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Abstract

This text is a contribution to the research on the worldwide success of evangelical Christianity and offers a new perspective on the relationship between late modern capitalism and evangelicalism. For this purpose, the utilization of affect and emotion in evangelicalism towards the mobilization of its members will be examined in order to find out what similarities to their employment in late modern capitalism can be found. Different examples from within the evangelical spectrum will be analyzed as affective economies in order to elaborate how affective mobilization is crucial for evangelicalism's worldwide success. Pivotal point of this text is the exploration of how evangelicalism is able to activate the voluntary commitment of its members, financiers, and missionaries. Gathered here are examples where both spheres—evangelicalism and late modern capitalism—overlap and reciprocate, followed by a theoretical exploration of how the findings presented support a view of evangelicalism as an inner-worldly narcissism that contributes to an assumed re-enchantment of the world.

Diese Arbeit ist ein Beitrag zur Erforschung des weltweiten Erfolges des evangelikalen Christentums und bietet eine neue Perspektive auf die Beziehung zwischen spätmodernem Kapitalismus und Evangelikalismus. Zu diesem Zweck wird untersucht, wie Affekt und Emotion im Evangelikalismus eingesetzt werden, um seine Mitglieder zu mobilisieren und inwieweit ähnliche Mobilisierungsstrategien im spätmodernen Kapitalismus wiedererkennbar sind. Ausgewählte Beispiele aus dem evangelikalen Spektrum werden als Affektökonomien analysiert, um herauszuarbeiten, inwieweit die affektive Mobilisierung

eine zentrale Bedeutung für den weltweiten Erfolg des evangelikalen Christentums hat. Ein zentraler Punkt dieser Untersuchung ist die Frage, wie der Evangelikalismus seine Mitglieder, Förderer und Missionare zu ihrem außergewöhnlichen Engagement motiviert. Die hier präsentierten Beispiele zeigen auf, in welchen Bereichen sich spätmoderner Kapitalismus und Evangelikalismus überlagern und austauschen. Darauf aufbauend folgt eine theoretische Erkundung, inwieweit die hier präsentierten Ergebnisse eine Beschreibung des Evangelikalismus als innerweltlichen Narzissmus erlauben und einer angenommenen Wiederverzauberung der Welt Vorschub leisten.

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Contents

It's just like a magic penny,

Hold it tight and you won't have any.

Lend it, spend it, and you'll have so many

They'll roll all over the floor.

(Malvina Reynolds)

Introduction

America is moved by the spirit of the Holy Ghost. Evangelical Christians cry tears of joy in emotional services, hands held up high, singing to the tunes of Christian rock music in mega-churches all across the country. That is at least one of the most prominent images of evangelicalism. And while it is true that millions of Christians in the United States adhere to a faith that emphasizes the experiential and affective aspects of religion, these expressions of the experiential, supernatural and irrational as described above are only aspects of parts of the evangelical spectrum. However, those parts have become the dynamic expressions of a religious movement that now has more than 850 million members worldwide as some sources estimate (Pew Research Center, "Global Christianity" 67).[1] What began as an obscure, even marginalized sect at the beginning of the 20th century is only a hundred years later rivaling traditional Protestantism; and in "most parts of the country, adherents of evangelicalism now outnumber mainliners by at least two to one" (Silk and Walsh x).

Such a dynamic development is surprising even without taking into consideration that Christianity as a whole has sharply declined during the last eight years in the United States (Pew Research Center, "Changing Landscape"). It is from here that this relatively young form of Christianity is taking over the world. Evangelical proselytization

[1]For 2011, the Pew Forum estimated that Pentecostalism had 279,080,000 members, that there were 304,990,000 Charismatics, and 285,480,000 evangelicals worldwide—869,560,000 in total (there are approximately 2.2 billion Christians worldwide). The three movements may differ in certain aspects significantly, however, the categories are not mutually exclusive and for the purpose of this dissertation thesis will be discussed under the umbrella term evangelicalism in chapter one. These numbers are based on estimates based in large part on figures provided by various Christian organizations around the world and thus should only be used as a approximate estimate.

is unmatched in its success. No other religious group or current has grown more rapidly over the past fifty years due to missionary efforts. Evangelical missionaries are active in all parts of the world. This development leads to a seemingly simple question: from what does this incredible success derive? As with most simple questions, there is no simple mechanism or reason that might explain this success. Not so long ago, the incredible rapid expansion of evangelicalism would have been deemed paradoxical as it did seem to challenge the secularization paradigm that dominated much of the academic discourse on religion in the 20th century.

In recent years, the 'religious turn' has put the focus on religions as an integral part of culture (back) again, which makes almost forgotten that for the longest time, the study of religion had been neglected and was not one of the major topics of American Studies (Mechling 64). In itself a surprising fact, given the incredible importance religion has to life in the United States. Evangelicalism's public image still suffers from it, as many of the misconceptions in regard to evangelicalism can be grounded in the secularization paradigm, the Weberian notion that in the wake of progress and rationalization, "the disenchantment of the world," religion slowly would cease to be relevant. As religion forced its way back into the focus of academia in the twentieth century, much of the scholarly work on the topic concentrated on its relationship to the until then assumed idea of secularization progressing hand in hand with modernization. The latter had been unthinkable without the former. And as education and wealth seemed to be constantly increasing in the West, it would only be a matter of time until religion would have vanished. Part of this narrative was rooted on a continuation of a nineteenth century positivism that relied on reason, rationality, and faith in the unstoppable progress of human endeavors through science.

The other, less obvious factor was the rise of consumer culture, switching the spotlight from the transcendent to the materialist sphere. Hence, it is no surprise that the first important works on the assumed return of religion focused on its reciprocation with a secular and materialist society. What had changed? What had brought religion

back into the public sphere, as Jose Casanova asked in *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Casanova), pondering the de-privatization of religion. Had religion really returned or was it just that it had been invisible to a secular academia?

As Charles Taylor put it, the closing of a sense of porousness between the natural and the supernatural results in a condition of being "buffered" (C. Taylor 300). Buffered subjects live in a disenchanted world, whose attractions are "a sense of power, of capacity, in being able to order our world and ourselves" (300). While being buffered does not exclude being religious, it means that belief is detached from our social imaginary. This sense of the secular as Taylor presents it might be one of the reasons why evangelicalism, at least in the representation given above, is regarded by many as bizarre, if not uncanny. Evangelicalism offers—at least nominally—a world outside the buffered, promising a new porousness. One of the objectives of this dissertation is to show that this offer is neither a return to the pre-secular world, nor an offer that takes us beyond our own.

In the 1980s, two major fields of interest can be identified: one was research that concentrated on the reciprocation between the religious and the political sphere, best exemplified by the concept of *issue advocacy* between American religious groups which will be discussed in chapter one. The other major field was the interest in the worldwide return of religion. Evangelicalism was examined largely through the impact it had on national politics and its liaison with conservative neoliberalism, which had its climax in the second Bush administration. George W. Bush's use of religious tropes—especially with regard to justifying foreign policy—has been mainly interpreted as an evangelicalization of US polity.[2] While the so called Neocon-Theocon alliance[3] certainly marked a new climax in religio-political rhetoric, the policies of the Bush administration stood in a tradition older than the Neocon-Theocon alliance that had been pervading US-politics

[2]See for example (Volochinsky; Green, Rozell, and Wilcox; Rozell and Whitney).

[3]The categorization of Republicans into neocons and theocons was coined as late as 1996 by Jacob Heilbrunn in an article for The New Republic (Heilbrunn).

for the last two centuries, as has been repeatedly argued.[4] Political evangelicalism is certainly an important part of the evangelical narrative. But the focus on this aspect of evangelicalism has left us with a reductive and distorted image of the movement as a reactionary political pressure group that is the natural ally of a paranoid Republican party. As a result, evangelicalism tended to be viewed through a fundamentalist lens, reducing it to its impact on quotidian politics. The resulting stereotype could favourably be called "traditional Christianity", as the majority of evangelical would describe themselves, and unfavorably as backward, misogynist, and totalizing. This stereotype is especially vital in Europe, sometimes even impeding an unbiased examination of evangelicalism. The focus on conservative evangelical involvement in institutional politics, while an important aspect of evangelicalism, fails to grasp the complexities of the phenomenon as a whole. Evangelicalism as a movement has been too diverse and adaptive throughout the last century to approach it solely on the grounds of contemporary politics.

The second major approach explored the worldwide diversity of religious groups outside of the United States. The plethora of different expressions of Christianity encountered around the world were taken as proof for a vibrant return of religion, not in the original heartlands of Christianity, but in its new center, the "Global South."[5] The myriad of religious groups were seen as proof that a more sensuous life outside the West existed. The Global South's religious diversity was taken as proof that a form of resistance to a totalizing rational West and its hunchback capitalism was possible. This approach was, and continues to be, very popular among evangelical scholars for example and will be problematized in chapter two. While the 'blurriness' of evangelicalism indeed invites to look at specific churches rather than to try seeing the whole, this dissertation is an exploration of the factors that are responsible for the success of evangelical expansion as a whole. It might be a rather fruitful endeavor to try and identify what evangelical organizations "share" rather than to scrutinize what sets them apart. As their respective

[4]See for example (Kunow, "Religious Cosmopolitanism"; Wald and Calhoun-Brown; Brocker).
[5]See for example (Noll; Jenkins, *Global Christianity*; Sanneh, *Disciples*; "The Return of Religion"; P. Norris and Inglehart).

cultural expressions might differ, at least the phenomenon as a whole shares that it is the most successful religious current today. Both of these two academic approaches were in the vicinity of corresponding prevalent normative descriptions of evangelicalism: evangelicalism as a spiritual/irrational disturbance of the rational world and evangelicalism as the progressive motor of Christianity.

As a religious community, evangelicalism is often linked to the irrational, the reactionary, and to a fundamentalist politics that is driven by the refusal of science and a rationalized and secular world. The suspicion of irrationality has been summarized recently by Melani McAlister and Michel Saler: When it comes to the perception of evangelicalism, "US and Europe have long recognized the presence of enthusiastic extra-rationalities like magic and occultism, but until recently they treated those practices as remnants, hold-outs against the tide of modernity that would ultimately sweep them away" (McAlister 882). This rather progressivist notion McAlister describes is already apparent in Hofstadter: "in modern culture evangelicalism has been the most powerful carrier of this kind of anti-intellectualism, and of its antinomian impulse" (Hofstadter 47). Hofstadter saw America under the influence of an irrational religion that contributes to the anti-intellectual impulse (47). Evangelicalism, which is portrayed as a particularly anti-intellectual religion thus is influencing society unilaterally. This notion of influence as invasion or contagion will be addressed in chapter one.

While for Hofstadter evangelicalism is one of the forces that are holding back the progress of reason, others see an intensification of the mundane directly resulting in a new appeal of religion: The resurgence of interest in religion has been enabled by the apparent "spiritual bankruptcy" of the capitalist order (Eagleton, *Culture* 206).[6] While Eagleton rather sympathizes with the spiritual disturbance that is a result of a capitalist world too rational, he still indirectly confirms the secularization paradigm: It is a consequence of the "disenchantment of the world" that rising interest in religion can be determined.

[6]See also *Reason, Faith and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate* (*Revolution* 41).

Introduction

Within the evangelical camp, there exists the opposite conviction, that of evangelicalism as a sort of avant-garde that is modernizing Christianity. This self-assertion has become prominent ever since Roger E. Olson's essay on "Postconservative evangelicals" (Olson, "Postconservatives")[7] in 1995 gained wide recognition within the evangelical scholarly discourse. The influential current saw postmodernism as the change which could overcome the dichotomies of modernity:

> both modernist and fundamentalist slopes are sides of the same cultural Mt. St. Helens—modernity. Like the volcano of the Northwest, modernity is virtually extinct—it's passé [...] both theological liberalism (in all its varieties) and theological conservatism (with as many varieties) were and still are obsessed with "the modern mind." The new landscape is "postmodernity" and has barely been explored. (Olson, "Postconservatives")

Postconservative evangelicals envisioned a new evangelicalism that broke with the past and its dichotomies and was positive about the new.[8] While the momentum of this inner-evangelical movement has lost strength in recent years, its positions are still highly influential and have helped forming some of today's most prominent evangelical convictions. Postcolonial approaches to missiology or the concept of World Christianity are some of the most prominent examples of these convictions. They are inextricably connected to the notion of a relocation of the center of Christianity from the West to the Global South as mentioned earlier. This important legacy of the *emerging church movement* (sometimes called postliberal or even post-evangelical or post-charismatic movement)[9] will be discussed in detail throughout chapters one and two.

[7] For a thorough examination of "Postconservative evangelicalism" and its convictions, see also *Reinventing American Protestantism: Christianity in the New Millennium* (Miller).

[8] It has to be said that most proponents of embracing the postmodern meant something different than theorists when using the term postmodern, being more interested in "postliberal thinkers such as Hans Frei, George Lindbeck and Stanley Hauerwas" than "Richard Rorty, Jacques Derrida or Michael Foucault" ("Postconservative" 2). This confusion itself could be seen as postmodern.

[9] See *The Emerging Church: Vintage Christianity for New Generations* for an introduction into the movement's ideas by one of its early proponents, Dan Kimball (Kimball).

Both narratives depart from the notion of a mono-causal influence: Either evangelicalism is responsible for infusing the world with irrationality or it is progressing Christianity throughout the world and re-enchanting it against a capitalism that is detracting all spiritual from the world. I want to challenge the idea that evangelicalism is a mono-causal influence and examine the reciprocity of evangelicalism and an assumed secular society. While the "irrational" prominently exists within the evangelical spectrum, I argue that the movement as a whole is grounded and operates within the boundaries of this very world.

Structurally, evangelicalism is firmly embedded within the current market paradigm—late modern capitalism—and has profited immensely from processes of globalization during the last forty years. A look at the distribution strategies of evangelicalism, of which classic mission is only one among many, reveals a highly adaptive system that modifies the message—the"Good News"—to the requirements of the respective target region for the sake of expansive success, which will be the subject of chapter two. Not only can similarities to the strategies of global corporations be discerned, it can also be asserted that in evangelicalism the means of distribution have become more important than the message itself, which will be examined in chapter 1. The conclusion will offer a rapprochement of the term *irrational*.

Many authors have pointed out how the relationship between capitalism and evangelicalism is a reciprocal one. As Jean Comaroff states, "newly holistic movements are part of the neoliberal turn both *reactively* and *intrinsically*" (author's emphasis, Comaroff 54).[10] Intrinsic, because both rely on a similar logic of expansion, utilizing similar promotion strategies and media, reactionary, because evangelicalism presents itself as an alternative to a rationalized and commodified world that has lost touch with the spiritual. Consequently, many evangelicals see themselves as a global religious movement that gives voice to the marginalized and powerless in a world exploited by Western

[10]Comaroff uses a different, even broader perspective with "newly holistic movements" of which evangelicalism is a part of.

imperialism. This narrative departs from the concept of the Global South as the new spiritual center of World Christianity. However, a look at the material side of things reveals that the financial center that keeps this dynamic going originates in the historical heartland of evangelicalism, the United States of America. It is here that volunteers are mobilized and donations are generated that enable evangelicalism's worldwide expansion. It is also here that it becomes obvious how deeply evangelicalism is dependent on the logic of capitalism and how much the economic paradigm is about to become something extra-discursive. This interconnection will be examined in chapter 2 and section 3.3. The conclusion will return to this complex by juxtaposing the development of the secular in relation to industrial capitalism with the development of finance capitalism and a new re-enchantment of the world (section 4.3).

My thesis is that evangelicalism's success derives from a voluntary commitment that is enabled by the activation of affect and emotion—measures which global corporate capitalism also relies on extensively. Furthermore, that the cultural predispositions of the United States have enabled such a development in the first place. As much as late modern capitalism, evangelicalism relies on the appeal to duty and promises happiness.

I want to contribute to the discussion on evangelicalism by offering a new perspective on the already extensively discussed relationship between late modern capitalism and evangelicalism by examining the role of affect and emotion in evangelicalism, how it is used to mobilize its members and what similarities to their employment in late modern capitalism can be found. For this purpose expressions of evangelicalism will be analyzed by using the work of Sara Ahmed on affective economies in order to analyze how affective mobilization is one of the major reasons for evangelicalism's worldwide success. Pivotal point of this project is the exploration of how evangelicalism is able to activate the voluntary commitment of its members, financiers, and missionaries and how this commitment is embedded into pragmatic distribution structures. Gathered here are examples where both spheres—evangelicalism and late modern capitalism—overlap

and reciprocate. These examples will be discussed in chapter 3. The discussion will be conducted by examining evangelical dynamics as an economy of affect and by analyzing how the evangelical "promise of happiness"(Ahmed, *Happiness*) provides a motivator for evangelical commitment.

Key Terms and Concepts

Some of the key terms and concepts used here require an introduction themselves, because their meaning depends on context. To avoid confusion, those terms that require more than a footnote to explain or contextualize are introduced and briefly mapped out here. All other ambiguous terms will be dealt with in the footnotes.

Late Modern Capitalism Evangelicalism is defined by a strong dynamic of transformation and as a movement it has much radical potential, which is one of the joints that articulates evangelicalism to the current economic paradigm—neoliberalism, or *late modern capitalism.* It is a well established term within, but not exclusive to the discussion of the entanglement between evangelicalism and our current market paradigm. Since I have been repeatedly asked why I would use the term late modern capitalism instead of the term postmodernism when I discussed or presented my thesis, a brief explanation is in order. Ernst Mandel's term "late (modern) capitalism" is quite helpful as a foundation for examining evangelical's relationship with the economic sphere, especially in its updated version by Jameson, who develops it from an understanding of "state-capitalism" to signify both a continuity of what preceded it and a rupture with what was before (Jameson, *Postmodernism* xvii-xix). From this follows a view of the postmodern not as a cultural force *per se*, but as a cultural logic that is a result of late modern capitalism. According to Mandel, late modern capitalism is the latest stage in an intensifying continuation of the economic, its dominant features being the multinational corporation, globalized markets and labor, mass consumption, and the space of liquid multinational flows of capital

(Jameson, Hardt, and Weeks 216-7). Postmodernism in this framework would indeed be a suitable nominator here, if understood as "the consumption of sheer commodification as a process" (Jameson, *Postmodernism* x). But *Postmodern*'s cultural resonance "distracts suitably from the economic while allowing newer economic materials and innovations to be re-catalogued under the new heading" (xiv) and it should be avoided that any reader might be distracted from the economic here. Hence, late (modern) capitalism is a term better suited for the purpose of this dissertation.

Affect and Emotion Brian Houston, senior pastor at Hillsong, an Australian Pentecostal mega-church, which operates in Oceania, Europe and North America, advises: "We will never inherit what God got for us, if we keep the wrong emotions inside" (Houston, "Leadership"). Houston's statement departs from the notion that we *own* our emotions: We keep them inside ourselves and have the power to move them. Good emotions we have to cherish and keep, bad ones we have to dispose of. They are personal and we are also responsible for our own emotional household. Evangelicalism makes use of emotions in a pragmatic way: For one's well-being it is imperative "not to allow unproductive emotions to fester or put down their roots" (*Maximise* 180). The proper personal management of emotions is presented as a requirement for a fulfilled and happy life. Evangelical literature on the subject often converges both the promises of new age and positive thinking. For example Brian Houston's bestseller *How To Maximise Your Life* is advertised for on the inside flip with the promise to "bring together several Biblical truths for living with purpose, building intimate and meaningful relationships and finding the balance to healthy living and wholeness [. . .] This book is about living your maximised life today" (*Maximise*). Such conceptions of emotionality have become a mainstream conviction in the wake of *individuation* that is so strong that even critiques of capitalism adopt this idea by lining up the "cold machine" (Weber) against a sensuous and affective humanity. Such a worldview leads to feeling, emotion and affect being predominantly considered as something individual, something owned by individuals, who uniquely express their

emotions. Emotions would be owned individually and privately and would usually be understood as part of a sphere excluded from the public, where business and politics are conducted in a rational manner, rendering them non-political: The private sphere is that of emotions; here the individual can "give vent to his or her feelings," the metaphorical use of vent here implies that feelings usually stay within the individual and can only be "emitted or discharged from a confined space" (to vent) every once in a while privately. The general consensus is that only few emotions are allowed in the public space and these are heavily culturally determined: For instance, one can cry at a funeral, but not at a business meeting. Aside from these occasions, personal, private emotions are not considered to be part of the public. The relationship between contemporary capitalism in its late modern form and emotion in such a framework is that of a private interior world to which one retreats in order to recover, but also one for which everyone is responsible personally. Our existence is understood as a sensuous one, our personal emotions are considered to be the last intimate resort, the ultimate thing still *owned*. But the domain of feelings and affect are equally colonized by the economic paradigm of the time as everything else is. Even more so, some scholars argue that late capitalism relies on the utilization and mobilization of affect and emotion.

The examination of evangelicalism with the help of affect theory promises to open up new perspectives and help in gaining new insights on a subject that otherwise has been scrutinized thoroughly, especially for the last thirty years. But the use of affect theory also poses problems that not only loom since the *affective turn* in the early 2000s, namely that affect is "both the simplest thing and the most complex," as Andrew Murphy has remarked (A. Murphy). As it is difficult to determine what affect and emotion *are*, no single, generalizable theory of affect has emerged yet as Melissa Gregg asserts (Gregg and Seigworth 3), on the contrary almost every field and discipline has its own take on affect and emotions, emphasizing different aspects and arriving at different conclusions.

To avoid the implications of a too diverse field in which one can get lost, it might be useful to consider what Sianne Ngai has stated on how feelings should be

approached: "[M]ost critics today accept that far from being merely private or idiosyncratic phenomena [...] feelings are as fundamentally 'social' as the institutions and collective practices that have been the more traditional object of historicist criticism [...], and as 'material' as the linguistic signs and significations that have been the more traditional objects of literary formalism" (author's emphasis Ngai, *Ugly Feelings* 25). Ngai thus indirectly warns us against regarding emotions as non-political, or extra-discursive. Ngai's work is particularly interesting since she concentrates on the petty negative emotions like envy, irritation or disgust. These rather underexamined emotions she attests with a quality of pre-political protest. According to Ngai, petty states of uneasiness lead to bigger emotions that eventually trigger an action. One of her examples is Betty Friedan's "problem that had no name" (cf. Friedan), widely considered the beginning of second-wave feminism. However, Ngai regards petty negative emotions as constituting for modern capitalism: "dysphoric affects often seem to be the psychic fuel on which capitalist society runs" (Ngai, *Ugly Feelings* 3). While Ngai's work disagrees with the notions that only strong negative emotions lead to forms of resistance, it still does deal with negative emotions, which in the case of evangelicalism I choose not to examine for two reasons. First, because the examination of negative emotion is already a field plowed extensively, and second, because evangelicalism's constant invocation of the positive, on how to gain happiness via positive emotions makes it more suitable to ask what the political implications of addressing happiness are. As Ahmed identifies discontent as a requirement for critique and political action by making a case for the figure of the "feminist killjoy," (cf. Ahmed, *Happiness*), she also asks the resulting question: Why has it become so paramount to be happy?

Happiness Happiness is one of the central promises of Christianity, if not of all religions. "If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them" (*KJV,* John 13.17)) or, speaking with Nietzsche, "the basic formula of religion and morality: 'Do this and do that, refrain from this and that—then you will be happy. Otherwise...'" (Nietzsche 493). Where

they differ, of course, is in the definition of "this and that." Evangelicalism has a different point of view on how to achieve happiness than traditional Christianity which I have already examined elsewhere (an Haack). Two things are to consider here. First, what is to be learned by looking at a rather evasive concept such as happiness? Considering the promises made by evangelicalism and late modern capitalism alike, addressing the aspirations and desires of the subject, would that not entice an examination of desire or pleasure? Second, if it is relevant, why and how is it especially important to late modern capitalism? The latter has to be evaluated under the premise that emotion and affect have been annexed by capitalism (which will be one of the main themes of section 3.3) and "have become entities to be evaluated, inspected, discussed, bargained, quantified and commodified" (Illouz, *Cold Intimacies* 109).

This is evident in the case of evangelicalism's invocation of happiness as a precursor to a good life, but also in other contexts such as the initiatives for a "Gross National Happiness Index" (GNHI) to replace the "Gross National Product" (GNP). The GNP is a clearly defined set of means to measure material growth. The attempt to measure happiness using the same instrument than material growth in a capitalist system, already asserts Illouz claim that—at least in the case of happiness—emotions have become commodified. But how to define what the GNHI measures exactly? Would the happiness experts expect it to grow and be alarmed at stagnating happiness growth-rates? And what would become of the "killjoys"? These are also questions that are tackled by theory of affect. It might not even be necessary to explore what happiness actually means, but it is important to know that happiness is desirable. The word itself is "motivated and energetic" (Ahmed, *Happiness* 200): Given that happiness is "a feeling-state or state-of-being that we aspire toward," it means that the word itself already evokes the hope of receiving it. Ahmed assumes that "creating happiness might even be a matter of spreading the word [. . .] We hope that the repetition of the word happiness will make us happy. We hope that the word happiness will deliver its promise" (200). As happiness might mean a myriad different things depending on context like time, space or culture, Ahmed suggests

that it would be far more fruitful to ask "what kind of desire is the desire for happiness in the first place, and what does it mean for subjects to be responsible for generating its effects, or to have a duty to spread the word?" (200). The problem with the desire for happiness is that we might not know what we are actually desiring. That is why Slavoj Žižek calls happiness "inherently hypocritical" (Žižek 60). We might think that we desire something, because it would make us happy "but the worst that could happen to us is to get what we 'officially' desire" (60).

The desire for happiness thus is different to other desires in that the desire itself gives happiness, while others, for example sexual desire can be fulfilled and satisfied. In a similar vein, Grossberg describes affective economies as "moods" that are different from libidinal economies of desire. Both may be wanted, but only the libidinal desire is focused: "Pleasure and desire operate within a structure in which it is their own satisfactions—however infinitely deferred—that define the operation of the system. They are systems replete with content. Affect is contentless; on the contrary, it is precisely aimed at constituting not only the possibility of difference, but the terms within which such differences are possible in a particular affective economy" (Grossberg, *Dancing* 159-60). That they are contentless does not make them extra-discursive, but, on the contrary, enables them to be "articulated ideologically [. . .] into other structures and forms of social difference and power" (159-60), the implications of which will be discussed in section 4.2. The examination of the constant stress that is put upon the importance of happiness in lieu of so many other possible things that would be worthwhile to desire, be it as an employee, a consumer, a patient or a believer, thus promises to be a fruitful endeavor and is an invitation to excavate that which is conveyed by the promise of happiness.

1 Evangelicalism

In an unremarkable commercial building in Berlin-Friedrichshain, a neighborhood very popular among tourists, expats, students, and party people, a crowd of around eighty people meet once a week to praise the Lord. For outsiders, it is not easy to discern the purpose of these meetings. Before the services, young people in their twenties gather in front of the commercial building, a few with a bottle of beer in their hand, and nothing separates them visibly from the rest of the party crowd in an area that is one of the most secular places in the world—East Berlin, Germany. The service itself is held in English by a beaming man in his thirties, while a Power Point presentation runs (English with German subtitles) in the background. Its purpose is to project the lyrics of the songs sung in a karaoke-like manner. Apart from the lyrics, the presentation shows long tracking shots through a CGI-animated landscape. From the earth, lush landscapes (with lens flares) to the sun, then pan shot to the milky-way and beyond. While the whole setting is reminiscent of a university lecture discussing commercials, the difference here being the happy faces of the participants, embracing each other, crying, and singing. This service is held by the International Christian Fellowship (ICF), Berlin branch, a neo-charismatic church founded in Switzerland in 1990. The ICF is active in Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, The Netherlands, Israel, Cambodia, and Albania. It was founded by Swiss-national Heinz W. Strupler, who previously had been active in the "New-Life Movement" (The Swiss version of the "Jesus People"). Similar enterprises can be found all over the city, some managed by the ICF, others by Vineyard from Australia or other internationally active church-planting organizations.

1 Evangelicalism

One of the aims of this work is to make visible the direct connection of this relatively new form of religiosity to American evangelicalism, to which it owes its form, organizational structure, methods and thus worldwide success. Although it is not exclusively American-based evangelical churches which proselytize, plant churches and invest in Christianity worldwide anymore, and American churches are even competing with similar outlays from Australia, UK, Switzerland or Ukraine, the worldwide evangelical community shares conceptual, practical, and dogmatic principles that originate in the US and continue to influence the shape of modern Christianity in an American way.

Before discussing evangelicalism and its international outreach, this chapter also offers a synopsis of what evangelicalism is, how it is defined by scholars from different fields and also by evangelical representatives. At its heart, this chapter offers a broad historical overview of the development of evangelicalism, its American roots and its main influences and a discussion of the importance of evangelicalism to domestic US-politics and American society. An examination of the various definitions of evangelicalism already available are also included. This chapter is designed as an opportunity to get a broad overview on the research and work already conducted on evangelicalism for those who are not too familiar with the subject. However, the conclusions drawn here from the current state of research may also be of interest to readers who are already avid experts in the field.

1.1 What is Evangelicalism?

Evangelicalism is not a organizational entity, but an identifier for various Protestant Christian currents that share certain characteristics, beliefs, dogmas, and conducts. The term itself is rarely used by evangelical Christians themselves[1] except for official and representational use. Hence, the adjective *evangelical* can be used to describe a plethora of churches, congregations, organizations, mission agencies, and denominations, but also non-denominational or trans-denominational movements or even currents in other Christian churches.[2] According to Balmer and Winner, this divisiveness is a characteristic of Protestantism (Balmer and Winner 12), which evangelicalism is still considered to be part of. Almost all evangelical currents have some core believes in common with mainline Protestantism: *sola scriptura*, the doctrine that the Bible is the sole authority over all Christian doctrines and practices,[3] or the importance of the personal relationship to Jesus and the direct and unmediated salvation through him, for example. Other convictions, like the third of the five solas, the *sola gratia*, which means that our saving cannot be influenced in any way by our individual efforts, but that salvation as a gift from God[4], have faded away with the Puritanism of the early American colonies, and have been replaced by something else, or as in this case, by its opposite as will be shown in the following pages.

The fascination with evangelicalism derives partly from its vibrant diversity, but this diversity also poses a problem of definition: What are we looking at exactly? Pentecost, Anabaptist, Charismatic, Faith, Holiness, Neo-evangelical—all these denominations and currents differ, however slightly, in their form of organization, method, and

[1] Most evangelicals prefer the self-designation "Christians", which has interesting implications on its own, as will be discussed later.

[2] The National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), umbrella organization for evangelical churches in the United States, claims to represent "more than 45,000 local churches from forty different denominations" (www.nae.net/about-us).

[3] *solam scripturam regnare* (Luther 98), contrary to what was decreed in the Council of Trent between 1545 and 1563 for the Catholic Church: *In libris scriptis et sine scripto traditionibus. Sola scriptura* is the first of the *Five Solas* of Reformation, summarizing the convictions of the Reformation.

[4] For by grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God (*KJV,* Eph 2.8).

interpretation of Christianity. This dilemma is reflected in the difficulty of finding a definition for the phenomenon of evangelicalism, which seems to evade any attempt to define it and thus make it tangible. Maybe this is its most important aspect: the liquidity, blurriness and adaptivity that reminds us to regard evangelicalism less as a solid creed and more as a process. Even the structure of the definitions at hand reveal a lot about evangelicalism and its reception, both from inside and from the outside of the evangelical movement. It might not be able to find a definition for evangelicalism, but by approaching evangelicalism from different angles, it might be possible to get an idea of the main driving factors of a movement that is at this very moment shaping the definition of Christianity.

1.2 Definitions

The National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) offers a common denominator in the form of the *Bebbington Quadrilateral*, which is composed of *Conversionism* —the importance of a transformative experience as an entry to the faith (i.e., 'born again experience' or 'New Birth'), *Activism*—standing for an actively Christian life, *Biblicism*—the reliance on the Bible as religious authority, and *Crucicentrism*—the importance of Jesus and his suffering as atonement above all other manifestations of God (Bebbington 2). Historian Bebbington offers a definition that is based exclusively on a *credo* that seems to be acceptable as a common denominator for evangelicalism. The term itself is already alluding to the authoritative claim of the definition. Bebbington's 'four sides' become the geometrically precise borders of evangelicalism. While certainly not wrong, the Quadrilateral tells us as much about evangelicalism than the *shahada* does about Islam. It is a definition from evangelicals for evangelicals and tells us what is deemed important within the evangelical spectrum, but not necessarily what it is defined by, least of all what it is or does. Bebbington is, among others like Mark Noll, one of the proponents that describe evangelicalism as a solid religious entity that has its roots beyond the eighteenth century, deeply rooted in Enlightenment. The quadrilateral serves the purpose of finding the most common denominator for a immensely diverse movement without offending any of its branches, a task at which it succeeds more than in providing an insightful definition.

Many available definitions of evangelicalism are similar to the Bebbington Quadrilateral. The definition Wilcox and Larson offer, for example, is based on religious convictions with a slightly different emphasis. Here, evangelicalism is defined by three core convictions: *Biblical literalism*—the importance of adhering to the literal sense of the Bible as God's own words. Emphasis on this point might differ depending on the evangelical current. The gamut runs from historical interpretative and analytical to literal. The second point is the *personal relationship with Jesus*—signifying an unmediated relationship between the individual and Jesus, who is the most important expression

and personification of God in evangelicalism, alluding to the experientalism prominent in evangelicalism. As the third defining aspect Wilcox and Larson identify *evangelism*, the will to actively spread the gospel, or, expressed slightly differently, to actively pursue and support the expansion of the evangelical community (90). Although this definition is also meant as a most common denominator for evangelicalism and in that sense remains rather vague, it extends the Bebbington Quadrilateral by pointing out the importance of evangelism, or mission, which is interestingly rather vague in Bebbington's definition or taken for granted as part of an actively Christian life.

