qualitative in-depth interview is thus a method of indirect behavioral observation (ibid., 55) and is hence well suited to assess concrete interactions and behavior of the four actors of this case study.

1. Adaptation of Westhoff's Method: Dimensions and Critical Situations

The method is adapted to fit the analytical framework of the thesis. Originally, the development of an interview manual begins with a requirements analysis, identifying specific psychological (cognitive, emotional, social, and motivational) as well as non-psychological requirements crucial for the respective occupation (Westhoff 2009, 21ff). For the thesis, the four dimensions specify the specific requirements for the civil society aptitude. Thus a preceding requirements analysis is not necessary. Each of the four dimensions assesses internal as well as external interactions of actors. Internal interactions refer to the way the members of the group behave towards each other, external interactions refer to the way they interact with other groups or external individuals.

Westhoff's method then continues with identifying critical situations which typically involve one of the requirements to assess the aptitude. Each of the critical situations reveals to what extent an individual fulfills a requirement depending on how well they managed the situation (ibid., 23). Consequently, to assess an actor's civil society aptitude, one critical situation for internal and external interactions respectively is identified for each dimension, in which the indicators specified in the previous operationalization section are of crucial relevance:

- (1) Compromise is most relevant in times of conflict; the internal critical situations is therefore disagreement between group members, the external critical situation is disagreement between the actor and an external person
- (2) Empathy is most relevant in times of emotional distress; the internal critical situation is therefore the reaction to a serious problem of a group member, the external critical situation the reaction to a serious concern of an external person that approached the actor
- (3) Respect is most relevant during teamwork of individuals; therefore, the internal critical situation is cooperation of group members during a project, the external critical situation is a workshop/ event/ project with external participants or partners
- (4) Procedural rules are most relevant in operational contexts; the internal critical situation is therefore the day-to-day operational work, the external critical situation is the adherence to funding regulations from external partners

During each critical situation, the described behavior shows to which degree the actors employ the two indicators both internally and externally:

- (1) The willingness to compromise is high, when an actor usually tries to solve disagreements and conflicts through communication and mutual concessions of both sides. If other types of conflict resolution strategies such as decisions based on hierarchy are dominant, the willingness to compromise is low.
- (2) Empathy is high, when the actor is open for problems and concerns of staff members and externals and tries to react by considering the position of the other person and emotionally relates to the concern. The ability to empathy is low, when the actor is not interested in the problems of others, there is a general atmosphere of competitiveness internally or the majority of staff cannot or do not want to emotionally relate and show sympathy towards the other persons concern.
- (3) The actor exhibits respectful behavior, when team members can all equally contribute conceptually during projects and their work is valued by giving constructive feedback that help them to improve. Likewise, when equal relationships on an eye-to-eye level with partners or external participants are a priority, the actor interacts respectfully. In contrast, when hierarchy dominates the teamwork and personalized, uncommunicated critique is the norm, respectful interactions are not dominant.
- (4) Adherence to procedures is high, when the actor has clear guidelines and principles (written or unwritten) on how the day-to-day work and decision-making procedures are handled and reliably follows those rules and when an actor can be described as reliably following external regulations by donors or cooperation partners. Unreliable actors in contrast often push deadlines, take decisions in an ad-hoc situational manner, have staff that does not stick to regulations, or change plans without informing partners. Also, problems with donors or reported instances of corruption are indicative of unreliable behavior.

2. Development of Interview Manual: Question Types and Structure

The interview is structured to assess each dimension with the two critical situations individually in one section. The questions are formulated so that the interviewee can describe how she or he behaved during a situation similar to the critical situation identified above. The goal is to receive an account of personal experiences in such a situation, not of behavior in a hypothetical scenario (Westhoff 2009, 62ff). Questions are always formulated in an open-answer format directed at accounts of recent experiences (ibid., 84f). Yet, to assure that the

interviewee has real-life experience in a specific issue area, some closed filter questions are inserted into the interview manual (ibid., 80). Initially, questions are always formulated in an indirect way, asking the interviewees for accounts of a certain situation without telling them beforehand which specific issue is of interest. Through more direct questions, the accounts of interviewees are then directed towards reporting of specific aspects that are of interest for the evaluation of each indicator. In a final question, the interviewees are asked to assess if the behavior just described corresponds to the usual behavior of the majority of group members in similar situations to assess if past behavior can be considered as habit and thus represents steady attributes. (ibid., 81ff.)

Additionally, self-assessment questions are inserted at the end of each section serving two purposes. The first is to receive an additional global assessment by the actors themselves that can complement the evaluation of the interviewer. The second is to provide an alternative procedure in case the interviewees can't remember or haven't experienced relevant situations. In this case, interviewees are asked to self-assess the respective dimension for their organization (after explanation of the construct) on a scale from one (lowest) to ten (highest) and then to exemplify their answers. The interviewees are also asked if the example they described corresponds to the usual behavior encouraged within the organization.

Following, an excerpt from the manual on the compromise dimension to exemplify how questions are formulated and structured (the complete and final manual can be found in the appendix):

Openness for Compromise

1.1. Please describe a situation, in which there has been an internal disagreement within your organization.

1.2. How did the parties try to solve this issue?

1.3. To what extent did the parties try to make concession to solve the issue?

1.4. Is this the usual procedure to solve internal disagreements in your organization?

Yes: Continue

No: What is your usual procedure?

1.5. Could you briefly describe a similar situation during a project, in which there has been a disagreement between your organization and an external participant?

1.6. How did you try to solve this issue?

1.7. To what extent did your organization try to make concessions to solve the issue?

1.8. *Is this the usual approach to solve disagreements with external persons?*

Yes: Continue

No: What is your usual approach?

1.9. *To be open to compromise means that opposing parties try to approach each other and make concessions to solve an issue.*

On a scale from 1 to 10 (1 being the lowest) how would you rate the ability of your organization (the majority of your staff members) to compromise?

1.10. *What makes you come to this conclusion?*

3. Interview Opening and Closing: Generation of Hypothesis

In addition, the interviews contains an opening and closing section to collect information on the actors' connections with the state, their relationship with governmental entities, as well as their view of civil society's function. The introductory part includes questions on the actors' background (area of work, objectives, instruments and programs), the necessary precondition (public discourse on issues of violence, power, and exclusion) and their type of engagement in gender issues. It also contains questions pertaining to the actor's organizational structure and funding to identify possible connections and interrelatedness with state entities.

The closing part comprises questions on the actors' perceived functions of civil society as well as their relationship to governmental institutions. This last part is included to generate hypothesis on the link between the actor's civil society aptitude and their relationship and stance towards the non-democratic regime. The questions have been selected to evaluate if the actors consider civil society to be directed at any kind of political impact and how they position themselves and civil society in general vis-à-vis the government. Taken together, the answers in the opening and closing section of the interview are supposed to yield information on possible patterns of correlation between the actors' dominant pattern of interaction and their general position towards the state.

4. Interview Settings and Partners

Interviews were conducted during a field research trip to Jordan in January 2014. Interview partners were either contacted beforehand by mail or approached directly by phone or personally during the stay. Interview partners are either project managers working within women empowerment programs for the two bigger organizations (Actor A and D) or the founders and executives for the two smaller groups (Actors B and C). Interviews were held at

the interviewees' workplaces to allow for direct observation of the organization by the interviewer. The first pre-test was conducted with the Chairman of a German student association in Berlin, the second pre-test was conducted with the director of a non-profit company active in societal and gender-based violence in Jordan.

B. Potential bias

This interview method is selected because of two central biases on the side of the interviewee and interviewer often affecting the results of qualitative interviews. On the one hand, the four dimensions involve issues that are highly socially desirable, meaning that interviewees tend to give answers in such a way as to be in accordance with social and situational norms (Schnell/ Hill/ Esser 1999, 332).¹³ Questions concerning the different issues of tolerance identified above fall into the category of ethical conduct that has been related to an especially high social desirability response set, because individuals would not want to be publicly portrayed as unethical and intolerant (Randall/ Fernandes 1991). Social desirability response bias in qualitative interviews can be reduced through avoiding suggestive questioning, employing specific question formats and question orders (Westhoff 2009, 61ff.) and through anonymization of the interviewees (Randall/ Fernandes 1991).

Question types yielding the least bias in such in-depth interview settings are biographical questions directed at accounts of concrete experiences in contrast to questions directed at behavior in hypothetical scenarios or self-assessment of character traits (McDaniel et al. 1994). Furthermore, to start each section with indirect questions that don't specify which aspect is of interest to the interviewer also results in less bias through social desirability, because the interviewee will answer more freely if there is no reference point for which social norms might be relevant in the situation. Therefore, the standard procedure is to first ask indirect biographical questions and then direct the interviewee towards the issues of interest through more direct questions. Self-assessment questions are only inserted as additional rating category for two purposes: (1) to get global evaluations of each section by the interviewees themselves that complement the evaluation of the interviewer and (2) as alternative procedure if the interviewee cannot remember relevant experiences. Additionally, as indicated by ethical conduct research, a double anonymization of actor and interview partner is applied to further reduce the obstacle of reporting unfavorable behavior and not portray the organization in an overly positive manner.

¹³ Additionally, each of the selected actors naturally wants to portray their organization's work in a positive light in respect to the issues that are posited as important by a researcher and will therefore try to anticipate which answers might be considered as positive by the interviewer.

On the other hand, unstandardized interviews often lead to a number of evaluative biases introduced by the interviewer. These can be avoided through structuring both the interview itself with a manual, as well as pre-defining the rating scheme with evaluative categories that detail relevant behavior with specific examples and explain endpoints of each category (Westhoff 2009, 29f.). This helps the interviewer to avoid subjective pre-judgments of the interviewee and ensuing bias in conducting the questions already during the interview (Posthuma et al. 2002).

The interview manual does not represent a closed standardized survey that has to be strictly followed point by point, but rather a flexible guideline to structure the interview and pre-formulate questions and explanations (Westhoff 2009, 68). In the course of the manual development, there were two pre-tests to ensure that the manual works in real situation and identify possible problems (Schnell/ Hill/ Esser 1999, 340f.). After both pre-tests, the manual was restructured and shortened. The final manual consists of three main blocks, the interview introduction including general background questions, the main part on the four dimensions and a final part with the hypothesis-generating closing questions.

C. Triangulation

Apart from the qualitative interviews, other types of resources have been used to assess the context and enabling environment of the four actors and Jordanian societal actors in general. These were mainly expert interviews with representatives of donor organizations and actors that are engaged in women empowerment in Jordan. Four expert interviews were conducted with representatives from USAID Jordan, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Jordan (KAS), and the Arab Women Organization of Jordan (AWO).¹⁴ These expert interviews mainly try to assess the general environment for civic activism in Jordan and collect relevant experiences of the donor organizations with civil society actors, especially in respect to their reliability concerning the usage of funds and implementation of projects. Furthermore, the interviews were also aimed at getting information on the range of civic activism and types of CSOs that exist in Jordan. Additionally, relevant documentation like country reports by UN bodies and assessments by projects such as Freedom House, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index and Human Rights Watch are used. The case study also draws on direct observations that were made during field research and experiences during the interviews with the four actors.

¹⁴ Because of tight security restrictions, a recording of the interviews was not possible because electronic devices weren't allowed within the premises of the organizations. Therefore, brief summaries of all background interviews are included in the appendix.

V. Data Analysis

A. Analysis of the Civil Society Aptitude

Data analysis follows a two-step procedure. The first step consists of evaluating the information on the four dimensions collected in the main parts of the interviews according to a pre-defined rating scheme. As described in the preceding section, such a pre-defined rating scheme with specific behavioral examples leads to less bias on the side of the interviewer. Questions can be better directed at yielding relevant information that fit the evaluation scheme so the interview won't meander and collect a lot of irrelevant information. Furthermore, the collected information is evaluated in the same way in every interview, avoiding overly subjective judgments.

The four variables of the civil society mode of interaction assessed in each section are modeled as dimensions, not dummy variables. Each dimension's value is evaluated empirically and combined to determine the overall civil society aptitude of an actor. None of the civil society actors can ever achieve to be considered completely civil society-like (or not at all), but actors will always be characterized by interactions that are more or less civil society-like and thus achieve each dimension in different degrees. Therefore, the overall civil society aptitude of an actor in this study is expressed on a continuum ranging from very low to very high in contrast to dichotomic categorizations of actors as either belonging to civil society or being excluded.

Each dimension's value can be expressed on a scale ranging from very (3) over mostly (2) to little (1) civil society-like interactions. Dimensions are evaluated separately, consisting of independent scores for internal, external and overall interactions ranging between one and three. The three scores are then added up and divided by three to determine the overall score for the dimension. Decimal numbers are rounded to the first decimal, integral numbers of total scores are understood to range from .0 to .9.

Table 2: Rating Scheme for Dimensions

1	Low civil society-like interactions	The requirements are only met on a very basic level with many exceptions
2	Mostly civil society-like interactions	The requirements are met in most cases with some exceptions
3	Very civil society-like interactions	The requirements are met on a very high level with exceptions only in exceptional cases

Thus, every actor can achieve a score between one and three for each dimension. Scores achieved in each dimension will then be added to receive the overall aptitude score. Every actor can thus achieve a maximum of 12 points (very high aptitude) and a minimum of 4 points (very low aptitude). If an actor receives only 1 point in any one dimension or stays under 8 points in total, the actor's civil society aptitude is only low. If an actor receives 3 points in at least three dimensions and thus at least 11 points, its civil society aptitude is very high. If the actor scores between 8 to 10 points, its civil society aptitude can be characterized as high.

Table 3: Overall Civil Society Aptitude Scale

Total score	Aptitude	Description
4	Very low	Civil society mode of interaction not very dominant
5-7 (or a score of 1 in at least one dimension)	Low	Civil society mode of interaction sometimes dominant
8-10	High	Civil society mode of interaction mostly dominant
11-12	Very high	Civil society mode of interaction highly dominant

The rating scheme for each section is detailed in the appendix. For evaluation, not all aspects of a value category have to be fulfilled at the same time, as each category details different examples of relevant behavior. Therefore, the describe behavior of an actor only has to correspond to one or some of the examples to qualify for a category. Following is an excerpt from the rating scheme for the compromise dimensions:

Rating Scheme: Openness to Compromise

Internal:

(3) *Compromise is generally encouraged within organization, usually opposing parties try to solve disagreements through communication and concessions on both sides*

(2) *Compromise is not always the primary way of solving internal conflicts, disagreements are sometimes solved by concessions of both sides, communication does not necessarily have to be part of the solution process, hierarchy can be a deciding factor*

(1) *Compromise is avoided within the organization or is not the primary conflict resolution strategy, disagreements are resolved by hierarchy without communication or concessions*

External:

(3) Organization is explicitly open for compromise with external partners, communication is always part of the conflict resolution strategy, organization is always open to some kind of concession on issue

(2) Organization will in some cases be open for compromise with external partners and make concessions, communication is not always part of the resolution strategy, other conflict resolution strategies (especially decisions based on hierarchy) are employed, conflict and disagreement are avoided

(1) Organization is rarely open for compromise and concessions, only little effort to solve disagreement or come to amicable solution, little communication with partner over issue

Overall:


(3) Self-assessment between 8 to 10 points

(2) Self-assessment between 4 to 7 points

(1) Self-assessment between 1 to 3 points

Interviews are transcribed using the software analysis tool MAXQDA, depicting the exact course of the interview, only changing any indicator that could help identify the actors. Each actor's aptitude is then graphically illustrated as a specific diamond, similar to Anheiner's and CIVICUS' illustration of a country's civil society strength. This enables better graphical comparison of the four actors.

Figure 6: Sample Aptitude Diamond



(Source: Author's own illustration)

B. Generation of hypotheses

In a second step, the opening and closing parts of the interview are coded through inductive category development (Meyring 2000). By analyzing all relevant passages of the opening and closing parts of the interviews that deal with the actors' connections with the state, their relationship with governmental actors, and their view of civil society's function, categories for each of these issues are deduced and formulated. This is achieved by a step by step examination with built in feedback loops to compare and reduce initial codings to overall categories (ibid., 3). To this end, the software analysis tool MAXQDA is used to develop the coding system.

Connections to the state are defined as any structural or financial interrelatedness with the regime. Structural interrelatedness may refer to links between the actor and the state such as being part of the state's institutional set-up, the employment of public servants, and state officials or members of the royal family on the organization's boards.¹⁵ Financial links refer to a majority of funding coming from official state sources. Interviews revealed that actors can be either coded as close in terms of both structural and financial interrelatedness or as independent.

The relationship between the actors and the state were either described as difficult or friendly. The actors' views of their primary function as civil society and position towards the state revealed a system of four categories:

- Opposition to the state with the function of monitoring, controlling, and addressing political misconduct and violations by government
- Mediator between state and society with a focus of accumulating the public opinion
- Partner of the state to jointly work on social relevant issues important for society and implement the state's agenda
- Without relation to the state (neutral), with the function of serving the community

¹⁵ As Jordan is a monarchy with a king that not only represents, but rules, the royal family is considered as integral part of the state sphere.

The final categories of the coding system are thus as follows:

Table 4: Codesystem

Codesystem		
	Connections to the state	
	→	Independent
	→	Close
	Relationship with the state	
	→	Difficult
	→	Friendly
	Function of civil society	
	→	Opposition
	→	Partner
	→	Neutral
	→	Mediator

VI. Quality of Research Design

A. Validity

Validity can be assessed in terms of internal and external validity and construct validity. Internal validity describes “the degree to which descriptive or causal inferences from a given set of cases are correct for those cases“ (Seawright/ Collier 2010, 334), while external validity refers to “the degree to which descriptive or causal inferences for a given set of cases can be generalized to other cases, also called generalizability” (ibid., 330). In general, internal validity has a higher priority in qualitative research, while external validity is more important in quantitative studies (Gerring 2007, 101ff). Construct validity refers to the task of identifying correct operational measures for the concepts being studied (Yin 2009, 40).

1. Internal Validity

Although internal validity is most important when it comes to causal inference studies, there are also some criteria for judging the internal validity of exploratory case studies. As case studies also make inferences about events that cannot be directly observed, an internally valid exploratory or descriptive case study tries to reduce as much bias as possible for every inference through the case study design (Yin 2009, 43). Thus the internal validity of the data collection process (interview method) and the data analysis method have to be ensured.

The internal validity of data collection through qualitative interviews is ensured because the interview is constructed to minimize possible bias both on the side of the

interviewer and the interviewee. Interviews designed to closely follow theoretically pre-defined requirements in a semi-standardized manual that can be repeated in every interview yield results that are empirically more correct (Wiesner/ Cronshaw 1988) and less biased by subjective views of the interviewer (Conway et al. 1995) or primacy and recency effects (Arvey/ Campion 1982). Secondly, the biographical interview questions used in the interviews are the most valid types of questions (Campion et al. 1994; Huffcutt et al. 2001) and are also incrementally more valid than situational (=hypothetical) questions (Campion et al. 1994). Thirdly, the double anonymization of interview partners results in less bias through social desirability (Randall/ Fernandes 1991). Lastly, the internal validity of the interviews is high in regard to data analysis because answers were evaluated independently, there are separate rankings of every aspect instead of global evaluations and the evaluation scheme has been pre-defined and illustrated with concrete behavioral examples (Campion et al. 1997).

2. External Validity

External validity of case studies has to be differentiated from external validity in quantitative research. The goal for quantitative studies is high statistical generalizability from the sample to the larger universe of the population. The goal of case studies in contrast is high analytical generalizability, referring to the generalization from the case study to a broader theory (Yin 2009, 43). Thus the external validity of a case study is high, when the results are generalizable to other theories on the same issue which is achieved by using a theoretical framework for single-case studies and replication logic in multiple case studies.

As the case study in this thesis has only been tested on the case of Jordan, results cannot automatically be generalized to other authoritarian regimes. Yet, as the study is based on a specific theoretical framework that guided the selection of the case and embedded sub-units as typical case, the results of the study are generalizable to theories on how to conceptualize civil society and can validly challenge existing theories.

3. Construct Validity

Case studies are often criticized for low construct validity, claiming that they fail to specify objective operational measurements and instead rely too much on subjective evaluations (Yin 2009, 41). To avoid these mistakes and ensure construct validity of the case study, the central terms and constructs under analysis must be clearly defined and operationalized by identifying concrete measures and relating both to previous research (ibid., 42). Both definitions of central constructs as well as specific indicators and their measurement have

been detailed extensively in the sections on operationalization and interview evaluation. Also, multiple sources of evidence were used to ensure convergent lines of inquiry (ibid.).

B. Reliability

Reliability describes the overall consistency of a measure. For case study designs, reliability can be ensured if replicability of every operational step is warranted (Yin 2009, 45). In the case study, every operational step has been detailed extensively by giving clear definitions and indicators, explaining the course of action and every decision from the selection of the case, to that of the sub-units as well as the selected interview method, describing all sources of evidence and steps during the analysis of data. The case study can thus easily be reproduced. Additionally, reliability of the data analysis process has been ensured by pre-testing the coding system for the main part of the interview as well as integrating feedback loops during the inductive development of the coding system for the opening and closing part (Meyring 2000, 4).

I. Background: Politics and Society in Jordan

A. Jordan, the Authoritarian Linchpin Monarchy

Like in most Middle Eastern States, the rule of the Hashemite tribe precedes the foundation of the Jordanian state and nation (Lucas 2004, 106). Established as the British mandate of Transjordan under the League of Nations, the kingdom of Jordan gained independence in 1946. The creation of formal governmental institutions in the years following independence in combination with the consolidation of informal patterns of rule represents the main source of authoritarian stability of the regime until today (ibid.).


Jordan constitutes the prototype of a liberalized autocracy (Brumberg 2002) although on paper it is a constitutional monarchy. Yet, the King “reigns and rules” (Lucas 2005, 21) and holds widespread executive powers as Head of State and Commander-in-Chief, from the appointment and dismissal of the prime minister, the cabinet, and regional governors to the dissolution of the National Assembly. Although the lower house of the Assembly is elected and can amend, reject or approve legislation, it cannot enact laws without the upper house which is appointed by the King. Elections have only taken place sporadically during the last years with extended periods of ruling by decree.

Jordan’s royal family bases the legitimacy of their rule on a number of different sources. On the one hand, their legitimacy rests on a traditional-religious claim of direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad (Bank et al. 2014, 2f.). Although religion doesn’t play a big role in the daily routing of Jordanian politics, the claim supplies the king with an aura of Islamic credibility, making him invulnerable for criticism from Islamist groups (Schlumberger/Bank 2001, 52).

On the other hand, the king’s legitimacy rests on his abilities to rule as charismatic leader in a style describe as neopatrimonial-authoritarianism (Pawelka 1985) or linchpin monarchy (Lucas 2004, 107). The king forms the center of a regime coalition acting as clientelist patronage network. Different elite groups consisting of the traditional Transjordan tribes, ethnic and religious minorities (Christians, Circassians, Chechens), administrative technocrats, the military as well as the economic elite (mostly Jordanians of Palestinian descent) orbit around the king in different spheres, constantly competing for their rank through personal favoritism (Bank 2002, 100ff., Lucas 2005, 21f.). Elite rotation and personalized nontransparent decision-making processes characterize the neo-patrimonial style of rule that disables anti-royal elite coalitions through constant reshuffling of personal in key

positions.¹⁶ The king is stylized as balancing patron and arbiter, who keeps up the “social and cosmic order” (Pawelka 1985, 24).

Figure 7: Neopatrimonialism in the Middle East and Northern Africa – The Pawelka Model (The Case of Egypt)



(Source: Pawelka 2002, 435)

His position is secured by a so-called rentier social contract, the ability of the state to act as allocator of material goods in exchange for political autonomy from societal pressures (Lucas 2005, 20). Jordan can be characterized as a semi-rentier state, receiving between 15 to 30% of state revenues from external rents (Bank 2002, 96.; Richter 2009, 62f., Mansur 2013, 6f.).¹⁷ During the height of petrolism (Korany 1986), an estimated two-thirds of Jordan’s external

¹⁶ This pattern of rule is even enforced within the royal family. Just a short while before his death in 1999, King Hussein reshuffled his succession, making his politically inexperienced son Abdallah Crown prince instead of his brother Hassan, who had been the nominated successor for over a decade (Perthes 2002, 257).