Wilcox and Larson also offer a very general categorization of the main currents within the evangelical spectrum, that diversifies their definition for evangelicalism as a whole and is indeed helpful for getting a first overview of the most important evangelical groups: *Pentecostals* are defined by the second baptism, or the born-again experience, Assemblies of God, gifts of the spirit such as glossolalia, faith healing and prophecy. *Charismatics*, while sharing these practices and believes with Pentecostals also emphasize on ecumenism and so-called "free associations." Lastly, *Neo-evangelicals,* being more moderate than other evangelicals in their religious and political believes and conceptions and following a less literal and more contextual, metaphorical and interpretative understanding of the Bible (90). While these definitions might help to broadly distinguish certain currents within the evangelical spectrum, they fail to grasp the phenomenon as a whole. Many research designs avoid becoming lost in this multitude of groups, churches and organizations within the evangelical spectrum by defining a narrow scope or concentrating on one specific belief, denomination or organization. Another approach borrows the self definition of evangelical organizations as a working definition, which is why most of these definitions are so close to the Bebbington Quadrilateral—the definition chosen by the NAE as representative. A third prominent approach is the emphasis on evangelical contemporary (conservative) political views, or looking at evangelicalism through a fundamentalist lens (although this approach of inflating evangelicalism with fundamentalism is more often found in the media than in academia).

However, there exist also some descriptions of evangelicalism that relate more to the diversity of the phenomenon. By giving her own very broad description of evangelicalism rather than trying to define it, Tanya Luhrmann points to some of the less represented aspects of evangelicalism and simultaneously reveals why none of these approaches are useful for taking on evangelicalism as a whole:

> Evangelicals comprise an enormous range of people whose views and practices and spiritual imaginations veer wildly. They include snake-handlers and home-schooling militia members and people in mainstream congregations. They include Pentecostals, members of a spirituality that emphasizes the direct experience of God through speaking in tongues [...] They include conservative Baptists, for whom tongues are an anathema. They include most of the Moral Majority, and they include left-wing activists. About forty percent of Americans describe themselves as born again or evangelical; about a third of those who call themselves born again are pro-choice; only sixty percent of those who call themselves evangelical believe that the Bible should be taken word-for-word as the literal word of God (Luhrmann 13).

Luhrmann is already alluding to the diversity of evangelicalism, which seems to be one of the key factors of describing the movement. But as Luhrmann describes it, evangelicalism seems to be incorporating both the conservative and the liberal, the supernatural and the rational. This observation, while formally correct, also has its pitfalls, and certainly might hint at why her in other respects brilliant book *When God Talks Back* is not only rapidly becoming the gold standard on evangelicalism in Anthropology, but also receives a lot of praise from the evangelical camp. Even if assuming a more conciliating point of view, like Luhrmann does, the phenomenon as a whole is still out of reach. On the contrary, it is more detached than ever when taking such an all-encompassing stance.

I want to follow a different approach by looking into the phenomenon as a whole, using only a very broad definition of what I will refer to as evangelicalism:

Christian, proselytizing, and originating from the United States, excluding the so called "mainline churches."[5] While this will necessarily lead to some generalizations, blurring out nuances between different denominations and their specific motivation for evangelizing, this common denominator can be applied to the majority of neo-evangelical, Pentecost, and Charismatic denominations, allowing me to emphasize the aspects that evangelical churches and organizations *share*. For this approach to succeed it will be necessary to take a closer look at how evangelicalism in America developed. As important as descriptive definitions might be to get a first idea or an overview of the subject matter, these definitions fail to look into why evangelicalism is so appealing in the first place. Therefore, it might be fruitful to look at the historical development of the movement and its reciprocity with the emerging American nation to arrive at a better conclusion.

[5]Mainstream American Protestant Churches, also called mainline churches. Mainline Protestants had been in the majority in the Unites States throughout the first half of the twentieth century. The seven biggest churches within that spectrum have been coined the "Seven Sisters of the Protestant Establishment" (Hutchison 6): "Congregationalist, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and the white divisions of the Baptist and Methodist families. For the decades since 1900, usually the Disciples of Christ and the United Lutherans have been added, while the vast Southern segment of the Baptist has been seen as increasingly and intentionally removing itself from such a category" (4).

1.3 A Short History of American Evangelicalism

In order to find a common denominator for evangelicalism, first its origins have to be acknowledged, which are deeply rooted in an North American context. It is here that the first evangelical churches were established and it is here where the worldwide dynamics of evangelicalism are originating to this day, which is one of the major arguments I want to make with this dissertation. My point of departure is therefore that evangelicalism emerged as a North American phenomenon, which it continues to be no matter how global a phenomenon it has become.

The importance and status of religion in the United States is barely comparable with that in other industrialized nations. Simon Coleman once wrote that in the 1980s the most prominent question in social sciences conferences on religion was: "Why is the US the great religious exception?" (Coleman, "Empire on a Hill" 656). Coleman sees another question immanent in the subtext: "Why is the most 'advanced' technological nation in the world also seemingly one of the most religious?" Coleman asserts that "various evolutionist and intellectualist assumptions can be detected [...] involving the conflation of technology with secular reason, the association of religion primarily with issues of cognition, and the implied opposition between religious faith and progressive human development" (author's emphasis, "Empire on a Hill" 656). And while G.K. Chesterton's often-cited dictum that the United States is a "nation with the soul of a church" (Chesterton qtd. in Junker 212) might be true, it borders on arrogance to conclude that this was a result of a lesser intellectual development in the Unites States compared to more enlightened and secular nations, which as an assumption is also conveyed with the question. Included in this assumption is the secularist conviction that religion will become extinct in the progress of historical development sooner or later.

Such an argumentation is still confined in modern discourse, in which the importance of religion in the United States in general and of evangelicalism in particular could be described in Bloch's terms as a "synchronicity of the nonsynchronous," describing

the United States religious landscape being a result of an *uneven development*. As Jameson describes modernism in the Postmodern as: "the coexistence of realities from radically different moments of history—handicrafts alongside the great cartels, peasant fields with the Krupp factories or the Ford plant in the distance" (Jameson, *Postmodernism* 307). Bloch's argument gains a Progressivist notion as soon as it is used for evaluating the different realities. That these evaluators owe to the convictions of their times becomes clear in Jameson's agriculture and industry analogy. What might have been desirable in the 1950s, factories over farmer's fields has reversed into the opposite: lush fields and green energy are desired over smoking factories. The question exposed by Coleman only makes sense if the factories were preferable to peasant fields. The flaw of such an argument is the assumption that progress, whether it be of societal, economic, or intellectual nature, will lead to a more secular society and does not account for the possibility that religion itself could be a reality that changes, and not only be a feature of an outdated reality. Similarly, evangelicalism being portrayed as the reactionary force in US-society might fit well with the Culture Wars thesis, but it oversimplifies evangelicalism's reciprocity with American society. The reasons for an assumed American exceptionalism in religious matters has to looked for elsewhere. The historical development of religion in North America would be a good point of departure. To follow the development of the different branches of Protestantism from British America to the contemporary Unites States of America in detail over a span of over three hundred years would be a task too bold too try to fit into this dissertation. Nevertheless, I will highlight some of the important events and developments that are crucial for the understanding of today's evangelicalism.

One of these important historical occurrences are the revivals[6] that have been held throughout North-American history. For the purposes of this text, I will look briefly at the First and Second Awakenings and then continue with the history of

[6]I am interested here in how far the revivals and awakenings had an impact on American evangelicalism. But the revivals were by no means an exclusively American phenomenon. The awakening movement, especially of the nineteenth century to be a transatlantic phenomenon defined by a brisk interchange between Pietist, evangelical and moravianist groups with its protagonist traveling ceaselessly between Europe and the United States (Hansen 192; cf. Carwardine).

evangelicalism in the twentieth century. Such a brief overview cannot substitute for a thorough examination of the history of American Christianity, and this is not what I aim for. However, it is important to point out how contemporary evangelicalism does not come into existence *ex tempore*, but is the result of a long history of Christian development in the United States.

American Protestantism begins in Jamestown in 1607 with an Anglican congregation. Over twenty years later, in 1628 the Dutch Reformed Church gains hold in New Amsterdam (Balmer and Winner 13), and

> by the late 1620s a group of Puritans in England had despaired of ever reforming the Church of England, so they sought and obtained a charter for the Massachusetts Bay Company and set sail for the New World in 1630. Aboard the *Arbella*, John Winthrop summarized their mission: "We shall be as a city upon a hill," he declared to his fellow Puritans. Massachusetts would set the standard and provide a beacon to the rest of the world (England especially), showing how church and state should be configured in a godly commonwealth. (13)

More and more Protestant settlers found their way to North American shores: "Anglicans in Virginia; Huguenots in the Middle Colonies; Swedish Lutherans along the Delaware River; Scottish Presbyterians in New Jersey; Quakers and numerous Anabaptist groups in Pennsylvania; and German Lutherans in Georgia, New York, and Pennsylvania; among many others. By the middle of the eighteenth century the Atlantic seaboard provided a virtual laboratory for Protestant groups [...] North America offered a chance to start anew, a *tabula rasa,* free from the restraints of the Old World" (14). The United States have never ceased to be a "virtual laboratory for Protestant groups" and remain to this day the laboratory in which new forms of Protestantism are tested, surveyed, distilled and then developed.

Balmer and Winner open up a double dichotomy they identify manifesting in the nineteenth century. A dichotomy between liturgical (Anglicans, Lutherans) and non-liturgical (Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians and various Anabaptists such as Mennonites, Amish, Hutteries, et al.) and between Calvinist and Arminian theology (14). The Calvinists retain the original reformed idea of grace: "Salvation only comes to the elect, who are chosen according to the mysterious councils of God rather than with regards to good works or individual merit" (14). Arminianism, which gained prominence after the American revolution has a more "*democratic* soterology" (14) to offer: Salvation is a consequence of ones own doing. Anyone can achieve it, it is a mere matter of individual decision.

It is right here in the beginning of the colonies that some specifically American ideas are formed that will remain to this day essential to both American identity and be an integral part of evangelicalism: The positive attitude towards change and starting anew. The idea that America will be (and still is) different to the rest of the world. And whats more important, that the "new start" as a 'city upon a hill,' a 'beacon of light,' that Winthrop imagined would be an example for the world. On an individual level, the concept of being born-again mimics this transformative power of the United States. Robbins finds that Pentecostal and Charismatic symbolism is "integrated around the key notion of transformation" ("Globalization" 127), an assertion that could also be made in non-religious discourses on the United States. Few individual myths are as powerful as the optimistic assumption that change is possible, that one can always start anew, with a fresh slate, make a new beginning, a fresh start. This notion is so inextricably connected to American culture that it would be rather peculiar if it were not part of evangelicalism as an American religion. But these notions are so strong just because they were not only formed on the religious side of things, but are mirrored also in the secular political foundation of the nation. This is especially interesting in light of the strict division of state and religion in the United States. The Constitution of the United States of America prohibits the establishment of religious-political power *(enterprise clause)* and protects the

individual exercise of religion (*free exercise clause*). The two religious clauses of the First Amendment constitute the United States as a secular nation state. Its elites consciously constructed the state as such:

> The founding fathers drafted a radically secular state with a constitution that stood in an enlightened tradition. This document does not mention God even once. As an adherent of French and Scottish Enlightenment, Thomas Jefferson saw a "Wall of Separation" between Church and State. He, James Madison and George Washington [...] were agnostics—as was their friend Benjamin Franklin—or deists at best (my translation, Ostendorf 13)

The paradox is, at least for many European observers, that "because the churches are independent, they enjoy an important role in the political process of the United States" (my translation, Wald 187). As Broker points out, the civic religion of the United States, "this ensemble of dogmata, symbols, and rituals that binds citizens to the community politically [...] It defines those values that should be nonnegotiable principles of that community." (my translation, Brocker 9). Civic religion means a concept of state as a substitute for religion—another integral part of the American political architecture—the religious clauses enabled developing a different cultural understanding of public religion in the United States than in other industrialized nations, Germany for example. While in Germany legally acknowledged religious communities and churches are fostered in manifold ways (church tax is collected by the state, the wages for church dignitaries are paid by the state, religious education is part of public school curriculum to name but a few), the impact of religious groups on the societal and political discourses of the country is significantly lower than in the United States. It has been argued that the fostering of the officially acknowledged religious communities is like a suffocating embrace to their political participation. So maybe not so surprisingly it was evangelicals who fought for disestablishment and the separation of church and state after the Revolution, as Balmer and Winner point out: The reasons being that the majority of evangelicals who had

supported the Revolution were now obliged to pay taxes to the Anglican church, they petitioned the Assembly for disestablishment. In a first step the Anglican church was then indeed disestablished, but the Assembly still required all citizens to pay church taxes, no matter to which church. Still unsatisfied, they "continued the fight that culminated in the Virginia Statue of Religious Freedom—the basis for the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights. In this statute, religion is separated from the state not because religion might impinge on government but the other way round—because state interference would be bad for religion" (Balmer and Winner 49). Whether or not these were the major impulses for the creation of the the First Amendment, the ensuing separation of church and state seems to have had a positive impact on religious groups; and in the case of the United States not only did it result in a strictly secular formation of state, it was also a result of the influence of the religious communities of the country.

The other important debate in American Protestantism starts as early as the 1720s on a passage in the Bible and its interpretation: "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God" (*KJV,* John 3.3). While evangelicals interpret this passage as a calling to be baptized consciously as an adult, to be 'born-again,' and thus stressing the importance of a consciously made transformative decision, non-evangelicals prefer a more rationalistic approach to the Bible. This conflict between "New Lights" (evangelicals) and "Old Lights" (non-evangelicals) marks the beginning of the fissure between evangelical and non-evangelical Protestantism. The fissure develops into an outright schism by the nineteenth century, by which the non-evangelical camp had divided into "various forms of theological liberalism, raging from a non-revivalist Protestantism and Universalism to Unitarianism and Transcendentalism, while evangelical conducted a massive series of revivals and sought to reform society and usher into the kingdom of God" (Balmer and Winner 15).

Far more interesting than what happened during each specific Revival is that they happened at all. One of the first scholars to look systematically at the American Revivals was Anthropologist William G. McLoughlin. His classification into

five distinct phases of "religious fervor" is still a classic, cited throughout the literature on evangelicalism. McLoughlin identified five distinctive religious moments in American history, the "Great Awakenings" (Puritan Awakening, 1610-40; First (1730-60), Second (1800-30) and Third Great Awakening (1850-1920) and a Fourth Great Awakening (1960-90) that McLoughlin assumed to be in progress when he published his book in 1978 (see McLoughlin)). How many awakenings and when exactly they took place is still debated by historians, but McLoughlin's categorization seems to be the most accepted. Interestingly, McLoughlin's theoretical framework for explaining these revivals is less remembered than his temporal categorization. McLoughlin used Wallace's "Revitalization Theory" (264) to explain the Great Awakenings as moments of cultural transformative events that helped to shape America's identity in moments of crisis:

> Great awakenings are not periods of social neurosis (though they begin in times of cultural confusion). They are times of revitalization. They are therapeutic and cathartic, not pathological. They restore our cultural verve and our self-confidence, helping us to maintain faith in ourselves, our ideals, and our "covenant with God" even while they compel us to reinterpret that covenant in the light of new experience. Through awakenings a nation grows in wisdom, in respect for itself, and into more harmonious relations with other peoples and the physical universe. Without them our social order would cease to be dynamic; our culture would wither, fragment, and dissolve in confusion, as many civilizations have done before. (McLoughlin 2)

This approach that emphasizes an assumed therapeutic power of religion over a society today might still be in lieu with the evangelical camp itself rather than its outside perception—and this might be the reason that McLoughlin's theoretical framework is less remembered than his categorization of five revivalist phases: Revitalization Theory transforms evangelicalism into a remedy to a (societal) pathology, hints at the group therapeutic effect of religious exercise and holds a universalist pretension. As a side-note,

it is worth mentioning that also here evangelicalism is attested a transformative quality.

The First Great Awakening (1730-60) had been part of a "great international Protestant upheaval" (Ahlstrom 263), along with Pietism manifesting in continental Europe and the Evangelical Revival in Great Britain, that profoundly changed Protestantism in the colonies. The visits of Anglican itinerant preacher George Whitefield to the colonies in this time frame did not only trigger different revivals, but also "knit together disparate revivals in the colonies" (Balmer and Winner 15). The Revival was also an emotionally intense uprising against established hierarchies and orthodoxy in Christianity: "In New England it was an apocalyptic outburst within the standing order, a challenge to established authority" (Ahlstrom 263). The relatively small Methodist and Baptist churches gained prominence and what according to Balmer and Winner was then called "experimental" not only challenged the ecclesiastical establishment, but has been retained by evangelicalism in America: "the centrality of conversion, the quest for an affective piety, and a suspicion of wealth, worldliness, and ecclesiastical pretension" (Balmer and Winner 16).

It is here that experientalism finds its way into Protestantism. In Europe through Pietism, in the colonies as an answer "against the coldly rationalistic religion characteristic of the upper class" (16). Evangelicals also actively sought to promote Christianity among the slaves and freed black Americans. Schools for black Americans were financed in order to educate former slaves in literacy in order to enable them to read the Bible. In consequence the first black churches were founded. Frank Lambert argues that this was an important stepping stone in the emancipation process of African Americans: "Far from victims of an evangelicalism intended to tighten their bonds, blacks shaped the message of the New Birth to their own ends, including breaking the chains that confined them" (Lambert 23).[7]

[7]The emancipatory fervor of white evangelicals in the nineteenth century should not be overestimated. While white evangelicals certainly promoted basic education for African Americans, this did not translate into a fight for equality. Services were still segregated, and the racism towards African Americans led to their withdrawal from white congregations and establishing their own churches (cf. Lambert).

Years before the colonists would break their ties with the British Crown as colonial authority, they challenged ecclesiastical authority by forming a personal relationship with God and thus bypassing it. As John Wesley's heart is "strangely warmed" in Aldersgate Street, London, the experientalism and debates of the First Great Awakening proved crucial for the political formation of America: "Vital for the political future of the colonies, the Awakening also made people aware of their common spiritual heritage, and of their existence as an American nation" (Ahlstrom 263). Again, the religious development of the US seems to be intrinsically tied to its genesis as a political entity. And thus it is of no wonder that the vast majority of evangelicals aligned with the Patriots in the Revolution (Balmer and Winner 16).

While the First Awakening has been found by Balmer and Winner to be a reform within Protestantism, the Second Great Awakening's (1800-30) repercussions could also be felt beyond the religious communities, changing the United States and its attitude towards Christianity profoundly. In New England, the revivals "gave rise to benevolent and reform societies such as the temperance movement, the female seminary movement, prison reform, and abolitionism" (17). As the First Awakening set crucial milestones for the emancipation of African Americans, the second Great Awakening sees evangelicals deeply involved in social reform and in the emancipation of women. In the early nineteenth century evangelicalism is one of the modernizing forces, breaking down boundaries and societal confinements for the sake of their own growth and deeply connected to the emergence of women's rights, abolition, and temperance reform movements. In Western New York, Charles Finney introduces his "new measures" and argues for innovating Presbyterian service, propagating an Arminian tradition that would eventually help to render the Calvinist tradition insignificant.

> "Finney also emphasized the role of human volition in the salvation process. American evangelicalism ever since has eschewed Calvinist notions about predestination in favor of Finney's Arminian doctrines that exalt the individual's

> ability to 'choose God' and thereby take control of his or her spiritual destiny; such notions doubtless had a certain resonance in the new nation among a people who had only recently taken control of their *political* destiny". (author's emphasis, Balmer and Winner 18)

The "new measures" are the methodical expression of the Arminian doctrines publicized by Finney: "We must have exciting powerful preaching" (*Lectures on Revivals of Religion* 176) was at the center of his demands for a more participatory and democratic and thus more appealing service. He called for the use of a "plain, pointed and simple, but warm and animated mode of preaching" (252). Many of the introduced measures were already used to great success within Methodist congregations. Finney introduced them to a wider Protestant (e.g., Presbyterian) audience. They all share the idea of the audience participating more actively in service by singing emotionally, sharing experiences and praying together for individual members. Service changed from a measure of keeping attendants in line with authority and orthodoxy to a participatory, almost therapeutic event: For one of the new measures, the "anxious seat," individuals could come forward near the end of service and ask the congregation for repentance or to announce a spiritual commitment. This measure is still used in evangelical churches, now called altar call. The success of Methodists was answered by other Protestant groups by incorporating their methods. Apart from strengthening the individualist and experientalist traits, this change in evangelicalism is also part of a democratization of religion. As the regal authority had been repealed, so followed the notion of a destined path and that only a few elect might get God's grace. Again, the political and the religious developments reciprocate.

After the Second Great Awakening, major shifts in evangelical eschatology profoundly change the whole movement and its relationship to the world in general and to American society in particular. Evangelicals had been postmillennialist by the majority. Postmillennialism is the idea that Jesus' second coming will occur after a thousand years' period of peace and prosperity. Many of the enthusiastic social reforms of the

nineteenth century supported or even initiated by evangelicals were measures towards the fulfillment of these thousand years. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, that optimism had waned. The catastrophic experience of the Civil War and—as Balmer and Winner argue—social and economic factors were responsible for the diminishing of that optimism: "teeming, squalid tenements populated by immigrants, most of them non-Protestant, hardly looked like the precincts of Zion" (Balmer and Winner 19). The social disruptions that came with the Gilded Age were answered by two different strategies from within Protestantism. The first strategy is a continuation of the reforms started in the second Great Awakening and culminating in the Social Gospel movement, which still had the societal transformative pretense that derived from postmillennialism: both the world and the individual could be bettered and saved. But the Social Gospel movement is starting to become a liberal project, favored by the middle-class and wealthy philanthropists; evangelicals retreat to the individual that has to be saved from the world. The eschatological change from postmillennialism to *dispensational premillennialism* is a result of this waning of optimism to be able to change the world. The belief to bring upon the world God's reign through good social deeds started to fade and made way for the idea that "Christ would come at any moment to 'rapture' the true Christians from the earth and unleash his judgment against a sinful world" (19). The dichotomy mentioned earlier by Balmer has become a schism between the more liberal, soon to be called Mainline Churches and the evangelical movement.

The period from 1850 to 1920, by some called the "Third Great Awakening" marks a new phase of religious fervor that sweeps through the cities of the United States. It began with the revival of 1857 that started in the wake of the Panic of 1857, when the stock market collapsed. More than 10,000 people gathered daily for prayer, businesses were reported to close during the prayers (*Memoirs* 442). Within the Methodist Church, the Holiness movement calls for reforms, Christian Science is established, and, most importantly for evangelicalism, the rise of Pentecostalism and with it an intensified affective fervor in form of the everyday realization of the Baptism with the Holy Spirit changes the

Methodist Church. Pentecostals are in the vast majority premillennial dispensationalists. Started as a radical fraction within the Holiness movement, Pentecostalism and its descendants, the Charismatic Movement and Neo-Pentecostalism, today make up the majority of evangelicals.

And it is not only the socio-economic circumstances that lead to this change of perception for evangelicals. Another development shakes at the foundations of evangelicalism at the end of the nineteenth century: the loss of academic authority over religious matters. In the absence of formal hierarchies except for the Bible, American Protestants had early on produced their own institutions to provide them with intellectual authority over religious matters. Some of the very oldest universities were founded by evangelicals in the eighteenth century. Princeton University, for example, was founded by 'New Light Presbyterians' in 1746 as an institution to train new ministers.

The intellectual exchange between evangelical leaders and Princeton theologians had been one of the cornerstones of American Christianity. The 'Princeton Theology' stood as a synonym for conservative theology. Renowned theologians like Alexander Hodge or Benjamin Warfield dominated the theological discourse. However, as rational and secular discourse started to dominate the public, theology departments were not left untouched by liberal German Theology, or even Marxism and Darwinism. The last Princeton theologians answered with secession in 1929, leaving Princeton to form the Westminster Theological Seminary in Pennsylvania. What at first glance looks like a defeat to modernity, or at least a retreat, marks actually one of the strengths of evangelicalism and reveals its high institutional productivity that Robbins observes ("Globalization" 131).

At the turn of the century, the most influential seminaries and universities like Princeton or Harvard turn towards new, more liberal theological approaches. This is part of a general trend that Marsden sees with evangelical institutions:

> Beginning with the gradual slippage of Harvard into Unitarianism, the past two hundred years had seen an endless repetition of the same story. Most of America's greatest academic institutions had been founded by conservative Bible-believing evangelicals. But nearly every one of these schools had eventually fallen to the onslaughts of theological liberalism, and then to outright secularism. A vast empire lay in ruins. (Marsden, *Reforming Fundamentalism* 214)

But it is also possible to view this development the other way round: Although evangelical's institutions keep being 'turned' towards more liberal stances, evangelicalism remains to be highly institutionally productive to this day, as the importance of newly founded institutions like the Liberty University (founded 1971) or the influential Fuller Theological Seminary (1947) show. These institutions might not be able to retain their original ideological fervor, meaning they are not successful in changing the general attitude of the public in their favor. Nevertheless, they doubtless have some kind of effectiveness in keeping evangelicalism alive.

At the same time, the scientific revolution was taking down one established certainty after another: In theology, *higher criticism*[8] contested the original authorship of biblical texts through linguistic and historical analysis and shifted to a more symbolic interpretation of the Bible. Geologists could not find evidence for the Deluge or other biblical events, or at least they discontinued looking for evidence, which had been a major goal of the discipline since the seventeenth century (keyword: 'flood geology'). But the biggest blow is evolution theory contesting the very heart of the Old Testament—Genesis. It is important to note that these developments were less part of a shift towards scientific and academic practice, but an epistemological shift *within* academia and science. Science emancipated itself from being a means to provide 'extra-biblical evidence.' For the last 200 years, it was especially American Protestant academics that had been using science as

[8]Term for historical criticism in theology, *lower criticism* meaning literary criticism.

an authoritative measure to prove Biblical literalism. The shift was heavily fought against and resulted in the formation of fundamentalism.

The term fundamentalism is unfortunately often confused with evangelicalism itself. Marsden states with a little levity that "a fundamentalist is an evangelical who is angry about something"[9] (*Understanding Fundamentalism* 1). The longer version follows suit: "An American fundamentalist is an evangelical who is militant in opposition to liberal theology in the churches or to changes in cultural values or mores, such as those associated with 'secular humanism' (author's emphasis, 1)." According to Hood, "the term *fundamentalist* as a noun came into use just prior to the 1920s. The term itself is credited to Curtis Lee Laws, editor of the *Watchman-Examiner*, a conservative Baptist publication, who first coined the term at an organized protest within the North Baptist Convention in 1920" (Hood, Hill, and Williamson 61). The term in its original use as intended by Laws meant those "who were ready to defend the fundamentals of the faith" (61). The term originates most probably from a massive publication named *The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth*. This collection of 90 essays, published in 1910 and 1917 from over 60 conservative Protestant writers, pastors and scholars, defining their fundamentals of Christian belief; very often in delineation of liberal theology, *higher criticism*, and competing Christian creeds like "Romanism" (i.e., Catholicism). The publication was mainly sponsored by "two laymen" as the title page of the first volume stated, who happened to be Oil Tycoon Lyman Stewart, co-founder of Union Oil and his brother Milton. They also sponsored the free distribution of three million copies around the world to mostly British and American pastors and missionaries (61). Marsden regards the intellectual impact of the publication as low, despite the sheer volume of publications (*Culture* 119),

> however, *The Fundamentals* had a long-term effect of greater importance than its immediate impact or the lack thereof. It became a symbolic point

[9] A quick definition of fundamentalism that, according to Marsden, is used by Jerry Falwell.

> of reference for identifying a "fundamentalist" movement. When in 1920 the term "fundamentalist" was coined, it called to mind the broad united front of the kind of opposition to modernism that characterized these widely known, if little studied, volumes. (119)

Ironically, as Marsden points out, many authors of essays for *The Fundamentals* were defending what they thought to be "true science and rationality." As Torrey, one of the editors of *The Fundamentals* wrote, "true science does not start with an *a priori* hypothesis that certain things are impossible, but simply examines the evidence to find out what has actually occurred. It does not twist its observed facts to make them accord with *a priori* theories, but seeks to make its theories accord with the facts as observed" (Torrey 240). Torrey stood, as many other contributors to *The Fundamentals*, in a Baconian and Scottish Common Sense tradition (as did the Princeton theologians) and were defending their "definition of true scientific and open inquiry—an ironic twist to the frequent accusation that fundamentalism itself was (and still is) a closed system," as Hood (61) argues. The authors saw two problems with modern scientific and historical method: The methodology relied on speculative hypotheses (the motto was Newton's "Hypotheses non figo," a refusal of any inductive approach.) and a prejudice against the supernatural, which modern science denied without formally disproving it (62).

While these arguments are obviously not up to contemporary academic standards, if not outright frivolous as in the case of the supernatural, it is interesting to note that they were well within the boundaries of the academic dispute of the time and not, as today's use of the term fundamentalist would suggest, the irrational ravings of religious reactionaries. Even more important, they stand in an old American tradition of reconciling the scientific with the religious; Cotton Mather had already tried to synthesize philosophy, science and religion in his unpublished work *Biblia Americana* on which he had worked until his death in 1728 (cf. Smolinski 281). And in such a tradition stood the authors of *The Fundamentals*: "For many of the essay's authors, the tenets of the

Christian faith could and must be rationally defended. And such a defense would only be strengthened by the objective evidence of true science" (Hood, Hill, and Williamson 62). Using the term fundamentalism for modern day evangelicals is in this light at least historically incorrect. Roger E. Olson stresses the semantic bandwidth the term evangelicalism has by identifying seven different meanings (Olson, *Evangelical Theology* 4-6). One of these meanings of the term *evangelicalism* derives from the above described reaction of conservative Protestants to liberal Protestantism. "It is nearly synonymous with fundamentalism—at least as that term was originally used and understood" (5). The meaning of the term later changed into its pejorative use and one of the reasons for this change was the Scopes Trial.

The State of Tennessee v. John Thomas Scopes marks the culmination of the fundamentalist-modernist controversy. 1925 sees the first coordinated attack of orthodox Christianity on an alleged rational/secular zeitgeist. In an early example of issue advocacy, representatives of different evangelical currents support the accusation of John Scopes, substitute teacher in Dayton, Tennessee, to have violated the recently passed Butler Act that prohibited the teaching of evolution theory in Tennessee schools. Far more important than the actual outcome (John Scopes was found guilty but the verdict was later overturned due to a technicality) was the deep division in American society that the trial revealed. Although evangelicals had won the trials against a newly founded ACLU and the evangelical churches and thereby succeeded in becoming visible as a participant of the public space, the case developed into a public relations disaster for evangelicals, who were ridiculed by the media as being behind the times.

The fundamentalist camp retreats from public discourse and is now concerned with the saving of the individual, and institution building. As Balmer and Winner remark: "evangelicals, meanwhile, became increasingly alienated from the larger culture. They viewed with suspicion everything from the Bolshevik Revolution to the bobbed hairstyles fashionable among women in the 1920s" (Balmer and Winner 30). Uneasiness with the 'modern times' resulted in retreat. What had until a hundred years ago resulted

in optimistic attempts to change society, now led to surrender and withdrawal.

The term fundamentalist, however, 'stuck' and remains in use as a polemic term for evangelicalism. Wilcox and Larson stress the difference between the evangelical main currents and fundamentalist branches, which they define as reclusive, even hostile towards other Christian groups and deeply rooted in an apocalyptic millennialism (90). Robbins illustrates this difference by pointing out the different attitudes towards a presumed modernity: "While fundamentalists react against modernity, P/C [Pentecostal/Charismatic] Christians find ways to work within it." ("Globalization" 123). This differentiation is important, since in public discourse, evangelicalism is often used synonymous with fundamentalism. It seems clear that the original term *fundamentalism* has nothing to do with the pejorative term as which it is used nowadays, sometimes even for the whole evangelical spectrum. Olson observes that "the adjective *evangelical* [often is] used by journalists to describe anyone or any group that seems particularly (by the journalist's standards) enthusiastic, aggressive, fanatical, or even simply missionary-minded. True fundamentalists (militant, separatist, ultraconservative Protestants) are often described in the media as evangelical" (Olson, *Evangelical Theology* 6).

However disastrous the first orchestrated effort to influence public opinion might have been, the Scopes Trial marks the first successful evangelical grass-roots activism, uniting supporters from a plethora of different churches, institutions, and denominations in twentieth century America. The origins of this conservative grass-roots agitation can be found in the congregationalism inherent to American Christianity: Since the New England colonies were the periphery of Christianity, the authority of European-based churches was hard to sustain. The believers in the colonies formed their own organizations and took matters into their own hands. This contributed to the American tradition of grassroots democracy and a weakening of the influence of the clergy. "The religious self-administration of the congregation became the American way and influenced all later religious communities" (my translation, Ostendorf 18). This might also have contributed to strengthening the importance of the Bible as authority and the resulting importance of

biblical literalism. But the Scopes Trial was only one of various occasions were evangelicals united over denominational boundaries for the sake of political goals. Wilcox and Larson identify three other peaks of political activism: the promotion of prohibition in the 1920s, the activism against Communism (or against anything that was deemed Communist and thus un-Christian) in the McCarthy era of the 1950s and the mobilization of evangelical voters for presidential campaigns, beginning in the 1970s with Jimmy Carter's campaign, followed by the later mobilizations of voters for Reagan and later Pat Robertson (Wilcox and Larson 92).

During the Second Red Scare,[10] evangelical churches actively become part of the conservative political spectrum and use the fear of communism for the proliferation of their own societal world-view. Since Communism is a threat from without that is a danger to the nation, its defenders are representing the real America, which is a Christian country combating a secular foreign enemy. The notion of a Christian nation is solidified in this time. By using this discourse, evangelical representatives shape not only the public discourse for their own political aims, they also define what is American and what is un-American. But evangelicals remain here within the conservative mainstream of American society. But the real comeback will be in the 1970s as part of the conservative backlash. "At the same time, the mainline churches lost influence since Vietnam due to their positioning with intellectuals and pacifist circles, which conservatives deemed unpatriotic" (Prätorius 69).

While the campaign for prohibition and the activism against communism were reminiscent of the grassroots democracy, they also where example of extra-parliamentary politics, where issues were fought for by fighting for approval in the pulpit and increasingly in the public media. The beginning of the active promotion of presidential candidates mark the return of an evangelical politics to institutional politics. Remark-

[10] Also known as the McCarthy Era. A phase in American history that is recognized to have begun in 1947 with the "Federal Employees Loyalty Program" as a reaction of widespread fears of being infiltrated by Russian agents. The second red scare and led to a witch hunt of anything deemed communist or socialist well until the mid-1950s (cf. Fried).

ably, evangelical activism in institutional politics begins with a campaign supporting a democrat candidate, Jimmy Carter (Southern Baptist/evangelical). According to Wilcox and Larson even evangelical conservatives voted for him out of a feeling of "Christian duty to defend God's commandments and biblical principles" (my translation, Wilcox and Larson 90). Thus, this first result of issue advocacy, the election of Jimmy Carter was an effort that not only transcended religious communities but even political camps. Although most evangelicals were disappointed in Carter and the insignificance of their political influence on presidential politics, the campaign was successfully repeated later for conservative candidate Ronald Reagan, when evangelical voters turned away from Carter in disappointment.