¹⁷ Exact numbers on external rents are hard to come by, as a high number of external funding stemming from the Arab Gulf monarchies is not officially recorded. Estimates for the time before the oil price shock in the 1980s ranges around one third of the total state revenue of non-tax foreign revenue (Perthes 2002, 249; Gause III 1995, 292). Current numbers suggest that official foreign grant inflow is still around 28%, with the value of foreign grants in the period 2005-2011 almost tripling to JD 1215 in 2011 (of a total of JD 4198 million government revenues) (Mansur 2013, 23).

rents stemmed stemmed from unconditional transfer payments from the oil-producing Gulf states (Perthes 2002, 249f). Additionally, up to 25% of Jordan's GDP was at times made up of expatriate transfers of Jordanians working in the Gulf States, which for long years relieved the king from the pressure of investing and reforming the private sector and labor market (Perthes 2002: 250). Instead, large sums are free to be used as state subsidies for scarce goods like water and power, basic foods, free education and healthcare, low tax rates and a huge public sector to employ loyal elites in comfortable state positions (Richter 2009, 62f., Bank 2002, 97). Although the number dropped immensely after the Kuwaiti exodus during the first Gulf War, until today remittances make up an estimate 10-12% of GDP (Mansur 2013, 32).

The oil price recession during the 1990s led to decreasing transfer payments and forced Jordan to limited neo-liberal socio-economic reforms in exchange for international loans from the IWF and World Bank (Richter 2009, 54). These also lead to calls for political reform and high hopes of democratization within the international community after the passing of the so-called National Charter of 1991, granting limited political pluralism. Yet, in contrast to the political transformations in former Soviet states and Latin America during this time, liberalization in Jordan and other Middle Eastern states was not so much due to public pressures, but rather a managed reform by the regime, opting for limited political opening as survival strategy of the semi-rentier dependent on external rents (Brumberg 1995).

Since Crown Prince Abdallah II succeeded his father King Hussein in 1999 on the throne, the main source of legitimacy has shifted from charismatic rule to performance and discourse legitimacy (Schlumberger/ Bank 2001, 65f). Although it still relies on the basics of neo-patrimonialism, Abdallah has managed to create an image of himself as modernizer who can tackle Jordan's economic problems. Although most of his projects are considered to be more façade than genuine reform, Abdallah has focused public discourse solely on socio-economic issues during the years of 2000, completely banning questions of political reform and further liberalization that were on the national and international agenda during the liberalization years of the 1990s (ibid.).¹⁸

Today, due to the still high energy and food subsidies and a bloated public sector, Jordan runs on an extensive budget deficit of \$2.8 billion in 2013, which makes it highly dependent on foreign aid. Thanks to Jordan's geographical proximity to Middle Eastern hot spots, the country receives high aid payments by Western countries, especially by the US with

¹⁸ Through his economic reform program, Abdallah has also gained a reputation as liberal, modern king among the international community. This picture is completed by the activities of his wife, Queen Rania, who is engaged in numerous social and charity projects especially in the area of education and women empowerment, for which she receives a lot of national and international press coverage and recognition and which have earned her the title "Princess Diana of the Middle East." (compare <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/queen-rania-al-abdullah-a-diplomatic-monarch-in-a-troubled-region-1.942163> (last accessed 1.3.2014)).

\$660 million annual foreign assistance for the time period 2008-2014, not including military spending an additional \$200 million budget support for the Syrian refugee crisis (Sharp 2014, 13). In an attempt to secure the monarchical status quo in the region (Richter 2011), the Gulf States offered Morocco and Jordan an invitation to become GCC members in 2011 along with a five-year \$5 billion support fund and continuous bilateral project investments, in contrast to Western aid providing fairly unconditional money.¹⁹

Although Jordan is trying to implement public and private sector reforms, especially in response to the Arab Spring, its many structural problems such as high poverty rates (15-30%), corruption and lack of economic and social mobility because of so-called *wasta* (“connections”)²⁰, high levels of unemployment, especially among youth (30%) and ensuing “brain drain” makes Jordan prone to social and political unrest and more international dependency in the future (Mansur 2013, 56f).

B. The Jordanian Arab Spring

Jordan was only mildly affected by the social unrest during the Arab Spring with small-scale demonstrations late in 2011 calling for political reforms mostly against governmental corruption and favoritism. The outbreak of protests can mostly be traced to the highly controversial parliamentary elections of 2010 and ensuing regional protests in combination with high unemployment and subsidy cuts for food and water (Beck/ Hüser 2012, 22). Only few of these demonstrators such as the youth movement *hirak* crossed the red line of accusing King Abdallah II personally of corruption and calling for regime change (Al-Sharif 2013; Susser, 2013, 4). Most demonstrations such as those initiated by the Muslim Brotherhood and their political arm, the IAF, together with an oppositional alliance of different ideologically oriented groups and parties were directed at changes at the governmental level, but not towards resignation of the king himself (Bank 2009).

These calls were mostly met with the promise of reforms instead of the use of violence, leading to the usual cabinet reshuffles in the name of combating corruption as well as new parliamentary elections in spring 2013 with a preceding reform of the election law and formation of an independent election commission. Elections in Jordan can generally be characterized as “competitive clientelism” (Lust 2009) that allows influential families and

¹⁹ Yet up to now, there are no official figures concerning the actual transfers of money, but only reports on the pledge and possible initiation of projects. See Al-Khalidi (2013): Jordan Taps \$5 billion Gulf fund to ease economic woes, Al Arabiya News, <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2013/02/27/268715.html> (last access 20.1.2014).

²⁰ In Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index of 2013, Jordan ranks 66 with a score of 45, indicating a serious corruption problem, compare <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results> (last access: 14.3.2014).

tribes to gain access to the patronage network of the Jordanian parliament that is reigned by *wasta* instead party membership or constituency representation (Bank 2010, 2).

The new election law has again furthered voting based on tribal and family relations instead of voting according to political affiliation (Bank/ Sunik 2013). On paper, the controversial "one man, one vote" system is amended by a proportional representation (PR) voting system, giving each voter the right to cast one vote for a national party list based on party affiliation through PR and one vote for a local candidate in a single non-transferable vote system (BTI 2014, 8). Yet, only 27 of the 150 seats are allocated through PR, the rest being allocated to mostly pro-loyalist candidates through quotas for each rural district, for minorities and women (ibid.). Accordingly, the parliamentary elections have yielded similar pro-royalist results as past elections (albeit only a 75% majority instead of 90% in 2010), not the least because the opposition is highly divided and factionalized (Bank/ Sunik 2013).

Although according to reports by Freedom House and Human Rights Watch, the government has further restricted freedom of expression and stifled action against alleged insults of the royal family and Islam or other violations against unwritten social taboos since 2012 (Human Rights Watch 2014, 562; Freedom House 2013), there is heightened awareness of these restrictions in public debate and a greater readiness to critically discuss them and other political issues (Interview USAID). According to the assessment of a USAID specialist on Civil Society in Jordan, CSOs have also been able to act more freely since the beginning of the Arab Spring, being able to openly address various problematic issues to some extent without the immediate fear of retaliation from the state.

C. Social fabric and gender issues

After the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948, King Abdallah I occupied the Palestinian East Bank and united it with the Transjordan West Bank only to lose the land again in the six-day war of 1967. Both wars resulted in a massive influx of Palestinian refugees that had to be incorporated into a society with a predominantly Transjordan tribal identity. This resulted in the brink of an all-out civil war in 1970 with the *fedayeen* fighters of the PLO. Until today, there are an estimated three million Palestinian in Jordan, with 1.8 officially registered as refugees and 300,000 still living in refugee camps without Jordanian citizenship.²¹ Although figures are inexact, Jordanians of Palestinian origin probably account for more than half of the

²¹ Compare official figures of UNRWA at <https://web.archive.org/web/20080726123903/http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/jordan.html> (last access: 14.3.2014).

population, with an especially high percentage in the urban areas of Amman and Zarqa.²² Palestinians form the backbone of the Jordanian private sector, as the widespread “tribal neopotism” (Perthes 2002, 247) prevents them from working in administrative positions, which are reserved for citizens of Transjordan origin. Although the last wave of Palestinian refugees dates back to the Kuwaiti exodus during the first Gulf War, the Jordanian identity until today is split between the “East Bankers” (Transjordan Hashemites) and the “West Bankers” (Palestinian), with the former fearing that any political liberalization might lead to the end of the system of privileges (Susser 2013, 3).

Additionally, Jordan’s society is divided along the lines of tribal membership, with over 40% of citizens being member to one of the many Bedouin tribes and tribal kinship representing the main focus point of societal organization (BTI 2014, 16). Furthermore, just as many other Arab countries, Jordan has surfed on a wave of religious conservatism in the course of Islamic resurgence over the last decades, adding a divide between secular or more liberally oriented Jordanian Muslims and Christians and religious conservatives and Islamic extremists (Interview AWO).

This religiously conservative development is also visible when considering the role women are attributed and actively want to occupy in politics, economy and society. Gender issues in the public debate range from appropriate dresscode to questions of women quotas for parliament and management boards. Yet only a small fraction of women mostly from urban upper middle class neighborhoods in Western Amman can be characterized as liberal and secular, actively campaigning for full political, economic and legal equality of women. National initiatives are mostly just directed towards achieving equality of women for typically female occupations such as teachers or nurses, while most work of civil society organizations is directed at social aspects of women empowerment in the rural areas such as education or poverty reduction through micro-loans (Interview AWO). According to statements of interview partners at the AWO and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Jordan, the few women that won the 15 parliamentary seats reserved for females in the last parliamentary elections mostly sit there as representatives of their tribes and families, not because they are actively engaged women activists campaigning for gender issues (Interview KAS).

Although on paper, women enjoy equal political and social rights with Jordan having ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), in reality they face discrimination in all areas, especially those regulated by Sharia law such as inheritance, divorce, or child custody (Freedom House 2013). Jordanian society is reigned

²² Compare figures of the World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples at <http://www.minorityrights.org/4940/jordan/jordan-overview.html> (last access 14.3.2014).

by patriarchy and women's role in society is accordingly mostly defined in traditional terms – by men and women alike (USAID 2012, 11). Around 85% of women are not participating in the labor market compared to a 69% male participation rate, although gender parity in school is achieved up to the secondary level (ibid., 8f). Instead, in accordance to current Sharia law, up to 14,000 girls under the age of 18 are forced to marry each year in Jordan (Human Rights Watch 2011, 3). Also, reduced sentences for so-called honor crimes committed by males against alleged misconduct of female family members remain in place (Human Rights Watch 2014, 565).

D. Civil Society in Jordan

1. Legal environment for civic associations and civic activism

The fight against the PLO and against pan-Arab nationalist movements between 1950 and 1970 provided King Hussein (1953-1999) with the chance to curb political liberties and participatory rights. Between 1957 and 1989, only sporadic parliamentary elections took place, political parties were banned and the King ruled through decrees in a nation-wide state of emergency (Lucas 2005, 18). Following the threat of Islamist terrorism and demonstrations in favor of the second Palestinian Intifada after 2000, Crown Prince Abdallah II (since 1999) broadened restrictions on civil and political liberties after the period of liberalization in the 1990s (Freedom House 2013).

Under Article 16(ii) of the Jordanian constitution, every citizen has the “right to establish societies and political parties provided that their objectives are lawful, their methods peaceful, and that they have by-laws that are not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution.” Until 2008, the right to association was regulated by the very restrictive *Law on Societies and Social Bodies* (Law 33 of 1966). According to the law, any organization had to be licensed with the Ministry of Social Development and informal association could lead to criminal conviction of up to two years in prison (Elbayar 2005, 8f). According to reports by Freedom House, individuals were frequently prosecuted for allegedly belonging to unlicensed groups, although these were mostly comprised of few individuals getting together informally to discuss political and social issues (Freedom House 2013). A survey of NGO laws in different Arab countries in 2005 found that Jordan's law of association is one of the most restrictive, oldest and most arbitrary in the region (Elbayar 2005, 8f).

Yet, a reform of the Law in 2008 and 2009 further stifled restrictions. To obtain a license, associations must now apply for approval as societies, closed societies (foundations) or private societies (non-for-profit companies) after going through a lengthy application

process with a registration board (Article 2). The board is made up of representatives from a variety of different ministries all able to deny the license as seem appropriate without justification (Article 4). Once registration is obtained, the activities of organizations are closely monitored (Article 6). As the new name of the Law – *Law on Charitable Societies* – already suggests, associations are restricted from any “political activity” and the government tightened its authority to intrude in internal activities. For any foreign funding or donation received or given, associations must get approval from the full Jordanian Cabinet which reserves the right to inspect bank accounts at any given time (Article 17c-e). Similarly, any planned activity, project or public meeting or assembly of its board must be denoted in advance (Article 14). In case of a perceived misconduct, the government may shut down any association without judicial process or replace the organization’s management boards with government officials (Article 19). Also, specialized laws exist for the operation of professional associations and there is no right to form new trade unions (CIVICUS 2011, 212).

Additionally, most registered societies are members of national umbrella unions (CIVICUS 2010, 38) that are in differing degrees administered as state-led units with mandatory membership. For example, the General Union of Charitable Societies (also known as General Union of Voluntary Societies – GUVS), officially an independent NGO yet with such close governmental relations that it is also called the ‘Ministry of Associations’, unites all social development associations and coordinates, streamlines and monitors their activities (Wiktorowicz 2002, 88f; Jamal 2007, 120).²³

Apart from the mass of bureaucratic restraints termed as “administrative co-optation” (Fowler 1991, 67), many of the civic associations are also said to be prevented from acquiring sufficient funding because of infiltration by so-called Royal NGOs (RNGOs), associations headed by a member of the royal family that are mostly exempt from the regulations of the *Law on Charitable Societies* (Wiktorowicz 2002, 85ff). Jordanian RNGOs such as the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JOHUD) headed by Princess Basma and the Jordan River Foundation (JRF) chaired by current Queen Rania are said to monopolize foreign as well as governmental funding through providing highly professionalized and effective operations by a staff of globally educated Jordanians which are then favored by donors because they can ‘get the job done’ (Interview USAID; Wiktorowicz 2002,


²³ Similarly umbrella organizations exist for every sector: the Council of Trade Unions, the Cooperative Enterprise, the Jordanian National Assembly of Women Commission or the National Committee for Women’s Affairs are some of the key networks.

86).²⁴ Additionally, RNGOs are only directed at social issues such as education and poverty reduction and thus help the regime to focus public discourse on politically uncritical topics and direct and dominate the public agenda (ibid., 87).

2. Activities of civic associations

Although the mere number of around 5,700 civic associations in Jordan (number for 2011)²⁵ is relatively high, Jordanian civil society in general is considered rather weak (Interview x). According to the assessment by CIVICUS from 2011, Jordan civil society especially lacks a broad volunteer and participation base within society and has very limited political impact on democratic reform, as CSOs mainly concentrate on influencing social policies (CIVICUS 2010, 27ff., CIVICUS 2011, 214). Most active civic associations in Jordan are service and welfare organizations that work on social issues such as poverty reduction (Wiktorowicz 2002, 83). This includes the many Islamic charitable societies such as the charitable arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Center Charity Society, that address socio-economic issues and provide social services such as kindergartens, schools or healthcare (Clark 2004) as well the RNGOs and so-called almsgiving zakat committees (Wiktorowicz 2002, 88).

Figure 8: The CIVICUS Civil Society Diamond for Jordan



(Source: CIVICUS 2010, 13)

²⁴ When looking at the USAID Jordan Civil Society Program, the biggest bunch of funded CSOs are Royal NGOs, which also constitute three of the four national sub-contractors, compare <http://www.csp-jordan.org/EN/SitePage.aspx?PageId=54> (Last access: 8.3.2014).

²⁵ Compare table II.3.1., CIVICUS Jordan Country Report 2010, 27, for an detailed numbers on every sector.

Additionally, foreign funding for civil society is considered skeptical by the Jordanian population, resulting in low levels of public confidence in CSOs and the general perception of a corrupt, politically conservative and pro-regime stance of civil society (CIVICUS 2010, 14, 47).

CIVICUS counts 174 women organizations (CIVICUS 2010, 27), while the Comprehensive Guide to Civil Society Organizations in Jordan, a project by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Jordan and the Phoenix Center for Economic and Informatics Studies only lists 74 active women's organizations.²⁶ The state domination of public discourse is especially evident in regard to the gender issues these organizations work on. Gender issues have been confined to a narrow version of feminism, carefully crafted and controlled by the state and disseminated by the RNGOs, mainly consisting of socially empowering women in regard to their status within the family or tribe and their employability for "female" occupations in the public sector such as healthcare or education, while at the same time avoiding any discussion of harder aspects of equality to prevent a feminist opposition (Wiktorowicz 2002, 87).²⁷ Work on gender issues is monopolized by two main RNGOs, the Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW) working within the framework of JOHUD and the Jordanian National Forum for Women (JNFW), initiated by Princess Basma in 1992.

International CSOs mostly act as intermediary organizations to distribute funding provided by their governments. These funds are no longer conditionally given to the Jordanian governments in exchange for reforms but are directly channeled to civic associations in hope of bottom-up democratization within the framework of specifically designed thematic programs. For instance, USAID Jordan is only responsible for drafting country strategies within their main focus areas, while implementation and cooperation with local civic associations is mainly carried out by two internationally active American NGOs, 360 FHI and the National Democratic Institute (NDI). Next to USAID, all big international democracy promotion actors are present in Jordan, such as the Swedish international Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the EU, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the German GIZ, or the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID). Yet, their work falls into to common track of development cooperation and democracy promotion programs in that it is only minimal coordination between donors,

²⁶Compare list at <http://www.civilsociety-jo.net/en/index.php/specialized-org/women-organizations?start=60> (last access: 14.3.2014).

²⁷ Although the RNGOs also lobby for enhanced political participation of women through quotas for communal and national parliamentary elections, as described above, such quotas can for the most part be considered cosmetic. Education on political rights and participatory possibilities for women as well as strategy training of women MPs is mostly done by international organizations, yet without much too much success (Interview KAS and NDI).

lots of doubling of efforts and programs and thus most funds are channeled to a very small range of the same CSOs (Interview KAS, NDI).

3. Other Types of Civic Activism

Apart from legally registered societies, there is a growing range of other types of civic activism in Jordan. As mentioned, tribal structures play an important role in Jordanian society with tribal associations and traditional forms of Bedouin assembly as major influence on public debate. Tribes have played a major role during the protests of the Arab Spring, representing one of the strongest groups to demand political reform. Especially their younger generation has organized in grassroots youth movements and continuously demanded that the king honor past reform promises (Yom/ Al-Khatib 2012). It was also a union of Bedouin leaders that has dared to cross the red line of accusing the royal family, in particular Queen Rania, of corruption (Zecchini 2011).

Other types of youth movements such as *hirak* or *Youth of March 24* have also been very active during the Arab Spring, yet have been weakened since by the regime (Al-Sharif 2013). Traditionally, student movements are not very strong in Jordan, mostly due to the fact that political activities of any student club are officially prohibited, but also because their membership is only very slim (Hussainy 2012, 5f). Unofficial unions of students exist, often defined by tribal membership, yet they have led to a rise of violence at universities in the last years instead of a push for more rights (Sweis 2013).

There is also a slowly growing scene of social media activism in Jordan, such as *7iber*, which was started in 2007 as a citizen media platform to collect citizen contributions and offer a space for critical discussion.²⁸ Another example of social media activism would be the concerted website blackout in August 2012 as a response to a draft bill on Internet censorship (Galperin 2012). Social media is also considered as increasing in importance for the organized CSO community, with internationally funded projects such as *E-Mediat* aiming at creating what Hilary Clinton has termed Civil Society 2.0.²⁹

The involvement of economy in social activism is also slowly increasing in Jordan. Big companies like the mobile phone corporation Zain more and more begin to establish social responsibility campaigns and work together with CSOs on issues such as education or youth unemployment (Interview USAID). Additionally, companies also start to slowly build

²⁸ Compare their website at <http://7iber.org/about/> (last access: 13.3.2014).

²⁹ Compare US Department of State civil society 2.0 project under <http://www.state.gov/statecraft/cs20/> and E-Mediat project under <http://www.emediat.org/program-overview/> (last access 13.3.2014).

up networks to lobby for common economic goals instead of having to rely on private networks of *wasta* and corruption (ibid.).

II. The Four Actors

A. Pre-tests

The first pre-test was conducted on January 9th, 2014 in Berlin with a longer version of the interview manual. The pre-test revealed that questions in the empathy and respect dimension lead to misunderstandings on the part of the interviewee. Questions in both sections were therefore reformulated. Also the arrangement of the sections was changed and condensed to time the interview to roughly one hour. Also after the first pre-test it was decided to opt for a double anonymization, because the interviewee was both found to give socially desirable answers in the compromise and empathy section and did not want to give information on internal structures and funding. The interviewee commented that he would have given out this information in case of complete anonymization. The second pre-test with the revised manual was conducted in Amman on January 14th, 2014. The organization is a not-for-profit company, working on issues of societal and gender-based violence. It has only been initiated in 2012 and up to now, basically only consists of the founder who works with a minimum of project-based staff that varies heavily.

The interview revealed that the operationalization is not well suited to assess such cases of individual activism. Yet, real individual activism is very rare and most times, potential civil society activism involves some kind of unstructured group or social network. During the second pre-test interview, the interviewee was still able to report some experiences of internal cooperation with temporary staff during projects. As all the other pre-selected actors represent formally organized associations or group projects, it was decided to keep the manual in this form and only to further re-formulate a couple of unclear questions.

B. Actor A: The Royal NGO

1. General Description

Actor A is a RNGO founded by a female member of the royal family several years ago and chaired by another high-ranking member of the royal family. The actor is mainly active in the social areas of child protection, poverty reduction through distribution of revolving loan funds as well as community empowerment through working with local CBOs mostly in tribal areas to increase economic participation and further local businesses. Since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, youth is primarily targeted in the new projects to achieve greater inclusion of

young people into the economy. Women empowerment is a streamline issue within all thematic areas of the actor and thus addressed in all projects they are implementing. In general, the actor resorts to typical means of NGO work to achieve their objects, such as public awareness raising campaigns for their issues, implementation of projects together with local CBOs and distribution of revolving loans, and providing service programs for children and families. The actor is a very large RNGO with headquarters in Amman, which is organized highly professionally, with internationally experienced staff, a clear hierarchical structure and nation-wide reach. The interview was conducted on January 16th, 2014 with two project managers working for the community and women empowerment sections.

2. Dimensions

a) Procedure

When it comes to procedure, Actor A is a highly professionalized, big organization with specific manuals and procedures detailing internal operations and day-to-day activity from attendance to decision-making processes for project developments. Regulations are managed by a human resource unit with little to no exceptions by the majority of the staff. This evaluation is also mirrored in the actor's self-assessment. Yet both interviewees show realistic expectations about the possibility of exceptions from rules, but it also becomes clear that this only pertains to special situations and does not happen on a more regular basis. Internally, Actor A can thus be scored as (3).

Externally, the organization can also be characterized as very reliable. The interviewees describe that during an external assessment by USAID, they have receive the highest scores for their financial department. They have also developed a comprehensive manual, detailing procedures for financial management of funds to cope with the mass of different regulations stipulated by donors. International actors such as USAID and UNDP have additionally funded a broad array of different projects of the actor over the last decade, implying that they are satisfied with the financial performance of the actor. This has also been specifically noted during the interview with USAID and NDI, in which all interviewees agreed that they often like to work with the actor, because it is very professional and reliable. It also mirrors my personal observations before and during the interview. The actor was the only one immediately replying to the interview request sent by mail before the field trip with a proposal for date and time and it was also the only scheduled interview starting on time. Therefore, Actor A can be rated as (3) externally.

b) Respect

Internally, the actor can clearly be rated as (3) regarding respect. Everybody in the organization, not only people involved in project development can contribute conceptually and there is a distinct culture of feedback without regard to hierarchies that is even implemented structurally through feedback rounds on lessons-learned of previous projects. Critique is usually given constructively on work-related issues without personal attachments, including the possibility for explanations and exchange on improvement for the future.

Externally, a close relationship of the actor to all of the CBOs they are working with in the field is a priority, because the actor is dependent on these relations to implement projects in the field. Therefore, CBOs are mostly met on an eye-to-eye level and consulted about planned projects beforehand. Also, all of the CBOs are considered as equal and diversity is encouraged. Exceptions from this relationship can be identified during the Arab Spring when the actor describes demands made by CBOs as irrational and blackmail and was more concerned with fulfilling its own implementation and action plans. Yet, although the relationship during this time could be described as hierarchical with the organization looking down at their “irrational partners”, this represents an extreme case that is not representative of the actor’s overall attitude towards partners. It can therefore still be rated as (3) on external respect.

c) Empathy

Internally, there is openness for all kinds of concerns of staff members, personal or professional. A majority of staff members can be described as reacting empathetic to concerns. Both interviewees describe that the work environment is usually characterized by sympathetic reactions to emotional problems of staff members, for example when there are personal problems at home. Externally, the actor is very open for concerns of partner CBOs that it works with in the fields, which approach the actor often with various concerns. The actor doesn’t stop at just considering the context and technical solutions to a concern, but rather tries to consider their position and relate to their concern to find a solution that fits and helps in the long run as well. Therefore, the actor can be scored as a (3) both internally and externally.


d) *Compromise*

Internally, the actor's willingness to compromise can be evaluated at (2). Although both interviewees explain that disagreements are a usual feature during meetings followed by discussions, the final decisions is mostly taken according to hierarchy and does not necessarily involve concession of both parties. Rather, the management takes the decision. Externally, the actor can be rated at (3). The interviewees explain how during disagreements with CBOs on demands made during the Arab Spring, they still attempted to make concessions to come to an agreement with their partners even though they considered the demands of the other side as irrational.

e) *Total Score*³⁰

Actor A receives an average score of 3 for the empathy, procedure, and respect dimension and an average of 2.7 for the compromise score. The actor's civil society aptitude is therefore very high with a total score of 11.7 points.

Figure 9: Aptitude Diamond Actor A



3. **Position vis-à-vis the State**³¹

The actor can be coded as close to the state both in terms of finance and structurally. The ministry of planning and cooperation has for the past years continuously been the biggest donor for the organization, holding bids for specific poverty reduction projects that are then simply implemented by the organization. Additionally, the actor's board of trustees is not only chaired by the high-ranking royal family member, but also includes members of the public state sector, which are selected to sit on the board.

³⁰ A summary of all individual ratings can be found in the appendix.

³¹ An overview of the line by line coding of transcripts is attached in the appendix.

The overall relation to the state can be described as friendly. The actor and government officials regularly interact and cooperate within various steering committees that are set up before and during project development and implementation to ensure smooth and efficient procedures. The actor is not only close to the state in terms of structure and funding, it also views the primary function of civil society as a partner of the state, responsible for the implementation of the state's social policy agenda. Yet the actor also sees another function of civil society organization as mediator between the state and society, yet only in terms of social policy issues. They regard themselves as a bridge between the Jordanian society and the government, in charge of raising important social issues, to lobby for those issues and facilitate their introduction onto the national agenda. The interviewees seem to disagree on the degree that this function can be fulfilled by Jordanian civil society actors, with one of them claiming that she feels their organization can successfully lobby for issues such as poverty reduction. Yet, both didn't want to elaborate further.

C. Actor B: The Limited Liability Company

1. General Description

Actor B is a limited liability company engaged in enhancing corporate governance practices in the private sector in Jordan. The company is not listed as a civil society association under the Jordanian Ministry of Social Development, but is registered at the Ministry of Economy. The actor focuses mainly on providing training sessions on good corporate governance practices for executives and board members. Yet it is also engaged in raising awareness on corruption and the problem of *wasta* in the private sector by conducting research in cooperation with the International Finance Corporation (World Bank) and holding monthly public discussion panels focusing on various issues related to corporate governance. At the core of the actor's work is the objective of raising women's participation in boards of Jordanian companies. The actor works with the assumption that the participation of women in company boards would greatly increase the financial capacities of each company and help the economic empowerment of women through a top-down approach. Actor B has been restructured into its current form in 2012. Before that it has been the regional Headquarter of an OECD and CEDAW project, researching obstacles for women entrepreneurship in the Middle East and North Africa and designing an international campaigning project to raise awareness. In its current structure, the organization is very small, only comprising six staff members including the founder. It has no membership base and only a three-person board which is selected. The interview was conducted on January 20th, 2014 with the founder and managing director at her office in Amman.

2. Dimensions

a) *Procedure*

Internally, Actor B can be evaluated as (3) for procedure. As the objective of the actor is to enhance corporate governance, it is determined to present itself as the model company in terms of internal procedures and regulations to not offer any room for attack. As corporate governance and the fight against corruption in the private sector in Jordan represent sensitive topics, the actor makes sure that internally, there are no exceptions when it comes to regulations related to good practice of corporate governance. Thus the actor reliably fulfills the regulations of the Jordan Corporate Governance Code with high transparency (reports and research findings all accessible online) and monthly reports to its own board.

Because the actor is structured as a company, it doesn't receive outside funding. There is external cooperation with certified trainers that are contracted for individual training modules according to specialization. Cooperation with the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank is based on a partnership agreement for content and expertise for research mainly. Actor B thus usually agrees and adheres to mutual regulations for both parties before entering into the corporation through signing a contract and is thus also legally bound to reliably follow those regulations. Also, the actor has for several years been a partner of the IFC for several bigger research projects that were headquartered at the organization in Jordan and are now continued within the new structure. This implies a level of reliability and trust when working with external partners, and can therefore be evaluated as (3) externally.

b) *Respect*

Usually, all staff members of the company can contribute conceptually to projects such as the focus groups that here organized as regular panel discussions each month. The actor generally describes the working environment as very open and focused on innovation, which makes it necessary that every person can contribute new ideas. This also includes a culture of feedback that can be given without regard to hierarchy, but rather encourages the expression of opinion in a positive, explanatory way that is directed towards improvement. Negative feedback is mostly avoided.

The relationship with external participants develops to get closer during the course of the training programs. Yet they are always characterized by an atmosphere of open discussion, sharing and learning instead of hierarchical lecturing. Although women are given preferential treatment for training programs, this cannot be evaluated as a discriminatory factor, as they are the main target of the companies work. Rather, all of the trainings are open

for any participant, male or female. Thus, the company can be scored as (3) both internally and externally when it comes to respect.

c) Empathy

Approaching colleagues with serious problems is not encouraged in the company. Rather, emphasis is put on working efficiently. While problems and concerns of co-workers are dealt with and solutions are sought through perspective-taking, the interviewee specifically states that the workplace is not a place for sympathy and that any solution should not harm performance. Similarly, concerns of external participants are only dealt with in a practical manner, the concern itself is of no interest, only a workable solution. Also there is no openness for problems of external participants other than those that are related to the technicalities of the training program. Thus both internally as well as externally, the actor is scored as (1) on empathy.

d) Compromise


Internally, Actor B is scored (1) on compromise as well. Hierarchy is mostly the deciding factor in conflict solution and compromise is not particularly encouraged within the company. In contrast, disagreements between staff members can be solved however they want to, as long as they are solved. If the founder is involved, the disagreement is decided according to her opinion. Although communications about the disagreement may take place, decisions will usually not be based on mutual concessions of both parties, but on the opinion of the founder.

Externally, the actor can be scored as (3). The company is specifically open to compromise with external participants, with preceding communication on how to find a solution to the disagreement. Communications with external participants are described as discussion-based instead of confrontational. Yet the actor also describes that concessions will not be made unconditionally, but only as long as they are in accordance with basic values.

e) *Total score*

Adding the self-assessment scores, Actor B receives an average score of 3 for the dimensions procedure and respect, an average of 2.3 for compromise and 1 for empathy. The total score is 9.3. As the actor has received a score of 1 in one dimension, it's overall civil society aptitude is thus categorized as low.

Figure 10: Aptitude Diamond Actor B



3. Position vis-à-vis the State

The actor can be described as independent in regard to connections with the state. There is no outside funding, neither national nor international, and the company's structures are solely situated within the economic sector without any connections to state institutions. The actor's relationship with the state can be defined as difficult. As the company is directed to combat a the critical issue of corruption in the private sector, it is often targeted by public institutions that try to intimidate and control its actions. The actor views civil society's function as neutral towards the state, with civil society actors working towards the advancement and development of society in different policy areas, ideally without being bothered or influenced by state institutions. This last point might reflect its difficult relationship with the state in advancing the issues of corruption. Ideally, civil society should look like the civil sector in the US, as a strong sector next to the economy that can contribute to the advancement society.

D. Actor C: The Community-based Space

1. General Description

Actor C is a project which can be described as community-based space of the liberal, secular, and gay community in Amman. The project now includes an internet café and restaurant, English bookshop, stages and events for alternative artists and regular discussion groups on issues currently relevant for this community in two locations in Amman. The project has also developed a network to help and assist any person that has been the object of harassment, violence, or exclusion based on their gender, beliefs or sexuality. The project is infamous in the region as being progressive and publicly addressing gender issues that are otherwise shunned in the religious-conservative, tribal and traditional Jordanian society. The project's various components provide a space for anybody in Amman that wants to openly show their identity without fear of getting harassed or being ostracized.

The project has evolved since its foundation 17 years ago to a big organization with 52 staff members in two locations. The staff mostly consists of people that have found help through the project's network and now work for it fulltime. The founder and his brother together with other people from the gay and liberal community in Amman initiated the project and still hold most of the executive positions. Daily operations are primarily managed by one of the co-founding brothers, largely dominating the direction and agenda based on his own experiences as openly homosexual Jordanian Muslim. The interview was conducted with one of the co-founding brothers at one of the projects Amman locations on January 19th, 2014.

2. Dimensions

a) Procedures

Up to now, there are no written procedures guiding the internal work of the project. Yet, there are some clear principles that guide the relationship between the owner and staff and between them and customers in particular. These relationships are based on the principles of equal, personal, and warm behavior. Yet, exceptions happen from time to time as regulations and principles aren't officially trained, but rather passed on through imitation and are therefore somehow depend on each staff member's individual personality. Previously, decisions have often been made on situational basis, only following these basic principles, but as the project developed, decisions have become more reliable and mostly follow best practices from previous situations. Also, principles and regulations are at the moment being put together into a manual, to standardize and train them. Therefore, Actor C can be scored as (2) internally.

Externally, the actor doesn't receive any funding from international or national sources. Cooperation with other organizations is based on a personal network, rather than official partnership agreements. Yet the actor enjoys a high level of trust among organizations that are confronted with cases of gay bashing or honor crimes and often refer such cases to the project. The actor is also well-known among Jordanians in Amman as a trustworthy institution that will reliably provide help in any case that is related to intolerance and inequality. This can also be seen on the facebook page of the project which often contains personal thank you notes from people that have received help as well as the positive press coverage of the projects reliable involvement in cases of open harassment and human rights violations. The actor can thus be evaluated as high (3).

b) Respect

Although one of the projects main objectives is equality, respectful behavior internally is not always guaranteed. Conceptual work is mostly done by the owner, although from time to time, other staff members can contribute. There is no reliable open culture of feedback, it is rather mostly given top-down from the owners to the staff and may from time to time also involve personal issues often depending on the background of staff members. From time to time, some of them reproduce abusive or harassing behavior that they've experienced in the past when dealing with co-workers or customers. Therefore, the internal ability to respectful behavior is scored at (2).

Externally, close and personal relationships with customers are a priority for the project and all customers, no matter their background, sexual orientation or other difference are considered as equal without exception. As soon as a customer walks into the space, they become part of the community and everybody meets at the same level. Although there may be some exceptions within the staff, this doesn't influence the overall environment. This leveling, equality and freedom was also experienced during personal observation. The project is one of the few if not only public spaces in Jordan that can provide such a free and respectful environment, especially when it comes to being a woman. Therefore, the ability to external respectful interactions is scored at (3).

c) Empathy

Internally as well as externally, the owner himself can be described as very empathetic. He is open for any kind of concern or problem and makes it a point that this openness is connected to the project, not only to himself as a person. Other organizations regularly refer hard cases of harassment to the project and individuals often turn to the owner for help. When

approached with an issue, the person seeking help can be sure that not only will the owner consider the other perspective and emotionally relate, but additionally do anything possible to help and even show a high level of emotional distress. Although this reaction to concerns is encouraged within the project, it is not systematized, which is an objective of the owner in the future. Therefore, the reaction of the majority of staff depends on the individual that is approached and their respective personal empathetic ability. Both internally and externally, the actor is hence rated at mostly (2).


d) Compromise

Internally, the actor generally encourages communicative strategies to solve disagreements between parties. As the project involves many people from very different backgrounds who have often experienced difficult psychological situations in the past, disagreement is a usual feature of everyday internal operations. Communication to understand the opposing party is described as being a characteristic feature of conflict resolution. Also, the majority of staff is described as being open for concessions in those situations of conflict to find middle ground. Internally, the Actor C can therefore be evaluated as a (3). Externally as well, Actor C is always open to concession towards its customers, as long as they follow the basic principles of tolerance that are important for the actor. Therefore, Actor C is rated as (3).

e) Total score

Combined with the self-assessment scores, Actor C receives 3 points for the compromise dimension, 2.7 for respect, 2.3 for procedures and 2 for empathy. This adds up to a total of 10 points, Actor C thus has a high civil society aptitude.

Figure 11: Aptitude Diamond Actor C



3. Position vis-à-vis the State

The project can be mostly defined as independent in terms of connections with governmental institutions. Yet, during the interview, the owner described the continuous support of the royal family for the project, which could date back to his personal connections to the queen herself, dating back from their youth in Kuwait. Yet officially, there are neither structural nor financial connections to the state.

Actor C's relationship to the state, meaning his relationship to governmental institutions, can be coded as difficult. The project's objectives of providing an open and public space for a community of people that are considered as non-existent by traditional Jordanian believes, such as gay men or women drinking alcohol, often results in conflicts with societal norms and official restrictions. The project had to deal with regular controls, attempts of intimidations and obstacles by government officials. Yet, the actor views civil society's main function not in opposition to a repressing state, but as mostly directed at promoting tolerance and equality within society. Yet, the actor is not just neutral, but also considers advocating for those rights on the state level as civil society function and can therefore be coded as mediator.

E. Actor D: The Independent NGO

1. General Description

Actor D is a proto-typical membership-based NGO mainly working for women empowerment, gender equality and women's rights in Jordan. Their main objective is to monitor the government's commitment to grant and guarantee the rights sent out in CEDAW by compiling annual shadow reports and presenting them at the UN. Apart from that, the NGO mainly works with local CBOs to educate local communities on their rights as women and prevent sexual violence and honor crimes. They also cooperate with the female parliamentarians to help them build an agenda based on gender issues, not on tribal relations. Recently, the organization has also started to address social gender issues of female Syrian refugees, building up services that provide female refugees access to healthcare and housing.

The organization has been active in the area of women empowerment for more than two decades. It has built up a membership base that is responsible for the election of the board and president every three years as well as the annual adoption of the financial and administrative reports. Actor D can thus be described as democratically organized organization with clearly defined responsibilities and administrative units. The actor has

several locations in Amman as well as in the field and within Palestinian refugee camps. The interview was conducted on January 14th, 2014 with the director of projects.

2. Dimensions

a) Procedures

Apart from official written-down by-laws and a statute that is mandatory for every licensed association in Jordan by law, Actor D only has some unwritten guidelines and principles that regulate day-to-day activities. This flexibility in rules is described by the interviewee herself as a weakness. Decisions may thus be taken on a more ad-hoc situational basis by a responsible person as seen fit in that case without fixed procedural guidelines. Yet, although procedures are flexible and only some unwritten guidelines exist, a majority of the staff reliably follows them with exceptions happening sometimes. Therefore, the actor is rated as (2) internally.

Externally, the actor is heavily dependent on international funding. Yet the interviewee admits that there are so many different regulations posited on them by different donors that they can't reliably follow all of them in every project. Sometimes, the organization has to ask for the extension of deadlines, mostly because their partner CBOs in the field are not working efficiently and therefore, the actor needed more time to complete a project report. Hence, the actor can be scored as a (2) externally as well.

b) Respect

Internally, the actor can be scored as a (2) for respectful behavior. Although all staff members that are part of a project can also contribute to its conceptual development, there is no culture of feedback. Critique is generally avoided, the interviewee sees her function as project director more as reassuring staff members and therefore refrains from negative feedback. Externally, the partner CBOs that the actor is mostly working with in the field are consulted and included into the different phases of project implementation to avoid conflict. Projects are designed to ensure that every CBO enjoys equality when it comes to their rights and duties. The actor is very keen on upholding good relationships with all external partner CBOs and the women they work with in the field, maintaining an eye-to-eye relationship with them and calling them sister NGOs. Therefore externally, Actor D can be rated as (3).

c) *Empathy*

The actor encourages an environment, in which staff members can openly approach each other with problems and know that they will be heard and get help. The situation described by the interviewee represents a severe example in which the actor was taken to court by a former employee. Although in this case, the actor didn't feel sympathy for the former employee, they tried to understand her situation and learn from mistakes. In general, the interviewee describes the organization as a family that will always be open for concerns of others and show sympathy in those cases. Thus internally the actor is scored as a (3).

Externally, the interviewee reports to be very open for concerns of partner CBOs which often approach the actor with problems. Although in all cases, the majority of staff will help and try and consider their perspective and the situation on the ground, sympathy is not necessarily a factor during this process, especially when donors and deadlines are involved. Therefore, the actor is scored as a (2) externally.


d) *Compromise*

Compromise is the usual conflict resolution strategy in cases of internal disagreements between staff members. This includes communication about the problem to help the opposing party understand the respective position and making concessions to come to a solution. Externally though, the actor rather tries to avoid conflict and disagreements with partner CBOs. If there is a conflict such as a missed deadline, the actor may resort to setting an ultimatum, especially if donors are involved. Although communication is mostly part of the solution strategy, the decision in such situations is rather based on hierarchy instead of mutual concessions. The interviewee admits that to keep up good relationships and a high reputation with the donors, compromise cannot always be the primary conflict resolution strategy. Therefore, Actor D can be scored as (3) internally and (2) externally in the compromise dimension.

e) *Total score*

Together with the self-assessment scores, the Actor D thus receives an average of 2.3 points of the procedural and compromise dimensions respectively and 2.7 points for respect for empathy. In total this adds up to 10 points. Actor D thus has a high civil society aptitude.

Figure 12: Aptitude Diamond Actor D



3. Position vis-a-vis State

Actor D can be coded as independent, receiving neither governmental funding nor being in any way structurally connected to the state. The actor's relationship to the state can be clearly coded as difficult. As the NGO regularly criticizes governmental entities publicly and addresses shortcoming also at the international level, their relationship to the government is characterized by a lot of regulation and control. Accordingly, the actor views civil society's main function as opposition to the state, monitoring and controlling the government's human rights violations. Civil society is also seen as a way for such politically oriented organizations to unite to have a bigger impact on the state and more weight with international institutions.

I. Analytical Generalization

A. Patterns of Interaction

The case study shows that three of the four actors have a high civil society aptitude along all four dimensions. The low aptitude of the fourth actor, Actor B, only stems from its low score in the empathy dimension, while the points received in the other dimensions are still high. Yet this result suggests that Actor B is dominated by civil society-like interactions from time to time and in some dimensions. Overall, the four actors can however be described as being dominated by tolerant patterns of interaction.

From the results it can be assumed that such a dominant pattern of tolerant interactions might be found for a large number of different types of societal actors in Jordan. Although the case study is in no way representative in terms of sample size, the four actors are typical cases for their respective sub-unit and thus represent a range of grey zone actors. Yet it has to be noted that all four actors that were selected are formally organized and made up of more than one individual. Before more definite assumptions on a dominant pattern of tolerant interactions within and between societal actors can be made, it would first be necessary to also test less organized activism situated towards the outside grey zone circle of civil society.

As recommendation for research as well as democracy practitioners alike, the case study implies that the normative restrictions to a few supposedly “good” societal actors situated in between the other spheres should be abandoned in favor of an inclusionary concept that contains all types of societal actors and civic activism. Not only formal organizations within the traditional civil society sphere, but also different types of actors from other spheres are dominated by civil society-like interactions and should thus not be pre-maturely excluded.

B. Position of Civil Society vis-à-vis the State

The thematic coding of the four actors shows that there seems to be a correlation between close connections with the state, friendly relations with governmental institutions and a view of civil society’s function as partner of the state in charge of implementation of the national agenda as well as mediator between the state and society in terms of social issues. Independence from the state in contrast seems to result in difficult relations with the state. Yet there is no apparent connection between independence and difficult relations and a view of civil society as opposition towards the state in charge of monitoring and publicizing misconduct. While Actor B and C both view civil society’s function as neutral vis-à-vis the

state, directed mostly at the advancement of society without state interference, Actor D takes an oppositional stance towards the authoritarian regime. Yet while Actor C’s relationship with governmental entities is coded as difficult and as independent from the state, there are some reported unofficial connections with the royal family that might be the cause of a more neutral view of the function vis-à-vis the state.

The interviews suggest that although an actor may be characterized by a high civil society aptitude and thus dominantly shows tolerant patterns of interaction, there is no evident correlation with a certain type of relationship with governmental institutions, interrelatedness with state entities, or view of civil society’s function. Although Actor B and C both deal with highly critical issues (corruption and homosexuality), the issue area of activism seems to be indicative of a difficult relationship with the regime, but not of the view of civil society’s function. In contrast, being engaged in an uncritical issue area that is in conformance with the regime’s agenda might be indicative of friendly relations and a function as partner or mediator.

In general, this implies that although there may be a high pattern of tolerant interactions in Jordan that also deals with politically critical issues, this does not necessarily result in an oppositional position towards the authoritarian regime. Only one out of the four actors clearly stated its objective as being directed against the authoritarian regime. If this pattern can be confirmed within a broader set of Jordanian societal actors in further research, this means in turn that not only is there no clear correlation between tolerant interactions and disposition towards the state, there is also only low potential for possible political change coming from civil society in a liberalized authoritarian regime such as Jordan.

Table 5: Summary of Actor’s Positions towards the State

	Connections		Relationship		Functions			
	Close	Independent	Friendly	Difficult	Neutral	Mediator	Partner	Opposition
Actor A	x		x			x	x	
Actor B		x		x	x			
Actor C		x		x	x	x		
Actor D		x		x				x

C. Tolerance and Democratic Dispositions

System theory in general doesn't necessarily refer to democratic systems, but to any society that has evolved from a traditional to a modern, functionally differentiated societal order. Yet, the action-based concept of civil society as proposed by Gosewinkel and Rucht suggests that a dominance of tolerant interactions in civil society can in fact be equated with a democratic societal order. If the state's mode of interaction (power) dominates not only its own sub-system, but others as well, a society will drift towards authoritarianism (Gosewinkel/ Rucht 2004, 48). In reverse, this implies that when each sub-system is dominated by its own mode of interaction, the society is balanced and in effect democratic. But is tolerance indeed a form of interaction characteristic for democratic practice and can it therefore serve as indicator of a democratic societal order?

In political theory, democracy is mainly understood in terms of liberalism and pluralism: the state grants basic civil and political rights to citizens and provides a legal framework for pluralism, allowing for the peaceful coexistence of different beliefs, worldviews, cultures and ideas in society. Tolerant interactions as understood by Gosewinkel and Rucht exist, because actors believe in the advantages of such peaceful coexistence and cooperation (ibid., 46). They thus opt for pluralistic instead of authoritarian practices, which in contrast can be defined as "limited, not responsible, political pluralism" (Linz 1964, 255), submission to authority and traditional beliefs postulated by leadership (Altemeyer 1998) or the rejection of differences in favor of uniformity (Stenner 2005).