This return of evangelicals to politics and the public discourse is part of what Balmer and Winner call an "Evangelical Resurgence" (Balmer and Winner 33) in the 1970s: "a half century of institution building had begun to pay off in the 1970s. They had laid the foundation for their return to the public arena, with a flourishing subculture of colleges and seminaries, missions and publications, and they had made their presence felt in the media, not only radio but television" (35).

Evangelical leaders were at the forefront of the conservative counter revolution: Jerry Falwell Sr. promoted ultraconservative family values, supports Apartheid, the Vietnam War and was an opponent to the Civil Rights movement. He founded Liberty University in 1971, which today is the largest evangelical university in the world. He also co-founded the Moral Majority, which successfully promoted conservative politics and the presidential campaigns of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and 1984. However, the practice of political campaigning for candidates that might favor evangelical positions drew to an end. The 1988 campaign saw two different Republican candidates being supported by two different evangelical organizations. While Falwell and the Moral Majority favored George H. W. Bush, the Christian Coalition stood behind its founder Pat Robertson. Robertson, founder of the the Regent University (1977) and the Christian Broadcasting Network, was sort of an evangelical Rupert Murdoch. His strategy was two-fold: to gain

dominance over the societal discourse via the use of new media and to educate a Christian elite that could take over public institutions. The 1980s return of evangelicalism marks also the end of the underdogs image, as "evangelicals grew more and more comfortable with the world outside their subculture" (35). While many retain a cultural underdog image, "evangelicalism had ceased being a counter-culture" (35).

But the fundamentalist resurgence is only one narrative (albeit a major one) in the success story of evangelicalism. Schreyer has pointed out that extreme ideologies are usually drawn on by political actors to convince voters on the fringes of society, but that the culture wars thesis makes it thus convenient to overlook groups that transverse the dominant axis of conflict (like secular conservatives or religious liberals) (Schreyer 153). And while public figures like Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson represent an important part of evangelicalism, they are not representatives of the whole movement.

Evangelical politics are undeniably spearheading the ultra-conservative camp. Many of the key convictions that a majority of evangelicals share are reactionary if not discriminatory: a misogynist perception of women and their role that derives from an idealized conception of the 1950s, a generally homophobic stance, the project of re-introducing religious education in public schools while canceling sex education (Wilcox and Larson 97). The key-word here is *issue advocacy*, a term that describes the politicization of the Christian Right in the US. Contemporary right-wing politics might be inextricably entwined with evangelicalism, but it is important to point out that these are not the only voices existent and that all positions of the political spectrum can be found within the evangelical movement, however marginal they might be. The prominence of these so-called social conservative values might be due to the importance of the religious community in conservative settings. It is here that politics are debated, opinions are shared. Liberal, secular and politically active individuals usually find other modes of expression and organization than their conservative counterparts. Admittedly, this is rather speculative, but I am stressing this point because the undeniably important examination of political right-wing evangelicalism as the publicly most visible form of evangelicalism might have

distorted our view of the whole picture. And indeed there are signs that the times they are a-changin': A recent study among young evangelicals conducted by PEW has found that the homophobic stance in evangelicalism is losing ground (Pew Research Center, "Less Religious").[11] Maybe the political direction of evangelicalism might change once more in the near future? Either way, the focus on representative politics distracts from the politics underlying the evangelical current as a whole, whether it be progressive or conservative sub-currents. Wilcox and Larson also suggest that the streamlining of extreme political opinions that is taking place along the mainstreaming of evangelicalism. Apart from the democratizing effect of issue-advocacy, it is the conglomeration of smaller denominations into mega-churches that bridges political and ideological differences between the groups. As the denominations grow, the political positions become more consensual (Wilcox and Larson 92).

This can already be observed in the shifting of tone and direction the umbrella organizations are utilizing. Terms like *eco-justice*, *creation care* and *creation spirituality* hint at changing paradigms at least concerning the evangelical political outreach. While these concepts might not be part of the general consensus yet, they show how there are also forces at work within evangelicalism that seek to deviate from the well-worn paths of culture-wars and ultra-conservative leadership. According to Prätorius, this politicization does not take place within the borders of established religious communities, but instead groups within these communities reach out beyond the borders of their community to find allies for their cause in other groups (Prätorius 80). The common misconception of confusing extreme positions with the consensus of a respective group might also derive from a misunderstanding how religious groups—at least in the evangelical spectrum—are usually constituted: "It is not the churches or religions (doctrines and dogmas), but the denomination that organizes religion in America and marks religious differences" (my translation, Ostendorf 20). Therefore, an examination of what happened

[11] According to the survey, evangelical acceptance of homosexuality has risen from twenty-four to thirty-six percent in seven years (2007–2014). The change in attitude towards homosexuality is attributed to younger evangelicals ("Less Religious" 35).

to the evangelical denominations beginning in the 1960s yields surprising results.

It is tempting to tell the evangelical history as a history of a reactionary movement, and the prominence of the ultraconservative in the conservative backlash of the 1970 and throughout the 1980s superficially could be interpreted as a return of fundamentalism and radicalism. But ultimately, the loud and raucous voices of the descendants of the fundamentalists were not able to transform society towards their goals; while they are still able to attract a considerable following, other forms of evangelicalism have long ago ousted this outwardly radical form of evangelicalism as the main driving force of the movement. That does not mean that the new evangelicals are less radical, but that they are radical in a different way. In the 1960s, a movement within the evangelical spectrum starts to challenge the dominance of the descendants of the fundamentalists and their leadership in representing the movement as a whole: Pentecostals, who have been deeply influenced by hippie counterculture. Evangelicalism as of today owes a lot to the counterculture movement of the 1960s. This is especially surprising if the formation of public political conservative evangelicalism is considered that can be witnessed at the same time. Tanya M. Luhrmann is one of the few scholars to look into the hippie influence on evangelicalism: "One of the greatest paradoxes of a movement many people think of as a right-wing threat is that is was fueled by the most counter-cultural left-wing movement our country has ever seen" (Luhrmann 16). The 1960s were a particularly interesting time for religion in America. The mainline churches were opening up and becoming more liberal. The Catholic Church reformed its liturgy with the Second Vatican Council, giving more participation to lay people, allowing female altar servers and mass being held in vernacular. Liberation Theology, a fusion of Christian and Socialist principles gains prominence in South America. But it is not only the established churches undergo deep changes. Luhrmann elaborates how the *Jesus People* "played an important role in enabling an experiential spirituality and making it public, and [how] both the hippies and the conservative Christians shared the sense of being hurt by the age's social tumult" (note 16 Luhrmann 333).

"On Hollywood's Sunset Strip they roam about in shaggy pairs, praising the Lord and pressing for converts at the drop of a psychedelic Bible tract. On Midwestern college campuses, fellow-travelers of the Jesus People stalk the fringes of the radical political rallies shouting 'Right on—with Jesus!'", as Newsweek commented on the Jesus People in 1971 (qtd. in "A Brief History of the Jesus Movement"). The Jesus People had already become a mainstream phenomenon that inspired and was reflected in the countercultures massively influential entertainment industry. Christian Folk songs became popular and even non-Christian bands had at least one or two Christian songs in their repertoire (e.g., Simon & Garfunkel or The Doobie Brothers). Musicals that shared both hippie and Christian aesthetics were successful (Jesus Christ Superstar, Godspell). The hippie's experiments with mind-altering drugs, their quest for meaning and the search for an alternative life-style made the counterculture prone for spiritual experimentation. It was the time of Ashrams, drug-supported meditation, and of individual spiritual search. Christianity was only one of the many possibilities into which one could venture, but it quickly became one of the most important ones.

One of the first contacts between evangelical and hippie cultures seems to have happened on Haight St., San Francisco, the epicenter of the hippie movement. Baptist pastors where among the first to open shelters and to give out free food to hippies who were camping out in the streets. As much as the time of the summer of '69 is idealized today, circumstances must have been dire. City services had collapsed due to the pouring in of young people from all over the country, for most newcomers, neither food nor sanitary service were available. Medical care was over-strained and rape and violence were common: "Rape is as common as bullshit on Haight Street"[12] (qtd. in Luhrmann 16) commented the anonymous author of a poem in one of the many broadsheets circulating on "the Haight" already two years earlier in 1967. In contrast to Mainstream churches, Baptist pastors saw the need and opened a shelter—'The Living Room'—directly on Haight St.

[12]The complete poem can be found on the homepage of Red House Books: http://www.redhousebooks.com/galleries/haight/haightHate.htm.

(17), a shelter decorated with psychedelic suns and scripture verses painted on the walls. In two years, more than twenty thousand people came through the Living Room (17). But it was not only Baptists who reached out to the Jesus People. Billy Graham, known for his influential television program "The Hour of Power" and evangelical campaigner known for his "crusades", reached out to them, because he was convinced that they shared basic convictions: "these young people are bringing us back to primitive Christianity, studying the real Jesus [...] which we have been trying to do for years" (qtd. in Bruns 126). Other important figures of evangelicalism also were part of the movement, like Hal Lindsey—author of *The Late Great Planet Earth*, which was published in 1971—or were highly influential, like Francis Schaeffer. The Jesus People formed their own version of Jesus and Christianity that they took directly from the Bible. Jesus' message, as much as their own, was love, and their own interpretation of the New Testament emphasized on the young rebel that questioned the authority and normativity of his time. This lay and naive way to read the Bible was also a break with the *Cessationism*[13] that was prominent then even among evangelical Christians. Luhrmann writes:

> Teens finding Jesus while high on acid, while the Beatles where discovering Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, did not think that the supernatural was safely in the past. In the Gospel of John, Jesus says that "the one who believes in me will also do the works that I do, and in fact, will do greater works than these." The hippies took that work to include the supernatural miracles. They seem to have modeled themselves on the disciples early in the Book of Acts. (Luhrmann 23)

The Jesus People encountered a branch of evangelicalism that had already radically changed since the beginning of the twentieth century—Pentecostalism. The Azusa Street Revival that had started on April 9, 1906, had attracted followers to a new way of worship.

[13] Cessationism is the Christian doctrine that holds that the Gifts of the Spirit such as speaking in tongues, faith healing, miracles etc. had ceased with the death of the original twelve apostles.

Preacher William J. Seymour held ecstatic services that emphasized spiritual experience, speaking in tongues and miracles, open for all people regardless of skin color. It was a revival of Holiness and Pietist traditions that emphasized the second baptism by the Holy Ghost and clearly negated the then still prominent Cessationism, which is one reason why it was met with suspicion by the established churches—even other evangelicals. But their media-literacy let them quickly gain prominence. In the 1930s and 1940s, it is Pentecostals who are most successful in building a religious media infrastructure (radio and newspapers). Today, some of the largest evangelical denominations are Pentecostal, like the 'Assemblies of God' with over sixty million members.

Many of the protagonists of the Jesus People later founded their own churches or became prominent in existing Pentecostal movements, such as Franklin Graham (son of Billy Graham), John Wimber, founder of The Vineyard or Chuck Smith, founder of Calvary Chapel.[14] Their most significant contribution to today's evangelicalism is the (re-)establishment of the personal experiential Jesus or the discovery of, as Luhrmann puts it, "this intimate, personal, supernaturally present God [...], this happy companion with thunderbolts." (15). It is the activism that marks modern evangelicalism and their re-entry into mainstream culture:

> Ever since the coming of the Jesus Freaks, born of the generation gap and the rebellion against the technocratic establishment, evangelicalism has been injected with an activist fervor that encompasses the whole of life. That activism and commitment stimulated and nurtured the Christian Right. [...] The Christian Right, therefore, should not be simply viewed as a reactionary movement fomented by enraged fundamentalists who had finally come round to rebelling against the sixties. Although this was true for some, the Christian Right was also an extension of the sixties' counterculture, and without this

[14] According to Larry Eskridge, "some of America's fastest growing denominations of the late twentieth century trace their roots directly back to the Jesus People", including Calvary Chapel, Hope Church, the Vineyard and Willow Creek Community Church (Eskridge 30).

> perspective we cannot explain the all-encompassing activism of the Religious Right. (Shires 209)

With the Jesus People pouring into Pentecostalism culminates a development that had started in the 1940s and 1950s parallel to the continued development and resurgence of fundamentalism that Olson calls *post-fundamentalist evangelicalism*. This development is complicated by both groups calling themselves evangelicals *and* still sharing core believes. But the differences are greater than what they share: "They [post-fundamentalists] appealed to prefundamentalist evangelicals such as the Pietist-revivalist leaders and thinkers of the Great Awakening and to the great theologians of Protestant orthodoxy, and they sought to engage evangelical belief and experience with contemporary society and issues in a less negative way than militant fundamentalists" (Olson, *Evangelical Theology* 5). Not as raucous as the ultraconservatives, these post-fundamentalist groups had quietly and steadily build their own global networks and organizations. The most important organization resulting from this productivity being the National Evangelical Association (NAE) in the United States, which in the 1940s "was formed as an alternative to the liberal-dominated Federal Council of Churches; eventually over fifty conservative Protestant denominations with at least some sympathy for revivalism (e.g., Billy Graham's evangelistic ministry) joined" (5).

The post-fundamentalist rise marks the return of evangelicalism to mainstream culture in the United States, ironically through the approximation of the 1960s counterculture, which is one of the important milestone of this development, although approximation might not be the right term to describe what happened, a better description would be the bilateral insight that both Jesus People and evangelicals shared their most important convictions. The fusing with the Jesus people updated evangelical cultural practices and thus other's perception from stereotypical fanatics with wild eyes, mumbling incoherent things while ecstatically dancing, to (almost) 'cool cats' with beards, who sat at the beach in California playing guitar, singing together, showing emotion and caring

for their fellow humans and the world. As so often before in its more than 250 years of American history, evangelicalism had once again 'touched base' with contemporary modes of expressing emotion, finding again a way to relate to people in their own colloquial way. But "the greatest irony of the traditional interpretation of the Christian Right as a negative reaction to the sixties' counter-culture is," as Shires points out, "that most evangelicals agreed with such a definition in the late 1970s and still agree with it today. And with this understanding, they confidently stand dismissive of the sixties counterculture. But had not it been for the counterculture, there may never have been a Christian Right, because the counterculture gave to evangelicalism the rebellious spirit, the youthful activists, and the committed voters it so needed" (Shires 210). The most important developments here to mention for evangelicalism is a renewal of itself, a fresh influx of people, resulting in a greater range of their message and thus efficacy. As so many times before, evangelicalism again finds the right way to relate to people emotionally.

But it is not only the form that changes in the second half of the twentieth century. Changes to dogma, eschatology and liturgy also mark important transformations within evangelicalism that lead to the formation of new sub-currents like for example neo-evangelicalism, and even fundamentalism goes through profound changes, of which many are inextricably connected to *Fuller Theological Seminary*. Fuller's was founded in 1947 as one of the institutions built in the 1930s/40s institution built-up phase. It has become the biggest evangelical seminary worldwide[15] and is highly influential; it has shaped and influenced many crucial discourses within the evangelical spectrum (some of which I will discuss later) and is organized in three schools: Theology, Psychology, and Intercultural Studies, the latter training evangelical missionaries. The combination of these three disciplines (and the naming of the latter) itself tells a lot about Fuller, and I will return later to discuss the seminary in detail, but for the moment the focus will stay on the School of Theology. What Fuller Theological Seminary can be credited

[15]From Fuller's self-description: "4,000 students from 90 countries and 110 denominations and over 40,000 alumni serving in 130 nations" ("Why Fuller?").

for is providing the intellectual base for an alternative to the "cultural and intellectual wasteland fundamentalism [seemed to be] by 1947" (Marsden, *Reforming Fundamentalism* 13). Co-founder and first seminary president Harold John Ockenga was one of the leading figures of the neo-evangelical (or new evangelical) movement that sought to reform the fundamentalist separation from a deemed unchristian secular society. While fundamentalists were still clinging to the withdrawal from society, caring only for the "spiritual gospel," Ockenga promoted a return on being involved in the world. The old fundamentalist mantra "Come out from among them, and be ye separate" (*KJV,* 2 Cor 6.17) was about to lose meaning. Ockenga sketched out his vision for Neo-evangelicalism in his opening convocation address in October 1, 1947:

> The philosophers say we have reached the eventide of the West; the end of an age; the crisis of an era; the conclusion of a civilization. We fling the challenge of the Christian gospel. There's a task to be done and that task is not going to be done by the ordinary Christian alone. It's going to be done by those who are prepared to do it. It must be done by the rethinking and the restating of the fundamental thesis and principles of a Western culture. (Ockenga)

It is in the aftermath of the Second World War that Ockenga, by redefining evangelicalism's mission (and thus Christianity's) contributes to bringing back evangelicalism into mainstream society and returning it into the core of American identity. As Marsden points out "Ockenga and his cohorts had no doubt that the responsibility for the West lay primarily with America. In 1947 it would have been difficult to think otherwise" (Marsden, *Reforming Fundamentalism* 62). But Ockenga's vision 're-synchronizes' the evangelical mission with American exceptionalism: having a "heritage, going back to the Puritans, of believing that the nation had a special cultural mission as part of the history of redemption" (62). "Evangelical Christianity then was the last hope for the world since it was the only hope for America" (62).

Fuller Theological Seminary continues to be an important catalyst for change within evangelicalism throughout the second half of the twentieth century. The two most notable being the the challenge of Biblical inerrancy in the 1960s and the democratization of the supernatural in the 1980s. The adherence to the inerrancy of the Bible, apart from militant separatism, had been one of the cornerstones of evangelical fundamentalism. Now with even key institutions discussing it, this bastion was about to fall as well. As Dan Fuller (the son of founder Charles Fuller), the designated new Dean at Fuller's announced only the "revelational" material but not necessarily the historical accounts in the Bible were inerrant,[16] he incited a development that lead evangelicalism—or at least neo-evangelicalism—out of the valley of fundamentalist dogma.

The other groundbreaking change came from within a course at Fuller's, started with a lecture by John Wimber[17] in 1981 labeled "Signs, Wonders and Church Growth" that later became a course he taught between 1982-1985. The most important aspect of what has become known as *power evangelism*, or just 'Signs and Wonders,' effectively starting what has been called *Third Wave Pentecostalism*[18] was the insight that mission already should incorporate the supernatural, thus effectively leading to a democratization of the Gifts of the Spirit, which formerly had been exclusively mediated by preachers or other spiritual leaders in service. Wimber taught that anybody could incite the supernatural (i.e. speak in tongues, hear the voice of God etc.), which promoted a growth of new lay movements like the *Association of Vineyard Churches*, of which Wimber was a central figure until his death in 1997, thus even further democratizing evangelicalism. Power evangelism completely turned around how evangelism was practiced. The central message changed from an intellectual argument whose purpose was to convince, to an experience with the purpose to overwhelm. While early Pentecostalism had emphasized

[16]For a more detailed description of the discussion known as "Black Sunday" see (*Reforming Fundamentalism* 214; Luhrmann 310).

[17]The same John Wimber, who had been a major figure in the Jesus People Movement and a protagonist in the Christian Folk music scene and later founded Vineyard.

[18]First wave being the Pentecostal movement at the beginning of the century (keyword Azusa Street Revival), second wave standing for the Charismatic movement of the 1960s in which mostly mainline churches and Catholics adopted gifts of the spirit.

glossolalia as the central Gift of the Spirit, power evangelism embraces the whole canon: faith healing, miracles etc. As John Wimber notes:

> By power evangelism I mean a representation of the gospel that is rational but that also transcends the rational. The explanation of the gospel comes with a demonstration of God's power through signs and wonders [...] Power evangelism is that evangelism which is preceded and undergirded by demonstrations of God's presence, and frequently results in groups of people being saved. (Wimber and Springer 11)

The use of the supernatural is indeed peculiar in power evangelism. It serves as proof, as solid evidence for the truth of the message. Not only does once again the importance of the message shift more into the background in favor of the means of distribution. Using the irrational (the supernatural) as rational proof for the argument is only at first glance paradoxical. Because in evangelicalism the supernatural is a rational part of the world that cannot be argued against—as much as it was for the original fundamentalists for whom 'new science' was frivolous because it refused to even try to falsify the supernatural scientifically. Formally there is no way to disprove that the supernatural exists, whereas the Christian message can always be contested on an intellectual level, whether it be by other creeds or secularism.

1.4 Evangelicalism Now

Contemporary evangelicalism remains the "virtual laboratory for Protestant groups" (Balmer and Winner 13), a sprawling liquidity with a rich history of different versions of evangelicalism running parallel, parting, and then crossing paths again. By taking a glimpse at that history it becomes clear why classic definitions of the matter like the ones presented at the beginning of the chapter must fail. The only sensible way to define evangelicalism is by pointing out to the many influences it has absorbed over its history as Balmer does:

> Evangelicalism itself, I believe, is quintessentially a North American phenomenon, deriving as it did from the confluence of Pietism, Presbyterianism, and the vestiges of Puritanism. Evangelicalism picked up the peculiar characteristics from each strain—warmhearted spirituality from the Pietists (for instance), doctrinal precisionism from the Presbyterians, and individualistic introspection from the Puritans—even as the North American context itself has profoundly shaped the various manifestations of evangelicalism: fundamentalism, neo-evangelicalism, the holiness movement, Pentecostalism, the charismatic movement, and various forms of African-American and Hispanic evangelicalism. (Balmer, *Evangelicalism* vii-viii)

However, there are some recurring themes or features that have been important to evangelicalism throughout its history and continue to be so in a way that makes it suitable to call them constituting factors. The constituting factors of evangelicalism as they can be derived from evangelical (and American) history are its transformative power that has its analogy in the early formation of American identity and exceptionalism, the optimistic affinity to change, to use the *tabula rasa* in order to create something new, something better, that is intrinsic part of the founding of the nation.

The formation of American individualism can be traced both by looking at the genesis of American democracy and the development of evangelical experientalism

with its Arminian and Pietist tradition that celebrates the individual experience. These connections manifest themselves in many various landmarks of evangelical and American history. The last important factor to mention here is the high institutional productivity, which is both an answer to the "federal and diffuse structure of the USA" (Bruce 204) as a result of historical developments unique to the United States and a thriving communalism in consequence. Robert Wuthnow identifies the aspect of communality as central for the formation of American Christianity as a whole. Wuthnow argues that religiosity in America has been foremost a "local experience of communality" (Wuthnow 13). This emphasis on the local is on the one hand a consequence of the "religious consumer's" interest in personal instant gratification and efficiency, on the other hand it is a result of the historical importance of the local, which can be traced back to the historical development of the United States that generated a general anti-institutionalism still visible in American society, and in its wake an alienation from bureaucracy (15). That is one of the reasons why the local religious community became so important to America: as a consequence of the importance of the experiential in US contemporary life, fellowship[19] takes precedence over dogma (16).

I hope to have shown that both (evangelical and American) histories are interdependent, have fertilized each other and that evangelicalism is indeed an American phenomenon, even if it manifests itself as an apparently cosmopolitan and international phenomenon like the ICF from the opening example. Therefore, it might be useful to look at the phenomenon by utilizing Bloom's concept of *American Religion*: Bloom argues that most American Religions share certain aspects that are defining them more than their respective religious traditions, whether it be Christian religions or other Abrahamic religions. In regard to American Christianity, he identifies a set of characteristics that can be found in almost all currents and denominations. According to Bloom, Christ is a personal experience for the American Christian. The sense of religion in America is experiential, tied to the feelings, acts and experience of the individual. God is not found

[19]Fellowship is meant here in the sense of *koinonia*—a communion or joint participation.

without, but within the individual and experienced in solitude, as a "one-on-one act of confrontation" (Bloom).

But his main argument is that American Religion only "masks itself as Protestant Christianity yet has ceased to be Christian" (Bloom). That it has "kept the figure of Jesus" (Bloom), a very solitary and personal American Jesus who is "more American than he is Christ" (Bloom). Following Bloom's argument, then evangelicalism does not only worship a divine entity (Luhrmann's "buddy with thunderbolts"), but also the individual itself and its quest for renewal and transcendence. Jesus Christ merely remains as an artifact that signifies the idealized state that can only be achieved by breaking with the past. Jesus is also the only possible Christian figure to remain in a heavily democratized, personal and equal relationship: It is easier to relate to the son as your "buddy" as to the father (or the mother). Thus it is a religion that at its core celebrates the mundane over the spiritual and has no need for faith anymore. That is what power evangelism stands for: the experience gains dominance over faith. This also means that evangelicalism in its current form must stay politically ambiguous to be successful, as it has been throughout its history; from reformational power to conservative gatekeeper to the embrace of modernity, evangelical politics have more than once completely turned around, albeit always within the conservative spectrum. The evangelical God is not liberal—yet. Shires hypothesizes that yet another transformation is imminent: "It is even foreseeable that a global evangelical culture will be a force to be reckoned with. This may mean a left-leaning, but no less dynamic, political expression of evangelicalism. The shift, however, is possible because of the conversionist emphasis of evangelicalism. If the choice is between remaining faithful to a political expression or bringing salvation to a greater number of individuals by abandoning that expression, the latter course will be followed" (Shires 209).

However, what Shires was referring to, "Post-evangelicalism" or the "emerging church", has already lost its momentum, not being able to fulfill the promises of reform Shires, among others, had hoped for. But many criticisms of the emerging church continue

to contribute to the inner-evangelical discourse. Managerial mission, individualism, and the emphasis of a consumerist orientation, among other subjects, are discussed critically. While a radical turn-around is not to be expected in the near future, the adaptivity of evangelicalism will likely win over dogmatic pertinacity. As the theological distancing from traditional fundamentalism and the following changes were crucial in setting the stage for the worldwide success of evangelicalism, it is plausible to assume that this development has not yet ceased to continue. As Luhrmann observes, to reach out became more important than "doctrinal purity of those for whom they reached, [they became] more concerned about bringing people in than about protecting the threshold over which those people would cross" (Luhrmann 310). In other words, as evangelicals opened to the world by letting go of old convictions in favor of an experiential Christianity, the means of distribution gradually became more important than the message. Considering the state of the mainline churches, the shift seems to be successful: "Membership in charismatic congregations has exploded since the 1960s. Over the same time span, mainstream denominations have seen their numbers plummet relative to the population size [...] This history tells us that the liberal Christian God has failed. The mainstream churches are often empty now, their pews unfilled, their hymns unsung, while the churches of the supernatural God blaze with life" (311).

One of the central questions resulting is: Has the "liberal God failed," as Luhrmann puts it, because His message was not radical enough, or because the message has lost relevance in relation to experience? Interestingly, the tension is already invested in the term evangelicalism itself. As it derives from the Ancient Greek *euangélion*, it can mean both the good message or the messenger who brings joy, depending on whether the word derived from the verb *angello* (message) or the noun *angelos* (messenger). It seems that with evangelicalism the *Euangelos* has gained prominence again.

Many of the features of evangelicalism described here and their implications are hard to grasp: What does it mean exactly to rely on experientalism? How does the affective mobilization in evangelicalism work? And most importantly, how to understand

the here often used 'supernatural' as someone "supernaturally nonmusical" to borrow (and slightly modify) an expression from Max Weber?[20]

Joel Robbins asks "how can one live a life fully modern and fully engaged with the supernatural realm?"[21] Translated into a broader frame, it could be asked: How does the global success of evangelicalism's supernaturalism and its mobilization of affect and emotion reciprocates with the paradigm of the secular world, neoliberal capitalism? This will be the subject of the following chapters. Neoliberal capitalism and evangelicalism do not only reciprocate, but rely on each others' dynamics. For this purpose I will first take a closer look at mission and its inextricable connection to markets, taking from this chapter that the most important aspect of evangelicalism is not the message but its distribution.

[20]This self-description is often misquoted. Weber wrote in a letter on February 9, 1909: "It is true that I am absolutely unmusical religiously and have no need or ability to erect any psychic edifices of a religious character within me. But a thorough self-examination has told me that I am neither antireligious *nor irreligious*" (author's emphasis, qtd. in Weber and Zohn 324).

[21]Taken from the back cover of *when God talks back* (Luhrmann).

2 Mission & Market

As elaborated on the preceding pages, evangelicalism develops in a firmly American context. From the first settlements to the nation of the United States of America, evangelicalism as an organized form of religion is a product of the historical development of a discrete American culture. It seems rather likely that this would be equally true of the economic development of evangelicalism, which will be the subject of the following pages. For this purpose, the missionary efforts of US evangelicalism will be surveyed. As a religious system that has approximated corporatism, its missionary efforts resemble more and more the expansive strategies of corporations. Here, I want to elaborate why evangelical mission is as successful as it is and how it is radically different to other Christian missionary efforts. The aim is to shed light on the ideological and structural connections between evangelicalism and neoliberalism, mission and the concept of economic growth. One of my objectives here is to shed light on how these connections are older than the twentieth century, which has been the focus of more recent considerations of the interdependencies between evangelicalism and neoliberalism.

The beginning of understanding mission[1] as a private enterprise can be found in the nineteenth century. In the United States, congregations were lacking the organizational and hierarchical structures found in Europe. Thus, they "assumed a more

[1]Missionary work or mission is the organized effort to spread Christianity, whereas proselytization names the conversion to Christianity, either from another Christian current or another religion. Some Christian groups use the term proselytization exclusively for the active conversion of other Christians. I do not follow this definition. Two very general methods are discernible: Evangelism (i.e. the preaching of beliefs, to make heard the Good News, to spread the Gospel, the Great Commission) and humanitarian aid.

direct role in overseas evangelistic and humanitarian efforts" (Wuthnow 18). Therefore, in the United States "missionary societies evolved as voluntary organizations" (18). The American local congregations had already been able to gain experience in gathering private funding: they could fall back upon experience in congregation building at the 'frontier' and later as part of the development of the evolving nation: as US territory expanded, new congregations had to be founded as well. Thus, evangelical mission began as an interior project of providing the first settlers with religion, which called for creative solutions to bridge the vast distances of North America, such as the Methodist circuit riders. At the very beginning of the nation, mission was already an integral part of manifest destiny. Hence, at the beginning of the nineteenth century the structures for fund raising and activating voluntary involvement were already in place and could be applied for targets outside the United States. But also new forms of raising funds were established. In 1802, fourteen women founded the "Boston Female Society for Missionary Purposes", the first of many female cent societies, through which women contributed to missionary efforts by saving and donating a penny a week (Cayton 73). These societies were some of the earliest voluntary organizations and "led within a few decades to the development of hundreds of ladies' associations that raised funds for foreign mission and gradually drew their congregations into a more sustained supporting role" (Wuthnow 19).

The impact that cent societies had on local congregations was profound in enabling them to actively raise funds and decide on how to spend them. The other important development in the United Sates was that of huge organizations solely committed to foreign mission, such as the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions (ABCFM). Founded in 1810, the ABCFM played an important role for mobilizing evangelical voluntary engagement and donations, quickly becoming the defining model for religious outreach from the United States. "By 1835 it had raised more than $ 1.4 million, not counting in-kind donations of clothing and bedding: printed and distributed some ninety million pages of tracts and other religious material; opened sixty-three overseas mission stations with 311 staff members; and initiated 474 schools for upwards of 80,000

pupils" (98). As a board, the ABCFM "was officially constituted, held regular meetings, had an appointed corresponding secretary and an elected president and vice-president, and was governed by a five-member executive group of prominent clergy and educators [...] The board was the central decision-making body through which all matters of financing and coordinating the activities of its workers abroad were channeled" (99). Structurally, the ABCFM's organization was that of a private legal entity, and was thus organized as most non-profit and equity organizations (corporations) are organized until today. The important point about this structure that Wuthnow makes it that although the voluntary organizations might have provided the funding for foreign missions, it was the boards that decided how these funds were put to use. The board structure provided the frame for soliciting the individually collected funds: "Nearly all of these societies were pyramidal structures with a single governing board at the top, well-orchestrated mechanisms for raising funds and and recruiting personnel from local congregations, and a formal process for commissioning and supporting workers abroad and receiving reports from them" (110). By 1839, 680 female cent societies were affiliated with the ABCFM (out of 1,600 so called "auxiliary societies" in total) (Strong 145). The astonishing success of the ABCFM made it a model for organizing mission in the United States. The denominational board spawned various other institutions like the American Bible Society or the American Tract Society and the later formation of interdenominational boards followed the organizational form of the ABCFM. These organizations have provided the link between the voluntary engagement and funding that organizations like the female cent societies, other voluntary organizations and individual congregations contributed to foreign mission. While there are many possible ways of sending a missionary abroad, interdenominational organizations (further consolidating evangelical outreach, now in the form of 'mission agencies') remain one of the most prominent. Beginning with the nineteenth century, the story of evangelical mission abroad is a story of corporate planning, relying on American voluntarism to provide the means.

Today's structures for organizing mission in the United Sates have evolved from the commissions and boards of the nineteenth century. Meanwhile, the basic model has not changed significantly. Local voluntary organizations and denominations provide the means—both labor time and monies[2] for centrally organized and coordinated programs implemented by nation-wide organizations. Mission in the United States is primarily organized as a private enterprise, conducted by individuals commissioned for the task, some of them proselytizing on a global scale, while others are active locally. The many influential non-denominational mission agencies are responsible for the main share of evangelical mission.

There are groups active in almost all countries in the world, making heard the "Good News," preaching the word of God, of Jesus, evoking the end of times, the gift of the Holy Ghost or simply hope for material prosperity. The American model of mission has profoundly transformed mission on a global scale. How fundamental a change the shift to this mode of mission was becomes clearer if compared to how mission had been executed for the first fifteen hundred years of Christianity. Wuthnow offers an overview based on Stephen Neill's seminal work on the history of Christian mission:

> The spread of Christianity came in large measure from conquest and territorial rule as individual leaders, particularly Constantine, converted to Christianity and declared it the official religion. Christianity spread through persecution, as congregations fled and became diasporic communities in new locales. It also spread through the witness of itinerant evangelists and traders. By the sixth century, the Western church was sufficiently organized that ministries abroad were centrally commissioned under papal authority, much like ambassadors and emissaries sent by secular authorities. [...] This pattern expanded during the Middle Ages through the establishment of monastic orders [...] who took on the responsibility of representing the church abroad. These religious order

[2] An average of five percent of congregational incomes goes to denominations (Wuthnow 14), however, a shift towards individual donors of time for short term missions can be observed (23).