Therefore, a high degree of tolerant interactions can serve as indicator for the democratic disposition of an actor. Accumulated at the level of civil society as a whole, the overall degree of tolerant interactions can accordingly help to identify, if patterns of authoritarianism are really reproduced by civil society actors. Yet as the interviews revealed, a high aptitude and thus a democratic disposition does not necessarily go hand in hand with an oppositional stance towards the authoritarian regime. Just on the contrary, although tolerant democratic dispositions may be dominant in the internal and external interactions of actors, their relationship with the authoritarian regime may be friendly with close connections to state entities. Thus, such democratic dispositions of actors are no indicator of the readiness to push for political reform and democratization. Although civil society actors in Jordan might not reproduce authoritarian patterns of rule, but rather yield to tolerant interactions themselves, the potential to challenge existing power structures within civil society may still be low. This may be due to a number of restrictive factors such as a disadvantageous political context including co-optation by the regime, simple repression or threats, or too narrow a space for

politically oriented activity, so that a majority of actors rather chooses to engage in uncritical social issues and conform to the state's agenda instead of not being able to act at all.

For Jordan, the case study suggests that although actors score high on civil society aptitude and thus show tolerant, democratic dispositions, most of them don't view their function in society as political, directed towards monitoring and opposing the authoritarian state. Even those that can be coded as independent with difficult relations to governmental entities may see their function rather as mediator between society and the state or mainly focused on societal issues, without framing their function in relation to the state. In conclusion, this means that although many of the potential civil society actors might show dominantly tolerant and thus democratic patterns of interactions, the overall potential for democratic change coming from civil society in the country is rather low. This may be due to the restrictive nature of Jordan's political context, including limitations on associational rights and freedom of expression, administrative co-optation of civil society actors, and domination of public discourse, leaving only little space for any non-socially oriented activism. Not the civil society aptitude, but the self-positioning of civil society vis-à-vis the state in combination with the political environment might thus be the deciding factor in determining the potential impact on future political reform by civil society actors.

As implication for democracy promotion and future research, these findings therefore suggest that when it comes to promoting democracy, a top-down approach of investing in a benevolent enabling environment allowing for political activism also on critical issues for any kind of civic actor might be far more crucial than only investing in civil society organizations themselves and hoping that they will challenge the system from the grassroots up.

II. Critique of Analytical Framework and Operationalization

Although Gosewinkel and Rucht claim that their conceptualization of civil society is not normative in itself, because it is an account of empirically valid norms of social interaction, their approach nonetheless has a normative bias. Just building upon the concept of functionally differentiated societies and distinguishing between societal spheres in itself can already be considered normative according to Gosewinkel himself (2003, 6). Also, to base the understanding of civil society on any kind of norm, whether an ideal-type moral value or an empirically observed custom of social interaction, puts a normative spin on the concept. Social and cultural norms, just as philosophical ones, describe how social behavior ought to be, not necessarily how it is. Thus, by raising empirically observed norms such as that of tolerance to a defining criterion of a theoretical concept, the concept itself becomes

normative. In consequence, civil society is not merely considered as any type of civic activism, but as activism dominated by tolerant interactions. While this may be the social norm of civil society behavior, it does not necessarily have to describe the reality of societal interactions. Although the authors admit that no society and actor will every by completely tolerant, it nevertheless stipulates an ideal-type of civil society behavior.

Yet the demands of some social scientists to rid the civil society concept of all normative attachments and use it in a purely analytical, neutral way can hardly be realized. Any concept, by its nature of building on theoretical propositions, has a normative component about how the world ought to be and can never be completely neutral. Yet, by applying the analytical framework in an open way that considers any societal actor as civil society, the inclusionary approached presented in this thesis achieves a certain degree of neutrality.

Also, the authors criticize the conception of civil society as separable domain, yet they follow a hidden logic of spheres themselves. While domains-based approaches define civil society in terms of the type of actors or type of space, Gosewinkel and Rucht define it in terms of type of interactions. Although the positive definition of the action-based approach may have a number of distinct advantages over the logic of domains, both approaches rely on the same basic logic of societal order. From an institutional viewpoint, non-Western societies especially in the Middle East may have clearly discernible spheres of state, family, public, and economy that have been imported with the establishment of European models of administrative nation states after independence. Yet, traditional structures of societal order in Middle Eastern societies often run exactly contrary to this administratively imposed division of spheres, with family and tribal networks dominating public, political and economic life. It may therefore be somehow questionable, to what extent any concept relying on such modern assumptions of societal order may be transferable to non-Western contexts in the first place, no matter if following the logic of actions or domains. Yet, this issue already touches the argument about the supposed Eurocentric dominance of development models which is a debate that cannot be followed in detail here. Methodologically speaking, a completely neutral approach would entail abandoning any theoretical framework for the study of civil society and instead explore societal practices and norms within society in the spirit of purely explorative grounded theory. However, as the application of the analytical model in this thesis is directed at developing a more inclusive understanding of civil society for the analysis of Middle Eastern regimes, it is particularly open for more traditional, regionally specific forms of societal order and thereby refutes the critique to some extent.

Apart from the normative-empiricism debate, it could also be criticized that tolerance is identified as the interaction specific only for civil society. One could argue that tolerance as

a moral value and practice of accepting differences and pluralism is a concept that is at the basis of all societal spheres, a precondition for democracy in general, and just as much the responsibility of every individual, state official, or economic firm to uphold. Yet, while it may certainly be a common value for any citizen and a responsibility of the state to guarantee, tolerance is especially important when it comes to interactions of actors in public and may therefor very well be considered as the typical mode of interaction of civil society. Tolerance is important for the others spheres, but their dominant mode of interaction does not primarily rely on it.

When it comes to the operationalization of the analytical framework, critique could be issued in regard to case selection and interview partners. As mentioned above, the case study only considers formally organized organizations and does not test less organized types of civic activism for practical reasons. Additionally, the interview manual is not very suited to test individual activism, but is to some extent biased towards more formalized, established group structures. It also relies on the interview partners and the groups themselves to have a certain degree of experience. Additionally, as interviews were only conducted with one representative of the organization, interview results still contain a degree of subjective bias, because the accounts of that one interviewee may not necessarily be representative for the organization in total. For more accurate results, it would therefore have been better to interview different representatives of an organization within different hierarchical positions and average their accounts.

III. Outlook

Future research should further analyze civil society in a more differentiated way, studying how different facets of a civil society actor may account for its impact instead of viewing civil society as black box, either furthering democratization or stabilizing authoritarian rule. Civil society as inclusionary concept shows that there are many grey shades, with some types of actors or activism having a higher potential for political change than others. Research should therefor work at analyzing if the identified correlations between different factors of civil society actors and their potential political impact hold up. Also, further empirical exploration should be undertaken regarding the dominance of tolerant patterns of interaction within unorganized civic activism. Moreover, it will be necessary to research the interplay between the patterns identified in this study with additional factors such as differences in the political environment, the policy area of engagement, degree of formal organization, type of foreign

funding, membership base or interrelatedness with domestic and international organizations, just to name a few.

Next steps could thus include the development of a survey to turn the qualitative interviews into quantifiable results. This survey should take into account a broader range of activism within Jordan as well as within other types of authoritarian regimes and test different components of the following pattern identified by this first explorative case study in combination with the other possible factors of influence:

- Highly tolerant interactions (pattern of democratic interactions) of majority of actors
- No reproduction of authoritarian pattern of rule
- Dominant view of civil society as mediator/ neutral
- Close connections go hand in hand with friendly relationship and view as partner of the regime
- Independence correlates with difficult relationship if dealing with critical policy areas/ issues
- Tolerant interactions do not correlate with oppositional view directed at politically challenging power structures

Such research would yield a map of civil society, categorizing different types of activism and its relation with a pattern of interaction, connections and relation to the authoritarian regime as well as view of civil society's function and disposition towards the authoritarian state to identify correlations between those categories and potential impact on political change in authoritarian regimes. This would further a more differentiated view of civil society not instead of its research as monolithic black box. This in turn would make the current dichotomic view of civil society as either stabilizer of authoritarian rule or motor of democratization more nuanced and empirically valid.

Conclusion

The preceding analysis has shown that literature and democracy promotion is dominated by a domains-based understanding of civil society as separable sphere between state, market, and family. By normatively pre-defining the borders of civil society, those understandings limit the concept to a proto-typical civil society actor, the independent, formally organized, voluntary and democratically oriented non-governmental organization. The inclusion or exclusion of other types of CSOs depends on research goal or objective of practitioners, with borders of the civil society sphere varying greatly.

This thesis has presented an alternative, empirical approach to civil society, understood in terms of interactions of societal actors dealing with issues of power, violence, and exclusion. Depending on the type of interactions in four dimensions, an actor's civil society aptitude (dominance of tolerant interactions) can be assessed and ranked on a continuum from very high to very low aptitude. The case study testing the aptitude of grey zone actors in Jordan shows that independently of sphere, actors can be highly dominated by tolerant interactions and should thus be considered as civil society. Following such an inclusionary approach to civil society that does not predefine borders, but looks at all actors on the ground also yields better results on the question, which actor might possibly challenge existing power structures and which might stabilize authoritarian rule. The results of the case study imply that civil society actors differ when it comes to their position vis-à-vis the state and might thus also show variation in readiness and potential for political impact.

The case of Jordan illustrates that among formally organized actors, there is a high dominance of tolerant, democratic interactions, implying that civil society in Jordan does not reproduce authoritarian practices. Yet, just because a civil society actor has a general democratic disposition, this does not automatically entail an oppositional position towards the regime and thus a higher potential of political impact. Rather, even actors that have difficult relationships with governmental institutions only see their function as neutral or mediator. This in turn suggests that the potential of civil society to change current authoritarian power structures in Jordan is rather low.

For practitioners, these results entail that more focus should be put on pushing for a favorable political environment instead of solely hoping for a democratic push from the bottom. For research, the case study shows that instead of viewing civil society as black box, the correlation between different facets of civic activism and their effects on the political impact of a societal actor should be studied to receive more nuanced results on when and how civil society challenges authoritarianism.

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Berlin, 17. März 2014



Maria J. Debre

I. Interview Manual for in-depth Interviews

A. Introductory part: General questions

1. In which area is your organization mainly active?
2. What are your main objectives?
3. Which means do you mainly employ to achieve those objectives?
 - (3.1.)³² To what extent do you deal with socio-political questions such as established patterns of power, violence or exclusion?
 - (3.1.) Do you have programs dealing with gender issues or women empowerment? Would you please elaborate?
4. To what extent do you work in public?
 - (4.1.) Do you organize public events, workshops or projects for external participants?
5. What is the motivation of your organization for pursuing those issues?
6. How is your organization funded?
 - (6.1.) Can you name the most important donor organizations of your organization?
 - (6.2.) Do you receive funding from governmental sources?
7. Could you please describe the organizational structure and decision-making process within your organization?
 - (7.1.) How many members do you have in your organization?
 - (7.2.) Which kind of members?

³² Questions in parentheses are optional questions, depending on the course of the interview and answers.

B. Main part – internal and external work of the organization

I would now like to talk to you about the internal processes within your organization as well as your work with external participants and partner organizations during projects.

I will ask you to describe specific situations and would ask you to then try to briefly sketch the most important points.

I. Adherence to rules of procedure

- 1.1. Do you have established rules of procedure or principles governing your internal work?
Yes: Could you please describe a recent situation, where these rules applied?
No: How do you work together internally ? Could you please explain a recent situation?
- 1.2. To what extent did every staff member stick to those rules and principles?
- 1.3. Have there been exceptions, where you departed from these proceedings?
Yes: Which exceptions? Could you elaborate briefly?
No: Continue.
- 1.4. Is this characteristic for your internal operations?
Yes: Continue.
No: What characterizes your internal work?
- 1.5. Could you please describe some regulations you had to follow to receive funding or other support from international/ external organizations during a recent project?
- 1.6. Have there been regulations you weren't able to fulfill?
Yes: Which ones? Could you elaborate briefly?
No: Continue.
- 1.7. Is this characteristic for your organization?
- 1.8. Adherence to rules of procedure describes the ability to dependently follow established procedures when working with others.
On a scale from 1 to 10 (1 being the lowest), how would you rate the ability of your organization to adhere (stick) to regulations?
- 1.9. Could you explain your evaluation with a specific case?

Rating scheme: Adherence to Rules of Procedure

Internal:

(3) Have clear written guidelines/ unwritten principles that guide day-to-day procedures and decision-making processes, majority of staff reliably follows rules in most cases, realistic expectations about exceptions in unprecedented or special situations

(2) Some written rules/ unwritten principles, daily procedures or decision-making from time to time guided by situational decisions, reliability of majority of staff varies, exception happen sometimes

(1) No/ very few clear written rules/ unwritten principles, daily procedures or decision-making in most cases guided by situational decisions of one person, reliability of majority of staff varies heavily, exceptions from rules happen often

External:

(3) Majority of rules and regulations by external donors are met in almost all cases, exceptions only in unprecedented, special situations, donors keep up funding over longer periods / return for new projects // Cooperation with external partners according to previously agreed-upon procedure, exceptions (extensions of deadlines) only for unprecedented, special situations, deviation from procedures are communicated to and discussed with partner

(2) Some Rules and regulations by external donors can be met, some exceptions happen during all projects, donors have in the past addressed problems of reliability // only few procedures agreed-upon before cooperation with external partners, deadlines had to be pushed in multiple instances, partners are not always notified in case of deviation form plan

(1) Rules and regulations are rarely met, exceptions happen frequently, donors have in the past ended cooperation/ reported instances of corruption // cooperation with other partners always on ad-hoc or unorganized basis, deadlines are rarely met, little to no communication with partner

Overall:

(3) Self-assessment between 8 and 10

(2) Self-assessment between 4 and 7

(1) Self-assessment between 1 and 3

II. Respect

- 1.1. Please describe the most recent bigger project which you organized together with your co-workers.
- 1.1. How many people participated in the project?
- 1.2. Who was allowed to contribute to the conceptual work?
- 1.3. Is this the usual routine for the internal work during a project?
Yes: Continue.
No: What is the usual routine?
- 1.4. Could you please describe a situation during this project, where a staff member was criticized for his/ her work?
- 1.5. Is this the usual way of criticizing a co-worker in your organization?
Yes: Continue.
No: What is the usual way?
- 1.6. Filter question: Was the project you just described a project with external participants?
Yes: Continue
No: Could you please briefly describe a project with events for external participants.
- 1.7. Could you briefly describe the relationship between the staff members of the project and the external participants?
- 1.8. Could you explain your description with a specific case?
- 1.9. To what extent were all participants considered as equals?
- 1.10. Is this the typical relationship between your organization and external participants?
Yes: Continue.
No: How does the relationship typically look like?
- 1.11. Respectful behavior means valuing others and their work and treating them as equals.
On a scale from 1 to 10 (1 being the lowest), how would you rate the ability of your organization to act in this regard?
- 1.12. Could you explain your evaluation with a specific case?

Rating Scheme: Respect

Internal:

(3) Everybody is allowed to contribute to conceptual work, (negative) feedback is regularly given and encouraged, everybody is allowed to feedback, critique is expressed in constructive (=communication about problem, room for explanations, recommendations for improvement) & impersonal manner on work-related issues

(2) Only some are allowed to contribute to conceptual work or decisions may be taken by leadership without taking into account previous contributions, negative feedback is avoided or only given top-down, critique without much explanation, can sometimes involve personal issues

(1) Conceptual decisions are taken by leadership without previous consultation, feedback is never given or only in unconstructive, personalized way

External:

(3) Relationship to external participants and partners are on eye-to-eye level, external participants/ partners within a workshop or project are considered equals, close/ good relationship with external partners & participants priority for organization

(2) Relationship to external participants and partners is sometimes characterized by hierarchy with organization dominating partners, sometimes preferential treatment of participants/ partners on basis of their sex, religion, political dispositions, good relationship with externals not heavily invested

(3) Relationship to external participants and partners is always characterized by hierarchy with organization acting/ feeling superior to partners, often preferential treatment of participants/ partners or open discrimination, relationship with externals of no concern to organization

Overall:

(3) Self-assessment between 8 and 10

(2) Self-assessment between 4 and 7

(1) Self-assessment between 1 and 3

III. Empathy

- 1.1. Please describe a situation, where a staff member or colleague turned to you with a serious problem. (personal issue, problem at work with co-workers etc.)
- 1.2. How did you react?
- 1.3. To what extent were you able to put yourself in the position of your colleague?
- 1.4. To what extent were you able to sympathize with the issue?
- 1.5. Do you usually handle problems of staff members in this way in your organization? (The majority of staff members)

Yes: Continue.

No: How do you usually handle such problems?

- 1.6. Could you describe a similar situation, where an external participant of a project or workshop approached you with a serious concern (eg. Discrimination, unfair treatment etc.)?
- 1.7. How did you react?
- 1.8. To what extent were you able to take the perspective of that person?
- 1.9. To what extent were you able to sympathize with his/ her concern.
- 1.10. Does your organization (majority of staff members) usually handle concerns of external participants in this way?

Yes: Continue.

No: How do you (majority) usually handle concerns?

- 1.11. Empathy describes the ability to take the perspective of somebody else and to sympathize with his issue.

On a scale from 1 to 10 (1 being the lowest), how would you rate the ability of your organization (majority of staff members) to be emphatic?

- 1.12. Could you explain your evaluation with a specific case?

Rating Scheme: Empathy

Internal:

(3) Approaching colleagues with problems is encouraged in organization and happens frequently, before reaction to problem, majority of staff considers position of other person and openly express sympathy for concerns

(2) Approaching colleagues with problems is neither openly encouraged nor discouraged, but depends on personal relationship between staff members, only some staff consider position and express sympathy for concerns

(1) Approaching colleagues with problems is discouraged, general competitive atmosphere between staff members, majority of staff does not react sympathetic to concerns or consider position of other person

External:

(3) Explicit openness of organization for concerns and problems of external persons (participants of workshops, partner NGOs, target groups etc.), consideration for position of other person and expression / feelings of sympathy before reaction to concern

(2) No explicit openness of organization for external concerns, approachability depends on contacted staff member, only some staff members show consideration for perspective of other person and expression/ feelings of sympathy or can only take perspective of other person without emotional relation

(1) Organization is generally not open for external concerns, external concerns are often ignored, reaction without prior consideration for perspective of other person and sympathy for the concern

Overall:

(3) Self-assessment between 8 and 10

(2) Self-assessment between 4 and 7

(1) Self-assessment between 1 and 3

IV. Openness for Compromise

- 1.1. Please describe a situation, where there has been an internal disagreement within your organization.
- 1.2. How did the parties try to solve this issue?
- 1.3. To what intent did the parties try to make concession to solve the issue?
- 1.4. Is this the usual procedure to solve internal disagreements in your organization?

Yes: Continue

No: What is your usual procedure?

- 1.5. Could you briefly describe a similar situation during a project, where there has been a disagreement between your organization and an external participant?
- 1.6. How did you try to solve this issue?
- 1.7. To what extent did your organization try to make concessions to solve the issue?
- 1.8. Is this the usual approach to solve disagreements with external persons?

Yes: Continue

No: What is your usual approach?

- 1.9. To be open to compromise means that opposing parties try to approach each other and make concessions to solve an issue.
- 1.10. On a scale from 1 to 10 (1 being the lowest) how would you rate the ability of your organization (the majority of your staff members) to compromise?
- 1.11. Could you explain your evaluation with a specific case?

Rating Scheme: Openness to Compromise

Internal:

(3) Compromise is generally encouraged within organization, usually opposing parties try to solve disagreements through communication and concessions on both sides

(2) Compromise is not always the primary way of solving internal conflicts, disagreements are sometimes solved by concessions of both sides, communication does not necessarily have to be a part of the solution process, hierarchy can be a deciding factor

(1) Compromise is avoided within the organization or is not the primary conflict resolution strategy, disagreements are resolved by hierarchy without communication or concessions

External:

(3) Organization is explicitly open for compromise with external partners, communication is always part of the conflict resolution strategy, organization is always open to some kind of concession on issue

(2) Organization will in some cases be open for compromise with external partners and make concessions, communication is not always part of the resolution strategy, other conflict resolution strategies (especially decisions based on hierarchy) are employed, conflict and disagreement are avoided

(1) Organization is rarely open for compromise and concessions, only little effort to solve disagreement or come to amicable solution, little communication with partner over issue

Overall:

(3) Self-assessment between 8 and 10

(2) Self-assessment between 4 and 7

(1) Self-assessment between 1 and 3

C. Final part – Closing questions

1. How would you describe your relationship with governmental institutions?
2. What does the term civil society mean to your organization?
3. Which would you say are the most important roles and functions of civil society organizations?
4. Do you consider your organization to be a part of the Jordanian Civil Society?

Thank you very much for you time!!!

Do you have further questions or comments?

Could you give me additional info material about your organization?

Is there somebody else in this organization who I could interview?

Do you have any other contacts within other organizations that might be open for an interview?

D. Rating Scheme

I. Rating scheme for components of each dimensions

1	Low civil society-like interactions	The requirements are only met on a very basic level with many exceptions
2	Mostly civil society-like interactions	The requirements are met in most cases with some exceptions
3	Very civil society-like interactions	The requirements are met on a very high level with exceptions only in exceptional cases

II. Calculation of overall score

Dimensions	Maximum Scores possible	Achieved Scores			
Procedural Rules		A	B	C	D
<i>Internal</i>	3	3	3	2	2
<i>External</i>	3	3	3	3	2
<i>Overall</i>	3	3	3	2	3
<i>Average</i>	$9 / 3 = 3$	3	3	2.3	2.3
Respect					
<i>Internal</i>	3	3	3	2	2
<i>External</i>	3	3	3	3	3
<i>Overall</i>	3	3	3	3	3
<i>Average</i>	$9 / 3 = 3$	3	3	2.7	2.7
Empathy					
<i>Internal</i>	3	3	1	2	3
<i>External</i>	3	3	1	2	2
<i>Overall</i>	3	3	1	2	3
<i>Average</i>	$9 / 3 = 3$	3	1	2	2.7
Compromise					
<i>Internal</i>	3	2	1	3	3
<i>External</i>	3	3	3	3	2
<i>Overall</i>	3	3	3	3	2
<i>Average</i>	$9 / 3 = 3$	2.7	2.3	3	2.3
Total Score	12	11.7	9.3	10	10

III. Table 3: Overall civil society aptitude scale

Total score	Aptitude	Description
4	Very low	Civil society mode of interaction not very dominant
5-7 (or an average)	Low	Civil society mode of interaction

score of 1 in one dimension)		sometimes dominant
8-10	High	Civil society mode of interaction mostly dominant
11-12	Very high	Civil society mode of interaction highly dominant

IV. Overall Results for Actors

Actors	Total Score	Aptitude
Actor A (<i>RNGO</i>)	11.7	Very High
Actor B (<i>Limited Liability Company</i>)	9.3 (including average of 1 in empathy dimension)	Low
Actor C (<i>Community Space</i>)	10	High
Actor D (<i>NGO</i>)	10	High

II. Expert Interview Summaries

Interview with Hana Marar and George Kara'a , USAID – 15.1.2014

- Objectives: see strategy
- Programmes: two main programmes → see programme reports
 - o Up to now: capacity building for CSOs (CSP Programme through FHI360 and NDI)
 - o New Programme starting in March: training, implementation of strategies
- Gender: no special programmes, but mainstreamed
- Funding: through US organizations → mainly NDI
 - o No funds to government
 - o No direct funding
 - o Programmes are designed by USAID, implemented by NDI
- Two-sided approach
 - o Top-down: pressure government to abide certain rules
 - o Bottom-up: capacity building
- Effectiveness of focusing on CSOs: slow process, no immediate change visible
 - o BUT: Jordan has weak Civil Society, but is getting stronger, more professionalized in the last years
 - o Through Arab Spring, more liberalized, more awareness for the issues, more room for CS to grow
 - o If keeps developing in this way, it will be able to change more and more in the next years
- Funding not only for NGOs, but programmes that also try to encourage work with CBOs (grassroots) → develop into more professional NGOs through capacity building
 - o also: work with RNGOS → more effective at implementing in certain areas (more directed at social issues (education, disability, gender issues), not so much political
 - goal-oriented strategy of USAID
 - provide services, see themselves as corporate companies
 - “can get the job done”
 - Very reliable and transparent
- Civil Society: any actor who wants to play a role in society as an engaged citizen → actor centered but very broad understanding of CSOs (from single engaged citizen trying to set up projects to CBOs, NGOs, trade unions, professional organizations, networks)
- Growing social responsibility programmes in Jordan (eg. ZAIN), but very recent development
 - o Growing efforts of economy to cooperate and set up their own “NGOs” lobbying for economic interests

Interview mit Simone Hüser, Project Manager, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Amman – 20.1.2014

Arbeit der KAS

- Politische Analysen
- Wirtschaftliche Analysen
- Auswirkungen des Arabischen Frühling
- Auswirkungen des Kriegs in Syrien
- Training von Parlamentariern: Aufbau einer Agenda etc.