> carried a significant role in carrying Christianity to the New World during the Spanish imperium of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Local parishes were involved in these efforts, but their role consisted largely of paying mandatory tithes. The Protestant reformation did not greatly alter this pattern, although the religious conflicts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries resulted in a new diaspora of religious dissenters, such as the Huguenot community that fled to Brazil and the Puritans who settled in North America. (Wuthnow 17-18)

Mission was, for the longest time of Christian history result, by-product or legitimation of other historical occurrences: conquest, change of state religion, migration and trade. As Christianity gained influence and power over the centuries, the secular structures already in place were reproduced. The law of the land of the Holy Roman Empire can still be adumbrated in the structure of the Roman Catholic Church, whose hierarchy mimics it with its cardinals, the prince-electors of the Vatican, ruling over the ecclesiastical provinces formed after Roman provinces. The Roman Catholic church still uses the terminology of the pre-modern feudal state.[3] Wuthnow points out "how little the story of Christianity's first millennium and a half involved anything resembling what is currently regarded as missionary activity, namely, the commissioning of individuals charged specifically with spreading the gospel in new venues" (18n18).

Evangelicalism has approximated the structure where power resides nowadays and arguably will even more so in the future—not the modern nation state but the corporation. The corporation and its mode of operation—neoclassical or neoliberal economy—is the economic (and more and more political) paradigm of the time.[4] How

[3] Although it has to be pointed out that considering the structure of the Roman Catholic Church, many features of the modern state had been anticipated by the Gregorian Reforms (cf. Berman).

[4] This assertion obviously is rather reducing. While this is not the place to summarize the history of economic thought, it should be noted that neoclassical economy and neoliberalism are not identical, however conjoined their histories might be. The former is a scientific model that assumes that individuals act rationally in order to maximize utility, the latter describes a policy that promotes neoclassical economics radically.

dramatically the structural shift of power in favor of corporations has been in recent years shows a report published by the Institute for Policy Studies. Its key findings, among others, are that of the top one hundred economies worldwide, fifty-one were corporations and forty-nine were nation states. Furthermore, the two hundred biggest corporations' combined sales were bigger than the combined economies of all countries apart from the biggest ten (S. Anderson and Cavanagh 3).

It is important to note that this development was not inevitable. There were various competing models on how to organize mission available and executed in the nineteenth century and many of them exist, however negligibly, until this day. European mission was not solely a consequence of imperialism, while for the history of the United States it was not only mission that shaped US foreign policy in the nineteenth century. But there is certainly a pattern to be found that finds foreign policy of the United States frequently guided by missionary considerations.

On 8 July 1853, a squadron of four American steam engine warships arrived at Edo Bay (now Tokyo Bay) and positioned their guns toward the town of Uraga. As the Commander of the fleet, Commodore Matthew Perry, opened fire, he did so in celebration of the American Independence Day—the cannons were firing blank shots. But the spectacle is less a celebration than a demonstration of American military power and determination to use it. In a textbook attempt of gunboat diplomacy, the mission approved by President Fillmore aims for the opening of the Japanese harbors for trade, the establishment of coaling stations, a vital infrastructural element of nineteenth century maritime power projection, and diplomatic contact. The obscure nation of Japan that had been denying most foreigners contact for over 220 years was about to be forced to open to the world by any means necessary. Krauss, an avid expert on the history of American-Japanese relations, elaborates the religious undercurrent this important occurrence of American colonial history carried:

> One of the most frequently made claims for the expected results of the Perry mission was a religious one, an association befitting an age in which commerce was often described as the "handmaiden of the Gospel." The first American effort to open Japan in the nineteenth century had been the Christian missionary venture of the *Morrison* in 1837, which also had as its purpose in Japan to "trade a little." The repulse of that expedition had convinced its leader, Charles King, that Japan had violated an unwritten commandment and he prayed for the time when his country would "cast the first stone at Japan, unless she will sin no more against the dearest human interest." Another member of *Morrison*'s crew by 1853 also reached the conclusion that the seclusion policy of Japan and other Asiatic powers was "not according to God's plan of mercy to these peoples." From the assumption that seclusion violated divine law it was but a short step to the conviction that the United States was the chosen instrument to bring Christianity to Japan. One member of the Perry expedition, Lieutenant William B. Whiting, found a Biblical passage which predicted the conversion of Japan, and a Californian missionary quoted the 45th psalm, 12th verse, "The daughter of Tyre shall be there with a gift," as a direct allusion to America's relationship with Japan. (author's emphasis, Krauss 30)

The United States might have been late in participating in the colonial project of the European powers, but it nevertheless pursued its own colonial endeavors. The colonial endeavors of the United States in the nineteenth century where legitimized differently than those of European nations. The Perry expedition and its perception and justification is tangent to an older colonial logic than the one used in the nineteenth century. The theoretical justification of European colonialism in the nineteenth century had been largely an expression of Scottish Enlightenment. Colonization was seen as a 'civilizing mission' that was sometimes unjust but necessary for the development of uncivilized peoples and

this mission was the 'white man's burden,' who in his European variation was most fit for the task. This paternalistic and chauvinistic line of argumentation had its roots in a worldview of conjectural history, or stadial history, which described history as an inevitable progression of four developmental stages of subsistence. From hunter-gatherer to pastoral to agricultural to commercial. The model was popular with Scottish (and also French) Enlightenment thinkers like Henry Home Kames, Adam Smith and John Millar (cf. O'Brien). "Stadial history, narrowly defined, describes a natural trajectory or spiral of development in which societies undergo change trough successive changes based on different forms of subsistence" (133). Previous theoretical justifications had been of a more theological sort, referring not to natural law, but God's will. This older argument had been developed from the medieval *Deus Vult* to the "Petrine Mandate" of the sixteenth century.

Justification of the colonial efforts of the United States is located somewhere between these two; on the one hand it is abiding by a paternal logic of enlightenment, here in the conviction that opening to trade with the United States would be good for Japan, on the other hand, the restoration of the divine order that Japan is disturbing with its seclusion from the world market. Theology here is not simply a justification but it is entwined with the secular purpose of the mission: That the United States would trade with Japan in itself is God's will. Trade is no longer "the handmaiden of the Gospel" as Krauss had pointed out for earlier endeavors. American foreign politics have become the will of God. This particular entanglement of secular and religious mission has been amply described by various scholars, among them Junker:

> [American sense of mission] has oscillated between the passive notion of transforming America into a new Jerusalem, which would be a beacon to the world by example, and the active duty of mission to elevate backward and less civilized people to American standards, to create a new world order, to deliver the world and to create the millennium. (my translation, Junker 212)

As an integral part of American culture, this sense of mission is not restricted to the political sphere. The willingness to support and send missionaries abroad is highest in evangelical congregations, but nevertheless considerable in all American Christian branches—even in mainline Protestant and Catholic congregations,[5] whose US branches adapted to this American mode of mission. American evangelicalism mission is a mirror to the political and social mission America deems to hold for the rest of the world and relies on similar simplifications to those of American politics, which Junker amply describes as Manicheanisms.

Rüdiger Kunow has recently pointed out the long history of organizing mission through agencies in the US and emphasized how deeply "the notion of a mission, the sense of being sent out into the world for a special purpose [...] has had wider repercussions inside American culture, past and present" and is "intimately linked to the ideology of Manifest Destiny" ("Religious Cosmopolitanism" 28). This sense of mission is accompanied by an entrepreneurial pragmatism that is similarly embedded in American culture. Together, these aspects of American culture form the basis for evangelical success in mission regarding its organizational form.

As the secular political world view of the United States tends to be Manichean, so does the evangelical world view, dividing the world into those saved and those still "ruled by Satan" (Robbins, "Globalization" 2004) (most evangelicals would refer to 'the unsaved' though). But this division is important because it underlines the universal claim evangelicalism has made for all of mankind, making no difference in race, gender or origin, blurring cultural differences. Part of being saved is becoming American, at least in the sense that evangelicals have of America. In that way, evangelical proselytization is also an expression of a specifically American Enlightenment. That is why proselytization is as important abroad as it is domestically. Also it becomes clearer how early evangelical efforts to educate black slaves and women were less an expression of an early evangelical struggle for equal rights, as some scholars from the evangelical

[5]For the exact numbers on missionary support in different Christian branches see (Wuthnow 149).

spectrum suggest, but an expression of the importance to save *any* soul. The quantitative importance of saving the unsaved has led to a pragmatism in mission that is highly successful—both in the United States and abroad. The Willow Creek Community Church is a prime example for domestic evangelical proselytization.

2.1 Domestic Mission

In the mid-1970s Bill Hybels conducted a door-to-door market survey in South Barrington, Illinois, a wealthy suburb of Chicago. Its aim was to determine what exactly kept suburbanites away from church attendance (Balmer and Winner 80), which had been in decline for years. In his survey, Hybels found that many interviewees regarded sermons as overbearing ("don't like being preached down to" (Callaway 10)) and held little interest in church attendance ("Church is boring" (10)). Even suburbanites, who expressed a general interest in religion stated that they "were put off by religious symbols—crosses, icons, and the like" (Balmer and Winner 80). The Willow Creek Community Church was designed after these findings and has become what can be called the "prototypical mega-church" (Callaway 10), being among the ten biggest churches in the United States. It is notable, because it is the first religious community that was designed in accordance with market research and on the basis of the results of a conducted quantitative study: First, the market was 'probed' and scrutinized and only then the 'product' designed specifically for this market was 'rolled out.' Willow Creek thus works similar to a brand name that had undergone scrutiny before it was released to the market. Today's compound, or "central church campus," as it is called by Willow Creek, is void of any religious symbols and icons. No crosses, no doves, no colored windows or Jesus statues are to be found. In fact, the whole compound emanates the slick and nonchalant professionalism of corporate culture, something which Balmer attests to not being coincidental, since the architecture was deliberately chosen to relate to an audience for whom the corporate world is something familiar, if not appealing (Balmer and Winner 80). And thus it is of no wonder that Willow Creek is also organized similar to a commercial entity, relying on the organizational model of 'policy governance,' a model of organizational governance designed for both equity corporations and non-profit organizations by John Carver in the 1970s. Policy governance, or the Carver model, as it is sometimes called introduced the differentiation between governance and management. The change to policy governance marks a paradigmatic shift

in business organization as it delegates operations to "management" who is mandated by governance through a board which defines the aims for which it mandates management to find the means to achieve them (proper empowerment) and also what conduct would be unacceptable (executive prudence) through policies. It separates the means from the end and marks a new level of division of labor. While the model is already slowly being taken over by a new model, the "network governance model", the bottom line is that Willow Creek was founded with the latest organizational model from the economic sphere in mind.

The largest theater in the compound can hold almost 8,000 visitors and is equipped with the latest multimedia devices, among them two enormous (14'x 24') LED screens, which usually can be found in sport arenas. The more recent addition of a food court to the compound, which in other respects is also resembling a shopping mall, is just the latest evidence of a strategy to relate to the attendee's quotidian experiences. As journalist Lauren Sandler, who interviewed many Willow Creek evangelicals quotes one visitor: "'The food court is great. I can bring my friends here just like we'd go to the mall. What counts is reaching people where they're at,' a young woman in a pink velour sweatsuit tells me between Frappucino sips as we chat by the waterfall" (Sandler 78). Other findings of the survey suggested that people were reluctant to donate when asked for money and that they usually disdained dressing up for church, so donation is handled more discreetly at Willow Creek and attendees are encouraged to wear casual attire. Ideologically, founder Bill Hybels is certainly on the more liberal end of the evangelical scale, considering his having been adviser to Bill Clinton whom he presumably befriended with, and his progressive stance (relative to religious conservative circles) on gender equality: prospective members have to affirm that they would "joyfully submit to the leadership of women in various leadership positions at Willow Creek" (Balmer, *Evangelicalism* 68). As an evangelical leader he is exemplary in promoting a pragmatic approach in order to grow instead of adhering to orthodoxy. And so it is not surprising that Willow Creek is sometimes mocked as "market-driven philosophy" (Callaway 10).

But the reason why Willow Creek is so successful, is that it orients its appearance and method toward the consumers' needs and expectations.

Willow Creek is thus one of the many examples of the impartiality with which evangelical leaders utilize marketing and distribution principles of the corporate world for their own purposes. As a theoretical approach this has been elaborated as "religious market theory" (Stark and Finke). Stark and Finke describe religions as competitors on a global market and the followers as independent customers that choose their religious affiliation based upon the information they have. Market competition thus lets the best product win the favor of customers and the markets regulate themselves via the often-cited invisible hand. As evangelicalism is particularly successful on the global market, it is not surprising that the religious market theory is especially influential in evangelical circles where it is often used as a guidebook to achieve church growth. This is, of course, not what I am after here, on the contrary, religious market theory is criticizable insofar that it takes the economic paradigm for granted and thus contribute to naturalizing it. Religious market theory adopts the rational choice model that emanates from the assumption that all individual economic decisions are made in the pursuit of one's own interest. By taking this much contested model—a model that is describing an ideal market—as the base for their study, Stark and Finke reify the concept of the *homo oeconomicus*. The implications it carries are well within the economic paradigm; not only does "the winner take it all", he or she (or it) also has the morally justified right to do so, because he/she/it has been the most able market participant.

One could argue that Willow Creek is actually not void of any religious symbols, but that they have merely been changed. The new symbols are the enormous LED screens that might be a sublime experience to its viewers (almost mocking Marshall McLuhan's "The medium is the message"). Media use has always been intrinsic to religion,[6] as a visit to any Italian Catholic Church from the Renaissance reveals. The

[6]However, evangelicalism has been incorporating mass-media more successfully than other Christian branches. A good overview on the subject can be found in *Aesthetic Formations* (Meyer, *Aesthetic Formations: Media, Religion, and the Senses*).

excessive use of art, the dimensions of the architecture—all aim at overwhelming the senses. In today's age, though, it is not the message that is awe-inspiring, but the medium; the shiny white smartphone, the enormous LED screen or the six channel surround sound audio system. Willow Creek is a product designed for a certain customer: the urban corporate employee. The approach utilized here is indeed a "market-driven" one: Relying on preliminary surveys of prospective "customers" and recreating Christianity in a way that resembles their non-religious life, from corporate workplace to the mall to the heavy use of the same media encountered in leisure time spent in stadiums, cinemas or concert venues. The idea to radically adjust to the target group's needs and expectations is indeed used by many evangelical churches and it is called the "seeker-sensitive" approach.

The seeker-sensitive approach also emanated from Fuller's Theological Seminary, where Donald McGavran established the missionary branch of Fuller's in 1965, the *School of World Mission*. Ever since, Fuller has been one of the main proponents of a doctrine called "Church Growth," which according to its advocates relies on a Pauline tradition.[7] McGavran turned around the way how proselytization worked by redefining its aims:

> It [mission] is feeding the hungry, healing the sick, giving sight to the blind, teaching the illiterate to read, and on and on. The gospel was really news of a better way of life, a more nutritious diet, and a growing democracy around the world. I could not accept this way of thinking about missions. These good deeds must, of course, be done, and Christians will do them. I myself was doing many of them. *But* they must never replace the essential task of mission, discipling the peoples of earth. Indeed, all these good deeds must help in its accomplishment. (author's emphasis, McGavran 54)

McGavran proposed a concept of mission, both domestic and foreign—which are from

[7]The two Bible passages usually referred to in this context are "Be wise in the way you act toward outsiders; make the most of every opportunity (*NIV,* Col 4.5)" and "I have become all things to all people so that by all possible means I might save some. I do all this for the sake of the gospel, that I may share in its blessings" (Cor 9.22-23).

an evangelical perspective at least conceptually congruent due to the divide in those 'saved' and those yet 'unsaved'—that is more concerned about the number of those 'saved' than about the importance of abiding by Christian dogma and tradition. The seeker-sensitive approach thus was approximating Christian (at least evangelical) proselytization to secular market principles of growth. The second major contribution to church growth was the incorporation of quantitative methods in determining the success of missionary efforts. Ever since the 1960s, when Church Growth started to gain recognition, evangelical mission has relied heavily on social science research and the use of its methods—even if sometimes rather arbitrarily and in layman's terms—to further proselytization. This has also influenced the language used in today's missionary seminaries. For example, the Great Commission Research Network,[8] a network promoting Church Growth with publications and defining its methods in annual conferences, promises "The latest cutting-edge research on ministry that balances the 'Great Commission' with a 'Great Compassion.'"[9] As so often in the religious history of the United States, evangelical outreach finds the tune with the spirit of the times by evolving into a form compatible with secular principles of name brand distribution—at the expense of "product development." The resulting doctrine, *managerial missiology*, has been successfully in action ever since it was developed at Fuller's in the 1960s.

[8]formerly known as American Society for Church Growth
[9]http://www.greatcommissionresearch.com/

2.2 Foreign Mission

The Christian and Missionary Alliance (C&MA), an evangelical Protestant denomination from the United States, began sending missionaries to Peru in the 1920s. In 1973, their first congregation in Lima had 150 members. Forty years later, Lima is home to one hundred C&MA congregations with a membership of nearly 35,000 (Mandujano). The Peruvian C&MA congregations today are organized in the Peruvian Alliance National Church, which is independent from its US counterpart. As a consequence, US missionaries have long been withdrawn from Peru.

However, the Peruvian branch still is closely connected to the US-based mother institution. Recently, efforts have begun to proselytize among the Chinese population of Peru. The Chinese American and Taiwanese C&MA sections are cooperating to spread the gospel in the Chinese Peruvian community. As the American C&MA homepage informs its readers, a growth target of five percent has been defined for this transnational endeavor. American Christians can contribute to these efforts by praying for the success of the mission, by donating directly to the Peruvian Chinese mission or by getting involved through voluntary work.[10] For that purpose, the C&MA uses every communication channel available: Prayer services are streamed live and can be accessed in the online archive, twitter hashtags are formed for upcoming events (for example #allianceprayer) and daily prayer requests can be received via an iPhone app that also provides supporters with a daily devotional by Aiden Wilson Tozer, according to C&MA a "modern-day prophet" and key figure of C&MA's history.[11] What is also available are short but professionally made image films that uncannily resemble the self-representations often seen in the corporate world: fast cuts rapidly jump from one set to another, creating a whirl of smiling faces, held hands and word clouds formed out of Christian buzz words in front of changing backgrounds from all over the world.[12] Those interested can be

[10] see www.cmalliance.org/worker/chang-michael-christina.
[11] http://www.cmalliance.org/about/history/tozer
[12] See for example http://www.cmalliance.org/about/.

connected to the Christian & Mission Alliance continuously via any personalized media channel available. The C&MA homepage also hosts info pages for each of their projects and their respective project managers. These inform about recent efforts, missions, and their status. The C&MA is active in thirty-nine countries and the requirements for missions vary according to country or region. For the Northeastern part of Germany for example, the region with the allegedly highest atheist population worldwide, supporters are invited to pray in order to "push back the darkness in NE Germany" (Jones).

The missionary efforts of the C&MA are just one example for the many success stories of evangelical Christianity. But in many ways their modus operandi is exemplary for evangelical proselytization as a whole: Mission is run in a business-like fashion: growth-targets are formulated, project managers are appointed for specific goals and regions and held responsible by boards, joint-ventures between different international branches are formed and every new venture is accompanied by detailed market research. Every aspect is organized in a fashion in accordance to the principles of policy governance, making its organization very adaptive and flexible in reacting to the requirements of the target region. Furthermore, the success of the mission relies on the financial and voluntary involvement of the C&MA's members. As soon as the new foreign congregation is stable, it is *indigenized* and Western missionaries are withdrawn. The new congregation gains autonomy while still maintaining strong ties to the US mother institution.

As the C&MA is expanding, so is evangelical Christianity as a whole. It is the fastest growing religious group by means of proselytization. In less than a century, evangelicalism has grown so rapidly that in 2010 more than one quarter of the estimated two billion Christians worldwide were evangelicals (Pew Research Center, "Global Christianity" 9).

Statistics show how efficiently evangelicalism manages mission. In the United States, evangelical mission is better funded, has more active missionaries, and is more successful than any other religious group or organization. Evangelical growth is fueled by thousands of US American missionaries, active in all parts of the world: While

thirty-four percent of Americans stated their religious affiliation to be evangelical (Schreyer 159), ninety-one percent of all American Protestant missionaries were evangelical in 1991 (Noll 84).[13] This enormous evangelical missionary force has a budget that is matching in dimensions: 1,019 evangelical mission agencies have a combined budget of $2.37 billion at their disposal to spread the "Good News" (85) (a huge sum compared to the total $ 3.7 billion mentioned earlier that *all* US-Churches have available for foreign mission).

In contrast to highly institutionalized churches that have professionalized mission, like the Catholic Church and Mainline Churches, the many evangelical agencies actively proselytizing provide for an entrepreneurial competition, ever adapting to the needs of the spiritually seeking. At the same time, the pressure of competition has led to more efficient means of mission, which resemble the methodology of corporate business. Managerial missiology describes the approximation of mission to corporate methodology: "missionary action is reduced to a linear task that is translated into logical steps to be followed in a process of management by objectives, in the same way in which the evangelistic task is reduced to a process that can be carried on following marketing principles" (Escobar 109). Thus managerial missiology shifts the focus from the message to its distribution. Key objectives are numerical growth and performance, enforced by "Mission CEOs," who set the growth targets for their missionaries, to save more "unreached people groups" in the "10-40 window" (between ten and forty degrees north of the equator) by identifying their "homogenous unit" (shared interest). Mission terminology has become indistinguishable from market research-speak. As numerical analysis and marketing principles take over, the old question 'Have you heard the Good News?' becomes 'Have you spread the Good News?' In a continuation of Manifest Destiny, evangelical mission thereby also promotes entrepreneurial pragmatism and late modern capitalist principles, especially in Latin America and Africa. David Martin suggests that the Pentecost movement, the evangelical current most successful in proselytization,

[13] According to Noll, this amounts to 38,044 evangelical US missionaries compared to 3,913 US missionaries from other Protestant denominations or organizations (84).

promotes a competitive pluralism that is

> arguably a manifestation of modernity. [...] If Pentecostalism advances pluralism in Latin America and voluntarism in Africa then it not only has historical links with the USA, but represents a variant of the North American model of secularization in areas where such a development seemed unlikely. That model is one in which differentiation separates church from state, from territory and local community, and exhibits a partnership between voluntary denominations and modernity. (Martin 1-2)

It is exactly this differentiation that enables the social transformation evangelicalism pursues in the first place. As a global movement with its ideological and eschatological heritage deeply rooted in American culture and economy, evangelicalism seeks to disaffiliate religion from state, territory, local community, and other local contexts, but only in order to create a new universal affiliation with itself. This is exemplified in evangelicalism's ability to incorporate local belief systems into a transnational evangelical community to an extent that exceeds the usual syncretization that goes along with mission.

Robbins identifies this ability as central and argues that evangelicalism can be read as both "an argument for Westernizing homogenization through globalization and as a process of indigenizing differentiation" ("Globalization" 117). While evangelical growth has been used to support both theories on their own, Robbins was the first to point out that evangelicalism "possesses cultural features that allow it, in most cases, to work in both ways at once" (117). In economic terms this would allude to *glocalization* (Robertson 173-4), the concept of locally promoting a global product: In order to access new markets, the original product is modified to meet local demand. The hamburger sold in Mumbai might not be made out of beef, but it is still a hamburger.

The incorporation of marketing principles with "Church Growth" (McGavran), the promotion of pluralism and voluntarism as described by Martin, and the transformative drive in which evangelicalism is consistent with older, underlying aspects of American

culture as Junker describes allude to the ideological and methodological proximity of evangelicalism to neoliberal economics. Neoliberal ideology seeks to diminish national institutional power and promotes the reduction of national authority in favor of the private sector, which has been remarkably successful for the last thirty years, especially in Africa and Latin America, where evangelicalism is expanding like nowhere else in the world. While IMF and World Bank have pursued economic transformations on a national scale by providing loans in exchange for the reduction of subsidies and national economic supportive and protective structures, evangelical missionaries 'sing from the same hymn book,' promoting these transformations on an individual and societal scale. In Nigeria, for example, the incredible rise of Pentecostalism is accompanied by a prosperity gospel that offers "a doctrine of morally-controlled materialism, in which personal wealth and success is interpreted as the evidence of God's blessing on those who lead a 'true life in Christ'" (Marshall-Fratani 282) (The prosperity gospel will be addressed in more detail in chapter 4.2.1). However, the phenomena of evangelicalism and neoliberalism are not completely congruent. While neoliberalism seeks to diminish the influence of established institutional structures in favor of a free market doctrine, evangelicalism's aim is to replace the existing structures with its own. Jean Comaroff describes global evangelicalism as a "newly holistic movement" and argues that "[these] are part of the neoliberal turn both *reactively* and *intrinsically*" (author's emphasis Comaroff 54). While the message of evangelicalism often resonates with critiques of capitalism and promotes a social gospel its means of distribution are expressions of a globalized, late modern capitalist world. Samuel Escobar, himself an evangelical critic of managerial mission, asserts that the field of missiology "has yielded to the spirit of the age" (110). And although the turn to corporate methods of distribution in mission is controversially debated in evangelical circles, its successful utilization shows how deeply evangelicalism itself is part of the "spirit of the age."

The inner-evangelical debate indicates how important the implementation of neoliberal business strategies for proselytization has become. When the World Evangelical Fellowship Missions Commission met in Iguassu, Brazil in 1999, 160 evangelical leaders

from fifty-three countries drafted a document outlining a "Global Missiology for the twenty-first Century." The document was intended to "become a point of dialogue that [would] help shape both missiology and strategy into the next century/millennium" (W. D. Taylor 16). This *Iguassu Affirmation* repeatedly mentions the economic and political system's impact on mission (18) and calls for a "critique of mission theories that depend heavily on marketing concepts and missiology by objectives" (20). This inner-evangelical debate is not over yet. Proponents of managerial missiology accuse this line of critique as a "pejorative use of the word 'Managerial'", excluding anyone whose "God-given managerial gifts" have helped the cause—"Management is one of many gifts of the Spirit" after all as the author of this critique informs the reader with the authority of the Bible (DeCarvalho 142). Within managerial mission, capitalism and its conduct of business have become naturalized, are part of "God's Law" as much as in the days of the Perry expedition to Japan. For the inner logic of evangelicalism this poses a problem: If evangelicalism is the answer to the decadent secular world, why is it utilizing its business model? As Connolly asks: "Why does one wing of the evangelical movement give such intense priority to its economic interest [...]? Why not preach the Social Gospel, as innumerable Christian believers have in the past, giving the Jesus of Luke priority over the Christ of Revelation?" (Connolly 874).

And so it is no wonder that in recent years a different and more attractive narrative has emerged that describes the phenomenal success of evangelical proselytization differently. It is a beautiful narrative of resistance, liberation and rebirth and is so successful that Wuthnow identifies it as the new ideological paradigm of evangelicalism (Wuthnow 36). This narrative explains the success of evangelicalism as a success of World Christianity over secularism and Western decadence. The idea is that, although Christianity is declining in the West, it has found a new center in the "Global South," a place more vibrant and spiritual than the West, which has unlearned the spiritual in favor of the rational. The important point made is that Christianity, which, needless to say, in this narrative means evangelical Christianity exclusively, has come to life in

the Global South on its own and that Western mission of the twentieth century, tainted by colonialism and imperialism, had rather hindered this development.[14] The "return of religion" in the form of the new and growing Christian center of the world thus is also a success story of cultural resistance against Western culture, of which many evangelicals feel alienated. It is a narrative that resonates with many tropes inherent to Christian teachings: "It is a before-and-after story of dramatic change, even of conversion and rebirth, of transition from apparent death to new life, and thus of synergy and hope. The narrative tension moves from despair to salvation" (37). What makes this narrative so attractive is that it revives the evangelical self-image of the marginalized (which is always alluding to the oppressed, similar to the first Christians), holding true to his or her beliefs in the face of an overwhelming opponent. It can also be read as a repercussion of the 1960s, an evangelical version of the search for spirituality in other non-Western cultures. Furthermore, this new paradigm, as Wuthnow terms it, fits in seamlessly with themes more likely to be found in critiques of globalization and capitalism. The assumed return of religion thus enables its acolytes to feel being part of a resistance against a rational world gone insane producing injustice, exploitation and ecological destruction.

The assumed "Return of Religion" is heralding the end of the secularization paradigm. It has been repeatedly argued that Christianity had experienced a phase of expansion since the 1970s. Within this narrative, evangelicalism is usually seen as the "driving engine" of an expanding Christianity (Sanneh, "The Return of Religion"), and a facile look at statistics affirms this thesis: "In less than forty years, the number of Christians in the world had nearly doubled" ("The Return of Religion"). But a closer look reveals that as religious affiliation to Christianity had doubled, so had the world population, leaving Christianity relatively stable at around thirty-three percent worldwide for the last hundred years (Pew Research Center, "Global Christianity" 9). Robert Wuthnow observes that "if all Christians are considered, then the rate of growth is less

[14] Robert Wuthnow has summarized this narrative far better and more extensive than I could (Wuthnow 36-7).

impressive and, in fact, amounts to little more in some countries than natural increase" (44). This means that evangelicalism is not the driving engine of Christianity as a whole, but that its dynamics stand in stark contrast to it. The space where this growth is taking place equally calls for criticism. The assumed Global Christianity or World Christianity (i.e. evangelicalism) is imagined to be located in the Global South. The idea is that since Christianity is most vibrant and expanding in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the focus and center of Christianity must have shifted from its original 'homelands' in Europe and North America to the Global South (Carpenter and Sanneh). This thesis is usually emphasizing the diversity of Christian denominations in Latin America, Asia and Africa and commonly connected to a view that sees indigenous missiology as a form of empowerment.

Two questions arise from this assumption: Where is the Global South located *exactly*—or put differently, how productive can a category be that encompasses all of Latin and Central America, Asia and Africa, with countries that are hugely different from each other in any comparable characteristic? And the second question is, who is responsible for evangelical expansion there? A closer look reveals that the Global South is a construct (Wuthnow 43) that ignores many of the complex differences between completely disparate countries imagined in the Global South. The other problem arising from this argument is that it omits the impact of the mainly US American funding (42) in favor of a perspective that imagines the success of evangelical Christianity as a narrative of a Christian resistance movement against a homogenizing Western culture. Therefore, the biggest challenge for evangelical scholars is to fit the successful Western evangelical mission into this narrative. If the Global South's growth of Christianity is fueled by its own dynamics, why bother with sending missionaries abroad at all?

Mark Noll for example carefully argues that "American Christian experience is most important for the world not so much as a direct influence but as a template for recent Christian history" (Noll 116). While not denying that "American voluntaristic, conversionistic religion has certainly exerted an influence elsewhere" (116), Noll sees

similarities between nineteenth-century American social conditions and those regions in the world, where this model of Christianity is especially successful, as the more important factor: "where, that is, social fluidity, personal choice, the need for innovation and a search for anchorage in the face of vanishing traditions have prevailed" (116). Following this thought, the Global South becomes a land of promise much similar to the pristine early America that was touched by progress. Non-Western countries in which evangelicalism thrives have now progressed to a level similar to nineteenth-century America (114). Noll is proposing a view that naturalizes capitalism: Globalization becomes a natural force rather than a process that is politically and economically influenced by many stakeholders. What is especially ironic is that the concept of Global South is sort of a counter-narrative to the cold realities of managerial mission. In any case, Noll acknowledges economic changes brought by international institutions and the pressure to conform to an international market, but denies or ignores how these are highly influenced by American economic polity and, furthermore, an evangelical distribution model that follows these very same rules. And so it is not surprising that evangelical scholars such as Noll deny any substantial American economic influence in the process of mission, calling such a critique in line with "the classic themes making up the last century's anti-Americanism" (100). While Noll concedes that "responsible apologists [of American missionary practice] almost always grant that missionaries in fact sometimes acted unwisely by sometimes linking the Christian gospel to the politics of American government, promoting capitalist exchange, or upsetting previously isolated tribal groups" (102-3), he continues to argue that American evangelical missionaries are more often than not the only allies the marginalized (in this specific argument its "tribal people") have against inevitable processes of globalization by quoting various of those "apologists," among them a "Wycliffe worker":[15] "the Wycliffe evangelical Christianity provided the 'best way to bring those changes necessary to end oppression and human exploitation'" (104). American missionaries thus become benevolent advisers

[15]Wycliffe Bible Translators, also known as Wycliffe Global Alliance, is an association of organizations that promotes the translation and proliferation of the Bible.

and guides through the perils of globalization. For Noll, the transformative processes in the wake of globalization are inevitable, but can be alleviated by the Christian message: "since this kind of integration has become all but inevitable for virtually all tribal peoples, it has been far better for the indigenous people that missionaries instead of other possible agents were carrying out this integration" (104).

According to Noll global Christianity does not need any Western missionaries, since it is self-sustaining, fueled by its own dynamics, and if Western mission still has any impact, it is in a paternal advisory capacity, accompanying the inevitable changes that come with Globalization. The narrative promoted by evangelicals deems more important the missionaries of the Global South, who are allegedly bringing back Christianity to the spiritual wastelands of the secular West. The keyword here is "reverse mission," often cited in the wake of the Global South/World Christianity paradigm, describing the assumed massive missionary efforts of the Global South in the West, however, whose "current scope should not be exaggerated" (Wuthnow 56). But, according to Noll, even in the event of missionaries originating from the United States, these missionaries are Christians primarily rather than Americans, advocates of the oppressed that work for World Christianity against the secular powers and processes in whose wake all ill travels.

But where do American Missionaries go? They go to the Global South, a space that is on the one hand imagined as sensuously superior , on the other hand as a space in dire need of aid. It is an afflicted space populated by undernourished children, poverty-stricken peasants and oppressed women, exhibited in the Power Point presentations of evangelical churches for the sake of donations. It is also the space of true and undiluted Christianity. For evangelicals thus the biggest challenge is to conflate these two quite different images into a coherent one.

The other reason why evangelicals are so reluctant to adhere to a specifically American mission is the history of Christian mission. One of the reasons why the fervor to proselytize has waned with many Christian churches is the entanglement of Western Colonialism and Christian mission, and the resulting reorientation to a more social gospel

in the twentieth century, which has surprising similarities to the passive sense of mission Junker describes: A mission that convinces by example of living a godly live. McGavran's paradigmatic shift in the 1960s mentioned earlier called for a more aggressive, more active mission. But such an aggressive mode of mission came with a heavy baggage in the form of the West's colonial history of the last five hundred years, which was inextricably connected with Christian mission. As Stephen Neill has noted, it is undeniable that the immense expansion of Christianity is related to the global expansion of European powers after the Renaissance (Neill and Chadwick 414). All colonizing European powers were Christian and a "a whole variety of compromising relationships existed between missionaries and governments; and that in the main Christianity was carried forward on the wave of Western prestige and power" (414).

Evangelical proponents were well aware of the implications an offensive pursuit of worldwide mission and the history of Western Christian mission would bring and thus were careful to dissociate themselves from colonial and missionary history, proclaiming the opposite—that evangelical mission now had become one of the major forces against colonialism. Sanneh argues along the lines of cultural relativism against any notions of cultural superiority:

> The characteristic pattern of Christianity's engagement with the languages and cultures of the world had God at the center of the universe of cultures, implying equality among cultures and the necessarily relative status of cultures vis-à-vis the truth of God. No culture is so advanced and so superior that it can claim exclusive access or advantage to the truth of God, and none so marginal and remote that it can be excluded. (Sanneh, *Disciples* 25)

As a relativist argument, Sanneh's claim lacks consistency, since it is built upon an assumed absolute—the truth of God. But this formal flaw is outweighed by the complete omission of political and economic realities of mission, reducing his line of argument to mere wishful thinking if not propaganda. Sanneh is not alone with his line of argumentation.

Various other proponents use postcolonial discourse to support their theses. As Robert Wuthnow points out, "Jenkins, Sanneh, and others acknowledge that Christianity may have been spread by imperialism in an earlier time but argue that its current popularity has nothing to do with imperialism. The gospel in former colonies is authentic now, no longer tainted by Western power, attractive solely because of the power of the Holy Spirit. The gospel flourishes simply because it fulfills needs and works miracles" (Wuthnow 54). Some even propose that it was imperialism that hindered a successful spread of the gospel: "it was precisely as Western colonialism ended that Christianity began a period of explosive growth that still continues unchecked" (Jenkins, *Global Christianity* 70). The Lausanne Covenant, drafted in the 1974 Lausanne Congress of Evangelism, attended by 2,300 evangelical leaders states in section 8: "We rejoice that a new missionary era has dawned. The dominant role of western missions is fast disappearing. God is raising up from the younger churches a great new resource for world evangelization, and is thus demonstrating that the responsibility to evangelize belongs to the whole body of Christ."[16] These discourses are already impacting mission conceptually. The call for a postcolonial missiology has been taken up since then:

> As Euro-American missionary proselytizing is deeply problematic for postcolonialism because it is often based on and perpetuates divisive dualistic thinking and global inequalities [...] An evangelical *postcolonial* missiology, emerging from protests against globalization, will work against perpetuating models of expansionist, center-out or top-down practices of mission. Equally an *evangelical* postcolonial missiology will not be reductionist. It will not abandon the ambiguous and dangerous task of mission by reducing it to relief work or advocacy. [...] Mission is, then, not so much the spread of one truth to many locations as it is the redemptive, discipling and hybridizing participation in many localisms, particularisms, reparations, perspectives and

[16]https://www.lausanne.org/content/covenant/lausanne-covenant

> practices. (author's emphasis, K. H. Smith, Lalitha, and Hawk 41-42)

Postcolonial discourse is used here to re-imagine evangelical mission as a liberating force that evolves out of a critique of the status quo of capitalism and globalization. McGavran's argument that relief work is not a compulsory function of proselytization is repeated here and missionary relief work is represented as a feature of the old Euro-American imperialism and colonialism. One of the practical consequences of the theoretical considerations outlined above is an even stronger turn towards *indigenization*, as already encountered in the example above. The turn to indigenization missiology marks a formal break with the concept of foreign missions and describes the rapid localization of a newly found church. After an initial impulse from the outside by a missionary, who would plant a new church, the main objective is to give over the church to locals as soon as possible. In a missiology context, indigenization means something different than the established use of the term in disciplines like Anthropology would suggest. The aim of *indigenous missiology* is to create "three-self ministries": self-supporting, self-governing and self-propagating congregations.[17] But the new paradigm of indigenization is not without its historical baggage. Rufus Anderson, an early proponent of indigenization saw it in 1869 as a tool to access the "degraded mental condition of the heathen world," since the "native preachers and pastors [came] from the same depths of mental degradation" (R. Anderson 114). Indigenization as a concept has thus existed for over a hundred years and has been in use ever since, but its context has changed—from a paternalistic and chauvinistic stance to a postcolonial stance. Indigenization might be a concept that at least in theory might be able to give more agency to the missionized, but contrary to what the new paradigm postulates, the vast majority of mission is still conducted by external missionaries from foreign organizations. And those missionaries are mainly Americans. The use of postcolonial discourse here obscures the material realities of mission, which Robert Wuthnow reminds us of by pointing out the enormous gap between American

[17]For the origin of this term see (Shenk).

spending power and spending power of countries located in the "new center" of Christianity. As an example, the 155 million Brazilian Christians in comparison to the roughly 190 million Christians in the United States show how the center of Christianity is indeed shifting away from the Unites States considering affiliation only. The difference is that the tithe collected from an average American family for a year would provide for the annual salary of a missionary in Brazil, while it would take the tithes collected from seventy-five average Brazilian families to make a similar contribution to mission (Wuthnow 24-25).

The point Wuthnow makes here is crucial for understanding the dynamics of evangelicalism without ideological distractions. Even if American engagement in mission were to dwindle, the enormous wealth of the United States would still guarantee an uncontested influence in how and where mission would be conducted. And it does not seem to be waning by any means. The newly planted churches are seldom released into autonomy and retain strong ties to their mother organization in the United States as in the example given above. The new paradigm is an attempt by evangelical theorists to 'ride on postcolonial's back,' utilizing it to make invisible the underlying economic and political influences of mission in tune with a globalized capitalism. But the use of postcolonial discourse here is flawed, utilized to promote and legitimize evangelical mission, to re-write it as some form of resistance of the marginalized.

Such a misemployment is certainly made easier by postcolonialism's multitude of voices, its "multifarious mode of analysis, where writers draw their inspiration and conceptual resources from a wide variety of political and philosophical traditions" as Abrahamsen puts it (197). While this certain mode of analysis is labeled by some critics as arbitrary, there are certain crucial themes and disputes recurring, among them the "deep engagement with the role of power in the formation of identity and subjectivity and the relationship between knowledge and political practices" (197) and the following assertion that the *post* in postcolonialism does not mean the end of colonialism, but that we live in a "we live in a post-colonial neo-colonized world" (Spivak 166). This notion is usually not to be found in postcolonial missiology, and if so, then only with evangelical

Christianity as the marginalized.

That does not mean to imply that postcolonialism is above critique. There certainly has been a rich variety of the latter that is worth to be considered. Ironically, in the context of a proposed postcolonial missiology, some of the oldest critiques of postcolonial studies are surprisingly effective. For San Juan, "viewed from the perspective of late-capitalist political economy, the figures of difference, fragmentation, liminality and diaspora [...] are modes of regulating the social relations of production, in particular the division of global social labor and its reproduction" (San Juan, E. Jr.). Focusing on these "modes" exclusively—as postcolonial missiology does—ignores other or even renders silent significant aspects of its discourse. Furthermore, it has been argued that postcolonial discourse tends to utilize a chronological order of 'the colonial' that is followed by the 'postcolonial,' thus merely shifting its focus from the "axis of *power*" to the less productive "axis of *time*," as McClintock points out (McClintock 85), thus following its own binary master narrative, while refuting any other approach as essentializing or totalizing. This becomes clearer with Prakash's assumption that we cannot look at colonial history in the terms of capitalism's development, since we then would essentialize capitalism and affirm the hegemony ourselves by describing it (quoted in O'Hanlon and David Washbrook 196). Evangelical postcolonial missiology follows the same logic of relativization by fragmenting discourses of power. The problem of course is that any missiology is working on its own "grand récit." In the case of evangelicalism, the fallback to the many "petit récits," whether imagined or not, works in favor of its own metanarrative of a vibrant and multiperspective World Christianity that ironically is even heroic in its imagined defiance of the colonial West.

While there are factions within the evangelical movement that are critical of the status quo in proselytization, as the discourse on postcolonial missiology shows, other signs indicate that the dominance of a market-orientated doctrine is all but disappearing, but rather intensifying. A Christian evangelical industry has long been developed that serves every imaginable need: "in addition to books, CDs, and videos, religious

bookstores are now packed with Christian tchotchkes, jewelry, and even junk food.[18] To non-evangelicals, products such as Scripture Candy and Testamints may seem profane" (Hendershot 4), but the claim to cover every aspect of life confirms Comaroff's observation that the "sacred has become increasingly prominent in profane places in our world" (43).

The offer made here is familiar to the consumer, because the product has not changed—only its context has. While a consumerized Christianity certainly seems to be easier to promote, it runs the risk of having to compete with the more secular goods on display. Comaroff quotes a preacher from the New Life Church in Mahikeng, South Africa, who puts this dilemma into words: "It might sound heretical, but we strive to make worship exciting, affecting. Our competition, after all, is the video arcade, the movie house, and the casino." (qtd. in Comaroff 49). And it could be argued that the more mundane competition is already answering the challenge.

Let us consider 'Apple Inc.' as an example. No company is more successful in selling not only electronic commodities, but a whole lifestyle that has become desirable for hundreds of millions of consumers. The whole communication, representation, and marketing of Apple serves the purpose of keeping this desire alive. The design of the company's products is light, simple, almost ethereal. Apple stores resemble temples, with white-plastered walls. Positioned over every store-entrance is the huge white bitten apple, prototypical evidence for the seductiveness of humankind, serving as a quasi-religious symbol for a worldly alternative.[19] Steve Jobs' annual presentation of new Apple products resembled religious services and customers developed an identification with the company that was close to worship, calling Jobs fondly "iGod." Apple's following has even found a 'great antagonist' embodied in Microsoft. Apple borrows heavily from representations of the sacred, however profane these might be put to use, and is immensely successful with a promise that exceeds that of a mere quality product.

[18] See also *To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise* (Moreton). The author describes the intrinsic relationship between capitalism and evangelicalism with the historical development of Wal-Mart as an example for what she calls "Christian free enterprise".

[19] A good example would be the Apple Store at the Rockefeller Center in Manhattan.

As much as this comparison should be taken with a grain of salt, it adds to the observation that "the boundaries dividing government, market and organized religion [are] under siege almost everywhere" (44). And as Comaroff finds "this contemporary branch of Protestantism [...] integrally connected [...] to capitalism in its late modern, post-industrial phase" (43), it is not surprising that the inner-evangelical critique on mission strategies resembles recent forms of critique of capitalism. This argument is not too remote from the critique that sees the message forgotten over the means of distribution, after all. I am alluding here to Naomi Klein, who expounds the problems of a brand-based marketing that emphasizes name-brands and marketing over product quality and sustainability (cf. Klein).

From the 1980s to the the turn of the millennium the "self-commodification" (Hochgeschwender 47) of evangelicalism became more apparent. While in missiology, the seeker-sensitive approach introduced market principles into mission and newly founded mega-churches were designed with corporations in mind as the example of the Willow Creek Community Church shows, a plethora of entertainment products entered the market, which followed the logic of similar, more secular products. Hochgeschwender mentions the Left Behind series as an example for conveying a "total internalization of free-market doctrine" (145) by presenting an apocalyptic, vaguely Christian story along the lines of an American superhero, who delegitimizes democratic proceedings through messianic violence (145). These products from the sphere of *credotainment* (Lawrence and Jewett) are another offer to experience all aspects of the world through an evangelical lens—even action-movies. The commodification goes along a waning of the original message.

The irony is that evangelicalism, as a new holism, is offering a way out of a disenchanted and thoroughly capitalized world. But the salvation it offers—both metaphysical and material—relies on the same structures as the world it promises refuge from does. The "religious cosmopolitanism" as some have called it, can only function successfully as long as it is operating within the boundaries set by the economic paradigm. This becomes especially apparent with The Propserity Gospel, the evangelical branch that

most radically "embraces the material world" (Jean and John Comaroff 23).

Evangelicalism thus refutes the contemporary world, but continues to operate within it. The all encompassing goal of making profit (or to save more unsaved) has to be represented by a message more profound than mere growth, an appeal to the 'meta-consumer' has to be made, so to say. Charles K. Wilber and Laura M. Grimes have pointed out how free market capitalism thus is defended morally by intertwining evangelicalism and capitalism into a "Christian Economics": "Numerous authors defend free market capitalism as the most Christian economic system, basing their arguments upon Scripture and theology in addition to economic theory" (Wilber and Grimes). Evangelical flexibility and pragmatic sense of mission do not fall short of corporate efforts. The emphasis on the means of distribution over the message while obscuring this very mode gives evangelical mission a performative character. Even radical notions of evangelical branches would then merely be vehicles for a much deeper going structural homogenization towards a commodified and Americanized religion, offered by churches, which act like corporations that have more than a product to sell: a whole lifestyle. While consumer's goods have long been infused with the symbolic, promising happiness and the good life, they become more an expression of one's desires and not their aim—consumption approximates religion and vice versa. Jean and John Comaroff have postulated that "neoliberal conditions render ever more obscure the rooting of inequality in structures of production, as work gives way to the mechanical solidarities of 'identity' in constructing self-hood and social being, class comes to be understood, in both popular and scholarly discourse, as yet another personal trait or lifestyle choice." (Jean and John Comaroff 15). In a similar vein, the re-imagining of evangelicalism as diverse and multiperspective World Christianity obscures the structures and flows of power through which evangelical mission operates.

The quantity of manpower and funds and the embedment into late modern capitalism are some of the reasons for the worldwide evangelical expansion. But the question remaining is: how does evangelicalism mobilize the manpower and funds at its disposal on an individual basis? What are the reasons for its success compared to the

Christian competition? The preacher from Mahikeng mentioned earlier already alluded to a possible explanation: excitement and affect, which will be the subject of the following chapter.

3 Affect

Corporations are incorporating elements of religious communality, trying to establish a relationship with the individual in many ways similar to the relationship evangelicalism establishes. On the other side of the reciprocal relationship between corporation and church, the organizational structures of evangelicalism resemble contemporary corporate structures. American religion in general—and evangelicalism in particular—developed consistently with private economic structures. As the organizational bodies of traditional Christian churches resonated with pre-modern societal and economic structures, so does evangelicalism with the contemporary paradigm—neoliberalism and its preferred organizational form: the corporation. Chapter one showed that evangelicalism emphasizes the distribution over the message itself.

While I have so far merely hinted at the important role that affect and emotion play in the formation of these contemporary structures of meaning, both corporate and religious ones, this chapter is dedicated to a more detailed examination of the affective relationship evangelicalism tries to engage the subject with and how it consequently shapes imagined communities as a premise for the activation of its members. Furthermore, I wish to examine in how far evangelicalism can be described as an affective economy that shares fundamental characteristics with late modern capitalism. For this purpose the recent evangelical involvement in the Ukraine conflict will be discussed. It is an example for how American evangelical media created an imagined community of World Christianity and how such imagined communities enable voluntary and monetary commitment of its members. The two main examples for the latter two will be the rather recent phenomenon

of short-term mission and and a look at evangelical fund-raising.

Affect theory has emerged out of a "desire to recognize how the world moves us" (Wetherell and Beer). The notion of movement is one of the few aspects of affect that most authors invested in this field can agree upon. The editors of the *Affect Reader* (Gregg and Seigworth) for example assert that most contributors to the reader concur that affect is something *in-between* bodies that shifts and accumulates and changes, moving bodies rather than inhabiting them (2). Since affect theory is used here as a tool to describe the similarities between late modern capitalism and evangelicalism, it is more interesting to examine what affect *does* rather than what it *is.* The examination of affect thus will be more of empirical than of ontological sort, although authors more inclined to the ontology of affect will be given room whenever their work might contribute to my discussion of evangelicalism.

The emphasis on movement in affect theory as understood in social science and the humanities is one of the more prominent deliminators from how affect is defined within a life sciences framework, especially the nexus that is called *affective neurosciences* which is predominantly grounded in the so-called *basic emotions model*.[1] According to this position, emotional states such as happiness are per se desirable and have no political dimension. Although the basic emotions model has come under criticism from different sides,[2] it can still be called paradigmatic for affective neuroscience (Leys 440). This road to affect should be mentioned here at least briefly since it has repercussions on how affective relationships in (and to) religions are viewed within contributions from such various fields as economics or psychology, where some researchers have adopted the

[1]The theory assumes that all humans share a discrete set of universal emotions that are measurable and physiologically distinct in the sense that different areas of the brain are responsible for different emotions (cf. Ekman; Tomkins). The assumption of the universality of basic emotions has so far led to an approach to affect in science that is more concerned with affect and emotion as states or conditions that influence the patient's well being. Strictly speaking, within such a framework what affect *does* or *is* does not matter as much as how to achieve or hinder certain emotions which are accepted *a priori* as good or bad (or healthy and unhealthy) for the patient.

[2]See Barrett for a critique from the field of psychology ("Are Emotions Natural Kinds?"), for critiques from within the field of affective neuroscience see Posner ("The Circumplex Model of Affect: An Integrative Approach to Affective Neuroscience, Cognitive Development, and Psychopathology") and Davidson ("Seven Sins in the Study of Emotion: Correctives from Affective Neuroscience").

position that emotions are scalable and thus can be associated directly with systems of meaning which trigger respective emotions, in some cases leading to rather misguided research designs: Frey for example wants "to measure the impact of religion on subjective well-being empirically" by utilizing "modern happiness research" (Steiner, Leinert, and Frey). Another team of researchers unhumorously asks the question whether shopping or religious participation contributes more to individual happiness (Cohen-Zada and Sander).

But even within the affect theory framework encountered in social science and cultural studies positions might differ considerably and while this is not the place to survey affect theory's multitude of approaches and positions, it might be helpful to acknowledge Murphy's proposal to approach affect theory less as an emerging field that one day could be compartmentalized into a new discipline labeled 'Affect Studies,' but rather to think in terms of *assemblage* when dealing with affect and emotion (A. Murphy). However, some points of departure crucial for this text will have to be asserted, especially if they are not consensual or even heavily debated within this affect assemblage. I follow Ahmed in the assumption that affect is "sticky," something that "sticks, or what sustains or preserves the connection between ideas, values, and objects" (Ahmed, *Happiness* 230n1). Without such a premise it would be impossible to examine affect as something productive that connects ideas, values and objects. Affect would have no meaning and could not produce any if it indeed were pre-personal and extra-discursive as some suggest.[3] What follows is that a conceptual differentiation of affect, feelings and emotions cannot be made since affects directly influence feelings and emotions.[4] Contrary to such readings of affect

[3]Shouse for example makes a distinction between feelings as something "personal and biographical," emotions as "social" and affects as "pre-personal" (Shouse 2), following Massumi in the assumption that "affect is a non-conscious experience of intensity; it is a moment of unformed and unstructured potential" (5). O'Sullivan sees affects as unproductive and extra-discursive "in the sense that they are 'outside' discourse understood as structure (they are precisely what is irreducible to structure)" (author's emphasis, O'Sullivan 131n4). Some critiques of such an approach point out the proximity such an understanding of affect has to the basic emotion model (cf. Leys 440).

[4]In contrast, many theorists distinguish between affect and emotion. Brian Massumi for example asserts it important to separate emotion and affect conceptually, since they "follow different logics and pertain to different orders" (Massumi, *Parables* 27). 'Emotion' is the "personalized content" that is context-dependent while the term affect signifies the continuation (217). Affect is that which is found between "events" that glues them together and intensifies them: "affect is transsituational. As processual as it is precessual, affect inhabits the passage" (217). Although affect might influence

in the tradition of Spinoza (or, as Ahmed has pointed out, Deleuze's reading of Spinoza),[5] the argument presented here departs from the assumption that meaning structures have to somehow be affectively charged for them to constitute experience (Grossberg, "Affect's Future" 328).

The intrinsic relationship between evangelicalism and late modern capitalism as discussed in the previous chapter is the point of departure for the discussion of affect in this chapter. Evangelical expansion and motivation strategies will be discussed primarily (but not exclusively) by utilizing the politics of affect model by Sara Ahmed. In her theory of affective economies (*Emotion*) Ahmed draws an analogy to Marx' critique on the logic of capital: Emotions circulate and increase thereby similar to capital, stressing the sociality of emotions by proposing neither an "outside-in" model, nor an inside-out model: "Affect does not reside in an object or sign, but is an effect of the circulation between objects and signs (=the accumulation of affective value).[6] Signs increase in affective value as an effect of the movement between signs: the more signs circulate, the more affective they become" (45). In her recent work *The Promise of Happiness*, Sara Ahmed uses the affective economy as a point of departure to describe how happiness aligns bodies to structures and "is used to re-describe social norms as social goods" (*Happiness* 2), stressing that feelings "get structures under our skin" (216) to the effect that happiness

emotion, it is detached from it, as Murphy explicates Massumi's work: affects "are not automatically feelings, or even human, or even lived (think for example of a wave and a cliff affecting and being affected by each other)" (A. Murphy).

[5]The basic premise for such a "nonrepresentationalist ontology" (Leys 442n22) being that *affect is the ability to affect and to be affected*. Brian Massumi, the translator of *A Thousand Plateaus* (Deleuze and Guattari) notes that "*L'affect* (Spinoza's *affectus*) is an ability to affect and be affected. It is a pre-personal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body's capacity to act. *L'affection* (Spinoza's *affectio*) is each such state considered as an encounter between the affected body and a second, affecting, body (with body taken in its broadest possible sense to include 'mental' or ideal bodies)" (xvii). For a more detailed discussion of Deleuze's Spinoza see (Ahmed, *Happiness* 211, 232n3).

[6]The $M - C - M'$ cycle is her point of departure, emotions behave as capital does in Marx's model. The notion of spending spending money for the sake of accumulating more money (in contrast to selling commodities in order to buy more consumable commodities ($C - M - C$)) is older than Marx though. Weber discusses Benjamin Franklin at length (Weber, *Protestant Ethic* 16) attesting his ethos a "philosophy of avarice" (17), which is at the core of what Weber calls "The Spirit of Capitalism". I will return to this notion when discussing duty in capitalism.

becomes a duty for the subject.

The term evangelicalism already evokes images that are connected to emotionality and affect. As discussed in chapter one, the term itself emphasizes movement over meaning, which is fitting as a denominator for a community for which the distribution is more important than the message. Evangelicalism has become a common term for the branch of Christianity that emphasizes the bodily experience of worship over an intellectual one. This tension between the bodily experience and the intellectual experience mirrors the tension between the distribution of the message and the message itself and shares this tension with the clash of the affective and narrative continua Jameson has theorized recently (*Antinomies*), the implications of which will be examined more detailed in the next chapter. Most of the very visible and most irrational practices like glossolalia, faith healing or prophecy, are even refuted by more established currents in the evangelical spectrum (for example the majority of the Southern Baptist Convention[7]), one has not to begin with the most extreme manifestations, like its interpretation of the gifts of the spirit (e.g. speaking in tongues, prophecy or faith healing etc.) to arrive at the conclusion that evangelical worship differs from traditional Christian worship. It seems incompatible with a more secular view that separates religious from public life, drawing a line between the inner and the outer world. The tension between a continuum that emphasizes "intelligibility" and evangelicalism as its disruption in the form of bodily experience becomes apparent even in the historical beginnings of modern evangelicalism in the early twentieth century.

[7]The Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) is the biggest Protestant denomination in the United States. Considering doctrine and practice, they follow evangelicalism. However, due to the diversity within the SBC with its sixteen million members (Lindner 12) and an ecclesiastical polity (i.e. church governance) that fosters the independence and administrative autonomy of the local churches, the SBC hosts both a considerable liberal faction and a considerable fundamentalist faction (which is not necessarily the same as evangelicalism). For a general introduction to the SBC, see (Marsden, *Reforming Fundamentalism* 164; Balmer, *Evangelicalism* 540). For a closer look at the recent history, especially at the "fundamentalist takeover" in the Southern Baptist Convention, see (Ammerman).

3.1 Azusa Street Revival

Azusa Street 312, Los Angeles, well known for what was probably one of the first evangelical revivals that took place here in 1906. Worshipers met for ecstatic, joyous services expressing their beliefs in a fashion yet unheard of. The Los Angeles Times commented on the *Azusa Street Revival*, as the event has come to be known, in an article on April 18, 1906 headlined "Weird Babel of Tongues. New Sect of Fanatics Is Breaking Loose." The deprecatory tone of the headline, continued in the article implies danger and hints at how radically different from contemporary conventions of Christianity these revivals must have been.

> "Breathing strange utterances and mouthing a creed which it would seem no sane mortal could understand, the newest religious sect has started in Los Angeles. [...] After an hour spent in exhortation the brethren present are invited to join in a 'meeting of prayer, song and testimony.' Then it is that pandemonium breaks loose, and the bounds of reason are passed by those who are 'filled with the spirit,' whatever that may be. 'You-oo-oo gou-loo-loo come under the bloo-oo-oo boo-loo,' shouts an old colored 'mammy,' in a frenzy of religious zeal. Swinging her arms wildly about her, she continues with the strangest harangue ever uttered."
>
> (author's emphasis, qtd. in Bartleman , LA (Daily) Times, April 18, 1906)

The interracial character of the Azusa Street Revival ("Colored people and a sprinkling of whites compose the congregation" (Bartleman)) is met with a racist undertone in the article.[8] But it is the emotional and irrational nature of the revival that is emphasized:

[8]There is certainly much to be gained from an examination of the relationship between racism and evangelicalism's beginnings. However, since this subject is not of my immediate interest in regard to my thesis, the implications such a examination might carry will only briefly be sketchedout here. Sianne Ngai's concept of *animatedness*, conceptualized as an analogy to stop-motion animation in film, might be helpful here to analyze the scene and its description by the journalists. With *animatedness* Ngai explores how the concept of "being moved" has been "twisted into the image of the overemotional racialized subject, abetting his or her construction as unusually receptive to external control" (Ngai, *Ugly Feelings* 91). Animatedness is the condition where individual emotions are made invisible under

Glossolalia, considered a gift of the spirit and proof of both God's affection and the worshipers devotion by evangelicals is for the 1910s journalists from the LA Times only animal-like onomatopoetic utterances. What today is considered the birthplace of Pentecostalism by many evangelicals is described here as a happening beyond sanity and rationality—the worshipers are detached from "sane mortals," the "bounds of reason are passed." The language used here to describe the Azusa Street Revival is that of the cult, of the sect: the participants are "filled with the spirit," who takes control over them. The description of the scene with the term "pandemonium" implies both chaos and tumult, but also invokes its original meaning as the "high capital of Satan and all his peers" in *Paradise Lost* (Milton Book 1, 27).

What the article conveys to its readers is that the worshipers at Azusa Street thus are possessed by something that is not part of the rational world and not even Christianity. In this article, the Azusa Street Revival is narrated as a breakdown of civilization and also conveys a warning: White Americans attending such a revival risk stepping outside the boundaries of their cultural peer group that deemed itself the gatekeepers of reason and civility and are punished the crossing of these boundaries with expulsion. The cult defies authority, according to Weber's Tripartite classification of authority,[9] it is "charismatic authority" which defies traditional and "legal-rational authority." What might not be the state of art in sociological research nevertheless still resonates in the cultural archives of our understanding of religion and its relationship to

prototypes of emotion. Ngai argues that especially black Americans are usually represented as overly emotional, guided by their emotions rather than reason: a good example would be representations of Gospel music and Black Church services, where everybody is always fanatically singing and dancing. Animatedness describes the point where we don't see the singing and dancing individual anymore but only the black man or woman expressing his or her religiosity. The Azusa Street Revival's description breathes animatedness. For the author of the article it is not surprising that black Americans meet for such an emotional service. The onomatopoeia used to describe the worship of the black woman ("old colored 'mammy'") in the article further dehumanizes her by equating her utterances to those of animals. Noteworthy for the author of the article and probably for its white audience is that white Americans participate. According to the LA Times article, it is understandable that blacks with their exuberant emotionality would fall for such a dubious religion. Scandalous here is not even the interracial communion, but that whites would even consider going to such an emotional spectacle.

[9] "Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft" are legal authority, traditional authority and charismatic authority. These three types compete over time for control (cf. Weber, "The Three Types of Legitimate Rule").

the rational world. This is why the Azusa Street Revival is historically significant for evangelicalism. For evangelicals this revival is archetypical in marking the beginning of religion as a bodily experience that is closer to what is assumed to be ancient Christianity. The reaction to the Azusa Street Revival also marks the beginning of the evangelical community asserting itself as outsiders that are marginalized and even ridiculed by the majority. The contempt for anything considered mainstream prominent in evangelicalism to this day derives in most parts from such a self-assertion and also carries specifically American notions of resistance against authority.[10]

In addition, resonating with the cult is the notion that emotions act like contagion—they do not originate in the individual body, but the body is overcome by an emotion from without. While such an understanding of emotion is helpful in challenging the notion of a psychological inside-out model of affect and emotion as described above, it also comes with new problems; Ahmed asserts that the "concept of affective contagion does tend to treat affect as something that moves smoothly from body to body, sustaining integrity in being passed around" (Ahmed, *Happiness* 39).[11] Being contaminated would be a question of weakness of character and as such—being of weak character—the participants of the Revival are pictured.

Apart from the psychological inside-out model, the Azusa Street Revival can also be read along the lines of an outside-in model. This perspective is still prominent in literature critically involved with evangelicalism, evoking the crowd psychology of a Durkheimian tradition (*collective effervescence*) and a sociological *outside-in model* that regards emotion as something a social body or group generates and thus shaping the emotions of the individual and/or group. This view can be interpreted as a function of a

[10]For a discussion of the importance of being "embattled and thriving" for evangelical identity see (C. Smith and Emerson) and (Shuck). For an exploration of the American trait of being a dissenter and its importance for American religious groups, especially evangelical, see (Moore).

[11]Again, affect would be treated as "irreducible to structure" (O'Sullivan 131n4). Sedgwick, for example, describes how shame generates shame in others. The affect is transferred without any loss or reaction (Sedgwick 36-38). Ahmed wonders "whether the concept of affective contagion might underestimate the extent to which affects are contingent [...]: to be affected by another does not mean that an affect simply passes or 'leaps' from one body to another" (Ahmed, *Happiness* 39).

secular and rational worldview, or put differently, a discourse emerging from a "closed immanent frame" (C. Taylor). Included in this approach is the notion of the crowd as a threat, the uncontrollable masses that act on impulse rather than deliberately. Needless to say, the invocation of the crowd as a contagious threat works in any context[12] and may be used as an argument that defines the crowd as a threat to an established order or paradigm. The outside-in model is still prominent in academic and other secular representations of evangelicalism. It helps forming the image of evangelicalism as a *mauvaise foi*. Apart from the ideological implications, such an interpretation of affect is problematic, as Sara Ahmed points out, "because it assumes that emotions are something that 'we have' (author's emphasis, *Emotion* 10). The crowd becomes like the individual, the one that has feelings." (10). The critique here aims at the blurriness of the distinction between the inside-out and the outside-in model—both models share that emotions originate in a body, either an individual or a social body. A similar problematization can be applied to behavioral models of emotions and for the investigation of neural processes that engage affect—both take for granted that emotions originate in the individual (Huddy, Sears, and Levy 166 pp.). Ahmed in contrast proposes that "emotions create the very effect of the surfaces and boundaries that allow us to distinguish an inside and an outside in the first place" (Ahmed, *Emotion* 10). The focus is changed here from an ontological discussion on what emotions are to a discussion on what emotions do: "emotions are not 'in' either the individual or the social, but produce the very surfaces and boundaries that allow the individual and the social to be delineated as if they are objects" (author's emphasis, *Emotion* 10).

The notion that we have emotions is also prominent in cognitive science theories, which as John Corrigan points out "generally view emotion as inherently joined to cognition [and] have been deployed to explore a range of issues, including the manner in which ritual impresses belief through emotional intensity, how 'emotional cognition,' derived from brain structures, makes persons susceptible to religion, and how reasoning be-

[12]The depiction of Communists as de-individualized mass, able to brainwash Americans from god-loving individuals, converting them to a godless mass is almost a perfect mirror-image.

comes integrated with the feeling in religion" (Corrigan 5).[13] Following this line of thought religion becomes a therapeutic method, similar to a reversed aversion therapy, highly popular in the 1950s and 60s and mockingly criticized in *A Clockwork Orange* (Burgess). Similar to Dr. Brodsky applying the "Ludovico technique" on Alex, evangelicalism would apply ritual on the acolyte believer. The believer's exposure to religious ritual, 'infects' (or brainwashes) the believer's reasoning with religion in a classic outside-in movement. Ritual here is a scalable mean, the success of its application depending on intensity and frequency.

It is important to stress that group rituals in evangelicalism, its most extreme forms being glossolalia, faith healing, prophecy and all the other "irrational practices," are extreme examples of emotion and affect in evangelicalism and although they are prolific throughout the different groups and churches, they are not prolific enough to identify as a common denominator for the movement. As already mentioned in the introduction, even in evangelical circles, the 'spiritual gifts' are controversial enough for some congregations to repudiate them completely or at least downplay these practices in their external representations.[14] However, they are a representation of how evangelicalism fosters a notion of Christianity radically different from mainline churches or Catholicism.

[13]Emphasizing on ritual in a similar vein is the schema of *interaction ritual chains* (IRC) (Collins), which describes the genesis and the movement of emotions in individual encounters as crucial in forming the social. Collins elaborates a theory of how the ritual forms groups via emotion: different interaction rituals link together in a chain that creates solidarity of an individual with a group. A successful IRC creates "emotional energy"—which Collins describes as a collective feeling of achievement—and collective symbols that are assigned sacred qualities (49). The theory was applied to evangelical Christianity by Joel Robbins ("Pentecostal Networks"), which is quickly becoming one of the most accepted approaches to explaining the worldwide success of evangelicalism (At least of Pentecostal/Charismatic Christianity to which Robbins is referring to.) utilizing affect theory. Collins concept of interaction ritual chains itself calls for critique, because it locates emotion and the production of "emotional energy" exclusively in group-related ritual. Peter Baehr asks how "emotional energy" can be central to the ritual but at the same time merely be the outcome of the ritual (Baehr). Here Collins inflates the aim with the mean, as emotional energy is both what fuels the IRCs and what they are leading to. Ahmed discusses this as making a "a means to an end, as well as an end" in her critique of how happiness is constructed in 'positive psychology' (Ahmed, *Happiness* 10), which roughly follows the assertion that all maladies can be atoned by positive thinking.