Gelder

- Massen an Geldern versickern → Korruption → Recherche nur bedingt möglich (keine zu kritischen Nachfragen)
- Wirtschaftliche Reformen auf Papier gute Intention → kaum Implementierung
- Sowohl für Westen als auch Golfstaaten strategische Bedeutung → Gelder fließen weiter
- Schlechte Quellen für Geldflüsse aus den Golfstaaten

Arabischer Frühling

- Wenig Proteste: meist Jugendbewegung & Muslimbrüder (kein Angriff auf König)
- Forderung von Reformen & Kritik am König durch Transjordanische Eliten (die nicht so sehr vom System profitieren)
- Kaum Auswirkungen → vermehrte öffentliche Debatte → Vergrößerung der Public Sphere in den letzten Jahren, allerdings politisch kaum Auswirkungen
- Zivilgesellschaft nicht Träger von Arabischem Frühling
- Große Zurückhaltung vor mehr Protesten aus Angst vor Eskalation wie in Syrien

Parlament und Wahlen:

- „tribales Parlament“ → keine Parteizugehörigkeiten, meist unabhängige Parlamentarier, kaum ausgearbeitete Partei Agenden
- Parlament als Netzwerk → „Wasta“
- Frauen zwar durch Quote vertreten, empfinden sich jedoch nicht als Parlamentarier für Frauenrechte, sondern als Vertreter ihres Stamm

Arbeit der Internationalen:

- Überwacht, allerdings braucht Jordanien die internationalen Organisationen und ihre Gelder → nicht zu viel Gängelung möglich (im Gegensatz zu Golfstaaten)

Frauen in Jordanien:

- Auf dem Papier Gleichberechtigung, in Realität patriarchalisches System → Frauen werden von Männern untergeordnete Rolle zugeschrieben und nehmen diese vielfach auch selbst an
- „fortschrittlich“ denkende Frauen gibt es vermehrt, allerdings hängt dies sehr von Bildungsniveau bzw. sozialer Herkunft ab

Interview with Suzie Abdou, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) – 19.1.2014

Main obstacles of women in Jordan

- Lowest participation of women in the workforce together with Egypt and Morocco → big campaign of ILO with Zadaqa for pay equity, establishing a National Commission including CSOs and the Ministry of Labor → national awareness campaign plus legal aspect
- Women that do work only get paid around 1/3 as men (eg for example teachers)
- Only receive training for female occupations, no training of management skills or marketing to successfully establish businesses → microfinance very unsuccessful in Jordan
- Low women participation in politics → training of female parliamentarians → only 3 women outside quota → training for legislative change
- “Sometimes it’s easier to ask what isn’t an issue than what is”

CSOs in Jordan

- Very good experiences with Royal NGOs, very reliable and effective, very impressed with Actor A
- In general, we only work with those NGOs that we have made good experiences with, if an NGO isn’t funded it’s normally an indicator of problems such as lack of transparency, little reliability, no effort → when an NGO is reliable and doing good work and are active, we will repeatedly work with them
- About 3.500 CSOs
- Jordan has very restrictive when it comes to NGOs → but lots of NGO growth because of many international donors active in the countries

NDI is partly funded by the National Endowment and partly by USAID, we either distribute funding to Civil Society Partners, only small grants or use the money to run our own projects where we work with CSOs and train them

Civil Society for NDI is especially important in regards to the Arab Spring → NDI has identified that countries that don’t have a good base of civil society did not achieve a good democratic transition → that’s one of the main reasons NDI has created its new project on civil society → CSOs bigger umbrella, all actors that bridge the gap between the government and political and social stakeholders and the citizens

Effectiveness of NDI’s work in terms of the impact that CSO funding has for democratization or liberalization

- Seen a lot of change in the last decade, got a lot more open and liberal → no annual benchmarks possible, democracy is a state of mind, can change the system, but not the minds that quickly → have to change the minds of elites, even if democratic laws are passed, they are not implemented
- Jordan is very progressive compared to other countries in the region
- We try for donor coordination meetings, but there is overlap and some loss of effectiveness

Interview with Laila Hammarneh, Projects Director, Arab Women Organization of Jordan – 14.1.2014

Objectives of women empowerment in Jordan

- Women empowerment in Jordan in general directed at poverty reduction, economic empowerment educating women for “female positions” → not a lot of opportunity for women to participate politically

Impact of Arab Spring on Women Rights

- Possibly step forward for women’s rights, in general
- Peaceful protests, calling for freedom and social justice
- Men and women were equal during protests → hopefully new dawn for women
- In Jordan, there have been many statements in favor for women rights, also by the king → but king is afraid of traditional tribal and religious views, can’t be too progressive

Major obstacles for women

- Women, especially in tribal areas don’t know about their rights and possibilities outside the family and tribe
- Women often don’t want to know their rights, are very focused on tradition and right place of women in society
- Difficult to advocate that they should follow women’s rights → many of the female parliamentarians don’t want to build a gender oriented agenda, but are sent to the parliament to sit there as representatives of their tribe
- Religious trend during the last decades → when I was in university, we used to wear short skirts, nobody was veiled
- Women issues have been neglected in Jordan and the Middle East in the last decades
- Only few and badly connected NGOs fighting for more political participation of women

III. In-depth Interview Transcripts and Coding Summary

<p>1: 1 2: So, to start of, can you tell me a little bit about the area that your organization is active?</p>	<p>2 Actually, we are a national NGO that is activate in two thematic areas. The first one is realted to child protection, here we're talking about protecting children from all kinds of abuse, verbal, physical, sexual. We provide services in two domains actually, capacity building and prevention activities and rehabilitation, so our organization is responsible for this component in light of psychological and scientific approaches. so all people working in this component are very well equipped and professionals in that area. And this is provided through two different entities, manged both by our organization, one is the center of child and family where they accept where they have the prevention component, like conducting different programs for children and the contexts that surround children, which includes families, parents, mother and father, schools, the neighborhood, anything that sourrounds children will benefit form the services of the center. The other physical entity which is managed by our organization tack'd have to change the proposal, but yesterday they met with the management and the director general and they agreed on it. s are then generating revenues and then increase their economic participation. So this is one aspect. Another aspect is the revolving loans. I would say it's about, I'm not accurate about the pertentage so don't take it as an accurate percentage, so around 60% of the revolving loans recipients are females who establish their small-size businesses. We channel the fund to the community-based organization and she can take this loan to establish her own business, small-size businesses. hurting the child, psychologically speaking and emotionally and pysicaly. It was one of these pioneer projects that was initiated by her majesty 30 years ago, so it has been running for some time.</p>
<p>3</p>	<p>This is one area, the other area is working in the community on enhancing economic participation, so empowerment of poor communities in Jordan, it is called the community empowerment programme. We are in charge of implementing different economic projects that in core focus on leveraging the living standards and status of poor communities through increasing their economic participation. We as a programme that is managed in at our organization function in the 12 governerates in Jordan, our partners in the field are from local communities are community based organizations, the interventions that we organize are related to economic empowerment through helping local businesses, revolving loans, capacity building, on job trainings, trying to create employability through networking for young people. So these are the two main thematic areas and now we added a very new one, it was integrated but now we want to focus on it in a very focused way, it is youth. It is in our five-year strategy plan, it is a thematic area wunity empowerment programme. focus on. will accept different abuse cases, and there the children will be treated psychol</p>
<p>4</p>	<p>So which are the main objectives in these areas?</p>
<p>5</p>	<p>Well I would say, in the child safety programme, it's to create awareness, to create prevention and to provide social and different kinds of services for children in Jordan that have been abused. Because children are the basis of any given Jordanian family, we're trying to create this kind of awareness. When it comes to the community empowerment programme and economic participation, we're working to contribute to eliminating poverty through providing economic opportunities. When it comes to youth, it's to empower youth, to reach their full potential, socially and economically.</p>
<p>6</p>	<p>Which means do you mainly employ to reach those objectives in all the programmes?</p>
<p>7</p>	<p>Mainly capacity building through implementation of different kinds of projects, that is in our mandate, continuous follow-up, networking with all stakeholders, local, governmental, private, other civil society organizations that work on the same mandate. We are not in a position to compete with everyone, we just bring everyone to the table and we discuss and share knowledge.</p>
<p>8</p>	<p>Actually, we use this participatory approach for all different kinds of interventions, there is always a kind of need assessment session where we try to guarantee that the whole community is represented in those participatory sessions at the beginning of every kind of intervention in any new area and even in an older area where we work to start a new project. And specific types of interventions are then decided by the local community, so we don't decide previously on the specifications of the project.</p>
<p>9</p>	<p>Could you tell me to what exten your programmes deal with gender issues.</p>

Interview_Actor A

<p>10 Definitely. In regards to the child protection programme, we believe that the mother is crucial and that increasing her level of awareness will expand to reach a child. If a mother is fully empowered, she can deal with her children in a better manner. So the child safety programme, they work on creating awareness among women in regard to their children upbringing, this is one aspect. Also in regard to their rights as women, so we have a programme that is integrated in the child safety programme that deals with violence against women, and creating this type of awareness on different types of violence against women to overcome. So women in the child safety programme is a target or a client that benefits from the services we provide, to create awareness for the woman in how to be empowered socially speaking and to be fully aware about here needs, and duties, and rights. When it comes to the community empowerment programme, women are in our projects because they are our main targets. So many of the income generat'd have to change the proposal, but yesterday they met with the management and the director general and they agreed on it. s are then generating revenues and then increase their economic participation. So this is one aspect. Another aspect is the revolving loans. I would say it's about, I'm not accurate about the percentage so don't take it as an accurate percentage, so around 60% of the revolving loans recipients are females who establish their small-size businesses. We channel the fund to the community-based organization and she can take this loan to establish her own business, small-size businesses.</p>
<p>11 Actually as my colleague said, we grant a revolving loan portfolio for a certain CBO, it's not necessarily a women CBO, it could be a charity CBO, a cooperative CBO, but the benevolents of these CBOs are most likely women. And our latest data shows that over 60% of the revolving loan beneficiaries of these CBOs are female. So it happens that a lot of beneficiaries are women, they are not specifically targeted, we don't have micro-financing institutions in those rural areas, which is a challenge that women are facing in rural areas, there are no micro-finance institutions, so our organization is granting revolving loans credits or portfolios to certain CBOs for comprehensive interventions, and their administrative committee or management committee actually decides on distributing the loans in their community according to their knowledge, and our statistics now show that 60% of them are women and 27% are youth.</p>
<p>12 I will emphasize the point made by my colleague, revolving loans are our means to reach individuals because we can't work directly with individuals so we work with the CBOs and they reach the individuals. So when it comes to youth, women are targeted in our interventions, are a focus among other clients, because our mandate is Jordanians, so regardless of their gender, regardless of their age, it's our mandate. And here it is worth to mention that our organization, when it started, it started with three income generating business, economic opportunities that were brought and managed by women. So this project is our baby, so when we started in 1995, this project, it was before that, it was since the 80s, however, we transferred it to our organization and it worked to empower one of these poverty areas in Jordan, through keeping the tradition of weaving rugs, so there it started, our organization started with women economic empowerment and then it lodge into other interventions and now we have this amount of diff'd have to change the proposal, but yes</p>
<p>13 To what extent do you work in public, for example through awareness raising campaigns?</p>
<p>14 I would say this is crucial in each step that we do, raising awareness and working publicly, trying to go out. Awareness raising, capacity building and community mobilization are cross-cutting issues in our three thematic areas.</p>
<p>15 What is the motivation for your organization to do this kind of work?</p>
<p>16 Working for Jordanians, trying to provide a support, I would say that our organization plays the role of facilitator, like bridging the needs of Jordanians with the national agenda, national plans, and we try to be this bridge.</p>
<p>17 How are you funded?</p>
<p>18 I'll let my colleague elaborate, because she is a project director.</p>

Interview_Actor A

19	We have different donors, local and international, so like any other NGOs, when there are bids, we apply for the bids, generally I would say that MOPEC, the ministry of planning and economic cooperation is our largest donor, we are now implementing the poverty pockets three project for the ministry in twelve different pockets. And another three NGOs are implementing the pockets in other areas, but we got the largest portion. But that was a bid, we applied for it, it's not automatic, it depends on the requests for proposals and request for application, we apply like any other NGO. We have some international funds like from the Spanish international cooperation unit, it was also a fund to implement an income generating project with one CBO and also to benefit women in rural areas, also the GIZ for one project. We have the ministry of energy now, implementing one of our projects now to reduce the costs of energy in Jordan. So international and national, but I would say that MOPEC is our largest donor for the community empowerment programme.
20	Also for the child safety programme, they are mainly funded by bilateral organizations that work on child safety like UNICEF, UNDP, orphans society.
21	Could you describe to me briefly how your organization is structured and organized?
22	We have a board of trustees of 12 to 13 members including individuals from public, private, and non-profit sector, headed by her majesty, she is the top of the management, under her comes to director general, the director general has a deputy and a consultant, and then you have division managers or directors, we have three divisions actually, these divisions run programmes under them, the first division is the technical division, that comes under the community empowerment programme, child safety programme, and a training center, then you have the support units, we have a fundraising and programme development division, then public relations and communications, another support unit is HR, and we have the financial unit. So we have these three divisions and under each division different programmes and support units.
23	So when you design new programmes and projects, what's the decision-making process?
24	Well, it depends. When you have a new idea, usually the programme development work on it until it is a little matured, then it is discussed with programme managers to see how applicable it is on the ground. Then we seek funding for it, this is when it comes to innovative ideas or when we want to develop a new service. When we seek funding for continuous project or programme that we are running, for example a programme within the community development project, it's running in the seventh cycle and every year we have a new donor, so we just seek donors at the end of each cycle. And we have potential donors, the fundraising continues contacting private sector and new potential donors to fundraise for the programme.
25	We'll come to the main interview part now, where I'll ask you about situations that you might have experienced during your work, just try and briefly sketch them, you don't have to go into huge detail on them. First, when you work together, do you have established rules or principles that guide your daily work?
26	Definitely.
27	Could you describe them please?
28	We have a manual of procedures, managed by the HR unit, which regulates all the setup you are seeing, in terms of when to sign in and when to sign out, what are the dos and do nots, who can take decisions, how to proceed for project developments etc.
29	To what extent would you say every staff member sticks to those rules?
30	They do.
31	Are there exceptions?
32	In every work there is an exception, but I've been working here for over five years and I've never seen an exception.
33	Is this characteristic for you the daily work of your organization?
34	Yes, it's very clear what's allowed and not allowed and everybody follows.
35	When you receive funding, are there many regulations you have to follow?

Interview_Actor A

36	Yes of course. Allow me to tell you, three years ago, we've been assessed by a USAID funded programme, assessing the different components of our organization, administrative and financially, technically and communication, we got the highest score for the financial component, and it's ugly, I can tell you, all those regulations.
37	So, this is very characteristic for your organization?
38	Yes, there are financial manuals that tell us how to manage every little detail.
39	During the last years, have you received international funding from the same donors?
40	Yes, mostly from USAID, bilateral with UNDP for a lot of different projects.
41	I'd like to as you to rate on a scale from one to ten, with ten being the highest, the ability of your organization to reliably stick to those established rules in your daily work and when you work with other partners, how would you rate your organization?
42	Eight.
43	Why eight?
44	Because there are always some kind of exceptions in reality when you deal with real people or have to adapt to different contexts, for example during the Arab Spring or with smaller things, for example when somebody is sick and can't meet a deadline. But I would say that we are very reliable, so we're a eight, leaving margin for some improvement to 9, but 10 is very unrealistic, because there are have to exceptions. And taking into consideration that after the assessment was conducted, we took huge mega steps to introduce improvements in our HR unit, in our financial system, our structure, salary scales.
45	Could you describe one of the latest bigger projects that you organized?
46	This would be poverty pockets and the energy project.
47	How many people participated in the projects?
48	Well, for organizing, this includes all the departments, the financial department, the management, and the implementing staff in the field.
49	And only in the conceptual development phase of the project?
50	We were a team of about 13 persons developing this programme, which was before the proposal development, there was a preparation phase that included assessing the needs in the field for 12 pockets, and a field research and a desk research, conducting profiling for all these areas. And after that, we started the proposal development, and 13 persons were involved in that.
51	And in the assessment phase, around 40 to 45 people were involved in the different pockets.
52	In the implementation, not less than 30 persons were involved, it's a mega programme.
53	Of the 13 people that were part of the developing team, who was allowed to contribute to the conceptual work of the project?
54	Everybody can contribute anything, there isn't one person that is doing all the work.
55	Would you say that this is the usual routine how you proceed with internal work during a project?
56	Yes, absolutely. There are also always lessons-learned from the previous projects. There was a poverty pocket 2 and we discussed the lessons-learned very openly with everybody during the project development. The people working on the project proposal discuss it with the other units, the management, the other programmes which may assist in components. So everybody can always contribute.
57	During the project, can you remember a situation where one of the staff members was criticized for his or her work or given any kind of negative feedback?
58	Yes, definitely. We have a continuous process of feedback.
59	How did you give feedback during the project? Can you tell me about a specific case.
60	There was a problem with a missed deadline, so we were trying to sit with that person to get the whole situation and the other person's point of view and tried to mentor this process. And we have this open atmosphere, anybody who does something wrong, he or she will be approached by conducting a meeting and this will then be part of the assessment at the end of each year.
61	To what extent would you say it was a constructive way of giving negative feedback?

Interview_Actor A

62	Very constructive. You know it's not like the manager or director is just saying this is forbidden or wrong and fire or lecture you. As an employee, I always have the right to ask and I have the right to express my opinion and let's say if two employees have a fight, everybody will be heard. Like, there was no personal attachment to the critique. But we are humans at the end of the day, I'm not going to tell you that this is utopian NGO. Yes, we strive to do it in an open direct way, not always in the official way. I would say that non of the employees in my division has ever gotten a written note by the director or by the HR, it is very often solved informally by directly talking with the other person. And even if I don't like something that is assigned to me or I have some problem, or I'm not satisfied with something during a project, like during the last project I worked on, I went to the others to express myself.
63	Could you briefly describe the relationship between your organization's staff and the CBOs during this last project?
64	That was usually very good. But we had encountered the challenge of the Arab Spring. And the people misunderstood the Arab Spring. So for them, if they asked for anything, it should happen immediately, as if we had the Aladin bottle. That was challenging for us to a certain extent. However, because we've been working with these CBOs for a long time, we managed to keep the relationship in a very moderate way.
65	What do you mean by moderate?
66	Moderate in the sense like trying to hold in in the middle, because people like after the Arab Spring were like very irrational, we want a clinic, but they have another clinic. But they said, we want a clinic, otherwise we will demonstrate. You know, we were threatened by them in this way. However, by using our facilitation and communication skills, we always managed to deal with them and keep our deadlines and goals. Through our previous reputation in the field, the transparency and credibility is there.
67	And how is the relationship normally, before the Arab Spring.
68	At least it won't be irrational. Because we ended up going to areas where they have a clinic, for example, and they want another one, it's not a priority but they just need it right now, otherwise they want to demonstrate.
69	They wanted to feel their influence actually, but we are among very few NGOs in Jordan that we were able to go in some critical areas and still meet with people, implementing projects and go according to our action plan.
70	So, how would you describe your usual relationship?
71	It's on an eye-to-eye level. We always try to meet and talk. Actually we have NGOs, usually after implementing a project, we sign a 10 year follow up agreement with any CBO we work with. Some of those agreements already expired, but they themselves wanted to extend them, because they feel whenever we go to the field, we pass by, we say hello, even if there is nothing. So we try to keep a relation with the local community and with the CBOs, because Jordan river foundation unlike other NGOs does not have local entities in the field. We depend in our outreach on the CBOs and in our partnerships on the CBOs. And we have partnerships with over 500 CBOs in Jordan. So, it's for our benefit and we make sure they feel it's for their benefit also.
72	To what extent do you consider all of those partner CBOs during the last poverty pockets as equal?
73	Definitely a lot. For example in the last programme, before we started implementing new projects in the same area, we went to the previous CBOs, we tried to discuss with them, is this fine, is this not fine, we made sure that each of their opinions is important even before we start with the project. And even before planning, we started discussing we let them know that we will come back to the area.
74	Also it's worth mentioning, we keep up these relationships through newly established sustainability unit, it's in charge of following up all our programmes and projects to keep a close relationship with the communities and to ensure the sustainability of the project, because sometimes they need very small assistance to enhance their project or promote it and this is one of the main responsibilities of the sustainability unit, not only with regard to relationships but also for feasibility and sustainability etc.
75	Are there CBOs you wouldn't work with for any reason such as tribal affiliation or religious bases?
76	No, when we decide on which CBOs to fund, we decide on efficiency criteria alone, who can help best to implement the project in a certain area. In fact, we need all kinds of CBOs because we want to reach all Jordanians.

Interview_Actor A

77	I'd again like to ask you a rating question. On a scale from one to ten, could you rate your organization's overall ability to respectful behavior. This means, that you treat others, staff members and external partners, as equals, you value their work?
78	9.
79	Could you explain this?
80	Because our staff is trained to handle communities. We are trained in different participatory approaches, and to go to the communities and speak with them. another thing: a lot of our employees are selected from the communities themselves. So, we have a lot of staff here from the areas themselves. So we are not getting people from the outside and we for example have certain ethics in terms of dress codes, in terms of language, like we don't want anybody to go to the field. This is a critical issue. People that can speak to the local communities are not everybody, you have to qualify. So, we have certain measurements when it comes to dresscode, when it comes to the language, I speak English and I speak Arabic English and so we can't go to the field. Even the colleagues at the reception have certain guidelines how to approach people when they come in, especially when there are local communities that visit the headquarters.
81	Could you describe a situation, in which one of your staff members or co-workers approached you with some kind of serious problem?
82	Well there was an incident, where one of my colleagues, she approached me with a financial problem. But this financial money was crucial so she could continue her education. We ended up setting up this kind of, well the one-to-one translation would be society, but it's a group of colleagues that give a certain amount of money each month into a fund, this month it goes to my colleague, the next month it goes to me. So we collect this money for herself because she needs to pay her fees for education at this time of the year. So it was personal, we solved it personal.
83	To what extent were you able to put yourself in her position?
84	Well, in the sense of emotional attachment, it was very high.
85	So you put yourselves into her position and you sympathized with her concern?
86	Yes, very much, I'd say a ten.
87	Is that how you normally handle such types of problems within your organization?
88	Well, that was a personal problem. When somebody is asking for a salary increase for example, there is a clear process. But you always try to support. Sympathy and empathy is very important for us here.
89	Could you describe a similar situation, in which somebody external approached you with an concern, like one of the CBOs or an individual from one of the projects?
90	The CBOs do complain to us a lot. We received a letter from an CBO that we need to do something for them although we already finished the project some time ago and the follow up from that project suggests that they have revenue and that they can do it. We went to the field, we talked to them, we conducted a number of three meetings, trying to elaborate, we created awareness that you can do this, you can do that, and it was solved. So we really tried to empathize with their concerns, see their side of the story and convince them, that they were able to do it themselves and that they didn't need us.
91	So, would you say this is typically how your organization handles such concerns?
92	Yes, empathy is very important to us here.
93	So how would you rate your organization's ability to act empathetic on a scale from one to ten. When empathy is the ability to put yourselves into the position of somebody else and sympathize with their concerns?
94	Well, it's not a ten. I would say maybe ten on a personal level, but eight, because we are representing this place, and not everybody acts this way, so I would say 8.
95	Would you say the majority of people act empathetic in your organization?