[14]The Southern Baptist Church for example, while not having an official stance on the gifts of the spirit, followed a rather cessationist line, assuming that all gifts ceased with the original twelve apostles. Missionary candidates speaking in tongues would be immediately disqualified, for example. However, resistance is slowly waning: The policy was recently reversed (Allen).

They are but a few of many different approaches to an emotional, affective, less dogmatic but more experiential Christianity. Undeniably ritual plays its part in constituting the evangelical community, but identifying it as the sole medium for affect and emotion leaves out the political implications of what makes evangelicalism so appealing and why its offer is so fundamentally different to that of established Christian churches. The gifts of the spirit are just one of many offers from within the evangelical spectrum. They strike many uninitiated as the most fascinating factor as they are farthest away from a rational perspective on the world. As Coleman observes, it is not the distinct practices or rituals that define evangelicals, but the offer of an experience that had been missing before: "While theological differences may exist among believers as to how regeneration is embodied—through tongues, moral action, prosperity, and so on—the point remains that the person becomes a vessel for the transcendent in a way that has been latent or absent beforehand" (Coleman, "Empire on a Hill" 664).

The offer that evangelicalism makes carries the prospect of belonging to a community that was formed as anti-thesis to all others existing, both secular and non-secular. It is an offer of transformation, promising to change the individual life of each believer fundamentally, while at the same time reaffirming his or her way of living as the right one. Kunow has recently pointed out to how religions "have created and sustained their own particular brand of cosmopolitanism, one that inserts insider/outsider relations into a framework that is at the same time transnational and transcendental" (Kunow, "Religious Cosmopolitanism" 27). What Kunow proposes to be a feature of all religions, is particularly true for evangelicalism which has approximated its own logic of expansion, dogma and action more to the workings of late modern capitalism than any other religion. Both, evangelicalism and late modern capitalism thus colonize the mind in a similar fashion as their offers share many similarities. The dialectic tension in this of course is between the longing of being part of a community on the one hand, and the celebration of the individual and its personal relations to God and its individual successes in a competitive world on the other. Capitalism has its own imagined community of a

transnational elite that is united in *ambition, passion* and *vision,* all nouns part of the mantra of the corporate world. At first sight the evangelical offer of community seems to differ from that of late modern capitalism, but a closer look shows profound similarities.

3.2 Community

It is generally agreed upon[15] that our current market paradigm—late modern capitalism or neoliberalism—is not conducive to any form of community. Not only after Margaret Thatcher proclaimed that "there is no such thing as society,"[16] late modern capitalism has been relying on mobility of capital, but also of the individual at the expense of local communities: The "transnational character of capitalism promotes an ever greater mobility of people" (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 161) and so it is only logical that the offers of belongingness sanctioned by neoliberalism rather emphasize the transnational, mobility, and competition. Affiliation with a global corporation ideally would fulfill the needs of the individual to belong to a group. But also offers of belonging from seemingly unrelated areas, such as religion, can be promoting similar values. Within evangelicalism, a surprising number of offers of belonging adhere to a logic of neoliberal thinking, which is the subject the following pages.

"You are called to belong, not just to believe" (Warren 85). Rick Warren, author of what is the most successful evangelical Christian guideline book[17] dedicates one chapter to community in "The Purpose-Driven Live," a book that has sold 25 million copies and has become one of the most prominent devotional books for evangelicals. "While your relationship to Christ is personal, God never intends it to be private. In

[15]The most recent contribution to this discussion would be *The Limits of Neoliberalism* (Davies). Thomas Piketty's *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* is at its base a call for a global democratic community as a counter-weight to global neoliberalism (Piketty 535). For a case study on the direct impact of neoliberalism on community work see (Brady, Schoeneman, and Sawyer), for a sociological perspective on the antagonisms of neoliberal globalization and global community work see (Bandelj, Shorette, and Sowers). See also (Bourdieu, "Neo-Liberalism, the Utopia (Becoming a Reality) of Unlimited Exploitation"; "The 'Myth' of Globalization and the Welfare State") as well as Harvey's recent take on the history of neoliberalism (Harvey) and Susan George's lecture on the same topic (George).

[16]I am not trying to revoke the separation and distinction of the terms *society* and *community* undertaken by Ferdinand Tönnies more than a hundred years ago, but allude to the general uneasiness neoliberalism has with any group greater than one.

[17]Luhrmann points to the similarities Warren's guidelines have with behavioral cognitive therapy: "If you read Rick Warren's Purpose Driven Life, it reads from one perspective very much like a cognitive behavioral therapy manual. He's trying to get you to see yourself from God's perspective. It starts with the statement that you are not an accident. And then, with each chapter, he is asking you to reconsider yourself, not from the perspective of your own limitations or your own failures, but from the sense that you are not properly understanding yourself as seen from the person who created you" (Luhrmann).

God's family you are connected to every other believer, and we will belong to each other *for eternity* (author's emphasis Warren 85)." Warren thus promises both, a personal relationship with God and being part of a *body of Christ* in the form of a community of like-minded who share a similar connection. Evangelicals have always been on the forefront of using new media to broadcast their message and, as I argue, proliferated a sense of community that went beyond the boundaries of the locale. In the case of the United States such imagined communities of Christians are even older than the nation: From the receivers of the circuit riders to listeners of the first evangelical radio broadcasts[18] to viewers of evangelical televangelists, the local congregation or evangelical gathering has for most of the time been extended by some external entity that helped in giving a sense of belongingness that transgressed the horizon of the locale and now help fostering a sense of being part of a global, transnational community. Today, evangelicals are again trailblazing the use of the internet and social media for developing and maintaining a transnational community as a first step to integrate individuals with a holistic system of meaning. Ukraine, as a recent example of constructing such a transnational evangelical community by the use of conventional and social media shows how elaborated these efforts have become.

3.2.1 The Battle for Ukraine's Christianity

The Ukraine crisis is very interesting for analyzing by which means an international Christian community is imagined—particularly for US American evangelicals—in order to make use of their productive means (in this case donations and prayer) for the sake of this newly created community. Apart from a look at evangelical media, the function of praying has been re-contextualized for internet-use and how it can be utilized to create such an *imagined community* (B. Anderson). The crisis in Ukraine that began in November 2013 with protests against the suspension of the preparations of signing

[18] A phenomenon Time magazine labeled "Air Worship" in 1931 (Time Magazine, "Air Worship").

of the EU Association Agreement on Maidan Square, has escalated not only into the first serious conflict between Russia and the West since the Cold War, but is also an example of what has been called a postmodern conflict. In what seems to be a classic conflict between NATO member states and the Russian Federation over geostrategic and economic influence, the melange of irregular combatants, contradictory news flows and intelligence items, notions of propaganda war and a deeply skeptical public in the West contribute to a blurriness that made it difficult to discern what was going on—at least until Russian 'little green men' invaded and annexed the Crimean peninsula. A multitude of different narratives competed for international attention, each claiming to be the most objective representation of the crisis. Apart from a Russian, an American, a European, a Ukrainian, and a Separatist narrative, unsurprisingly, evangelical media had their own interpretative frame, which created a connection between American and Ukrainian evangelicals by invoking the narrative of *World Christianity*.

And indeed, Ukraine has a long evangelical tradition. According to Catherine Wanner, the first American Baptist missionaries were active here before the revolution of 1917 and it is estimated that half of the three million evangelicals that were officially registered in the Soviet Union were Ukrainians (Wanner 732). Today, about two to three percent of Ukrainians are evangelicals, and the former "Bible Belt of the Soviet Union" (Fletcher) has turned into an evangelical hub from which Eastern Europe and Asia are missionized. Funding for these endeavors is provided from churches and organizations in the US, which also send missionaries, of which many are former Ukrainian emigrants now returning to their home country to spread the gospel. Even without the crisis, the example of Ukraine is particularly interesting, because the evangelical community of the country had been 'out of touch' with evangelicals from the States and other countries during the existence of the Soviet Union. Wanner describes a complex relationship between state structures, Ukrainian culture and Baptism that formed a unique Baptism rooted both in a rigid conservatism and an incorporation of Soviet values. This is one of the reasons why Ukrainian Baptism is a lot more traditional than its American counterpart. The first

encounters between Ukrainian evangelicals and American evangelical missionaries (who themselves were of mostly Ukrainian or Russian descent) are described by Wanner as religious communities who followed what might be called an "inner-worldly asceticism" (Weber) that forbid alcohol, singing and promoted the head-scarf to be worn by women and hold high the principle of seniority for determining authority. Contrary to the Ukrainians, the American missionaries were in their thirties, played acoustic guitar while wearing shorts and would even occasionally drink beer (Wanner 182, 196). After the fall of the Eastern Block Ukraine saw, as many other countries of the former Eastern Block, a renaissance of American mission. Hundreds of American missionaries were active in Ukraine after 1991, mostly funded by American sponsors. It has been argued that the success of evangelicalism was due to the vacuum the collapse of Communism had left. But other culturally similar countries like Russia or Belarus did not experience the success of a plethora of competing Christian groups. Wanner's explanation from 2004 goes along the lines of Religious Market Theory: As the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches were not able to unite and create a narrative of a state church grounded in national culture and thus using religion as nation building force (735)—as had been done successfully in Russia and Belarus—the absence of a state church favored a religious pluralism, making Ukraine one of the most active and competitive religious marketplaces (736). In a similar vein, the relationship between the traditional evangelicals and the newly arrived American missionaries is described as an exchange between the local and the global and as one of the many success stories of a globalized Christianity, that is pivoting around the notion of a religiously more receptive "Global South," with US American evangelicalism being just one of many manifestations of World Christianity. But the conflicts Wanner describes between the traditional and older evangelical churches in Ukraine and the newer creed spread by American missionaries and American funding can also be read along the lines of cultural conflict or more specifically, American religious and cultural export. Wanner's description of the differences between Ukrainian and American evangelicals seems to confirm that American evangelical involvement is less a support of Ukrainian evangelicals as it is a take-

over. The idea of World Christianity, made up by many different local facets can—at least for Ukraine—not be confirmed as American evangelicalism invested heavily in promoting an American version of evangelicalism in Ukraine that is especially successful with young Ukrainians for whom the Good News of evangelicalism are inextricably connected to the promise of consumerism and an American way of Life.

The long history of US-evangelical involvement and the importance of Ukraine as an evangelical base for further expansion in Eastern Europe and Central Asia are important for understanding the evangelical view on the Ukraine crisis. In American evangelical media, the crisis was covered extensively, concentrating on the impact of the conflict on evangelical Christians: *Christianity Today,*[19] for example, presented a feature on Oleksandr Turchynov, a Baptist preacher, who became Ukraine's interim-president for one week as a possible hopeful turning-point to the better in Ukraine (Morgan, "Baptist as President"). In March 2014, an appeal to pray for the prevention of a Russian invasion was published ("All-Night Prayer Vigil"), followed by a report on the occupation of a Christian University in Donetsk by pro-Russian forces (Tracy), slowly building-up an image of imminent danger for Ukraine's evangelicals. This narrative was supported by background features like the one looking in-depth into the religious side of the conflicts of the last 160 years on the Crimean peninsula by Philip Jenkins (Jenkins, "Christian History of Ukraine"). Other evangelical media, like Pat Robertson's Christian Broadcast Network, known for the program *The 700 Club*, published similar features, for example a report on four evangelicals who were abducted and murdered by pro-Russian separatists, assumingly because of their faith, thus creating a narrative of Christian persecution (Thomas). While all of these occurrences where part of the Ukrainian conflict, the emphasis on evangelical Ukraine created an interpretative frame, or 'evangelical lens' that formed its own narrative of the conflict: That of Ukraine as one of the many battlefields of World Christianity, besieged by non-Christian forces. In the case of Ukraine this narrative is also borrowing

[19] "CT" is one of the major evangelical news media providers with a circulation of 120,000 (print) and 647,000 monthly unique visitors for its online services ("CT media data").

from an even older narrative of a secular Soviet Russia, the 'Evil Empire' and enemy of America and Christianity. The evangelical updated version of this trope implies a continuation of that image, identifying a homogenous Russian-Orthodox side now as the opponent, in line with the evangelical claim of being the sole representation of Christianity.

This re-framing of a primarily geostrategic conflict of interest between Russia and the West into a conflict of (religious) identity (cf. Rothman) has several implications for the perception of the events in Ukraine by evangelicals in the United States, one of them being the invocation of a "deep, horizontal comradeship" that Anderson calls imagined community (B. Anderson 6) 'World Christianity,' which makes it easier for Americans to relate to a conflict that is 5,000 miles away from the USA, effectively making evangelicals in the United States part of that conflict. And more importantly suggesting that individual American evangelicals can influence the conflict in their favor.

"Tortured in Ukraine: Christians Living a Nightmare" (Thomas), the news feature mentioned above is a good example for this. It was repeatedly broadcast by different evangelical news stations and is centered on the widow of one the four abducted evangelicals. In an emotionally charged interview the widow states that she is "unwavering in her faith, trusting God to take care of her, the children, and Ukraine," stressing the importance of praying for Ukraine, by expressing that "the prayers from around the world help." The message to an American evangelical audience is clear: The suffering of the widow can be mitigated by praying for her, forming an affective connection of empathy and love between the praying subject and the widow. Here, prayer serves as a vehicle for affect, increasing the affective value between the American Christians praying and the Ukrainian widow, who acknowledges the prayer. Both become part of World Christianity, which at the same time diminishes other communities they may belong to. The function of prayer has expanded. In addition to being a one-way communication with God, praying now serves as a medium for an emotional communication with fellow Christians. More importantly, prayer also becomes a moral duty, because how can you not pray, if you know it helps?

There are important aspects to the invocation of a World Christianity through suffering, which first of all obviously is a notion inherent to all variants of Christianity. Here, it is the Christian in the Global South, who is suffering and the American Christian, who has the means to end this suffering, reviving a narrative of benevolent paternalism and imperialism in which Americans have the duty to free the World of its suffering. Duty is the first element that contributes to the sense of being part of an imagined world Christianity for US evangelicals, deeply intertwined with American notions of having a mission to the world.[20] This element also appeals to a double sense of duty—both as a Christian to save the unsaved and as the secular sense of duty American's have to the world[21]

But evangelicalism does not only invite believers to emphatically acknowledge the other's suffering (whether he or she be Christian or not), to pity him or her or to help, it also invites to *partake* in the other Christian's suffering. The second element of constituting the imagined community of World Christianity is dependent on a reciprocal recognition of suffering. What Eva Illouz attests for emotional capitalism[22] is equally true for the notion of suffering in this example: the model of communication which has pervaded our private and public lives "performs the new demand that one be recognized by others and recognize others" (*Cold Intimacies* 37).

Such a sense of being part of a group which is suffering from persecution worldwide has been preserved in the American evangelical self since the Azusa Street Revival and its following neglect and ridicule by non-evangelicals. Today's evangelical commentators and pundits create a narrative of Christianity being under siege; not only in

[20]Mission to the World is also the name of of the mission agency for the reformed evangelical *Presbyterian Church in America (PCA),* the second largest Presbyterian Church in the USA; not to be confused with the Presbyterian Church (USA), which has a mainline reformed orientation.

[21]As discussed on page 66 with the help of Junker.

[22]Eva Illouz has newly conceptualized the reliance of capitalism on affect and emotion: Contrary to the image of capitalism as a cold and rational machine, it has rather created a more emotional world: "The economic sphere, far from being devoid of emotions, has been on the contrary saturated with affect" (Illouz, *Cold Intimacies* 23). The spheres of capitalism and emotion have become so deeply intertwined that they cannot be thought separately anymore, Illouz calls the resulting entity *emotional capitalism.*

the Global South, but also in the United States. A rather extreme example for this notion of Christianity being persecuted worldwide is Todd Starne's "Dispatched," a program on Fox News, in which host Starne has repeatedly suggested that Christians are systematically persecuted in the United States. Apart from angled reports on the banning of Christmas at public schools or the alleged persecution of religious teachers, Starnes recently suggested that the temporary blocking of all websites of the Southern Baptist Convention by the U.S. Army was proof of the Obama administration being engaged in what he called "Christian cleansing" (Fischer). Alan Noble has recently pointed out in *The Atlantic* how evangelicalism in the United States is suffering from a "persecution complex" (Noble). Noble makes visible the tendency in evangelical sub-culture to glorify persecution as being proof of being a real Christian. As it has become increasingly important to define and postulate not what one does but what one *is* in the wake of the rise of identity politics, evangelicalism offers to be part of a minority community that is suffering from persecution, cultural marginalization—at least a perceived one as evangelicalism is clearly a mass phenomenon in the United States—and non-recognition. This way, even the stereotypical white old man can become part of a prosecuted minority. The Ukraine example shows how normative and psychological recognition are fused into one. Here, recognition of suffering equals recognition of suffering of Christians worldwide, which in turn translates to the recognition of one's own individual suffering. Two aspects work in favor of this: First, the wide acceptance of politics of difference as a mode of liberation and resistance opposed to a material struggle[23] and an increasing recognition of individual emotional suffering. As Robert Hughes puts it: We live in an "increasingly confessional culture, one in which the democracy of pain reigns supreme. Everyone might not be rich and famous, but everyone has suffered" (qtd. in Illouz, *Oprah* 81) to which Illouz adds that "identity is defined by its psychic lacks and deficiencies, which is incorporated back into the market through injunctions of self-help" (*Cold Intimacies* 109).[24] One of the means of self-help after Illouz

[23]Which is mirrored in the evangelical shift from a charitable mission to an identity-based mission mentioned earlier.

[24]For a recent theoretical approach to victimhood see also Giglioli, who sees victimhood as a position

in an evangelical context is prayer, which has transformed into a mode of communication.

3.2.2 Intimate Public Spheres

How much the character of prayer has changed and has become a means to circulate emotion, to create communities in evangelicalism, reveals a look at so called prayer apps for smart phones and similar supportive applications or web services that are very popular with evangelicals. The app *Instapray*, available for iOS and Android (slogan: "Pray more, worry less") was downloaded by more than 100,000 Android users alone and lets one connect with 'prayer feeds' from various evangelical churches or mission agencies. Via this app, users/believers can be invited to pray for a specific goal or event and thus be synchronized to pray for a specific goal at a set time, creating a powerful simulacrum of community. Users can also send out and answer to individual prayer requests, further individualizing the concept; after sending out a request, the user/believer can immediately check how many others responded to the call and are now praying for him or her. This is just one example for the genre of prayer apps. They all have in common that they are easily and intuitively to use, because they make use of practices we have already encountered and trained in social media. Similarly to social media, these services create the illusion of being part of a community, the illusion of being of use value to the user, while in reality its use generates a far greater value (surplus value) for the corporation (which can sell the user's data).

Internet economy itself can be described as a transformation process that aims at taking over established 'offline-businesses' by creating new dependencies for the customers, like *Uber* displacing established taxi companies (and with them what is left of protection of labor). According to Antonia Garcia Martinez, ex-manager with facebook, it is our conceptions of community itself that facebook wants to gradually change and then replace with their own (cf. García Martínez). The community social media thus offers is

of relating power: A victim does not have to exculpate him- or herself and takes no responsibility (Giglioli).

not only a simulacrum, but also colonizing minds by converging the commercial interest of the corporation with its customers conception of community—creating thus a private filter bubble. However, the value of such social media modifications for evangelicalism is not (primarily) material but affective: as a means of circulating emotion, it contributes to an affectively and emotionally charged community that can be motivated to further commit to the cause, thus politicizing the community.

Lauren Berlant's notion of an "intimate public sphere" is useful here to understand how an affective formation of an imagined community—in this case World Christianity—makes it easier to tap into the resources needed for further expansion. According to Berlant, "what makes a public sphere intimate is an expectation that the consumers of a particular stuff *already* share a worldview and and emotional knowledge that they have derived from a broadly common historical experience" (author's emphasis Berlant, *Female Complaint* viii). By "consuming" the intimate public sphere, evangelicals can become part of that process by praying, donating or other actions. Berlant asserts "that a certain circularity structures intimate public spheres." The "narratives and things" of the common history of the "consumer participants" both shapes its conventions of belonging and is at the same time expressive of that history (viii). For American evangelicals their broadly common historical experience is conveyed in Ukraine by US-evangelical missionaries, who, from an evangelical point of view, provide a better experience of social belonging for Ukrainians, while reaffirming their own experience of social belonging. The offer to become part of a community engaged in Ukraine via online prayer both affirms the evangelical common history and shapes it by offering a low entry point into the community and thus attracting more people to it; it also becomes an affective magnet. The intimate public already "is an achievement. [...] It flourishes as a porous, affective scene of identification among strangers that promises a certain experience of belonging" (viii). The evangelical offer of community thus is an offer of belonging without the impertinences it might impose on the individual like proximity to others, liability, continuity or accountability. Anyone can tap in into a global community of individuals

that think they are sharing one vision without having to dispute what this vision is. A fitting analogy for the intimate public sphere that sheds light on how much of in demand these kinds of communities are is "The silent disco." People meet in clubs where music is not played via loudspeakers, but each visitor is handed a pair of cordless headphones with which they can tap into what the DJ is playing. Very often they can even chose between multiple DJs playing simultaneously at such an event. Visitors might dance together, but to different tunes, each one in their own respective audio bubble that is not penetrable by others (except for when they take off their headphones). Thus visitors can participate at a public event with other people, but define all parameters according to their wishes: type of music, speaker volume etc. World Christianity is a similar offer: One does not have to leave their respective comfort zone and engage with the outside in order to become part of it—this is an option though, but by taking off the headphones the connection becomes a local one (between those who left their bubbles), with all consequences that such an encounter entails. A very similar phenomenon has been observed by Robert Bellah called *Sheilaism*. Based upon an interview with a young nurse who the researchers named Sheila Larson (and who had "received a good deal of therapy," Bellah, "Implications" 221), the term denotes an individual belief system that has no theological foundation. Bellah mused, that Sheilaism was the "perfectly natural expression of current American religious life" as it "suggests the logical possibility of 220 million American religions, one for each of us" (221). The evangelical offer of community offers shelter to all those lonely Sheilaisms out there.

I have identified two narrative elements as crucial to enable this particular community—duty and suffering. One narrative tells of suffering, of recognition of being part of a marginalized and persecuted group—as Melani McAlister asserts, "many of the fundamental affects of [the evangelical public] are organized around outsiderness, despite the obvious social and political power of the community over the last thirty years." (McAlister 873). Acknowledging Ukraine's suffering and the American evangelical's suffering as two sides of the same phenomenon—persecution of Christians, while the

second narrative is one of duty: The invocation of World Christianity is an appeal to the duty American evangelicals have to the world, a religious duty to bring the Good News to everyone. A duty that resonates with the secular American duty to free the world of poverty and oppression in the firm belief that this can be achieved by Americans. American exceptionalism thus has its mirror-image in evangelicalism's mission to the world, creating what Melanie McAlister has called an "enchanted Internationalism" (873). The first step to fulfill this duty is to acknowledge the worldwide community, to become part of it trough prayer and only later through action—monetary and temporal engagement. As global corporations like Apple Inc. approximate a religious logic, so does evangelicalism approximate the corporate logic of community by using similar technology like social media. This process fortifies both logics and the mutual reliance on similar technologies is one of the basic structural homology between late modern capitalism and evangelicalism. Both promise being part of a community that goes beyond the individual horizon, of being of value, of doing something substantially important, to have an impact, to turn the world upside down, but with minimal effort. Both are thus maximized offers with a high return of investment for a minimal investment.

3.3 Fund Raising—God Himself Wants Profit

Having looked at how evangelicalism makes offers of belongingness in the previous example, I want to turn now to how such an imagined community is motivated to donate to the course. There is possibly no better example to start an inquiry into relationship between affectively charged evangelicalism and capitalism than the evangelical empire of late Reverend Jerry Falwell Sr., founder of the Thomas Road Baptist Mega-church, co-founder of the Moral Majority and the Old Time Gospel Hour, a syndicated radio and TV ministry (now branded as Liberty Channel TV network) and founder of the now biggest private university in the United States, Liberty University. Falwell Sr. was one of the protagonists of the Moral Majority and has ever since build a "religious empire" (The Economist, "God Without the Godfather"). His views expressed in countless interviews have left little room for ambiguity on his political views. From promoting and religiously justifying war (Vietnam, Iraq), denunciation of the political left, of homosexuals, to favoring Christian Zionism and promoting a pro-Apartheid stance, Jerry Falwell Sr. was one of the ideological key figures of the evangelical movement in the twentieth century, and has shaped both sociocultural environment and public image of evangelicalism well into the present. But the designation "godfather" chosen by The Economist in the article quoted above does not exclusively refer to his importance as a leader within the evangelical movement. It also alludes to his practices as a businessman.[25]

Where Falwell has shown even more dedication than to his political religious beliefs is to his entrepreneurial endeavors. In that regard, Falwell Sr. was also exemplary for the openness American evangelicals had had for the introduction and application of modern business techniques as described in the previous chapters. As Susan Harding points out: "American evangelicalism and business had been exchanging techniques for over a hundred years. So Falwell was specifically predisposed to adapt modern business techniques and concepts to his evangelistic projects" (Harding 16). Falwell commented on

[25]The section headline is taken from an interview Marleen de Witte conducted with a Ghanian preacher (de Witte).

his businesslike approach in 1971:

> Business is usually on the cutting edge of innovation and change because of its quest for finances. Therefore the church would be wise to look at business for a prediction of future innovation. The greatest innovation in the last twenty years is the development of the giant shopping centers. Here is the synergistic principle of placing at least two or more services at one location to attract the customers. A combination of services of two large companies with small supporting stores has been the secret of the success of shopping centers. The Thomas Road Baptist Church believes that the combined ministries of several agencies in one church can not [sic] only attract the masses to the gospel, but can better minister to each individual who comes. (qtd. in Harding 16)

Falwell's statement uses the terminology of corporate management. It is a narrative of successful business that is hinted at here: A successful entrepreneur is on a "quest for finances" by utilizing the "cutting edge of innovation." To gain finances, the entrepreneur has to be cunning and adaptive, sometimes ruthless, never hesitant. The successful entrepreneur is the modern hero, who ventures forth on a quest like a knight in a fairy tale (the damsel in distress here being money). The figure of the successful businessman rings positive to an American audience, to whom Calvin Coolidge's dictum "The business of America is business" still sounds like a promise. It is alluding to the American Dream, conveying the promise of opportunity for every American who is able to seize it. Both, the "cutting edge of innovation" and "future innovation" are terms from a world excited about the competitive spirit, of being 'ahead of the chase,' of being 'innovative,' trying out something new for the sake of success. It also makes visible the importance of *kairos* in American culture, the business opportunity recognized and seized by a daring individual. This obviously stands in contrast to the religious and sociocultural message conveyed by Falwell and his ministries. Falwell's promotion of an entrepreneurial attitude that appreciates competition, constant change and adaptation for the sake of profit contrasts

his religious and sociocultural message that postulates stability and conservation or even a return to an imagined and nostalgic past. Not only does the success of certain distribution methods (as the shopping center) inspire a rethinking in approaching potential believers, Falwell proposes changing religious communities into corporations. And Falwell was extremely successful with this entrepreneurial approach. From 1999 to 2006, Falwell Jr. and his private development firm have raised around $100 million via sales of land and leaseholds to retailers who wished to open businesses in the vicinity of Liberty University. Companies like Wal-Mart, Kohl's, Staples and Circuit City and many restaurant chains profit from the nearby campus (Smillie). According to the Falwell family, "$163 million [are] pledged to Liberty's endowment in the form of wills, bequests, trusts and gift annuities from contributors to Jerry Sr.'s ministry" (Smillie).

Falwell Sr. has raised more than "$2 billion for conservative causes in the 1980s" (Smillie) by utilizing a business ethics that deconstructs the very same causes the money was collected for. While Falwell's radical stance on subjects like abortion or homosexuality made him prominent, those were acquired later than his business skills. In her work on the history of American ideas about life and death, historian Jill Lepore reminds us that many of the as of today perceived essential evangelical ideas of reproduction were crafted at the end of the 1970s by a religio-conservative elite of which evangelicals were only participants among others. It was "GOP strategists Richard Viguerie and Paul Weyrich, both of whom were Catholic, [who] recruited Jerry Falwell into a coalition designed to bring economic and social conservatives together around a 'pro-family' agenda, one that targeted gay rights, sexual freedom, women's liberation, the ERA, child-care, and sex education. Weyrich wrote that abortion ought to be the centerpiece of the GOP strategy" (qtd. in Lepore 135). The 1970s strategy can be seen as the beginning of the Republicans' strategy to disguise neoliberal policies under a social conservative icing. This has proven successful ever since; not because it was a persuasive strategy, but because it was deceptive and its message resonated (and continues to do so) with the mores of parts

of the American populace.[26] Up until the late 1970s, evangelicals where overwhelmingly indifferent to abortion laws, which was seen as a "catholic issue" (Balmer, "Origins of Religious Right"). Paul Brown, founder of the American Life League, commented on the founding moment of the Moral Majority and Falwell's stance on abortion: "Falwell couldn't spell abortion five years ago" (qtd. in Lepore 135). Randal Balmer makes the case that it was not U.S. Supreme Court's 1973 Roe v. Wade ruling—which legalized abortion—that led to the politicization of evangelicals and Falwell's participation in the Moral Majority, but rather the consequences of the Coit v. Green ruling[27] (Balmer, "Origins of Religious Right"). The threat to revoke the tax-exempt status from quasi-segregated education institutions—which most of the evangelical schools were—convinced evangelical leaders to join the Moral Majority in order to influence politics towards their favor. Only when the IRS began investigating and evangelical leaders had to fear losing significant amounts of tax reductions, threatening their business model, the decision to re-politicize was made.[28]

While Fallwell's political and religious views have changed over the years, his stance on capitalism has remained stable. The one thing that never changed was the business model of Falwell's empire. Liberty University is undeniably promoting evangelical values and in Falwell's words its purpose is "to develop Christ-centered men and women with the values, knowledge and skills essential to impact tomorrow's world."[29] But apart from Liberty University promoting a "strong commitment to political conservatism," it also promotes "total rejection of socialism, and firm support for America's economic system of free enterprise."[30] These "values, knowledge and skills" thus incorporate free

[26]It is often forgotten that the moral Majority was an inter-religious movement of the religious right, its founding members being Paul Weyrich, Richard Viguerie, Terry Dolan (all Catholic) and Howard Phillips (Jewish). For a closer look at the inter-religiosity of the Moral Majority see (Hudson).

[27]Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971): the United States Supreme Court affirmed a decision that a private school which practiced racial discrimination could not be eligible for a tax exemption.

[28]While I do not want to diminish Balmer's valid argument that the "anti-abortion crusade was more palatable than the religious right's real motive: protecting segregated schools" ("Origins of Religious Right"), it can be pointed out that the prospect of losing the tax-exempt status was threatening the business model of evangelical education, and thus the political involvement can be seen as a measure to secure the business model.

[29]http://www.liberty.edu/lucom/index.cfm?PID=27169

[30]Now only available via archive.org: https://web.archive.org/web/20150415173915/http://www.liberty.edu/index.cfm?PID=6909, see also (Roose 19).

enterprise, and they have been for an even longer time than the social conservative issues have. As an educational institution that seeks to train the evangelical elite, it charges the model of free enterprise with as much affect as the assumed sociocultural core values.[31]

Jerry Falwell had already earned a reputation of being very good at making money at the end of the 1970s. In 1970, Falwell's ministries earned around $1 million per year. In 1977 the annual income had increased to approximately $22 million, which grew to $55 million of annual income in 1980. After the founding of the Moral Majority, income was doubled in 1986 (Harding 106). Harding attests this miraculous income growth to Falwell's successful implementation of sacrificial giving, labeling it "sacrificial economics" (105).

In the winter of 1977 Jerry Falwell had held his first "miracle rally" at a time where his school faced bankruptcy. 2,500 students and the faculty of the college met at Chandler Mountain to pray "that one day a great Christian university would stand in this place" (Falwell qtd. in Harding 106). The prayers were specifically about the financial situation of the college: "They asked God to enable them to eliminate all unsecured indebtedness by February 28, 1977" (Falwell qtd. in Harding 106). Fortunately for them, the Thomas Road Baptist Church had received $2.5 million over operating expenses, just what they had prayed for and then some. "It was evidently the miraculous working of God" (Falwell qtd. in Harding 106). Falwell never asked his audience specifically to donate for a certain cause such as eliminating all unsecured indebtedness, but rather asked for a wonder from God. When the financial threshold was met, the wonder was there. It is likely that donors had understood the broad hint Falwell was giving them and donated in order to save the church. But from an evangelical perspective, the happy outcome was not a success because many people had donated, but because 'God willed it.' In this way, evangelical donors could imagine themselves not solely as helping to avert bankruptcy, but as contributing to a wonder from God. Falwell adopted a technique for fund-raising here

[31] An example for the importance of economic system questions over ethics is the recent decision to let left Senator Bernard Sanders speak to the students (Corasaniti). A unprecedented event that hints at the slow turn away from radical ethics.

that served very specific goals which were legitimized with the help of biblical images, here in the form of Joshua being given the mountain by God[32]. Harding points out how crucial this evocation of the Bible is as a legitimization strategy in evangelical fund-raising:

> The appeal, no matter how it is biblically adorned, sounds to the unborn-again ear like mere money-raising. But the biblical attire is everything to the faithful. An appeal for sacrificial giving catches them up in a sacred enactment of core gospel meanings. Just as Joshua obeyed God and was, necessarily, blessed, so was Jerry, and so will they be. (121)

Evangelical charity is expanded by this "sacred enactment of core gospel meanings" that Harding identifies. The dyadic[33] character of all charity is complemented by an affective charge of the transaction itself. As an additional motivator beyond the Christian motive of giving to those in need, the giving of money itself becomes a spiritual act. Ed Dobson, one of Falwell's principal co-pastors, explained in a sermon how closely related giving financially and being a good Christian are: "Giving is worshiping God. We're not giving to a church or a ministry when we give, but to God. God has a ledger with a debit column and a credit column, and God credits every gift. God does miracles because people give sacrificially" (qtd. in Harding 122).