Interview_Actor A

96	Yes, for example, if a family member has passed away, we send emails and people will be sending condolences. Or marriage, like today we received a marriage invitation for all the organization's staff, 64 employees, it's going to be a big wedding apparently. People can take days off for such events or when there are family issues at home. Everybody would understand.
97	Could you describe a situation, in which you had some kind of internal disagreement between staff members?
98	We always have disagreements.
99	Could you describe the most recent?
100	Well for example the last meeting, they are usually very loud and participatory, so active and so full of disagreement. For example, we disagreed about how to call a component in one of the project proposals.
101	How did you approach to solve this disagreement?
102	It depends on the level of hierarchy. There are always a lot of discussions, especially in the meetings, and exchange of opinions, this would work, this would not work, everybody put his or her point of view, why should we do it like this or that. It depends on the management level, the last say is with the management, we see things, but the management might see it in a different way. But nothing was taken personally. Because at the end of the day, if I disagree with my manager on a technicality, well then I have expressed my opinion. But if they took another opinion, it does not mean that I'm bad.
103	To what extent would you say that in this last meeting, the management tried to make concessions to compromise on the proposal?
104	This is actually a killer for our organization. Because we have this participatory approach, and every single employee can comment on what is happening. I'm actually a bit dictatorian, I always think certain things should come from top-down. That's why coming to a decision took a very long time. But they want input from like the the coffeeboy to the director on certain things. I think the management, a committee of seven people can decide on certain crucial things and not ask everybody for his opinion.
105	So in this example, did you try and find a compromise on the proposal?
106	Well, the top-down approach has never been taken, everybody can participate.
107	But in the end, who made the decision?
108	The management. Well, it depends, if it's in my mandate, I'd have taken the decision. But they listened to everybody's opinions and tried to consider them. For example, this project, we are launching it within the next few weeks. So the proposal, me and somebody from the development unit worked on the proposal. And then we released it for a larger group of people and of course then there were different opinions. So we made to or three meetings, the first among the staff, who is related in some way or has background experience on the topic, and we discussed advantages and disadvantages of each idea. And I thought after the first meeting that we should change the proposal or change the methodology with regard to this project. The second meeting was with the senior staff and programme management to decide finally on the approach. And they adapted the original version because it's too late to change and we have challenges we may not be able to handle, it was an open discussion. So as I said, first I thought I'd have to change the proposal, but yesterday they met with the management and the director general and they agreed on it.
109	So this is usually how you solve disagreements within the organization?
110	Yes, we discuss it very openly and everybody can contribute but in the end, it's the management that has to decide.
111	Could you describe a similar situation during a project, in which you had a disagreement with an external partner, such as a CBO?
112	Well, again, this is not an utopian organization. We have disagreements with CBOs, however we try and solve it by contacting the CBO or the person. For example with the CBOs that wanted a clinic during the Arab Spring, we tried to create alternatives, tried to create other options, tried to moderate. We didn't just want to say, no or do this. And there is another challenge with the CBOs, with the administrative committee. Every one year or two years, depends on the CBO, very often that we face a challenge that the administrative committees change or elect a new committee so we have to go into discussions, explaining alternatives, challenges option etc.
113	So how did you solve the conflict with those CBOs? To what extent did you make concessions?
114	We actually decided to add new services to the existing clinic.

Interview_Actor A

115	So this is how you usually procede to solve disagreeemnts wiith them.
116	Yes.
117	And how would you rate your organization's willingness to compromise on a scale from one to ten? This means that you are ready to make concessions and to approach each other to solve disagreements.
118	I would also rate us a 9.
119	Well, seven.
120	I mean, we are always ready to compromise.
121	Then what makes you say seven?
122	You know because we have set guidelines, as my colleague said, sometimes demands are not logic, they want a clinic in this certain area.
123	I'm also taking it from another angle which is related to the donor agencies. We always compromise with them although sometimes it's not our priorities. like what's happenin now, a huge amount of funds is directed to the Syrians and Jordanians are left.
124	As I said, there are guidelines, after all, we will not be implementing and compromising irrational demands, because it affects after all my reputation as a foundation. So going back to the clinic example, if there's a clinic and it's enough, because as my colleague explain, we facilitate the discussion with the department of health in that area and we know what's on their agenda for the next five years for their strategy, so we can compromised with the local community that we would add a new service to their existing clinic, but we didn't compromise and implement a new clinic in this area. So there are guidelines, that's why I would say seven, but we always manage to reach a middle point.
125	Thanks. Now I have a couple of closing questions. The first would be, how you would describe your relationship to governmental institutions?
126	Actually, we have two levels. For fundraising, MOPEC, the Minsitry of Planning, or other Ministries who are on top of our donor list, in terms of communication and introduction of new programmes, it can not happen without their participation. So we have a very close relationship.
127	We always establish a steering committee for the new projects and programmes and we make sure, for example, that the department of health or the department of education, in the ceratain or targeted area is represented in this committee. For different objectives actually. We don't want to duplicate efforts on the ground, so I don't want to work on schools that are on their platform next year, because that's waste of fund and effort, and they facilitate for us procedures very often. So if I want to enter a health clinic or a school, instead of keep sending official letters and write-ups for the minsitry to allow us, when the department of health is represented in the steering committee, it's easier of the director of that health clinic or school to allow us to enter easily, because he knows that his manger or director is informed.
128	It's lobbying.
129	Let me highlight the fact that we never take their role, we facilitate.
130	So you don't consider yourself as part of the governmental institutions.
131	No, because sometimes we disagree, we try to make our point. And our organization structre, our guidelines, our functioning, is our own.
132	To your organization, what is civil society?
133	Civil society organizations?
134	Well yes, and civil society in general. What doesn the term mean to your organization, how would you define it?
135	As an organizaiztion, they are the implementing, they are the organiaztion that should implement national agendas. Because of their daily contacts with the population.
136	Civil society organizations should be in charge of national agendas and national priorities in terms of social objectives, to define what, or the path of any given country, where is should lead in terms of improvement, in term of shortcomings for social issues.

Interview_Actor A

137	So they should raise issues and monitor shortcomings of the government?
138	Yes, they are the part for raising issues.
139	Should they also oppose the state?
140	Well, I believe that governmental entities are on the level of policies, they shape or prevent policies. We come on the second, we implement, although these policies should not be shaped before taking the opinion of the civil society organizations. But this happens in Jordan to a certain degree, for poverty reduction for example. Like it was a combination of MOPEC, UNDP and us.
141	And when we talk about policy issues that are more controversial, poverty reduction it is very clear where you want to go and how to combat poverty.
142	Well, I have a personal point which might disagree with the point of view of the organization. Like in Jordan, we have a stereotype for people in civil society organizations, that is they don't work, you know. But when you look at civil society organizations in the states, they shape policies. Here we do not, here we only implement.
143	Well, we do participate. We have our point of view and sometimes it is taken into consideration, for poverty reduction for example. Well, actually we should stop this now, it's too personal.
144	Well, thank you very much.

<p>1: 1 2: Could you first tell me a little bit about your organization, which are is it it mainly active in?</p>	<p>2 So, basically, we've been operating here for 7 years and since we started about 4 years ago, we did our first women programme which was with the OECD on women entrepreneurship in the MENA region. And we identified that there is a lot of obstacles from an economic empowerment perspective which resulted running a programme with CEDAW which involved CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) and gender, so we identified the obstacles within the workplace that prevent women from either entering or growing, which then resulted in running a programme with women campaign international, across the Middle East and northern Africa in 17 countries, it was regionally headquartered here, that enabled lobbying for women rights, for economic empowerment. So it's not women rights in general, the focus has never been on social perspective as much as it is an economic perspective.</p>
<p>3</p>	<p>So we worked in the 17 countries, we approached the topic differently in every country for example in Saudi we supported women employment in certain sectors, where women are not allowed to work in Saudi, so this was a big glass ceiling barrier. We worked in Kuwait for political empowerment of women, in Jordan we worked for the political empowerment and economic empowerment of women, there is a policy brief for every country. And then, giving it a lot of thought, we decided, we now know why women are not entering the workplace.</p>
<p>4</p>	<p>Why is that?</p>
<p>5</p>	<p>I mean, the majority is social and cultural. It's not academic, it's not interest, it's simply cultural and social which is for us too big to tackle. So we left that aside. But then the next question is, why, when you are in the workplace, are you not growing, and why if you are growing, you are not making it to the board. So we decided to take a top-down approach towards why are women not in the boardroom, which resulted in the research of, what would be the impact if we were to have more women in the board room. Our thesis is, if we can prove that having more women in the boardroom can provide increase in financial performance, then I don't think anyone could argue. So that's the different angle.</p>
<p>6</p>	<p>So, the organization in its current structure, how long has it been running?</p>
<p>7</p>	<p>The institute was established in 2012 and I'm the founder.</p>
<p>8</p>	<p>What are your main objectives and what do you do to achieve them?</p>
<p>9</p>	<p>Well, our mission and objective is to advance corporate governance in Jordan. We do that primarily through three things: raising awareness, training, and research. Raising awareness, we generally do through our publications, newsletters, information, informal sessions. We hold at least once a month a focus group with discussion that are somehow related to corporate governance. So we raise awareness that way. Training, we hold regular trainings for board members, SME (small and middle enterprises) and research. With respect to training, we provide free or highly discounted training for women. So we promote certifying more women to becoming board members or to have the knowhow and capacity to become boardmembers by providing them either free training or subsidized trainings. So that's the only way we can really support and promote gender. And obviously through research, which we are now working on to assess the impact of women.</p>
<p>10</p>	<p>Do you have numbers on how many members there are in boards in Jordan?</p>
<p>11</p>	<p>I don't have that information of the top off my head, but we have about 50 women in boardrooms in listed companies. In non-listed companies, about 40,000, we have about 100 women. So it's minimal.</p>
<p>12</p>	<p>Has there been growth in the last years? Even from 0 to 50 it's a long way.</p>
<p>13</p>	<p>The last research published on this was in 2002 and it was done by McKinsey and there were 7. So I guess it's growing, but I don't have a baseline, unfortunately, this is not part of regular research, data is not collected effectively and reported regularly, so it's very difficult to say, where and when did the growth happen or how did the growth happen.</p>
<p>14</p>	<p>Is it more that women don't get elected onto the board or that they don't want to?</p>
<p>15</p>	<p>That's what we are trying to find out actually. I have personal opinions, but I don't have numbers yet.</p>
<p>16</p>	<p>How are you funded?</p>

Interview_Actor B

17	We are self-financed. We refuse to take international donations, because we remain the watch-dog. So if a company is corrupt, I can say they are corrupt and nobody can tell me not to say it.
18	How are you organized?
19	6 people are working here. We are a not-for profit company, a limited liability company, so we have articles of association, we have a board of directors of 5 people from the private sector, we have not transformed into a membership base which is our endgame, we plan to do that next year. Our board is the senior governing body, then they give it to me as executive director and then I give it to the team to deliver.
20	Do you have established rules of procedure or principles that guide your internal daily work?
21	We don't have internal by-laws, but we have articles of association, we have our board charter, we have our gender references, we've structured the institute as a model company according to the Jordan CG Code, so that other organizations can follow.
22	Could you elaborate on those rules? Describe how to apply to your daily work with an example of a recent situation?
23	We have a very high level of transparency, of accountability, of reporting. For example, we have a monthly report that goes out to the board to detail what we have been up to and working on every day in here. And everybody in here has a clear area of responsibility to work with deadlines, we are a business, not an NGO.
24	So how do you make decisions, do you have rules for internal decision-making procedures?
25	Well, normally the person who is responsible for a project makes the decision, it's here area, she knows best. Only when they come to me with a problem, then I make the decision.
26	To what extent does every staff member stick to those principles?
27	We have to practice what we preach. We are doing it in here first before constructing others to do it. And I make absolutely sure that there are little to now exceptions to the basic principles, just so we don't open ourselves up for attack and vulnerability.
28	Have there been exceptions, in which you departed from those rules?
29	Of course there are always exceptions, everybody works differently. But never on the main principles of operation.
30	Have there been any regulations that you had to follow when working with outside partners?
31	Well, for training we mostly work with outside expert trainers and have formed partnerships. With them we have contracts for every session they do. And we have an official partnership with the IFC (International Finance Corporation), but only on content and expertise for research, not for funding.
32	Have there been contracts that you couldn't fulfill or regulations from the IFC that you didn't follow?
33	No.
34	Is this characteristic for your organization?
35	To keep contracts? Yes, absolutely. As I said, we are a business, not an NGO.
36	How would you rate your companies overall ability to be reliably and stick to established rules on a scale from one to ten?
37	At least an 8 or 9.
38	Could you explain.
39	Well, it's not always up to you, sometimes exceptions are necessary. But as I said, there can never be exceptions on the main principles of Corporate Governance.
40	Could you describe one of your most recent bigger projects?
41	Well, we've had a focus group every month, we have a training going on right now. The last focus group actually was on women in boards.
42	When you designed this focus group, how many people participate?
43	All 6 people. I'm actually the least involved.
44	And who is allowed to contribute to the conceptual planning?

Interview_Actor B

45	Yes, everybody. We have a highly participatory model in here, we encourage innovation, creativity, new ideas. We encourage new programs and we encourage everybody to contribute.
46	Is this the usual routine for every project?
47	Yes, we encourage as open and friendly a work environment as possible.
48	Can you describe a situation during the project, in which a staff member was criticized for the work?
49	Well, as I said, we encourage an open work environment where everybody can participate and everybody has an opinion and will give you feedback on what they think. That's part of the process.
50	Can you give an example, a specific situation you remember?
51	Ehm, well, I always tell them what I think about the topics they pick for the focus group and which issues I think they should focus on during the discussions, but we all try to be constructive, you know, give positive feedback or explain, why we think it should be done differently in our opinion instead of simply criticizing. So for example, told them that I think they should add a couple of issues to the list and also try and get male participants for the focus group, not just women
52	Could you briefly explain one of the projects with external participants?
53	Well, we have different training programmes. The primary training programme is the Board of Director Certification Programme. It's a 24-module programme over 8 days over 4 months, so two days per month, because board members cannot really spend 8 days out of the office. We train them on all the aspects of board membership, some are basic, some are advanced, some are intermediary, so that they better, certified board members. And this is the training that is going on right now. We target existing board members, senior executives and potential board members.
54	Could you explain the relationship between the staff and the participants of the project?
55	Well, every module is different, some are done by us, some by external experts. All the trainers have received their train-the-trainers and the program is certified by IFC. All of them have at least 15 years of experience within their subject.
56	And how is the relationship between you and the participants? Could you explain with an example.
57	How would you describe the atmosphere during the trainings, is it more lecturing by the training or rather discussion-based.
58	It's mostly discussion based. We try to encourage that people talk about specific situations on their boards and we take it from there, the trainer is more a moderator, nor a lecturer, it's not university. At least that is my approach as a trainer. But I know most of my colleagues do the same thing. If we just lecture, they won't go home and try to implement what they've learned, they don't come back.
59	Participants are sometimes forced to come, sometimes they want, sometimes they are sent. At the beginning, there is often standard resistance, but by part 2 we normally see a much more positive attitude and a much more supportive approach and by part 3 they are calling us, when are we doing this, can we make it earlier, we might take a little longer, we wanna talk more. So by the time they graduate, they are sad, like oh, no more... So the relationship develops, it's very professional at the beginning and then becomes more and more familiar and close towards the end.
60	To what extent are all your participants equal?
61	Well, we try to further women in boards, so of course we favor them a little. We have discounts or free trainings for them, but once we are in the training, they are all treated as paying customers. Whoever wants to learn and participate is allowed to.
62	Is this how the relationship usually looks like?
63	Yes, we always see that kind of development every time.
64	I'm interested in certain skills for cooperation between people. One of it is respectful behavior, which means to treat others as equals, to value their work and them as a person. How would you rate the institutes ability to respectful behavior internally between your staff and externally with other partners and participants on a scale from one to ten?
65	We have a very flat organization. I don't believe in hierarchies, because I think that takes away from the value added and the innovation and the creativity. If people only think within one, that is my, box, than this is not fruitful. So, I think, we've created that in our environment here.

Interview_Actor B

66	And if you had to put a number on it, between one and ten?
67	I'd say 8. Most of my personal assistants become project managers, most of my project managers become CEOs, so you know, I think I really do value their work I guess.
68	Could you describe a situation, in which a staff member turned to you with a serious issues?
69	Well, one of the staff members, she is pregnant. So when she had morning sickness, very bad one, she called in to say she wasn't feeling well.
70	How did you react.
71	I told her to not come into the office of course. But in return, I expected her to do her work from home, from the car.
72	To what extent did you try and put yourself into her shoes?
73	Yes of course, if she has morning sickness, she shouldn't come, this would be very unproductive.
74	And to what extent were you able to sympathize with her?
75	Well, I don't have any sympathy. I believe the workplace is not a place for sympathy. She can stay at home, I understand that part, it's easier for her to not come in with morning sickness, but then I expect her to get her work done still, so to do it from home or I don't care where. As long as you are performing your job, I understand.
76	So, is this characteristic? Do all staff members react in this way towards problems.
77	Well, it is part of the environment, we have personal relationship, but at the workplace, you perform first and then are friends. You can be supportive, but your problems, personal or whatever, are not my business.
78	And when it comes to external participants? Could you describe a situation, in which somebody approached you with a concern?
79	Well, actually I can't really think of an example.
80	Maybe during a training? Did somebody ever approach you, talk to you about their problems at work, that they can't advance etc.?
81	Well, we don't really have that problem. And then, it's not really the problem I care about, it's how can I help you professionally? So, when a participant approached me, telling me that he can't attend a part of the programme, I helped him to find an alternative. And if your problem is, you don't understand the language, I can provide you with different material. So, in this sense, I can be very helpful, but I don't really care what your problem is, it's not my problem, I have enough of my own.
82	Could you rate the institutes overall ability to be empathic, internally as well as externally? Meaning that you are open for the concerns of others, you put yourself into their shoes and try to sympathize.
83	I'd say on empathy 7, I mean on taking the perspective. On sympathy, 0.
84	Can you explain?
85	Well as I said, you can be supportive, I can try and help, but your problems, are your problems, not mine. If I want to help you as a friend, that's different, but that's not part of the business and our professional relationship. If you want to go help your friends and family, than by all means do it, but in a professional environment, tell me how I can help you professionally, but I'm not gonna get involved into anything else.
86	So, in any organization, there are always disagreements. Could you describe a recent internal disagreement within the institute?
87	Well, they sometimes disagree on things, but usually, then I decide and what I say happens.
88	To what extent do you encourage both parties to make concessions and talk about their disagreement?
89	Well, either they agree on something, whatever this is, I don't care how. But if you don't agree and come to me, I decide. I believe that if you are doing something, you have a system yourself. So you can not do something your way my way.
90	Can you describe a disagreement between you and one of the staff members.
91	No, it has never happened. You see, if you have a system to do something, do it your way. If you don't, you do it my way. I can't disagree that is not a good way if it's your way, if it's not efficient, I can show how to make it more efficient. I don't interfere with their disagreements, as long as things get done.
92	And what is your way of solving disagreements?

Interview_Actor B

93	We talk about it of course and you may have your opinion, but in the end, I decide.
94	To what extent do you make concessions when you decide.
95	Well, if you have a good point or a good way of doing something, of course we can try it that way. If I think my way is better, we'll do it my way. And if there's a third way, we'll take that, whatever is more efficient.
96	Could you describe a disagreement between the institute and external participants?
97	Well, there are discussions. It's more discussion-based than confrontation. We don't generally have disagreements with our clients and if we do, the client is always right, so I have to agree with that.
98	Can you give an example?
99	I don't know, anything. Moving the time of a module or incorporating another issue into the training or agenda. The client explains, we talk about alternatives, we decide which one is the best and do that.
100	To what extent do you make concessions to clients.
101	Of course, we always do. Except if it's on an ethical basis, then there are no concessions.
102	Could you rate yourself on the scale from one to ten on the readiness to compromise, so to make concessions to solve an issue and to talk about it?
103	If it's value-based, 10, externally. As long as as it's ethical and follows the rules. Internally, maybe lower, a 7.
104	Could you explain.
105	Well, as I said, everybody has a system to do things, and I can't do my things your way and I don't care how you solve disagreements, as long as you solve them and get the work done. But of course, if you have a good point, I will take it into consideration in my decision.
106	Could you describe your relationship with governmental institutions?
107	Oh yeah, we have a lot of issues. They don't like us. We fight corruption, they don't like that. So I get called in for questioning at least once every 2 months, it's ok, standard.
108	So business corruption is such a hot topic for the government?
109	Well, I fight corruption in the private sector, and if the private sector stop paying bribes, then, well, the government is unhappy. So, they don't like it, they haven't crossed a line yet, they are very polite. They give me a hard time with some things, like when we have events, they don't always give us their approvals in time, they make our life a little difficult. But I'm sure with the concept called wasta?
110	Yes.
111	So, sometimes, we have to resort to wasta, when things don't work. Not to corruption of course, in principle, governance should not include wasta. However, if we have an event happening tomorrow and I don't have approval today, we try and pull a few strings to make it happen and afterwards, we explain about it loudly.
112	Do you face the same regulations as civil society organizations, like informing officials of any events in advance, getting approval of all your finances, etc.?
113	That applies to all organizations. We have to hand in a list of participants beforehand, speakers, agenda.
114	And for finances?
115	No, we are not listed under the ministry of social development. We technically, we do not fall under their regulations, so civil society organizations, they have to get approval for foreign funding. We technically do not fall under that requirement, but we do not receive foreign funding anyways.
116	Do you work with CSOs as well?
117	Yes, we do. We work with them on governance issues, strengthening their capacities, we work with them with our sister company for sustainable CSOs.
118	Would you say, you're a part of civil society?

Interview_Actor B

119	Well, I'm too organized to be a civil society organization. Unfortunately, here we often have a perspective, if you are a civil society organization, you are an ad-hoc, chaotic organizations. Which I believe is incorrect. If you look at the US, the civil sector is the third strongest sector. So, which proves the point that as a CSO I'm a weak participant of the local community. So, I'm from the stronger participants in the local economy. So, I'm part of what would ideally be a strong civil society sector in Jordan.
120	What do you think is the function and role of civil society?
121	Civil society by virtue of its name are organizations that support the advancement and development of society, in any given area, democracy, governance, human rights, health, nutrition, but what their communities need.
	And what do you think is their function in relation to the state?
	Well, ideally, they can work for the advancement of society without being bothered by the state.

<p>1: 1 2: Good morning. To start, could you tell me about a little bit about this project, when was it founded and why?</p>	<p>2 I think this project found me, because I'm originally an architect, born and raised in Kuwait up until 16, I went to a university in the US and stayed there, I went back and forth a lot, but when I graduated, I started working there as an architect and I'm also a gay man, something I discovered, well I always kinda knew it, but I've never put a label to it, at 27 I could place it, I was confident with myself. But also around that age, I got gay-bashed in San Francisco, and sometimes I think, where did my latent self-consciousness start to cook this project, it was probably back then, that was the first time I was openly ostracized for my sexuality. I ended up at the police, surgery, witness-protection program. So rather than doing the program and stay in the US, I decided I'll come to Jordan.</p>
<p>3 Why Jordan?</p>	<p>4 Because after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, everybody, all Jordanian couldn't stay, so my parents left and came to Jordan, so it just made sense that I try it out. So I came here, right after coming out, only to realize I have to go back in. And you know, I went to my life her, opening a small restaurant outside of town, and then from there on, I needed something that my brain could work on, you know, being educated all over the place, I didn't wanna just serve, I wanted to think. So I came up with the idea of this project, providing this space, also as one of the first Internet cafés in the Middle East, so that added a lot. And being the first internet cafe in the Middle East, that also gave a lot of avenues without censorship and so suddenly the world was open. But I still wasn't thinking gay, I was just thinking, let's do this, I haven't ever done something like this before.</p>
<p>5 So you didn't particularly design it or think about it in terms of activism?</p>	<p>6 No, I remember in the beginning, walking around, searching for a place, thinking, what reflects the people around me that want such a space. It was a very small town, I only knew the people from Kuwait. It's as though the five-hundred thousand people from Kuwait were lifted, and then just dropped in Amman. So that was environment. And clearly, I'm a very people's person, I needed people around me. So, the only neighborhood that we found appealing was the first circle area, it was old, it was abandoned, it clearly had a lot of history, and that's something we were really looking for, as a Jordanian of Palestinian origin that has never lived in this area, so it was very attractive to me, although lots of people thought it was very stupid to go there.</p>
<p>7 So you were the first to provide such a space in Amman?</p>	<p>8 I was. That was 17 years ago. I remember climbing up the walls and then we found the first house, downstairs were we have the bookshop now. And going up upstairs, loved everything, it was abandoned, it was broken. So I looked at my brother, and said, this is it, this is ours, this is a blessing. And we started.</p>
<p>9 So, when it started, what were your main objectives, what did you want to achieve?</p>	<p>10 Education. There weren't any books around and all English books were so expensive, it felt to me that Jordan, that Amman was a cage, because there were too many walls, too many dividers. There was the divider of Jordanian origin and Palestinian origin. Then there was the divider of all of that, but if you were from Kuwait, that was another line. It was Muslim, Christian, it was tribal link, family link, there was income, there was neighborhood that you live in. There were just so many things there, and I couldn't deal with that, never grew up this way. I needed out, I needed a place without walls and this projects was the way there, a space for everybody in Amman who like me didn't want to think in terms of dividers and borders. I raised a flag and said anyone, who isn't ok with all of that, come here, this is a place without borders where you can just be like you are. And this attracted a lot of people, it was a space for the free-thinking, open-minded community in Amman and those were the people we started to point, but then it's not acceptable behavior in my organization anymore. e and of course by our books and the Internet as well. Of course we are not booksellers, we just went to Portland, Oregon, looked around books and just picked out books that I thought I'd like. It was no system in my head, but then every book I actually picked was alternative, was very freedom-oriented, spiritual not religious, free-thinking. So clearly, everything here now reflects me. I chose the daisy as symbol from day one, because I was always very flower power, very hippy, very nature.</p>
<p>11 How do you work now, you have evolved a lot, what are your main objectives now and how do you achieve them.</p>	

Interview_Actor C

<p>12 You know, with every little problem that goes on here, there's a little snitch between two people, a fight, it was always due to differences. And I was always, in every fight I went into, that I mediated, I was always trying to tell them, you know, it's ok for him to be different and it's ok for him to not think the same way, but it's not ok for you to fight over it. You have to accept this person, and I would go into, get creative, explaining to people that you know, differences are actually quite nice and not bad, it's just stuff that down the line I said and did. From time to time I would get young men, they've been beaten, they've been ostrized by by their parents because of their choices were not what their partents wanted them to do, young men that were gay and didn't know how to express it, or young women who wanted more freedoms and didn't know where to go and how to do it. I just found myself suddenly knowing everbody's lives and mentoring them because they always came up and asked me. But I also in point, but then it's not acceptable behavior in my organization anymore. e and of course by our books and the Internet as well. Of course we are not booksellers, we just went to Portland, Oregon, looked around books and just picked out books that I thought I'd like. It was no system in my head, but then every book I actually picked was alternative, was very freedom-oriented, spiritual not religious, free-thinking. So clearly, everything here now reflects me. I chose the daisy as symbold from day one, because I was always very flower power, very hippy, very nature.</p>	<p>13 To what extent and how do you get this message in public?</p> <p>14 We have a lot of events, concerts, readings, discussion groups, always with alternative artists, so we're always trying to not lose our identity, because there's always a little identity crisis to most of us. There are a lot of Palestinians, who came back or Jordanians of Palestinian origin or Jordanian Jordanians, who've come back after all these political problems in the region, especially after September 11, who have grown up abroad and suddently had to come back to Jordan. And we all carried the same passport, but we definatly weren't raised the same way, so there was an identity crisis that's going on. So that's something we really focused on, identity, and with that I was trying to also pick events that are a little more classical, more Jordanian and Palestinian, because we needed that, we needed to remember where we came from but also where we are going. So we did this in music, and we did this in books, we did that in supporting young artists, young people in general, because there are so many people point, but then it's not acceptable behavior in my organization anymore. e and of course by our books and the Internet as</p> <p>15 So you are publicly searching for identities?</p> <p>16 Yes, and are publicly unifying. Trying to create a awareness that yes, we are all Jordanian, but there are lots of Jordanians of Palestinian background. Don't be afraid to say it, be proud of your background, but be also proud of being Jordanian. Be proud of being Circassian, but be prepared to also be Jordanian and unite and alos allowing the Iraqi refugees that were born here, they are just as Jordanian, pushing that, pushing the Lebanese that have been born here, everything of that sort, and then women. We have cases were women have been battered, running away from their families, been chased sometimes, for protection of potential crimes, dealing with those as well. And we do, we've established a private network, smuggle them, take care of them, so we do that as well.</p> <p>17 How are you funded? No sponsorships, at the beginning, my or our own money. We started very small, and then just attached, attached, attached step by step, and then suddently we were really big.</p> <p>18 And how are you organized and structured now?</p> <p>19 Well, there is me and my brother, he is doing finances, I deal with everything else and we hold this project together. And we are trying to grow, we could've grown a lot faster, but it was very difficult with a lot of entities, trying to bash us, trying to take us down, it took us years until we were able to stand on our own stable feet, and only for 4 to 5 years we've functioned properly, only because 4 to 5 years, we haven't been shut down or harrassed you now, by government entities, a lot of people wanted us to stop, but a lot of people also wanted us to continue. And I think the only reason we are still here is because the royal family wants us to work. Because I think they believe in all of this. And it's their struggle in believing in this, trying to maintain and develop this versus the conservative tribes and conservative thinking. So they underline and supported us.</p> <p>20 So the harrassment and difficulties come not from the royal family and the king, but from government?</p> <p>21 No, it's corruption in the administration, corruption within the ministries, a lot of corruption, and a lot of people, a lot of buisnessmen who don't want this project to survive with this mentality. So they push people from institutions to come. You know, we had quite a bit of that.</p>
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Interview_Actor C

22	So how would you describe the relationship with state institutions?
23	Yes, it was somewhat difficult. It's better now, but it's careful, we are always walking on eggshells, always careful around them.
24	So, how are you structured and organized now?
25	Well, we have 52 staff in the two places here in Amman now, that work fulltime for the project. But mostly, decisions are taken by me and my brother. We opened a second branch here to prove to everybody that we are not just big and chaotic, like the first one. We also wanted to show that we are versatile, that we could be different. The first space is in the rebellious side of town, grundgier, younger, hipper. But this one here in an upscale part of town, it still sends the same message and it's been a real success, I mean we are here in an elite neighborhood.
26	How long have you been here?
27	Three years. And you now, everybody from this neighborhood, they just came here as well and suddenly, we were all on the same level as everyone. They are friendly, they don't just sit there expecting to be served, they want to help, clean up, feeling at home and I think once a person does that, they hug and kiss the staff, they've become part of our community, our family. And this is something you don't see too much, it's very rare in Amman. I think that message of equality and tolerance and love and friendship, I think we've finalized that formula and it works.
28	What I'd like to do now is to ask you specific questions to get a sense of how you, your staff, how interact with each other by asking for specific experiences that you might have had during your work. So, I'll now ask you for certain situations that you might have encountered during work and just describe briefly how you reacted and how you felt.
29	So, do you have establishe rules of procedure that you follow in your daily work?
30	No, but funny enough, we're writing that up as we speak. Because we are standardizing, we're trying to develop a manual, because we want to grow further and to do that, to train staff, we have to put a concept down and in writing. And the concept is mostly about to deal personally with each other.
31	Could you explain a couple of those rules and exemplify it with a situation that you've recently experienced?
32	I think the first one is the relationship from the owner down. I think it is very important that he or she deals with staff on an equal level for a start, and it's just on an equal level to be honest, we're not just talking on a professional level, we never knew how to be just professional here, and I know it breaks a lot of the rules in the books, especially business rules, but we don't care about that. It is very important for me as owner to walk in and every morning when I walk in, I hug and kiss my staff.
33	So, to what extent would you say that a majority of staff members follows these principles?
34	They just pick it up. They look at me do it and do it.
35	So it's a very personal relationship? Are there ever any exceptions?
36	Its got to be. Because if the owners are personal with staff, then they will be personal with each other and with everybody else that comes here. But of course there are exceptions, you know. We have many different people here from all social backgrounds and often, some need more time to pick it up or just can't. And it's also knowing where the borders are. It's personal but with a lot of respect, so also respecting the lines of people. It's warmth. And it's not that easy, because we have staff who are very rigid, not very touchy-feely. So with those staff, I don't give them hugs. So I just talk to them or only put a hand on their shoulder or shake their hand. It's always very warm.
37	Is this characteristic for your project's internal cooperation?
38	Yeah, well so far it hasn't been trained, but that's what we're working on now, but so far it's worked just by me doing it, everybody starts doing it and they feel more relaxed. And I watch how they speak to the customers as well. And the more personal it is, the easier it is to remeber everybody coming in here, remember what they like, rembmer their problems. So this often really breaks hard lines and suddenly there's a relationship with the people coming in here. But yes, everybody is different I guess.
39	And when you make decisions, to what extent do you follow established principles.
40	We've evolved a lot in the last years, it's been chaotic in the old place and we just made decisions as we moved along, yet always making sure that they are based on our main values. Now it's more organized, we've learned, we have experience situations and know how to do it this time around.
41	Did you ever receive outside funding? Or do you cooperate with other organiaziations?

Interview_Actor C

42	No, we've never received outside money. I mean we had to get permits and everything. We're not officially cooperating with outside organizations, just relationships on a personal level, but a lot of them, they immediately refer people to us when there are instances of gay bashing or with women running away, afraid of honor crimes, because they know, they can trust us and that we will do everything possible to help. We always keep our promises. Once we get involved, we don't just go out again. For example, there was a young man, his family approach us, because he had AIDS. But I was traveling and told them I could only deal with it after I get back. So they waited for me for two months, and I made sure that as soon as I was back, first thing, I would talk to him. Tell him that it's not his fault, that he won't die, that things had changed, made sure he would get treatment.
43	Ok then, well one of the skills I'm interested in is to be reliable and to work according to established rules of procedures. I would like to ask you to rate your project's ability, meaning the ability of the majority of the staff, to act reliable according to established rules of procedures on a scale from one to ten, with ten being the highest.
44	Well this new space, it's a lot more efficient and reliable than the old one. The other one just evolved and it was cut and paste and all our experimentations happened there. So it was wild, not rigid, but now this one here as well as the other one, is a lot better.
45	But where would you rate it in terms of reliability and procedures?
46	Probably around 6, whereas this here is around nine. So let's say seven taken together, after standardization, it's going to be a 10.
47	Ok, so could you explain this rating?
48	Well, there is a big evolution, it's not just some people coming together anymore, we can write manuals now, we've learned, the older space was chaotic, 400 people coming there in a week, we could keep up with everything, there was too much going on, too many spaces, you can't see them all at once. All in certain areas, in different rooms, behind walls. It's very difficult to keep up with everything there.
49	Could you describe to me a recent bigger project or event you organized.
50	You know every now and then, we had an event, for instance, lately, we had a drag event. And we do it deliberately. Because when we cross-dress people in such a show, it shocks. But we can disguise it and say it's just a show and still get people to talk about it, so we're training people to see things just from the complete other side. When I do this, I do them deliberately.
51	When you organized this project, who contributes conceptually.
52	Usually, it's me alone, the others only help with organization.
53	So the others or staff never contribute to conceptual planning or bringing in ideas?
54	Well for example one of the people here is a dancer, and funny enough he is a straight dancer. So, he participates in shows now and then, or some of the staff who are gay, they participate as well, sometimes. But then even on our facebook page, most postings, I post personally, if not all of them, and they are always realted to equality, abuse, bashing, exclusion. But of course I take ideas from staff members, you now most people that work here, they are not professionals, but were referred to us by phone, you know, please help this guy, this woman is divorced with two kids, ostrized by her family, can you help. We help, we hire them, no matter what they can do. We get refugees that we hire against the government. So of course their ideas, their stories inspire us to address issues.
55	Can you describe a recent situation, in which you had to criticize or give negative feedback to your staff?
56	Yes. One of the staff was obviously not tolerant to anybody gay. And obviously dismissive of straight men, and obviously very directed towards women. I fired him. He asked why, I told him exactly why. For one, you have no tolerance and you have no respect. When you jump on a woman aggressively and blatantly in front of everybody while you are ignoring others, this is rude and disrespectful to too many people at the same time.
57	Did you talk to him before you fired him?
58	Of course. Everybody that comes into this space, we ask them, do you know what we are, do you realize that you'll be dealing with a lot of different kinds of people and do you know what I mean with lots of different kinds of people, we get very specific, you will be dealing with the gay community, you will be dealing with the straight community, you will be dealing with people from lots of backgrounds, you will be dealing with people from different nationalities, you might be dealing with Israelis. Do you have a problem? And usually they say, no problem, no problem, but it doesn't take long until it shows. So unfortunately, we had to fired a lot of staff over that.
59	So is this usually how you procede when there is a problem with staff?

Interview_Actor C

60	It depends actually on how extreme the person's gone. But the thing is, by now, and not to sound judgemental, we can tell who's gonna get it and who isn't. And there are things that people do, it's not an issue just dealing with one intolerant situation, it's a composition of attitudes. You give a chance. But with some people, it doesn't take very long before they fall. So I talk to them, explain to them the problem, let them explain and give them another chance, but not forever. Of course, these are severe cases. I wouldn't fire people for simple mistakes, you know.
61	Is this how most of the staff would criticize each other?
62	It depends, some people, they just have never experienced a loving relationship. We have so many people in here, that have been abused, that have been through rough times, refugees, they sometimes get abusive towards others quickly. So I try to train and explain.
63	Could you describe the relationship between your staff members and the people that come here?
64	I'll tell you something, it's always in how you present things. In the beginning, I had it in my head that I would come in and infiltrate, you know, just sit somewhere, say something about homosexuality, or say something there about honor crimes, always infiltrating. But we've all changed. We just act as if it's all normal, I mean what's the big deal. We are all equal, we are one community and when you walk in, you become part of that community. When someone comes in and says but you can't do this, there are gay people here, there is a drag show, you just say, what's the big deal, we welcome them and it becomes normal, everybody meets at the same level. So, we are no longer on the defensive or on the offensive. We have changed and developed.
65	To what extent is everybody that comes here equals?
66	Well, everybody is very equal here, more than many people can take. We shock some people, we teach, we can see it on their faces. Women wearing hijab for example, they can come in and order a screwdriver, they are comfortable enough to ask for it, but not comfortable enough to be obviously drinking alcohol, so they ordered a screwdriver, it looked like orange juice, so they are somehow protected. The other side, one of the staff, they didn't want to serve it at the beginning, this is haram, I can't give an alcoholic drink to a woman wearing hijab, so I dealt with it and explained to him that everybody coming here is treated equally, everybody can do and order what he or she likes, no matter what. She makes the decision, why are you influencing the decision, you just do what you need to do, you serve, and let's talk about this, why do you think she's covered. I explained to him that 30 years ago, I didn't see hijab, it only started then, so let's talk about this, she probably is forced to cover, she probably f point, but then it's not acceptable behavior in my organization anymore. e and of course by our books and the Internet as well. Of course we are not booksellers, we just went to Portland, Oregon, looked around books and just picked out books that I thought I'd like. It was no system in my head, but then every book I actually picked was alternative, was very freedom-oriented, spiritual not religious, free-thinking. So clearly, everything here now reflects me. I chose the daisy as symbol from day one, because I was always very flower power, very hippy, very nature.
67	If you had to rate your project on a scale from one to ten, when it comes to respectful behavior, meaning that you value the other person and their work and you treat them as equals, how would you rate the project?
68	The staff?
69	Bot, the staff with each other and with the people that come in.
70	I think it's all about respect, we'll respect you for wherever you came from, whatever you think. What we offer you a free space, use it well. And you use it well by respecting the differences, treating everybody as equals, that's what we live here, that's why we are here in the first place.
71	So, if you have to rate your projects from one to ten, what would be the answer?
72	Actually, we are very close to 9, not ten obviously, because we're not in a country that allows us to be a ten. But close to the nine.
73	Could you describe a recent situation in which one of your staff members approached you with a serious issue.
74	Well, one of the Philipinos, there is a horrible all boys high school, 4 guys at seven am harassed her down the street in the neighborhood, like touching her. And she got down on the floor to protect herself and she kept saying I'm a Muslim, I'm a Muslim, she wasn't covered, stop touching me. And they still went on, she started to scream, two times. One taxi that went by slowed down and then continued, and a neighbor looked out and didn't do anything about it.
75	How did you react?

Interview_Actor C

76	I raised hell. I called the police, I called a couple of other organizations, I went to the school to identify and made it a big thing, the girl, I had to deal with her, get her permission, tell her that it's nothing wrong with her, it doesn't matter, Muslim or no Muslim, covered or not covered, you are protected. And I made it a point that she knew that I'd go for all her rights.
77	So to what extent were you able to put yourself into the shoes of that person?
78	Yeah, absolutely. I have no tolerance, no tolerance to abuse. And I feel very much for that person, I can obviously relate to it.
79	Would you say that this is how the majority of staff would react?
80	Well, normally, I try that they turn to me with an issue. But they often also do it themselves, and then it depends on the issue. For example if there's an issue between the guy and the girl, they immediately side with the girl. And if there's an issue between two guys, there's a procedure that we have to deal with that. So we have certain rules how to react in such cases, but they have rules amongst themselves, so it depends how they react.
81	So to what extent would you say most of your staff members would react the way you do to such serious problems, do they try and put themselves in the shoes of the other person?
82	Sometimes, sometimes not, it really depends on the issues.
83	Would you say they try and sympathize.
84	Again, it depends on the issue, when girls are in trouble, absolutely. With guys, it can go either way, but usually, when he has been hurt, he's sympathized with. So we also try, if there's anybody physically hurt, take care of him no matter what.
85	Can you describe a similar situation, in which an external person approach you with a concern.
86	Well, the other day, two guys were in here and four others were just looking at each other. And then another comes with a beer glass and smashes it on the head of one of the guys. And I was there. So immediately, we had the bouncer get them outside, all of them.
87	Did you ask what the fight was about?
88	ONLY later, we first had to separate them. But I found out that the people that were harassed were the aggressors in the first place, but the guy who attacked, I mean you don't do that, you use words. So, both groups are band. And it was a stupid thing, like the one didn't like how the others were looking at him. And I made sure they knew it was stupid.
89	Could you describe another situation in which an outsider approached you with a problem that does not have to do with a fight and violence?
90	Well, we have one case of harassment that I'm dealing with right now. Somebody came in and explains, look, my cousin came out of high school and was beat up by a bunch of bullies, harassed sexually, beat up by a bunch of police. He is ashamed of his sexuality, he is hurt and beat up and we don't know what to do and how to deal with it because it was the police. And now I'm contacting a few organization to start working on the issue.
91	When you deal with such issues, how much do you put yourself into the position of the other person.
92	I only put myself into the person to understand the emotional aspect, I get other people to deal with the legality. And I zoom in on the person victimized, and I talk to him, it's very important for me to explain to him that it's not his fault, because that's one of the first things usually that a person feels. So it was important to sit with him, to tell him not to be ashamed, to tell him what he can do. So I focus on all of these things and I zoom in on the person, victimized and coming on the personal level where I can show support.
93	Would you say that this kind of reaction is encouraged within the project?
94	Well with these kinds of issues, the external people usually approach me directly because they know I can and want to help.
95	So how would you rate the project in terms of empathy, meaning that you put yourself into the position of others and try to sympathize?
96	Collectively, I would put us between 7 and 8, 7 really.
97	Can you explain?
98	Because I haven't systemized it yet.
99	So this is something you want to put in the manual?
100	Yes, this is something that I want to put in the manual, to systemize it, so everybody does what I do reliably, to train them. At the moment, they just see what I do and they immitate. But of course, this is not just a matter of teaching. Nobody has taught me, I just do it and some of them do it as well, just because that's how they are. Now that I've watched how I and some of them deal with things, I can systemize it and train.

Interview_Actor C

101	You've talked before that there are often disagreements and conflicts, especially between people that come here. Could you describe a recent situation, in which there was a disagreement between staff members?
102	Yes, just yesterday. A staff member, who has been with us for seven years, and recently he started to bodybuild. And with that, he started to become aggressive. And more than once I've come up to him, tried to explain to him, say look, I don't now what you are doing, but it looks like you may be taking supplement of some sort and that's affecting your behavior, it's making you very aggressive from time to time and that's not acceptable. And yesterday again he was very aggressive to one of the senior staff members. So we went to the office with him, tried to talk to him, to tell him that we didn't want to threaten him but he shouldn't be aggressive towards us either, we tried to make come to an understanding, to make a deal, that he should try and work on his aggressiveness and he could stay. But he didn't calm down and threatened us so we had to fire him immediately. There are times where, I've seen him getting aggressive, I didn't ostrize him, tried to talk to him again and again. Tolerance only goes to a certain point, but then it's not acceptable behavior in my organization anymore.
103	To what extent do you usually try to make concessions to staff members in situations that are less severe?
104	All the time. I mean, anytime we have disagreements here or people have arguments, I sit them down, we talk about it. It's often personal issues, issues at home, latent issues and also one thing I realized because I have these people, refugees who have been traumatized or abused, they are very sensitive in a lot of situations. And then there are other people from lower ranks of society, they've grown up with abuse. And that's where we watch out for those issues, we understand people who have been abused, they pass it on, they mistake it and think that's a tool of love. So, they might be more quick to abuse you or slap you, but they don't mean it, but that's what happens when you have people from different socio-economic backgrounds. So we try to see those things when there are problems between staff members, talk about it.
105	So would you say it's characteristic for your project to encourage solving disagreements in this way?
106	Yes, because we realize there is a lot of mentorship necessary a lot of meeting in the middle and compromising on all sides.
107	And when there is a disagreement between your staff and external people, how do you deal with that? Can you describe a situation?
108	Well it depends, sometimes, like a week ago, we had somebody come in just to harass the waiter. We don't tolerate that, he has to go immediately.
109	But when there is only a simple disagreement, nothing to do with violence.
110	Well of course, when the other person is right or has an issue, we will approach him, talk to him, try to solve the disagreement. Just yesterday, my cook mixed up something in the kitchen, so some of the customers got things they didn't order and then had to wait a long time for the right food, it's always very busy in here, you see. So of course, they complained and we compromised and didn't charge them for the food.
111	How would you rate your project's willingness to make concessions and compromise, where would you rate it?
112	Well, 9, we are always ready for concessions.
113	Could you explain.
114	Well as I said it depends on the issue, if the other person is just plain aggressive or harrasses the other, we would never compromise, when it comes to tolerance, there is no compromising.
115	Well, I have just some final questions. We already talked about it a little in the beginning, your relationship with governmental institutions. Could you elaborate a little.
116	Well, we had problems during Ramadan. We are officially licenced to serve food and alcohol all day long, and every Ramadan, we got people from ministries and entities start to harass us. And we don't take that. The moment somebody starts with that, we tell them that we are not doing anything wrong here, that we have a license, please leave.
117	So, they just try to pick on you?
118	Yes, well they just ask questions. When they come in, they often assume I'm a Christian. Well I'm a Muslim, not a practicing Muslim, and so they come in and they ask these stupid questions where you see they are trying to assess me. Because if I'm Christian, they're going to be a little more lenient and they are going to act superior to me. But if I'm Muslim, they gonna lecture me, they gonna give me a hard time. We try to tell them from the beginning that this is none of their business, that we have a license, that if there's a problem, report me.
119	Did they ever report you?