While for an outside observer Falwell is the beneficiary of the donations, from an evangelical point of view Falwell is only the intermediary between the believer and God. The believer gives to God via Jerry Falwell and God rewards Falwell with money, because he is a faithful Christian.

God is not only the greatest religious authority, he is also the all-overseeing bookkeeper. The evangelical God in Falwell's sacrificial economy is the supervisory accountant of this economy, who giveth and taketh according to his designs. Whether His

[32] "Now give me this hill country that the Lord promised me that day" (*NIV,* Josh. 14.12).

[33] The interpersonal character of all charity remains an important factor in evangelical charity. No matter how abstracted the relationship between giver and recipient is through the mediation of charity organizations, it is still a reciprocal relationship.

authority as an accountant derives from His status as a God or vice versa is ultimately irrelevant for the transaction itself, but nevertheless reveals how the two spheres of capitalism and evangelicalism allocate authority reciprocally. Important is that each believer sacrificing is participating in God's scheme as conveyed by men like Falwell—and what is more, being successful in itself is rewarded by God: "Men and women sacrificially give money to God, and God gives money to men and women, above all to great men of God such as the Reverend Falwell: that is the gospel economy" (122). This mode of charity has enabled evangelicalism to collect far more funds than similar philanthropic endeavors, both secular and those of other religious communities.[34]

Anthropologist Simon Coleman offers an interesting perspective on the sacrificial economy with what he calls "double-talk" in another context. According to Coleman, Manichean thinking is so deeply embedded in evangelicalism that a mode of communication is used that carries a secular and a sacred meaning simultaneously, owing to a world view thinking in binaries of good and evil, Christian and non-Christian secular and sacred. In his work Coleman found that evangelical discourse often was "appealing to two different levels of reality simultaneously" (Coleman, "Empire on a Hill" 662). In this case, the appeal to God to enable them to eliminate all unsecured indebtedness was the "exoteric reality detectable by secular observers" (662). Said secular observers might see a poorly disguised scam for money veiled under religious language. But for an evangelical audience it is the other way around: the religious level is the "'real' perspective on the world being made available to believers. The distinction between the two was sometimes glossed as the gulf between 'the natural' and 'the supernatural' by [Coleman's] informants." (author's quotation marks, "Empire on a Hill" 662).

The acceptance of the existence of these two worlds—the natural and the supernatural is not an exclusive feature of evangelicalism, of course. All Abrahamic

[34] As Hamilton has recently summarized, "virtually all major studies of charitable giving have found that evangelicals are more generous than Americans in most other religions and nonreligious groupings—mainline protestant, Catholics, non-Christians, and the non-religious. Only sectarian groups with a strong communal identity—Mormons, for example—show higher rates of giving. The average evangelical reports giving away perhaps six to eight percent of annual income" (Hamilton 32-3).

religions distinct between these two spheres. However, these two spheres are usually separated; one is inner-worldly and the other outer worldly. What evangelicalism achieves is to conflate these two worlds again, thus creating a sense of immanence which is a basic requirement to charge with affect even the most mundane aspects of life. It also enables evangelicals to divest from the natural and invest in the supernatural. Any sacrificial giving to a ministry or church extracts financial means from the natural world and reinvests it in the supernatural as in evangelicalism both spheres are in reach. Harding notes that "the whole point of giving to a God-led ministry is to vacate the commercial economy and to enter another realm, a Christ-centered gospel, or sacrificial, economy in which material expectations are transformed" (Harding 109). Not only has thus the supernatural world gained agency over the natural, what is even more important in this process is that finance, money and investment have to be accepted as being part of the natural world, effectively naturalizing capitalism.

The transaction itself—donating to the ministry—is charged affectively, because mere money, a means of the natural world, can be invested in godly power. Every cent invested increases the power of God in this world. Money directly buys nostalgia as every cent transferred to Fallwell's bank account makes God's realm a bit bigger. This is the purest form of affective expansion and the one were the economic and evangelical affective expansion correlate most visibly. Although at first sight similar to, for example, the granting of indulgences in exchange for money in the fifteenth century, the similarities to Johann Tetzel's schemes[35] vanish under closer inspection. Tetzel's business model was selling redemption, buying the customer salvation or good passage to the afterlife. The evangelical donor *invests* in salvation in this world: Evangelical donation is not a trade where money is exchanged for grace to redeem past sins, but a proactive investment conducted by the believer. By giving money to Falwell the believer can actively contribute to extract money from the secular world and invest it in a Christian world. Jerry Falwell

[35]Johann Tetzel was a Dominican friar and was known for his pragmatic schemes of selling papal indulgences around the turn of the fifteenth century (cf. "Johann Tetzel").

becomes the mediator between the two worlds: "The personalized figure of 'Jerry' becomes the figure who mediates between the two realms, the key through which secular resources are given divine significance" (author's emphasis, Coleman, "Empire on a Hill" 663).

Here, another structural homology between late modern capitalism and evangelicalism is encountered. They both tend to naturalize market principles: late modern capitalism has to be accepted as a natural part of the world as it "prodigious expansion of capital into hitherto uncommodified areas" (Jameson, *Postmodernism* 36) it is the accepted mode of negotiating both spheres, the natural and the supernatural, forming the basis of both worlds. Hence, giving of money becomes itself religious activity and contributes as such to the devotion of believers. Connolly speaks in this context of "market apologism" (Connolly 870) and has argued that the structural homologies between evangelicalism and late modern capitalism (or, as he calls it "Cowboy Capitalism") is a result of a continuous process that makes for "a powerful machine as evangelical and corporate sensibilities resonate together, drawing each into a larger movement that dampens the importance of doctrinal differences between them" (871). Connolly calls this machine "The evangelical-capitalist resonance machine" (871).

3.3.1 Affective Leaders

But also very practical exchanges between the world of business and the evangelical world can be observed. The sacrificial economy of Jerry Falwell relied to a great degree on the prominent figure of Jerry Falwell himself. Some, among them critical evangelical theologists, argue that the obedience to God in evangelicalism translates to an obedience towards evangelical leaders. Reuschling for example states that sources of moral authority are primarily the Bible and evangelical leaders (Reuschling 59). That is certainly one of the reasons why the appeals to donate by Jerry Falwell were so successful and similar appeals continue to do so. But it is more complicated than that. In the 1980s, a time of recession and inflation in the United States, a longing for economically competent leaders could

be discerned, something that Falwell never ceased to claim for himself. There is another contemporary figure that advertised himself ceaselessly as economically competent: Ronald Reagan. The President, who introduced and implemented the teachings of the Chicago School and its mantra of trickle-down economics to the American federal government is a messianic figure to neoliberal proponents past and present. Reaganomics became the alleged salvation for stagflation and rising energy prices.

Rakesh Khurana has identified a similar development in business. Starting in the 1980s, "words such as 'mission,' 'vision,' and 'values' [started to appear] in the corporate lexicon" (Khurana). The image of the CEO changed from an "organization man" to someone who could "shake things up" (Khurana). Khurani argues that the advent of modern invest capitalism went hand in hand with a charismatization of its leadership, drawing parallels to evangelical preachers. CEOs like Lee Iacocca (Chrysler), Jack Welch (General Electric), and Steve Jobs (Apple) became the first "Superstar CEOs," who were a by-product of the "so-called populist capitalism, whereby ordinary Americans made investing the country's most popular participatory sport" (Khurana). As CEOs became the new saviors of a stricken economy, so did evangelical leaders borrow from their appeal:

> But if market futures often sound redemptive, faith-based language also bears the imprint of the market. Weber's interplay of Christianity and capitalism continues in our late-modern age. The prosperity gospels that are currently so appealing in many parts of the world bear the impact of a cult of salvation through the market [...] they talk of Jesus "paying immediate dividends"—i.e., shortening the cycle of investment in the future so that you can have a kind of customized millennium now, and not as the eventual result of patient toil. In many such contexts, the Lord speaks the language of finance capital, and the careers of many charismatic preachers, their dramatic rise to prominence and fall from grace, typify the boom and bust cycles of our wider socioeconomic environment. (Comaroff and Kim 172)

Jean and John Comaroff use the term "Millennial Capitalism" to describe the economic paradigm at the turn of the century, pointing out to its "messianic, salvific, even magical manifestations" (2) or as Susan George put it, "No matter how many disasters of all kinds the neo-liberal system has visibly created, no matter what financial crises it may engender, no matter how many losers and outcasts it may create, it is still made to seem inevitable, like an act of God, the only possible economic and social order available to us" (George). As evangelicalism is borrowing from the doctrine of late modern capitalism (and vice versa,) it also benefits from the reward system that capitalism offers the consumer and investor. Donating money, to use Ahmed's terminology, has become a *happiness-cause*. The more money is given, the more is contributed to the Kingdom of God becoming a reality. The donor as investor becomes a shareholder of the Kingdom of God. As a happiness-cause, it is especially effective because it relies on a transaction that is deemed positive: Giving money to God is "the best investment you'll ever make," as the "Crossroads Christian Church" (Cameron) advertises for donations. Evangelical churches are not appealing to the merciful and compassionate Christian, they are appealing to the business man or woman to make good choices for sound investments, which also means that they are appealing to individual egoism. Which is a good place to remind us of the intrinsically connection between happiness and duty Ahmed proposes. As in late modern capitalism, which relies on the individual primarily as a consumer, evangelicalism relies on the believer as a donor. Donation thus carries a similar promise of happiness than the consumption of commodities carries, as from an evangelical standpoint each donation is a partial payment to the kingdom of God, there has to be another happiness-cause that provides with a more instant satisfaction. This is where connection between the economy of affect and the financial economy is most visible. The duty to actively pursue the kingdom of God in this world is connected to the immediate rewards late modern capitalism promises to those who invest their money wisely. It is a one-to-one translation of money into happiness and purpose. The believer is able to exchange money earned in the secular world and to buy purpose and happiness directly with it, not via the detour of

doing good deeds with it. Money as a sacrificial mean becomes a sacred commodity that can be used to show devotion and, almost as in Calvinist times, can be a sign of Godliness when God gives it to the worthy like Jerry Falwell. What is more, the transaction itself becomes sacred, investing as a means to pursue the kingdom of God itself becomes a holy act. The void of the transcendental homelessness that might be the motivation for many to seek purpose in their lives with evangelicals is easily filled with a financial transaction. The effect is that money and affect circulate and multiply at the same time. In the form of money on the side of Falwell and in the form of happiness and purpose on the believers' side. The non-ideological means here is the evocation of the supernatural, the comparison to Biblical narratives, the ideological effect is the transfer of money to Jerry Falwell's bank account.

We have seen how evangelicalism has been reciprocally engaged with business throughout its history, adapting its techniques and doctrines and how the notion of giving has been re-contextualized to an individual investment that the individual does not for the sake of those in need, but as a consequence of egoistic economic decisions. As much as late modern capitalism is borrowing from religious motives, evangelicalism tends to naturalize market principles and incorporate them as a foundation for their own world-view. Late Modern capitalism and evangelicalism thus serve as each other resonance chambers, cross-fertilizing each other with meaning: late modern capitalism profits from making use of a metaphysical notion of meaning that helps setting in stone the very rules of the current market paradigm as God's rules on how to conduct business on earth, while evangelicalism profits from pragmatically utilizing those techniques most efficiently within the paradigm, contributing to a growth-rate that is unparalleled by any other religious group. The duty to give becomes a happiness-cause not because of the good deed done, but because of the good investment that has been made. Let us know turn to the other contribution evangelicals mobilizes its members for, mission.

3.4 Short-Term Mission—We're Building Kids, not Buildings

Apart from the full-time missionaries that are sent from the United States into the world, hundreds of thousands of American adolescents and young grown-ups go abroad every year for a short period of time to help preach the gospel. For most American evangelicals short-term mission has become the prime opportunity to participate in the missionary activities of their belief. It is a mostly, but not exclusively evangelical phenomenon and has gained relevance as a vital part of evangelical biographies only in the last twenty years. From the modest beginnings of the first programs in the 1950s, at first initiated by primarily two inter-denominational organizations, "Youth with a Mission" and "Operation Mobilization," short-term mission has grown into a defining aspect of the evangelical experience for a considerable part of evangelical youth. Although no verifiable numbers are available, some researchers estimate that "at least one and a half million U.S. Christians travel abroad each year on such 'mission trips,' with an additional unknown number traveling on similar mission trips within the United States" (R. J. Priest et al. 432). These mostly self-financed missions amounted to 1.6 billion Dollars spent in 2006 (Corbett and Fikkert chpt. 7). With the advent of internet technology, it has become incredibly easy to find and participate in a short-term mission uniquely tailored to one's desires and needs. Web pages such as *ShortTermMissions.com* or *MissionFinder.org* let the user define search queries with time period, place and type of engagement as variables similar to the tourism portals that are used to book vacations. And there are undeniably similarities to the offers of the tourism industry. The majority of participants spend less than two weeks on a single mission trip.[36] Activities range from interning at a mission abroad to the much cited worst case scenario, the 'painting of an orphanage somewhere abroad.'

Rüdiger Kunow has pointed out how "the intent to proselytize, to win over converts in other places and cultures, has effectively mobilized both the faith and the

[36]More than two thirds according to a representative study (R. J. Priest and J. P. Priest 57).

faithful" and examined how mission "as a form of Americanization, as a concerted effort at cultural export in a transnational context" is a "metaphysically sanctioned cultural export." This cultural export "*makes difference visible* in ways that reinforce asymmetries of power and privilege" (Kunow, "Going Native" author's emphasis,), something that can be asserted by looking into evangelical representations of mission, where the suffering and misery is always in the other that has to be mitigated by the missionary, reviving old paternal representations and reinforcing global power structures under the wake of charity. Kunow approaches mission as a variant of traveling culture, emphasizing on the cultural mobility of mission. I want to pick up that thought here, but develop it towards a different direction, since I am more interested in the impact this traveling culture might have on the missionary and how in lieu of 'short-term missions' proselytization is re-imagined as a consumable commodity.

The turn to short-term mission has brought about as much praise as criticism within evangelical missiology. While many proponents applaud the chance for young people to do good, critics doubt the benefit of such short missions: some regard it as "religious tourism," others see it more as a burden for the local missionaries. In addition, the majority of participants seems to lack language and mission skills, are un-experienced with cross-cultural encounters and are suspected to displace local untrained workers, encouraging economic dependency. Even the "cultural imperialist assumptions underlying many short-term projects" are reflected upon (for a summary of the inner-evangelical critique see Zehner 510). Conceptually, short-term mission seems to have little efficacy for the general evangelical effort to proselytize. On the contrary, it seems more of a burden to evangelical missionaries 'in the field.' More often than not, the cost of the travel alone could provide for long-term achievements in the target region and Simon Coleman notes that mission trips "may cultivate the experience of having traveled far to spread the Gospel rather than prompting a great deal of direct face-to-face interaction with the unsaved" (Coleman, "Continuous Conversion" 20-21). Considering these criticisms, one has to ask why concentrate on short-term mission in the first place? The answer lies in

the argumentation proponents give in favor of short-term mission programs: "In addition to potentially doing practical good, short-term missions are widely thought to transform participants, especially younger ones, by fostering increased cultural sensitivity, spiritual depth, and greater commitment to the cause of world missions" (Zehner 509). The primary effects of short-term missions seem to be more on the missionary's side than on that of the yet unsaved. The aim here is not to convert people abroad to World Christianity, but to affectively bind young American evangelicals to their faith, to make them an active part of the evangelical community. The traveling experience itself thus becomes a mission. As Robert Bland, director of *Teen Missions International* puts it:

> We tell our people who are leading our teams that we're building kids, not buildings. The purpose isn't just what we'll do for these people, but what these people will do for us[...] There is not a single purpose in missionary work [...] but to us this is the first purpose. (Allen qtd. in Fanning 6)

As the goal of short-term mission is rather "building kids," the possible impact abroad short-term mission might have or have not becomes irrelevant, but it begs the question what is the appeal for young evangelicals to sign up for a mission trip? And appealing they are. They appeal to an age range below thirty five.[37] "Youth With A Mission" (YWAM), which set up one of the first short-term mission programs is still one of the major provider for mission trips. According to their homepage, YWAM is involved in 1,100 locations in over 180 countries, with a staff of over 18,000 (Youth With a Mission Worldwide). Analyzing how YWAM advertises short-term mission to its audience might shed light on what makes these programs attractive to its target 'demography segmentation.' YWAM's web page is organized around "stories;" staff's stories, student's stories and outreach stories. These stories are an advertising measure for those interested in short-term mission, re-telling narratives of successfully accomplished missions. What is missing is a category

[37] According to a study conducted in 1991, 83.5 percent of participants were younger than thirty-six years and the majority being between nineteen and twenty-four years of age (R. J. Priest et al. 436).

for the object of the mission. There is no account of those outreached to, relieved or converted, a first sign that short-term mission is more concerned with the missionaries themselves than with those who are yet 'unsaved.' Each story gives a short summary of the experiences of one individual who did the training, which is the service that YWAM is offering. The program is called "Discipleship Training School" (DTS), a sort of summer school, organized in a phase of three months of tutoring followed by two months of "outreach" somewhere outside the United States. The way these narratives describe short-term mission are told reveals a lot about the desires of those who are interested in conducting s short-term mission, as it is mirroring what interested persons are looking for. The following is quoted from YWAM's homepage, the story of "Nate's Extraordinary Life"

> I used to live an ordinary life. Wake up, go to work, come home, go to bed, repeat. I was 20 years old and nothing extraordinary had ever happened to me... until one day God challenged me to do a Discipleship Training School (DTS). I was familiar with YWAM. Most everyone I knew had been through though it [sic]. Never did I think it was for me. I had a paper application packet sitting in the trunk of my car.
>
> In 2003, a mobile team from YWAM Denver had come through my town. Somehow I ended up with that application. Most likely I took it to be nice with the intention to throw it away. Instead, it ended up in the trunk of my car where it had collected dirt and stains. I cleaned it up as much as I could, filled it out and mailed it off.
>
> A few weeks later, I got the call that I was accepted to DTS. Now it was a real thing, and little did I know the journey God had in store for me.
>
> Since joining YWAM, I've seen the sick healed in the Sahara desert, ministered in the slums of Bangkok, Thailand and have stood in awe and wonder looking up at the Himalayas in Nepal.

> When you say 'yes' to God, the journeys He'll take you on will be beyond your wildest dreams and the things He'll ask you to do will challenge you on whole new levels. Ten years ago, I said "Yes, Lord." I've been ruined for the ordinary ever since.
>
> Nathan and his wife Joy currently are starting a YWAM ministry in Yosemite, California.[38]

Nathan's story is set below a picture of a young bearded man clad in travel gear—traveler backpack, army shorts sunglasses—gazing over a landscape of lush green rice fields, palm trees, and mountainside in the background. It is an imagination of the stereotypical experienced traveler, whose traveling experience makes him at home anywhere he goes. The picture supplements Nathan's narrative of before and after, a tale of life-changing experience. It is analogous to the greater evangelical story of transformation. Before DTS, Nathan's life was "ordinary," repetitive. It had no meaning and was devoted to work in the mundane world. His life was lacking meaning, and apart from the structure he was trapped in ("Wake up, go to work, come home, go to bed, repeat") his life was in turmoil (to which the untidy trunk alludes to). All it took to change Nathan's life in the treadmill and to fill it with meaning was to send the application to Youth with a Mission. Interestingly, "God had challenged him" to do so. Here the personal connection to God can be found again: God has a unique plan for everyone, also for Nathan, and his application *happened* or finally something extraordinary happened to him neither in the form of a gift nor a revelation nor a Godly advice, but in the form of a challenge. It is the peculiar combination of 'evangelical Kairos' that has repercussions with the challenges of life and the personal interaction with God. On the one hand, evangelicals should take their life into their own hands, on the other hand, they have to wait for a personal sign of God. Nathan answered to the call and what followed was a new life, a transition from the ordinary to the "extraordinary." This one action—applying to the program—triggered

[38]http://www.ywam.org/blog/2013/06/08/nates-extraordinary-life/

"the journey God had in store for [Nathan]." Fittingly, YWAM's claim is no less than "We are here to see you fulfill your destiny!". Since then Nathan has witnessed miracles: ("the sick healed"), encountered the sublime in nature ("stood in awe and wonder looking up at the Himalayas"), and ministered to the poor. All these experiences have "ruined Nathan for the ordinary." Nathan's story suggests that participating in YWAM's program offers no less than finding your true purpose.[39] *Double-talk* (Coleman, "Empire on a Hill" 662) is also encountered here again. Nathan's life before applying with YWAM is boring and repetitive because of personal choices and his individual unwillingness to break out of the "ordinary". His life was meaningless, because it was void of God. But Nathan broke free from the ordinary—from the mundane world of Satan and from a life that is not lived to its full potential. This is one of the consequences of the individual American dream: If anyone can make it, wasting your life is not acceptable. Interestingly, living to his or her "full potential" makes use of tropes that originate or at least echo the old hippie dream to live outside of society, to be unadapted to mainstream society, to travel and to meet different cultures. The promise here, of course, is to be able to express it in a tightly organized program with peers of your own mindset, and not by following the hippie trail to India on your own. Short-term mission is a commercialized and timely confined, clearly defined breakout of the ordinary that enables participants to feel having participated in the 'Great Commission' and construct fond memories of the time when they served their part of God's plan in Asia, Africa or somewhere else in the world. Youth with a Mission's advertisement is a religiously charged appeal to narcissism, promising that by booking a trip, participants can change the world.

[39] Some scholars use the concept of communitas (cf. Turner) to approach short-term mission. Short-term mission trips become "rituals of intensification, where one temporarily leaves the ordinary, and experiences an extraordinary, sacred experience 'away from home' in a liminal space where sacred goals are pursued, physical and spiritual tests are faced [...] This transformation ideally produces new selves to be reintegrated back into everyday life 'at home' [...] and inspire new mission vision at home" (R. J. Priest et al. 433–34). The problem with using ritual and communitas for describing short-term mission is that the argumentation resembles that of the advertisements of short-term mission organizers, as it is lacking distance and critique.

Reality is much more sober than those advertisements suggest. There have been reports of "authoritarian control [of participants] by the elders"(Ross, "Youth With a Mission"), "similarities between cult mind controlling techniques and the DTS program instituted by YWAM" ("Youth With a Mission"), and obscure finances. The *Cult Education Institute,* a non-profit organization dedicated to the study of destructive cults, controversial groups and movements, reports of exploitation of YWAM's 18,000 staff-members, who receive no material compensation for their work, but are "financially independent" ("YWAM is dangerous...I spent 12 years...Under the Influence"). In order to become staff, prospects first have to complete DTS and a second tier education that comes with tuition fees. After that, participants are encouraged to become staff members at their own expense. Participants who choose to continue as staff for YWAM are in a position similar to unpaid interns, YWAM is thus adopting and reaffirming something young participants as members of the 'precariat' are already accustomed to from their professional lives—paying for working in the form of unpaid internships—only that YWAM promises a deeper meaning than 'getting a foot in the door with a company.' Using a model similar to internships works in both ways reaffirming.

On the one hand, participants encounter a form—the unpaid internship—they are probably already familiar with, as this form of work relation has become incredibly widespread for Millennials.[40] On the other hand, the charging of the internship with religious meaning also reflects back on the general practice of internship. A religious organization offering such unpaid internships helps further legitimizing the practice of unpaid internships per se. YWAM's practice is rarely criticized openly by the staff. A rather extreme case of acceptance can be found in an article on financial dept in an internal newsletter published regularly by YWAM staff members independently from their mother organization. In this article, a YWAM staff member is sharing her experience with financial debt and how she had to sell her house because they where overcome by debt. While she was obviously in debt because she had paid for being a YWAM staff

[40]A development that started in the 1990s and is continuing to grow ever since. See (Howe) and (Perlin).

member by herself, and even had to sell her house, she did not see a connection between her indebtedness and the staffing policy of YWAM, but instead held herself responsible for not being careful enough. The solution was to pray to God: "So we did the only thing we knew to do, and that was to repent and ask the Lord to forgive us for our presumption and for our greed in buying things we didn't really need" ("The Curse of Debt: Are You A Revolver Or A Deadbeat?"). The authors hold themselves responsible for not collecting enough money to continue to work for YWAM. Two factors are of interest here: What Terry Eagleton has in another context called the "tragedy [...] that we are not wholly the masters of our own destiny [...] which is hard to swallow for an American culture for which 'I've made my choices' is a familiar phrase, and 'It wasn't my fault' an unacceptable one" (Eagleton, *After Theory* 187) and the following acceptance of debt as a natural phenomenon (in an evangelical sense). Not paying back debt thus becomes a sin. Not being able to manage debt means to succumb to sin. This is a good example of how evangelicals have integrated notions of social discipline—in this case paying back debt—from the secular capitalist world.[41] The justification of debt as in the example is the antithesis to Asad's assumption that with the advent of science the religious would wander into the individual while intellectual and social *discipline* "would gradually abandon religious space" (Asad 121). In the case of the dept example, a social discipline inherent to the economic contemporary is also part of evangelical social discipline, now religiously justified. Paying back debt thus gains a non-negotiable quality as something inherently natural (as in part of God's nature).

However, the majority of participants does not pursue a 'career' with YWAM but partake in a single DTS and think of it as a worthwhile experience. And that is because the program is not geared towards having an impact on outreach and mission, as can be seen in Nathan's story, but towards having an impact on its participants.

[41] A compelling case of how the notion that debt always has to be served is a rather recent conviction has been made by David Graeber (*Debt: The First 5,000 Years*). Not to mention that in a Christian context the notion of forgiveness plays a crucial role, also in relation to money and usury: "At the end of every seven years you must cancel debts" (*NIV,* Deut. 15.1).

Short-term mission as executed by YWAM presumably has little impact on the world, but promises to change the individual life of the participant. Short-term mission is not about changing the world, it is about having world-changing experiences of the self, adventures (one provider for mission trips consequently is called "Adventures in Mission") for the non-adventurous, as they offer the experience of meeting different cultures around the globe vis-à-vis without leaving the comfort zone of one's Christian peer group. Adventure, self-experience, the development of the self: Short-term missions satisfy a thoroughly egoistic and experiential desire. But in contrast to traveling the world, booking with YWAM converts a vacation into a spiritual experience and proof of the individual goodness, which is advertised by former participants for years after on their Facebook pages: "Not surprisingly, students treasure pictures from these times, pictures displayed on walls, Screensavers, or Facebook—pictures which capture and display a desired self-image, an image of the self-loving and serving those in need" (R. J. Priest and J. P. Priest 61). YWAM thus provides the religious subtext to one's 'work & travel' and is selling—apart from the mission trip—a self-image of the participant he or she can display publicly and identify with for years to come. What in the 1960s would have been called a voyage of self-discovery can now be re-imagined as a mission for God, of being part of saving the world, all one has to do is pay the tuition fee for a three month sermon followed by an organized backpacker trip. It is no coincidence that Nathan's story takes place in locations equally desired by a more secular backpacking crowd: Sahara, Bangkok and the Himalayas. A comparison of the most popular tourist destinations with the most popular short-term mission destinations consequently show congruence[42] (63).

Mission is imagined as a tedious task of hardship, danger and personal sacrifice by evangelicals. It is one of the central heroic narratives within evangelicalism. A huge body of text is dedicated to mission narratives—depending on the interest of the audience a wide array of different genres re-imagine the hardships and triumphs of past missionaries in biographies, travelogs, historical fiction and children stories. This genre

[42]In contrast to the most popular destinations for long-term, classic mission.

of mission literature includes classics like the biography of Scottish missionary John G. Paton (*John G. Paton: Missionary to the New Hebrides: An Autobiography Edited by His Brother*), active in the New Hebrides in the nineteenth century serve as an inspiration for a Christian life that is exciting and dangerous. The account of Paton's life features cannibals, unwavering faith in the face of mortal danger and of course, in the end a prevailing missionary who saved thousands of souls for Christ. Mission narratives are also interesting in that here Christian dogma plays less of a role than the individual achievement of the Christian missionary (Paton for example was a Reformed Presbyterian and thus does not qualify for an evangelical). Book retailers like *christianbooks.com*—an evangelical alternative to worldly book retailers online—feature biographies of Augustine next to those of evangelical protagonists.[43]

More important than the individual Christian background of the respective protagonists is the narrative of their individual dedication to mission as an inspirational example. Paton's autobiography for example structurally follows the narrative archetype of the *hero's journey*[44] (Campbell): A call from God (*call to adventure*) takes the preacher from his successful *ordinary life* as a city missionary in urban Glasgow. Friends and mentors (*threshold guardians*) try to hold him back, but God sends him strength (*supernatural aid*): "The opposition was so strong from nearly all, and many of them warm Christian friends, that I was sorely tempted to question whether I was carrying out the Divine will, or only some headstrong wish of my own. This also caused me much anxiety, and drove me close to God in prayer" (J. G. Paton and J. Paton 56). After parting with his father and taking up the journey (*threshold*), the Patons (with wife and son) arrive on the island of Tanna, which is inhabited by cannibals (*challenges*). Shortly after, his wife and son die, followed by four years of failure, sickness and mortal danger (*abyss, death*). Eventually, Paton is finally granted success by converting the whole island of Aniwa (312) (*rebirth*), leading to new found faith in God (*transformation and atonement*): "On looking back

[43]However, Christianbooks.com marks books with evangelical content with a small fish symbol for those who are more dogmatically inclined.

[44]Nathan's story also is yet another variation of the Hero's Journey.

now, I already clearly perceive [. . .] that the Lord was thereby preparing me for doing, and providing me materials wherewith to accomplish, the best work of all my life" (222). Paton's account can be seen as an archetype for the plethora of fictionalized accounts available for an evangelical audience. But the effect of these evangelical missionary fiction narratives is a similar one: They aim at inspiring evangelicals with the deeds missionaries have conducted under peril in the name of the Lord.

A prominent example here is the book series "Christian Heroes Then & Now," published by no other than 'YWAM Publishing' featuring titles like "Hudson Taylor: Deep in the Heart of China" or "Adoniram Judson: Bound for Burma" (J. Benge and G. Benge). These simple stories serve as a motivational stimulation to 'go forth and teach all nations.' Reviews from readers of "Hudson Taylor" (J. Benge and G. Benge) found on christianbook.com confirm that: "If we all had the unwavering faith, as Hudson Taylor did, then the Christian church would be unstoppable. We walked away as a family challenged to taste, as Hudson did, and see that the Lord is good!" or "An inspiring book about a man who had a passion for the people of China. In his life he experienced many trials but endured them all through the strength and focus of God's plan and purpose for his life."[45]

The desire to go abroad and preach the Gospel is not exclusively fueled by mission literature. Thousands of individual mission narratives are conveyed via blog "to plant seeds for new trips and support" as an online guide on blogging short-term missions states (Herwig). Web pages like *adventures.org*, *missionary-blogs.com* or *askamissionary.com* aggregate thousands of individual accounts of mission trips, each giving testimony to the adventures experienced in a foreign land in the name of the Lord. These blogs serve as a source of inspiration for those interested in doing a short mission trip. Bloggers also compete against each other—in the case of adventures.org, visitors to the site can donate directly to individual bloggers and thus fund the prolongation

[45]http://www.christianbook.com/hudson-taylor-deep-the-heart-china/janet-benge/9781576580165/product-reviews/80165?rpp=5&event=PRREV&page=1

of their trips. These site works as incubators for mission and resemble the structure of crowdfunding that has become popular as a means of funding start-up companies. While this is yet another example of how evangelicalism actively incorporates innovations from the economic sphere, the blogging is far more important as it forms a reservoir of personal Christian biographies that both give proof to the author's commitment and encourage those who have not been on mission yet. The accounts from the blogs and the literature on mission are integral elements for creating what Ahmed in another context has called an *anticipatory causality* with happiness. Mission is imagined as something that makes you happy, before it is encountered. Short-term missionaries know in advance that their short-term mission trip will be rewarding, because they have already internalized that mission is something that will enrich their Christian lives. Mission thus has become a powerful *happiness-script,*[46] a term by which Ahmed describes "straightening devices, ways of aligning bodies with what is already lined up" (*Happiness* 90). In this way, evangelicalism creates an "anticipatory causality" (28) between happiness as a sign for God and objects (in this case "doing mission") *before* they are encountered. It does not matter if the short-term mission is successful and exciting or not, since its outcome has already been determined *before* the trip, both by the fictional mission narratives and by the thousands of former participants giving their individual idealized accounts. Ahmed suggests in another context

> that the judgment about certain objects as being "happy" is already made, before they are even encountered. Certain objects are attributed as the cause of happiness, which means they already circulate as social goods before we "happen" upon them, which is why we might happen upon them in the first place. (28)

The young Christians know that mission is good before they book with YWAM or another organization. They can attribute mission with notions of selfless

[46] Ahmed's concept of happiness-script owes much to Arlie Russel Hochschild's notions of "feeling rules" and "emotional labor" as she herself points out in (Ahmed, *Happiness* 239n30).

commitment and doing good in the world as they become part of the Great Commission so vividly imagined by Christian Literature, family lore and nowadays personal accounts on internet blogs. Mission trips let them become part of this narrative for a closely defined and projectable time frame. Meet Emma, who is about to depart for India and reflects on her blog[47] on the upcoming challenges and her motivation to become a short-term missionary:

> Before i [*sic*] left for training camp, I knew I wanted to go to india [*sic*] because my heart was broken for the injustices and the amount of unreached people, and the Lord told me to go. Now I want to go because I want everyone to have what I have: complete freedom in the creator of the world. Endless joy that surpasses understanding. Peace. HOPE. [...] I encourage you and I beg you, go sit in the presence of the Lord and invite Him in like never before. Free yourself of all the things you do not have to carry!!! Find out what's holding you back, really search the depths of your heart, and surrender them. [...] I am growing in ways I didn't know were possible. I have loved the Lord for most of my life, but as I was sobbing on the floor two nights ago, a realization came over me. "This is so much bigger than I thought it was." The Spirit is real, living, breathing, active, and DESPERATE FOR YOU. (author's emphasis, Cary)

Emma reflects on her initial motivation as a desire for active commitment in order to help the poor and to reach unchristian people. While in training camp, she realized that she would also profit from such a commitment, which seems to be in the center of her motivation now. The focus has shifted from a perspective on others to one focused on herself: The First person pronoun "I" is used thirteen time throughout the short text.