Interview_Actor C

120	ONce they closed us down for three weeks. They lied about dirt and sex in the place. But in those three weeks, everybody knew we were closed down. We had BBC come in, we had come in, because the whole incident happend in front of the British Ambassador, so it went viral.
121	Ok. So, I have one last question. I'm researching civil society organizations in Jordan. So to you, what is civil society?
122	I think it's how people within a community deal with each other in terms of respect and in terms of their differences and in terms of their rights. And to make sure that as much as possible, they can be different, that their right to be equal is guaranteed by the government and not violated and restricted.
123	What would you say is the role of civil society in Jordan?
124	Normalizing differences and normalizing that there are differences, promoting tolerance and promoting different peoples rights and advocating it for them.
125	Would you consider yourself as a part of that civil society?
126	Yes, absolutely.
127	Great. Thank you very much for your time.

<p>1: 1 2: So we'll just start with some general introductory questions. In which area is your organization mainly active and what are your main objectives?</p>	<p>I have a brochure, which will probably answer that question. I'll give it to you, not because I don't know the answers by heart, I do, but it is easier. We've designed it for your 40-year anniversary, we are turning 44, so this is it.</p>
<p>3</p>	<p>Ok, thank you very much.</p>
<p>4</p>	<p>So you're interested in our structure?</p>
<p>5</p>	<p>Well I'd first like to ask you which means you usually employ to achieve your objectives? What kind of things do you do?</p>
<p>6</p>	<p>To realize our objectives, we do have several approaches. But the most important one is mobilization of women at the grassroots level.</p>
<p>7</p>	<p>Ok, so in your work, how much are you working in public?</p>
<p>8</p>	<p>Very much. We work all over Jordan, we do have sister NGOs who work with us, and whenever we make a workshop, we publicise. But the main idea is that we use the UN Conventions like CEDAW to monitor all the women's rights status in Jordan.</p>
<p>9</p>	<p>So what's your motivation in doing all this?</p>
<p>10</p>	<p>We follow such a thing as monitoring. We monitor the commitment of the government. How do we do that? Because in the UN System there are reports every four years for the different conventions, last year it was Jordan's time, so our role is to submit a shadow report, we call ourselves shadower, because we answer all the questions that the government doesn't answer. So the government has to submit a report, we have to submit a shadow report. And we organize a trip to Geneva or New York, it depends on the situation of the UN treaty, and we go to say, the government did not do that, did not do that, did not do that. And this makes us, well,</p>
<p>11</p>	<p>Do you also have projects where you work directly with women?</p>
<p>12</p>	<p>Yes, we concentrate on capacity building and training all the time also working with many local CBOs in the field.</p>
<p>13</p>	<p>How are you funded?</p>
<p>14</p>	<p>Mostly from outsiders. We are funded by donors, the EU mainly and then the European NGOs, many of the European NGOs.</p>
<p>15</p>	<p>Do you receive any governmental funding?</p>
<p>16</p>	<p>No!</p>
<p>17</p>	<p>How are you structured internally?</p>
<p>18</p>	<p>Let me tell you. Because every NGO in Jordan, this is according to Law, they have to have elections every three years, so we follow that. For example last year, we had elections. And then, election means that the general assembly which means all members.</p>
<p>19</p>	<p>Ok, how many members do you have?</p>
<p>20</p>	<p>Now, we do have a big number, but only those who have paid their subscription are allowed to vote. Last year, those who paid the subscription were 95. We have a bigger number, but many of them don't have the time to come. So we call everybody to come for the general assembly once a year, once every three years there's a vote and once a year for financial and administrative reports. They follow the work and the financials and the general assembly has to endorse the reports, so they vote to refuse or endorse the budget etc. For the finances, let me tell you, this is a must, we have an outside, an external audit as well, it has to be a company, so we have a contract with him. The auditor comes and passes the budget and then the general assembly passes the budget. And last year, we had a new board.</p>
<p>21</p>	<p>And the board is for what?</p>
<p>22</p>	<p>For administration. They are the most important people, I'm not one of them. So we have 7 board members, all engaged women that are members, and they meet every month, it's a must to meet every month to take decisions on how to run.</p>
<p>23</p>	<p>So you and your staff here are responsible for operations?</p>
<p>24</p>	<p>Yes. So the board has responsibilities, a president, a treasurer, and for the organizational's internal work, or shall we say every-day work, we here are the Head Quarter, where the board meets etc. We also have a Center in the Palestinian refugee camp called Baka camp, where we also have more employees. In the Headquarter, we do have departments, so there's a financial department with 2 people, we have the department for projects, this is where I work, I'm the responsible for all projects, which means everything funded by external donors, so I have to prepare proposals, make negotiations and then give it to the board to sign and then</p>
<p>25</p>	<p>So do you have people that work with you?</p>
<p>26</p>	<p>Yes, most people work with me in this department. So let me speak about the other departments quickly, there is the administrative department which is also responsible for the Baka Camp, they also call for meetings, they prepare the agenda, all letters we send out as well as the monthly reports and other than that they also prepare the annual meeting and the annual financial report. Here in my department, we have implementation, so the day-to-day activities.</p>

Interview_Actor D

27	So, what I'd like to do now is ask you to explain to me certain situations that you might have encountered during your work as project manager. So I'll ask you a couple of questions, I'd ask you to just sketch those situations, you don't have to go into great detail especially considering your limited time. So just go with
28	So, do you have established rules of procedure for your day-to-day internal work?
29	Yes, we do rules, I can give you the electronic version if you'd like. We have a statute, but also the government has made a new association law for which every association needs to define by-laws, according to which we have to define our main objectives, which is women rights, and we have to submit for every project and for every penny that comes from the donors. So we have constant correspondence within the administrative department that are in correspondence with the
30	So these regulations are for how you can use funds.
31	Yes, they want to control.
32	And do you have rules that guide how you work together with the other staff members internally? Like when you proceede with organizing projects, do you have guidelines on how to procede with everyday decision-making?
33	Yeah, this is our weakness. Do we have guidelines? It's unwritten.
34	Ok, it's unwritten, but to what extent does everybody follow it. Can you give an example of some unwritten regulations?
35	Let me tell you about attendance. Every single person should come and sign in the morning. So, we do have attendance charts, we have them daily and they are kept to know the hours of the time they spent at work. So this is a rule, it's from 9 to 2, and in their contract, it also says we might use them for workshops etc., so they might stay till four and then get extra time another day. But this is sort of unwritten guideline, but accepted.
36	And to what extent does everybody follow it?
37	I don't think there's trouble.
38	So usually, the majority follows those unwritten guidelines and fills out the sheet?
39	Yeah, we have two boys that are a little lazy with this stuff, they should appear earlier, but it's ok, it's flexible, so they just have to work longer in the afternoon.
40	And when it comes to taking decisions, like how to procede during projects or when to have meetings, are there rules for that?
41	It's flexible, during projects, I often make decisions, not the big ones, we have rules for the board to take part during projects, because I'm director of projects and for administration, the admin person does it. And we have regular staff meetings, it depends when everybody is here, not that regular, but we try.
42	So you'd say this is characteristic for you organization.
43	Yes, flexible unwritten guidelines, not if there's urgent work, but normally with the time, they can be flexible.
44	So, when you receive funding, you said earlier that you have to write it down for the government's approval, but there are probably also a regulations that come from the donors that you have to follow. Have there been regulations in past projects that you've not been able to follow?
45	Well, the German's are different from the Dutch, so there are very different regulations from every donor, but we try to abide by it.
46	Is it characteristic for your organization, would you say you usually manage to abide all those regulations?
47	Well, no, of course not.
48	Could you explain?
49	Well each donor has its own regulations and sometimes we have to negotiate. For example the EU pay you the final amount of money after you finish, two or three months, and the Spanish don't, you have to finish all the money first before they extend and they would like to supervise every penny, supervision is very strong with
50	Have donors ever addressed issues of reliability with how you used funds, for example the Spanish?
51	Sometimes we have to ask for an extension of deadlines, if there are problems in the field, you know, with one of the CBOs. They don't always work as efficiently as they should. So we have to deal with that. But we try to keep good relationships with the donors of course, to do everything they ask, turn in reports.
52	So when I say that adherence to rules of procedures means that you reliably follow established rules, on a scale from one to ten with ten being the highest, how would you rate the AWO on that? Internally as well as externally? How would you rate the ability of your organization to work reliably according to rules and
53	High, at 8.
54	Can you describe one recent bigger project you organized together with your staff members? Could you explain briefly what you did?

Interview_Actor D

55	We organized a project to strengthen women organizations at the grassroots. We created a network under the title musawah, which in Arabic means equality. So this network is composed of very simple grassroots ngos mainly, and they needed strengthening and to formulate, how to say, a strategy for the network we held several meetings with representatives of governorates, there we were all the time discussing how to improve relationships, the internal bonds or relationship between the ngos. We have 86 ngos and the trainer took from me a proposal of how to strengthen the network and we came out with a plan, the plan said that there would be one lady representing the north region, one the center, one the south of Jordan. So three, plus our organization plus a neutral administrative person, so we are now five
56	Thank you, I think that's enough for the moment.
57	So how was the relationship between your organization and the CBOs you worked with?
58	Up to now it is ok, up to now we've created the network together and now we're structuring it, this is what we are doing right now, together we are planning to have a flexible relationship, and we decided that each of the three representatives is elected, by whom, the first by the north ngos for example, the second one is elected by the south, and the third one is elected by the center ngos, so we decided to divide Jordan into three regions.
59	So would you say that for the network, your organization and the other CBOs and representatives on the board are equals?
60	Up to now it is equal, because we're all equal for policy-making, for the administration decisions etc.
61	So would you say that this kind of relationship is typical for the relationship between your organization and other external partners during projects?
62	Yeah. We always try to work together with them on all issues and make them all feel that they can all contribute so we can avoid any conflicts.
63	Ok, how many people from the staff here have participated in the project?
64	Let me think, yes, it was three staff plus the board.
65	Who of those was allowed to contribute to the conceptual work of the project?
66	For conceptual work, mostly the staff, not so much the whole board. So it's the director of projects, the admin, and the president. The three of us, we follow up, we come together to discuss and so on.
67	So is it usually like this when you organize projects?
68	Yes.
69	Ok, can you remember a situation from the project in which you had to criticize one of the staff members or give negative feedback for their work?
70	Well, my position was more to reassure everybody, not to criticize. I don't like to criticize in general.
71	To what extent do you and your staff give each other feedback on your work?
72	Well, I always try to support and reassure each other.
73	Does your staff ever approach you when they think something should be done differently?
74	Well sometimes, not that often.
75	Ok, so again a rating question. Respectful behavior means that you approach others as equals and that you value them and their work. On a scale from one to ten, with ten being the highest, how would you rate your organization's ability to treat externals as well as other staff members respectfully in this manner?
76	Well, I keep telling the people in the network that everybody is equal and receives the same vote. We don't want a hierarchy and we want our sister ngos to know that we're all in the same boat. So this is not just telling you, but it is really how we feel.
77	So how would you rate your organization on the scale from one to ten then?
78	High, maybe 9.
79	Could you briefly describe to me a situation in which a staff member approached you with a serious problem?
80	Yes, there was a problem which gave us a lesson. We were like a family here, but we learned that this is wrong. We had women, we told her that she'd get 50 JDs a month to do work for a project. And we were friends and at the end of the project we stopped the 50 JDs, so she went to the court of workers and said, look, this month I received that much but now not anymore, so she wanted this money as an acquired right and wanted to keep getting the money. So we went to the court, but she won and they said we can't just work without a contract on a project basis. So now we've learned the lesson, if the payment is an acquired right, we shouldn't
81	So, to what extent were you able to put yourself into her shoes?
82	Well at the beginning, we were shocked, why did she do all that? But then we understood her motives and also that we should abide by the rules of the labor law.
83	To what extent were you able to sympathize with her and her issue?

Interview_Actor D

84	No, we weren't able to sympathize with her at all. We were clear from the very beginning that this was only temporary and then she sued us, because she read in the law that there is no such thing as a temporary allowance.
85	Now, would you say that usually, when staff members approach you with a problem, this is how you and the majority of the staff members would react?
86	Well, normally we all try to be calm, and flexible and try to understand the other person and relate to their problem, you know, we are a family here, so they know that they can come with problems and get always get help. For example when they have problems at home and can't come into work, everybody will have sympathy
87	Can you remember a recent situation, where somebody from a project, a woman or a CBO you were working with approached you with a concern?
88	On the side of the donors?
89	No, from the side of the Jordanian people you deal with.
90	Well, many, they are very happy to tell you about all their problems. For example in one of the projects, we gave them funds to implement certain parts of the project. And they didn't use the money as efficiently as they were supposed to and weren't able to finish on time. So in this project, I had trouble understanding what was going on on the ground so I had to send one of my employees to check for everything. And we had to ask the donors to extend the deadlines for two months so
91	In this situation, were you able to take the perspective of those people?
92	We tried to see what was happening on the ground and managed to give them extra time.
93	To what extent where you able to sympathize with their time problems?
94	Well, not that much, they should be able to finish their work on time.
95	Would you say that your organization or most of the staff would usually react to problems in this way?
96	It depends on the problem. We always try to help and understand what's going on. But you can't always be sympathetic, especially not with donors involved.
97	Ok, another rating question: Empathy means that you try to put yourself into the position of somebody else and try to sympathize with his or her concerns. How would you rate your organization o and the majority of staff members n a scale from one to ten to react empathetic to problems?
98	Well, we train ourselves, constantly, to not only be sympathetic with the grassroots organizations, but also empathetic in the sense that we consider the community around them and whatever problems they face.
99	But if you had to rate yourselves on the scale, where would you be?
100	I like 10, but I think we're 8, we try to be a 10. So 8!
101	Ok, one last block. Could you describe a situation, in which there was an internal disagreement between you and staff members or between staff members?
102	So just a difference in opinion or a big conflict?
103	no, just an everyday difference of opinion, during a project for example.
104	Well, no dispute? Mhh, let me remember. We sometimes have conflict of ideas on how to procede, I'm trying to recall an incident, well, we do constantly have conflicts over time management and delays, so for example, there was one boy who was constantly late, so we discussed it and arranged that if he came late, he'd
105	So to what extent did you both try to make concessions and discuss to solve the issue?
106	Well, I would always like that they understand. So, for example tell them that we should not delay when we work with Germans, because they like to be punctual. But, I told him, if he comes late, it's ok, but he has to do his work and stay longer.
107	Would you say that this is usually how you try to solve internal disagreements?
108	Yes, we do have monthly meetings for the staff, the last meeting was at the beginning of this year, and I was a little bit hard on them because our website reconstruction took much longer, so at the beginning of the year I said this is not acceptable, the website should be finished, and everybody pledged and when I was away in Morocco, everybody was sending his part of the work, so because they only had one month to do it, now it's not very good. But we talked about this
109	Has there been a situation during a project, in which there was a disagreement between your organization and somebody external like CBOs you work with?
110	I normally don't allow it to come to that, let me think if we had such a situation, with empathy and sympathy, we don't reach that level. But for example with the Spanish project, one of the ladies didn't give a final report so we had to send the employee to check so that's how we tried to solve it, talk with them directly and see what is going on on the ground, not fight with them. We are strict and we would like our work to be ready on time, because our reputation with the donors is very important to us, but we always try to talk to the other party and make them understand so there won't be a disagreement in the first place, we try to avoid
111	An to what extent do you try and make concessions in such situations?
112	By protecting them and asking the donors to extend. But we give them a clear deadline and make sure they don't miss it.

Interview_Actor D

113	Ok, so one last self-assessment question. To be open to compromise means to make concessions and to talk to each other when it comes to disagreements. How would you rate your organization's readiness to compromise on a scale from one to ten?
114	Maybe a 7.
115	What makes you come to this evaluation?
116	It is always hard to compromise and it is not always up to us to make the compromise, but to the donors.
117	Ok, so two quick last questions. First, what is your relationship to governmental institutions?
118	Not very good. They don't like independent NGOs. They don't like to be criticized. The governmental and semi-governmental organizations like to support each other, but
119	For your organization, what does the term civil society mean, what is the role of civil society?
120	It is for us very essential, we are trying to build a movement for the civil society, we are very political, and we would like a better role for civil society in society and we'd like to aggregate the work, for example for the last shadow report, we went to other NGOs, for example some against torture, or for freedom of expression, and we tried to unite in order to have a good stand and collect the voices of all people. So we should try and strengthen the main role of civil society, to monitor the
121	What is a civil society actor?
122	An organization that works for their people and bring the voices of the people to the decision-makers and if they are not listening to go to the international

Codings

Dokument	Code	Anfang	Ende	Gewicht	Segment	Autor	Erstellt am	Dokumentgruppe
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor A	Connections to the state\Close	18	18	0	We have different donors, local and international, so like any other NGOs, when there are bids, we apply for the bids, generally I would say that MOPEC, the ministry of planning and economic cooperation is our largest donor, we are now implementing the poverty pockets three project for the ministry in twelve different pocets. And another three NGOs are implementing the pockets in other areas, but we got the largest portion. But that was a bid, we applied for it; it's not automatic, it depends on the requests for proposals and request for application, we apply like any other NGO. We have some international funds like from the Spanish international cooperation unit, it was also a fund to implement an income generating project with one CBO and also to benefit women in rural areas, also the GIZ for one project. We have the ministry of energy now, implementing one of our projects now to reduce the costs of energy in Jordan. So international and national, but I would say that MOPEC is our largest donor for the community empowerment programme.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 12:55:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor A	Connections to the state\Close	21	21	0	We have a board of trustees of 12 to 13 members including individuals from public, private, and non-profit sector, headed by her majesty, she is the top of the management, under her comes to director general, the director general has a deputy and a consultant, and then you have division managers or directors, we have three divisions acually, these divisons run programmes under them, the first division is the technical division, that comes under the community empowerment programme, child safety programme, and a training center, then you have the support units, we have a fundraising and programme development division, then public relations and communications, another support unit is HR, and we have the financial unit. So we have these three divisions and under each division different programmes and support units.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 12:59:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor A	Relationship with the state\Friendly	125	125	0	Actually, we have two levels. For fundraising, MOPEC, the Ministry of Planning, or other Ministries who are on top of our donor list, in terms of communication and introduction of new programmes, it can not happen without their participation. So we have a very close relationship.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:02:00	Interviews Strukturiert

Codings

Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor A	Relationship with the state\Friendly	126	126	0	We always establish a steering committee for the new projects and programmes and we make sure, for example, that the department of health or the department of education, in the certain or targeted area is represented in this committee. For different objectives actually. We don't want to duplicate efforts on the ground, so I don't want to work on schools that are on their platform next year, because that's waste of fund and effort, and they facilitate for us procedures very often. So if I want to enter a health clinic or a school, instead of keep sending official letters and write-ups for the ministry to allow us, when the department of health is represented in the steering committee, it's easier of the director of that health clinic or school to allow us to enter easily, because he knows that his manger or director is informed.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:02:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor A	Function of civil society\Mediator	127	127	0	It's lobbying.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:05:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor A	Function of civil society\Mediator	128	128	0	Let me highlight the fact that we never take their role, we facilitate.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:06:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor A	Function of civil society\Partner	134	134	0	As an organization, they are the implementing, they are the organization that should implement national agendas. Because of their daily contacts with the population.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:07:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor A	Function of civil society\Partner	135	135	0	Civil society organizations should be in charge of national agendas and national priorities in terms of social objectives, to define what, or the path of any given country, where is should lead in terms of improvement, in term of shortcomings for social issues.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:09:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor A	Function of civil society\Mediator	137	137	0	Yes, they are the part for raising issues.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:09:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor A	Function of civil society\Partner	139	139	0	We come on the second, we implement,	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:10:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor A	Function of civil society\Partner	141	141	0	Here we do not, here we only implement.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:11:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor A	Function of civil society\Partner	139	139	0	combination of MOPEC, UNDP and us	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:12:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor B	Connections to the state\Independent	16	16	0	We are self-financed	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:22:00	Interviews Strukturiert

Codings

Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor C	Relationship with the state\Friendly	18	18	0	And I think the only reason we are still here is because the royal family wants us to work. Because I think they believe in all of this. And it's their struggle in believing in this, trying to maintain and develop this versus the conservative tribes and conservative thinking. So they underline and supported us.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:45:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor C	Relationship with the state\Difficult	20	20	0	corruption in the administration, corruption within the ministries, a lot of corruption, and a lot of people, a lot of businessmen who don't want this project to survive with this mentality. So they push people from institutions to come. You know, we had quite a bit of that.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:45:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor C	Relationship with the state\Difficult	115	115	0	Well, we had problems during Ramadan. We are officially licenced to serve food and alcohol all day long, and every Ramadan, we got people from ministries and entities start to harrass us. And we don't take that. The moment somebody starts with that, we tell them that we are not doing anything wrong here, that we have a license, please leave.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:46:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor C	Relationship with the state\Difficult	119	119	0	Once they closed us down for three weeks. They lied about dirt and sex in the place. But in those three weeks, everybody knew we were closed down. We had BBC come in, we had come in, because the whole incident happend in front of the British Ambassador, so it went viral.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:46:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor C	Function of civil society\Neutral	121	121	0	I think it's how people within a community deal with each other in terms of respect and in terms of their differences and in terms of their rights. And to make sure that as much as possible, they can be different, that their right to be equal is guaranteed by the government and not violated and restricted.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:47:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor C	Function of civil society\Neutral	123	123	0	Normalizing differences and normalizing that there are differences, promoting tolerance and promoting different peoples rights and advocating it for them.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:47:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor C	Function of civil society\Oppositoin	121	121	0	And to make sure that as much as possible, they can be different, that their right to be equal is guaranteed by the government and not violated and restricted.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:50:00	Interviews Strukturiert

Codings

Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor D	Function of civil society\Opposition	9	9	0	0	We follow such a thing as monitoring. We monitor the commitment of the government. How do we do that? Because in the UN System there are reports every four years for the different conventions, last year it was Jordan's time, so our role is to submit a shadow report, we call ourselves shadower, because we answer all the questions that the government doesn't answer. So the government has to submit a report, we have to submit a shadow report. And we organize a trip to Geneva or New York, it depends on the situation of the UN treaty, and we go to say, the government did not do that, did not do that, did not do that. And this makes us, well, famous and motivates us.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:51:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor D	Connections to the state\Independent	13	13	0	0	Mostly from outsiders. We are funded by donors, the EU mainly and then the European NGOs, many of the European NGOs.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:52:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor D	Connections to the state\Independent	14	14	0	0	Do you receive any governmental funding?	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:52:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor D	Connections to the state\Independent	15	15	0	0	No!	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:52:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor D	Connections to the state\Independent	21	21	0	0	For administration. They are the most important people, I'm not one of them. So we have 7 board members, all engaged women that are members, and they meet every month, it's a must to meet every month to take decisions on how to run.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:55:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor D	Relationship with the state\Difficult	117	117	0	0	Not very good. They don't like independent NGOs. They don't like to be criticized. The governmental and semi-governmental organizations like to support each other, but they don't like independents.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:55:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor D	Function of civil society\Opposition	119	119	0	0	It is for us very very essential, we are trying to build a movement for the civil society, we are very political, and we would like a better role for civil society in society and we'd like to aggregate the work, for example for the last shadow report, we went to other NGOs, for example some against torture, or for freedom of expression, and we tried to unite in order to have a good stand and collect the voices of all people. So we should try and strengthen the main role of civil society, to monitor the commitment of our government to treat us as equals.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:56:00	Interviews Strukturiert

Codings

Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor D	Function of civil society\Mediator	121	121	0	0	An organization that works for their people and bring the voices of the people to the decision-makers and if they are not listening to go to the international organizations to tell what is going on.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:56:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor D	Function of civil society\Opposition	121	121	0	0	An organization that works for their people and bring the voices of the people to the decision-makers and if they are not listening to go to the international organizations to tell what is going on.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 13:56:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor A	Function of civil society\Mediator	15	15	0	0	Working for Jordanians, trying to provide a support, I would say that our organization plays the role of facilitator, like bridging the needs of Jordanians with the national agenda, national plans, and we try to be this bridge.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 19:01:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor A	Function of civil society\Partner	18	18	0	0	implementing the poverty pockets three project for the ministry in twelve different pocets.	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 19:04:00	Interviews Strukturiert
Interviews Strukturiert\Interview_Actor C	Function of civil society\Mediator	123	123	0	0	advocating	Maria Debre	09.03.2014 20:38:00	Interviews Strukturiert