[47] Emma participates in the passport program of "Adventures in Missions" which is geared towards eighteen to twenty-two years-old college students and offers one to three month organized mission trips. Her blog entry was chosen as one of the feature stories with which "Adventures in Missions" advertises for its programs.

Unknowingly she describes mission as a happiness-script: The prospect of doing mission fulfills her with so much joy that she feels compelled to share exactly that joy with others. It is the prospect alone that fills her with joys since she has not set her food upon Indian soil yet. As an example for others interested in doing mission, her blog entry is an object that "points happily" to use a term by which Ahmed describes objects that "are associated with affects before they are even encountered. An object can point toward happiness without necessarily having affected us in a good way" (Ahmed, *Happiness* 27). This is one example how affectively charged objects create the anticipatory causality mentioned earlier: "It is possible that the evocation of an object can be pleasurable even if we have not yet experienced an object as pleasing" (27). The emphasis has shifted from helping others to proliferate the affects and emotions she has developed for doing mission. She continues then by directly appealing to the reader, urging him to do likewise, promising that such a step would bring meaning to one's life, elevating oneself to grow and promising to be even closer to God/the spirit. The tone of the blog entry is highly affective and is written in the urging spirit of a sermon. Other mission blogs include accounts of emotional encounters in rural China (Z. Murphy), converted Voodoo followers in Haiti (Bickham) and healing in Mongolia (Blair), among thousands of others. What all those accounts have in common is that, on the one hand, those blogs tell about the deep emotional and experiential transformations the mission trip entailed that often gave them new insights or elevated their sense of existence, on the other hand, they all confirm how easy it was. All that is needed is to trust in God and book with adventures in missions.

Apart from serving as an opportunity to do God's work temporarily and to have an adventurous experience, short-term mission also forms an attachment to the organizers of the mission trip and evangelical mission in general. They are the one who have enabled the participant to go on mission after all. The individual narrative of mission is only valid as long as it is reaffirmed and acknowledged continuously, for example in the form of donations. Thus inherent to short-term missions is a strong performative aspect that changes afterward into a narrative re-imagination that is subject to the expectations

of those 'left behind.' After the trip, the narrative only works if it is narrated as a successful mission. Later on, the participant may promote mission by providing their very own narrative of successful mission, pointing out to his or her adventure and maybe even donate to organizers of mission. Thus again younger people might feel attracted to the wonders of mission and might want to do God's deeds in the world. Short-term mission thus is a circulatory and expansive system that relies on the amplification of positive affects generated by mission narratives.[48]

Organizations like YWAM or Operation Mobilization promise an opportunity to become part of an idealized heroic narrative without the hardships that such an adventurous life would presumably entail. Mission becomes something you do in your gap year or in-between schools. It is a consumable experience that in its form resembles all the offers of the tourism industry. To further accommodate to the individual interests and needs of those interested in short-term mission, the DTS is tailored to meet with the desires and interests of its participants pragmatically. Participants can choose between different programs: working with children ("if you want to bring justice and mercy for children who are abused, forgotten, enslaved, or abandoned."), "Writing. Media, Music & Dance" ("if you want to use any of the arts to overcome injustice, restore beauty in this world, and create new things together with other artists and God") or "Rescue & Restore" ("if you want to go to the poorest of the poor in the brothels, refugee camps and slums"). All of these programs are appealing to the heroic in a both naive and yet slightly megalomaniac way (saving the world by dancing), while on the other hand reassuring prospective participants that everything will be taken care of by YWAM and God. The description of the program usually puts the reader into a passive position: "DTS will help you discover your place in the Great Commission [...] Each day you'll be plugged into a schedule that provides time alone with God, small group interaction, teaching and study time, fellowship [...] You'll be put in situations that challenge you and bring out your strengths and weaknesses as you learn to give your all for Jesus. You'll learn how to hear

[48]The $M - C - M'$-cycle thus in this case becomes $narrative - mission - narrative\prime$.

God and to obey Him,"[49] thus offering a promise of the extraordinary and emphasizing the significance of one's own individual contribution in an all-inclusive sort of manner.

One study tried to assess in how far mission trips influenced the individual conscience of participants. "Almost half said they were less likely to see their culture as inherently superior. Most of the students who had been exposed to poverty on their trips said they had greater appreciation for what they have—or even disgust for American greed—but only a few mentioned concrete steps they had taken to lessen their materialism" (qtd. in Goodrich). Robert Priest (et al.), while doing a similar study on the impact of short-term mission found out that "'Gratefulness' would appear to be a common theme among short-term mission (STM) participants" (R. J. Priest et al. 440).[50] Being grateful for what you have in the face of poverty and sorrow is a very understandable human reaction. Without wanting to ethically value such a response, it is yet another indication that STM are indeed about the participants of the program and his or her individual needs rather than the people in need encountered on such a trip. While short-term mission seem to elevate the conscious of its participants for a short while, it is not necessarily a life-changing experience. For the mission-tripper, it is a 'feelgood measure' for easing the bad conscience of the privileged in the face of global injustice. The phenomenon thus fits well into modern evangelicalism as a lifestyle offer. For the majority of participants, short-term mission remains a simulacrum of a self-discovering journey, a personal experience that can be 're-branded' and then narrated as social and religious commitment.

Mission, to spread the gospel is one of the central activities for evangelicals and spreading the gospel thus is deeply entangled with notions of duty and also happiness as "doing mission" promises happiness from fulfilling a central Christian duty. The prestige and recognition gained by being a missionary renders mission highly desirable, which constitutes for one of the reasons for evangelicals immense success in finding and sending

[49] http://www.ywammadison.org/dts/

[50] The research team from Trinity Evangelical Divinity School added rather frustratingly that "when wealthy Christians, in the context of STM, encounter human poverty, suffering, and spiritual need, 'gratefulness' is not, by itself, an adequate response" (R. J. Priest et al. 440).

out full-time missionaries, who are devoted to spend considerable amounts of time and money in the service of evangelical proselytization. But as the experience of 'doing mission' is central for the evangelical promise of happiness, being both duty awaiting its fulfillment and happiness-cause, a demand to perform mission exists, which differs from devoting one's live to a career in mission. Short-term mission meets this demand for a low threshold option of doing mission. It is a commodity that is made possible (and advertised for) by a mission narrative. During the course of the consumption of the commodity short-term mission, various aspects of late modern capitalism are naturalized and legitimized, like wage-less jobs and debt. After the successful mission trip, it becomes a mission narrative itself and helps in generating new mission trips.

The crucial aspect of programs like YWAM's is not the reported cult-like indoctrination and not even the exploitation of its workers, these are byproducts of its purpose to productively expand itself. For this purpose it offers—as so often in evangelicalism—to 'break through,' to leave behind the mundane and boring, the meaningless life—but by the means of this very world. A Bible verse that is repeatedly mentioned within the evangelical spectrum is Acts 17.6–7.[51] Evangelicalism claims to enable every one to "turn the world upside down," to make an impact, to be significant. The offer here is exactly that but with minimal effort: booking a trip, consuming a product. Participants do not really have to change anything in their lives, they can book their trip online and pay by credit card.

The form is similar to other modes already encountered in the mundane world; be it either work & travel programs or unpaid internships. It is important to note that mission trips are not replacing traditional mission in evangelicalism, but are an addition to the range of products evangelicalism has in store for its members. Short-term mission lets those evangelicals not inclined to spend their lives abroad in service of spreading the gospel participate in the happiness-cause that mission is in an socially

[51] "And when they found them not, they drew Jason and certain brethren unto the rulers of the city, crying, These that have turned the world upside down are come hither also" (*KJV,* Acts 17.6–7).

accepted way, compatible with the demands of professional life. Thus participants are able to fulfill their evangelical duty to proselytize and gain happiness. Duty leads us back to Ahmed whose approach to happiness again here helps to understand the motivational force of the evangelical promise of happiness that relies on the mobilization of duty and purpose. Following Ahmed's line of argument for short-term mission, being a 'good Christian' means spreading the gospel. This is a social norm that is attributed to happiness. Ahmed suggests that "attributions of happiness might be how social norms and ideals become affective, as if relative proximity to these norms and ideals creates happiness" (Ahmed, *Happiness* 10). This "relative proximity" to evangelicalism is easier to maintain than to traditional Christianity. While traditional Christianity expects virtue in life as a premise for happiness in the transcendent afterlife, evangelicalism charges all aspects of life with immanence. Jean Comaroff mentions in this context Ted Haggard, according to whom the task is to put "'God in everything,' so that 'anything can be holy'" (qtd. in Comaroff 47). Evangelical agency can be executed through almost all acts of life, those traditionally connected to worship (like praying, donating or doing mission) but also through commerce and consumption. Any object encountered in life can be associated with signs of religiosity; can become a *happiness-cause*. Short-term mission is a hybrid between doing mission and commerce. It is a product that can be bought and whose consumption promises happiness as an accepted way to fulfill the social norm to proselytize.

As all three examples above have confirmed how deeply evangelicalism operates within the market paradigm of late modern capitalism. Central aspects of Christian commitment, like mission, are commodified while charity and donations are re-contextualized as capital investment. Regarding the formation of communities, social media is utilized to generate "content marketing," "micro-investments," and "clicktivism," all three methods intrinsic to the commercial side of internet technology. Granted, these are trends that can be observed within other religious communities as well. But no other religious community is as effective as evangelicalism in adapting these new forms of being Christian. While other religious groups might utilize these new forms as a mean to an end

for the distribution of their message, evangelicals charge the means themselves affectively. Ahmed discusses this as "to make the means to an end as well as an end" (Ahmed, *Happiness* 10) in another context. The offer to console transcendental homelessness is not transcendental at all, it is an offer of immanence, to find God in the here and now. Transferring money, booking a short trip or posting on Facebook become actions that are affectively charged and thus become religious acts that make evangelicals feel contributing to a godlier world.

The success of short-term missions was also facilitated through processes of globalization and technological and infrastructural changes, showing how the commodity of mission has adapted to new possibilities on the market, like more affordable international flights. The cheaper those became, the more feasible became the idea to send an adolescent to another country for two weeks in order to spread the gospel.[52] There are also some more substantial adaptions of marketing techniques observable here: The mission blogs are inspired by what in internet marketing is called "content marketing" and has recently become one of the most important marketing trends in internet marketing.[53] The notion of evangelicalism making use of the contemporary expressions of the market paradigm of their respective times was also found in my two other examples: The sacrificial economy of Jerry Falwell was tailored around a 'charismatic' leader, something which in the 1980s, the high-times of Falwell's empire, could also be observed in business and politics, the two most obvious figures being Steve Jobs and Ronald Reagan. With the opening of the world for almost every American, they also gained individual freedom as to choose where and how to spend their money and time, which lead to the success of offers like short-term mission. Evangelicalism has ever been more adaptive of new technologies for giving a sense of belongingness that transgressed the horizon of the locale and helped

[52]This is just the latest peak of a history of acceleration of travel and a resulting greater affordability of long-range travel that started much earlier with the advent of the railroad.

[53]The "Content Marketing Institute", who refer to themselves as the "the leading global content marketing education and training organization" (Content Marketing Institute, "About the CMI") define content marketing as "a strategic marketing approach focused on creating and distributing valuable, relevant, and consistent content to attract and retain a clearly-defined audience — and, ultimately, to drive profitable customer action" ("What is CM?").

fostering a sense of being part of a global, transnational community than any other religious community—from the radio days to television to the internet—the community making, the donation/investment scheme and the new approaches to mission are all offers of meaning that have been made possible by developments inherent to late modern capitalism that evangelical organizations are incorporating as their own as soon as they are available. There is no indication of this trend stopping any day soon. On the contrary, it can already be glimpsed at how those techniques are further developed and integrated into future applications in where evangelicalism will have arrived at a point where it makes use of the internet in an avant-garde way, only surpassed by the companies of the internet age. One very recent take on mission is trying to productively use loosely forming anonymous networks—crowdsourcing—for online mission.

3.4.1 Online Mission—A Glimpse into the Future

The new possibilities that come with internet communication are already being integrated into a more coherent way than in the examples given above. The internet had been recognized as a powerful media to spread the gospel early on. Osterbaan describes how from the beginning the technology resonated deeply with the mentality especially of pentecostal churches, whose drive for establishing World Christianity is discernible both in church names such as "International Central Gospel Church" or "Lighthouse Chapel International" (Oosterbaan 57) and pentecostal web presentations that often feature spinning globes, and interactive digital world maps and other representations of the global (57). The prospects of new technology and globalization opened up way of letting those hear the gospel who could not have been reached before. What sounds like a truism was actually the long sought solution to a major problem Christian churches were facing: "Believe without belonging". Ever since Grace Davie published her paper on dwindling membership numbers of churches in Great Britain, while belief seemed to persist (Davie), this problem has been tried to overcome by many churches. The crisis of the local church

has also been a problem in the Unites States, where "'nones' have been on the rise" recently[54] (Pew Research Center, "Nones on the Rise"). With the advent of the internet, it was especially evangelicals who reached out by offering a new kind of community over the internet which also gradually changes (and continues to do so) evangelicalism (Chidester 543).

A recent example for the rapid transformation of religious communities through its expansion via the internet is the "online mission" of "Global Media Outreach" (GMO), which is a first example of how internet communications may be used in future to address the demand for community and to provide an opportunity to donate (invest) and voluntarily commit oneself to the cause. The concept of Global Media Outreach's online mission is to attract seekers to its online services via internet advertisement—the little blinking banners that are the scourge of any internet user. Donations go directly into the advertising fund—the more is donated, the more evangelical 'ads' will be visible throughout the internet.[55] GMO advertises to potential donors by stating that "every nickel shares Jesus" with one person, by which GMO refers to the process of clicking on a banner-ad on the internet. Directing seekers to their online presentation is only the first step. Suitors can connect via Facebook, download various mobile phone 'apps' or write a text message. Regardless of how they connect to GMO, voluntary "online missionaries" are there to response to the incoming calls and messages: they "answer questions, pray for and guide new and recommitting believers on the journey to Jesus through a safe and anonymous system" ("How It Works"). Multiple media offers from animation films, guidebook-like material and weekly devotionals are available free of charge online to strengthen the bond. In a last step, GMO's online missionaries connect new believers to local churches. GMO has ties to "Campus Crusaders for Christ" (Vu), but presents itself as a sort of internet start-up for evangelicals. According to the homepage of GMO,

[54] "Nones" is a neologism describing Christians who are not associated to any denomination or organized religion.

[55] As abstract as this might sound, advertising is one of the biggest market of the internet economy. Google's "ad revenue" of 2015 added up to 53.05 billion US Dollars ("Google Ad Revenue Growth").

Founder Walt Wilson pondered the question "What if technology is the way to reach the unreached? What if technology is key to fulfilling the Great Commission in our lifetime?" and God answered by "providing him partners in Silicon Valley to build this idea into a ministry" ("Mission & Vision"). GMO also publishes a yearly financial report that interestingly puts first how many people they have reached and converted as in comparison to the previous year and how much was invested in financial means to achieve this number (The actual numbers on income and spending are hidden somewhere below). Converted or reached persons thus become tender and are seen as *return of investment* for a company that makes use of the appeal internet companies have as successful and innovative entities and proof of the American Dream still intact—you only need a good idea and to convince the investors and in the case of GMO, the help of God, who will guide you on your quest for investor's capital. The system GMO has established thus is an expansive circulatory system where financial funding and affect grow side by side, coexisting as exchangeable commodities: donations buy attention in the form of internet advertisements, voluntary work by online missionaries furthers the affective bond to the new Christians, who then in turn feed back into the system donations off affect and/or money. It is yet unclear how successful GMO's approach to mission will be. Their initial outreach seems to be highly successful, at which more than one and a half million Facebook 'Likes' point out.[56] However, Facebook 'Likes' are not conversions to Christianity and thus in the absence of more evidence of their success than their own financial reports, it can only be hypothesized on how much of an impact GMO will prove to have. Apart from that, GMO already is yet another example for the adaptivity of evangelicalism. It provides an business-like environment in which new approaches are pragmatically tested for the sake of success.

Again, the $M - C - M'$-cycle is encountered, which Ahmed based her model of circulation of affect upon. Online mission is just one example of how evangelical communication strategies makes use of the Internet. The interesting point here is that

[56]https://www.facebook.com/GodLifePage For comparison: The Catholic Church's Facebook account has over two million 'Likes' and Justin Bieber's profile over seventy-seven million 'Likes.'

it is not the arguably skillful use of internet technology and its underlying modes of communication that evangelical expansion profits from, but rather that media like social media work promote the aforementioned intimate public sphere. As a medium, the Internet is as much an emotion machine as it is an information machine that serves as an echo chamber for the convictions of its users.[57] But even before the advent of internet technology, evangelical media relied on the establishment of its own closed media ecosystems that amplified the consumer's owns convictions, creating a bubble of peers that at the same time shunned out non-believers, while leaving the door open enough to attract newcomers.

Which brings us back to Ahmed with a reminder that the reason for the happiness-script of evangelicalism being especially powerful is that it first of all emphasizes what causes happiness; in this case, love, belonging, and community. It is a totalizing script, covering even the most mundane aspects of life. The more happiness the affective economy of evangelicalism accumulates, the bigger becomes its affirmative power to align bodies to the values, norms, and meanings associated with it, and the easier it becomes to associate objects that are contrary to these values, norms, and meanings with unhappiness.

[57]The "Filter Bubble," a trend to serve personalized results on the basis of one's recorded previous queries intensifies this phenomenon (cf. Pariser).

3.5 Prosperity Gospel—The Reason I Went Diamond Is the Lord

The Prosperity Gospel is a current within evangelicalism that concentrates on born-again person-hood and its conceptual relation to gaining personal financial success. Prosperity Gospel, sometimes called Word of Faith movement, Faith gospel or health and wealth theology[58] (from here on Prosperity) might be among the most mundane manifestations within the evangelical spectrum.[59] Its proponents preach a gospel that emphasizes individual material rewards of personal health and wealth in this world. Its origins can be found in the New Thought movement of the nineteenth century as well as as in the post-World War II healing revivalism (Coleman, "Continuous Conversion" 24n3).[60]

Kate Bowler sees Prosperity "composed of three distinct though intersecting streams: Pentecostalism; New Tought [...] and an American gospel of pragmatism, individualism, and upward mobility" (Bowler, *Blessed* 11)—the latter exemplified by publications such as Andrew Carnegie's *The Gospel of Wealth* (Carnegie) or the essay *Acres of Diamonds* (Conwell) by Temple University founder Russel Conwell.[61] Simon Coleman argues that prosperity has been especially successful with "both working- and middle-class conservative Protestants in many parts of the world, particularly over the

[58] Some critics mock it as "name it and claim it" theology (Coleman, "Continuous Conversion" 21).

[59] The subsection headline is taken from a sermon from Sunday School Teacher Rick Betcher. James Bielo deals extensively with him in a one person case study (Bielo). Bielo identifies the 1950s as decade in which prosperity Gospel gained national significance in the Unites States with the emergence of organizations such as the Full Gospel Men's Business Fellowship and protagonists such as Norbert Vincent Peale.

[60] See also Kramer ("Global Faith") for a detailed examination of how material and health-related well-being became major themes in US Pentecostalism in the 1940s.

[61] The impact of New Thought on American culture cannot be overestimated. The notion of humanity being able to find its own salvation, the primacy of thought over substance and following a "generative power of human thought" (Bowler, *Blessed* 14) still influence major American discourses. New Thought had had repercussions with Evangelicalism as much as it had with therapy, economics, and politics. The notion that "positive thoughts yielded positive circumstances, and negative thoughts yielded negative situations" (14) is what lies at the basis of much of 'happy science' and positive psychology discussed earlier and also continues to influence popular culture in the twenty-first century. In the 1950s, *The Power of Positive Thinking* (Peale), which sold more than any other non-fiction book in 1954 expect for the Bible (Satter 6). It is also noteworthy that Peale wrote a 'spiritual successor' in 1980 called *The Positive Power of Jesus Christ* another indication to the close relationship between Christianity and New Thinking.

past thirty years" (Coleman, "Continuous Conversion" 24n3). Prosperity Gospel might be the most recent manifestation within the evangelical spectrum that is firmly grounded in an American sense of culture, religion and economy. Robbins notes that "the prosperity gospel preached in these churches holds that health and wealth are the believer's due and that illness and poverty are caused by sin and demonic influence. Converts are encouraged to give generously with the promise that their gifts will be returned lavishly" (Robbins, "Globalization" 137). In summary, it can be argued that Prosperity is the Christian current where the economic and the religious are most visible interconnected.

Prosperity Gospel has also been widely successful outside of the United States. The academic discourse on the success of Prosperity runs along similar lines as that on the general evangelical worldwide success discussed earlier. While some attribute its success to the Global South being more receptive and the driving motor of a new World Christianity, others see Prosperity as a successful export of American cultural values and economic conceptions. As Stephen Hunt notes, "[Prosperity] has roots in North American culture, its dogma and practices are considerably modified within local cultural environments" (Hunt).[62] But works as early as Paul Gifford's paper on US evangelical missionaries in Africa from 1987 show how the emphasis on material well-being of the individual is only a consequence of a long history of cultural exercise of influence. As Gifford noted in his appraisal of Reinhard Bonnke's "Christ for All Nations Crusade": "In this strain of religion, things like 'democracy,' free enterprise, individual liberty, 'a strong dollar,' and American military superiority acquire almost divine status" (Gifford, "Africa Shall Be Saved" 85). The expansion of Prosperity experienced especially in the 1970s "through such preachers as Oral Roberts, Kenneth Copeland, and Kenneth Hagin" (Coleman, "Prosperity Unbound?" 43n2) coincided with the rise of neoliberalism in the same decade. As much as mission in those days has to be seen in conjunction with the Cold War and the resulting systemic competition between the Unites States and the Soviet Union, it is observable that while the systemic competition has ceased to exist,

[62] Again, the dilemma with glocalization as discussed on page 77 is encountered.

the worldwide promotion of neoliberal agendas has even intensified—both in the United States and abroad.

The Prosperity Gospel is incredibly successful in Latin America, Asia and Africa, which is sometimes brought forth as an argument for the universality of its religious claim and as yet another proof for the vitality of World Christianity. Several reasons can be brought forth for its global success. Its global rise coincides with a shift in "US third world policy" towards the idea that "other countries could 'progress' only if they followed the US road to mass-consumption prosperity" (McClintock 93).[63]

Poverty and what Alain Badiou has called "Le desir d'Occident" (Maggiori, Vécrin, and Badiou) makes the Prosperity Gospel's promise of health and wealth more desirable in developing countries than it already is in privileged and saturated societies. The possibility that US evangelicalism only appealed to the then so-called third world due to its proximity to the American way of life and its promise of material wealth was discussed even in evangelical missionary circles. The rather deprecatory term "rice-bowl Christians"[64] was used to nominate those converts, who where suspected to be more interested in the material advantages that where connected to the new religion brought by Americans (Ensor 35).

Although resistance to Western cultural and economic domination is a crucial narrative within many evangelical communities (more so in the West), as discussed before, abroad the "desire for the West" and its material promises is spurred by all cultural manifestations of the West, even its religious ones. As Paul Gifford states, "in Africa it is obvious that the faith gospel builds on traditional preoccupations. Africa's traditional religions were focused on material realities" (Gifford, "Complex Provenance" 64). But the Prosperity Gospel is equally successful in the West.[65]

[63]McClintock mentions W.W. Rostov's "Non-Communist Manifesto" as seminal for "the so-called 'developing' nations as passing through similar stages of development, out of tradition-bound poverty, through an industrialized modernization overseen by the US, the World Bank and the IMF, to mass-consumer prosperity. (McClintock 93)".

[64]The term originated from missionaries in Asia. Later missionaries to central America brought up the term "corn Christians" (Ensor 35).

[65]See Simon Coleman on Prosperity in Sweden (cf Coleman, "The Charismatic Gift"), Kate Bowler on

The rise of Prosperity, first as a small group within Pentecostalism and now as one of the main currents of evangelicalism is deeply connected to the rise of neoliberalism and individualist thinking. As Birgit Meyer notes, by

> embracing the Gospel of Prosperity, wealth is regarded as a divine blessing. All this suggests Pentecostal-Charismatic Churches' easy adoption of, and incorporation in, the culture of neo-liberal capitalism, so much so that it becomes impossible to state where religion begins or ends. (Meyer, "Religious Sensations" 30)

Such an expression of Christianity with its blunt evocation of wealth and health as consequences of godliness marks the completion of the affect carry-over from social conservatism to neoliberal thinking. The ideological effect has already been internalized and as such can be promoted directly. As the fig leafs of the putatively endangered family—the euphemism for homophobia—or the "pro-life" movement, to name only two, lose their significance to a broader populace, these cultural reactions are replaced by seemingly empowering and enabling promises of health, wealth, and individual success whiach all address the individual believer directly. In short, what in the 1970s began as a "Neocon-Theocon alliance" has long been dissolved. Heilbrunn describes in detail how the alliance that formed in the 1970s has come apart in the mid-1990s over the frustrations of theocons that their agendas again had not been implemented, as with Carter and Reagan before (cf. Heilbrunn).

In addition, neo-conservatives were accused by the theocons that "neo-conservatives have preferred to tune out the message and embrace the messenger," (Heilbrunn) which goes along the lines of the argument presented in this thesis that evangelicalism as a movement has aligned with late modern capitalism rather than fundamentalism. Evangelicalism has long become part of the late modern capitalist endeavor that grants a higher justification to a worldly cause, where religious revelations and

Prosperity in the Unites States (cf. Bowler, *Blessed*).

economic natural law have coalesced.

One of the central concepts of the Prosperity Gospel that is a consequence of this coalescence is the notion of "being blessed." The term has in this context a special connotation whose significance Kate Bowler points out:

> Blessed is a loaded term because it blurs the distinction between two very different categories: gift and reward. It can be a term of pure gratitude. "Thank you, God. I could not have secured this for myself." But it can also imply that it was deserved. "Thank you, me. For being the kind of person who gets it right." It is a perfect word for an American society that says it believes the American dream is based on hard work, not luck. (Bowler, "Death, the Prosperity Gospel and Me")

Being blessed means *having achieved* and *having received* a the same time. Individual success is thus enabled by both, personal diligence and God's help. God becomes an asset on the individual quest to *make it* that furthers one economic prospects. Sunday school preacher Rick Betcher expresses this fittingly: "You can do anything you're doing ten times more if you're praying about it. [...] The reason I'm successful, the reason these other guys are successful, is because we have a powerful partner" (qtd. in Bielo 316). The non-ideological means here is as much part of the neoliberal paradigm as is the ideological effect. The promise is individual success, the ideological effect is not to question the system that may or may not enable said success. It becomes extra-discursive as it is part of the world God has provided for us to be successful in. Consequently, the responsibility for being unsuccessful is found exclusively with the individual which has not sought out the help of God. With Prosperity, late modern capitalism has completely merged with Christianity. Ideological effects inherent to capitalism do not have to be promoted anymore by non-ideological means that cater to the nostalgia of believers and thus an affect-carry over does not have to take place anymore.

As has been shown with the four (and a half) examples chosen, evangelical-

ism shares structural homologies with late modern capitalism that relies on mobilizing individuals, their funds and their commitment by the means of affect and emotion. However, affect and emotion do not stay a means for mobilization, but are an intrinsic and integral part of evangelicalism, which they are also for Late Modern Capitalism, as has been argued repeatedly by Illouz and Hochschild, among others. While the examples examined here are not representative for all of evangelicalism, they are inherent to evangelicalism in that no other religious environment generates so many offers that rely on the mobilization of emotion and affect. In the case of Ukraine, World Christianity is imagined as a community of suffering that is under threat, creating an intimate public sphere that allows anyone to 'plug-in' to a sentiment of belonging to a community under existential threat, elevating the sense of one's own importance as the individual becomes part of an epic struggle between good and bad. This struggle resonates with American Manichean notions of having a mission to the world that is set to bring the light of American civilization to the world. The American sense of duty to the rest of the world resonates with the evangelical duty to save the unsaved.

The second example—fund-raising—re-traced the emergence of the reciprocal relationship between Late Modern Capitalism and Evangelicalism in the 1980s. Evangelicalism had always resonated with the development of private business in the Unites States. But in the 1980s the economic sphere began to utilize aspects of evangelicalism. Business became messianic, evangelical leaders profited from appealing to the *homo oeconomicus*. The political, economic and religious sphere all started to rely on charismatic leaders who conveyed ideological effects (the naturalization of finance capitalism) by non-ideological means. Investing in Jesus became a personal business that promised as much happiness as a successfully managed portfolio. Evangelicalism adapted the workings of finance capitalism as their own; they became the fundament of their own world. Thus it became possible to divest from the natural and invest in the supernatural, as both worlds began to follow the same rules. The duty to donate thus becomes a happiness-cause, because it is re-contextualized into a good investment from

which the investor will profit eventually. Thus money can directly buy happiness.

Short-term mission, the third example traced how the evangelical environment promotes the creative re-imagination of proven concepts to meet new demands—another structural homology it shares with successful corporations. In demand here is a possibility to participate in the Great Commission, but without the hardship mission might entail. Short-term missions have become the product of a veritable industry that competes with the secular tourism industry for customers. The industry around this commodified offer of self-experience also helps naturalizing aspects of late modern capitalism like debt as a non-negotiable state and wage-less work. Apart from a consumable 'lifetime experience' short-term mission offers its customers meaning in the form of having contributed to a more godly world. They are tailored around the expectations of the customer and thus focus more on the prospective missionary and his or her experience than on those who ought to be saved in the process of doing mission. Short-Term missions rely on the individual representations of how significant an experience they are, both in order to validate the individual experience through a higher authority and for further advertising the concept to new customers. Thus an anticipatory causality is created that charges short-term missions with positive affects before they are encountered. After the encounter, they are presented in experiential narratives of self-enlightenment that add to the anticipatory appeal of short-term mission. Thus not only the short-term mission gains a performative character, the presentation following such a trip equally does. The duty to save the unsaved thus is easily fulfilled by consuming a commodity that also promises a self-experiential gain for the individual.

Lastly, the Prosperity Gospel preaches a strictly "contractual" social relation, in contrast to a more "covenantal" social relation other religions promote (Bromley and Busching 16-8). The authors speak of a greater conflict between these two forms of relationship and the social conflicts that arise as a consequence: "covenantal social relations, which characterize families, clans, and religious groups, are usefully understood as an alternative and qualitatively different form of social relations from the contractual

social relations which characterize markets and organizations" (16). While contractual social relations have gained more prominence over covenantal in the wake of late modern capitalism, it is not surprising that most religions operate the covenantal rather than the contractual.

Evangelicalism and especially Prosperity thus cannot be seen in a Protestant tradition in a Weberian sense, as it subscribes to the contractual. It thus "contrasts sharply with this-worldly asceticism" (Comaroff 42-3). But the constant appeal to the individual within a late modern capitalist framework alludes to a shift of the importance of the individual. It is indeed not inner-worldly asceticism that Prosperity and evangelicalism in general preach, but a *inner-worldly narcissism* that circles around the individual and its personal relationship with God in a late modern capitalist framework. One of the major premises of this inner-worldly narcissism has been a therapeutic culture that has been deeply entangled with American evangelicalism throughout its history.

3.6 The Narcissist in Therapy

Throughout this text, the evangelical entanglement with therapy was encountered repeatedly. Considering the historical development of evangelicalism, McLoughlin attributed the Great Revivals with a therapeutic quality on a national scale (as described on page 29), Finney's "New Measures" already encompassed methods that precede contemporary group therapy approaches (p. 32), and already Robert Bellah pointed out the similarities between the "therapeutically inclined" and evangelical Christians (p. 173). Today, some approaches to therapy originating from cognitive science are occupied with the (rather uncritical) question whether therapeutic utility can be discerned in the practice of religion in general (p. 102). Both Luhrmann and Bowler refer to the vicinity of therapy of evangelical literature to cognitive behavior therapy (p. 105) and how the teachings of prosperity are deeply rooted in the New Thought Movement of the nineteenth century, the positivistic mantra of positive thought as a therapeutic method (p. 152).

The developments of evangelicalism and what Lasch calls a "therapeutic culture" seem to have had so many contact points of reciprocal exchange that it is worthy to pursuit this connection. Two different perspectives are distinguishable in the broader discussion on the relationship of therapy and evangelicalism. Anthropologist Katja Rakow identifies this relationship as one defined by "interconnection and entanglement" (Rakow 485) rather than one of replacement and substitution as Lasch does. According to Rakow, Lasch's appreciation is "based on the idea that traditional Protestant religion has been eroded and replaced by the therapeutic ethos" (486).

The former thought resonates with Illouz's understanding of therapeutic culture as something that has emerged in the twentieth century (not without having been influenced by precursors that developed in the nineteenth century). As the "self has become the prime site for the management of the contradictions of modernity" (Illouz, *Modern Soul* 243), therapeutic discourse "establishes the self both as the problem and the solution for the

ailments of modern life and offers psychological techniques to accomplish the task"[66] (Illouz qtd. in Rakow 486). By incorporating therapeutic discourse into all major institutions of modernity,[67] the self itself is institutionalized in a "quintessential and powerful modern way" (*Modern Soul* 9). Evangelicalism might be as successful as it is, because it is able to address the problems and conflicts that arise with this institutionalization of the self. It is a religious offer in which "therapeutic language replaced sentimentality as the preferred medium of religious advice giving" (Bowler, *Blessed* 127) as Bowler has asserted for Prosperity. While not representative for all of evangelical Christianity, Prosperity clearly is one of the trail-blazers heralding a development that can already be recognized for all of evangelicalism. The most prominent example for addressing the therapeutic is probably Prosperity Gospel preacher Joel Osteen of Houston-based Lakewood church, one of the largest mega churches in the United States. Osteen is also one of the most successful writers of evangelical literature. His 2007 bestseller *Become a Better You: 7 Keys to Improving Your Life Every Day* (Osteen) oscillates between the genres of self-help and religious literature. Osteen preaches what Bowler calls "soft prosperity" (Bowler, *Blessed* 125), making a connection between psychological health and financial success with an emotional appeal within a vaguely Christian framework. Osteen teaches a christianized version of positive thinking:

> Every day, we should make positive declarations over our lives: "I am blessed. I am prosperous. I am healthy. I am talented. I am creative. I am wise." [...] as those words permeate your heart and mind, and especially your subconscious mind, eventually they will begin to change the way you see yourself. (Osteen 109)

Osteen promises profound change through the power of iteracy and belief in a quantifiable way. As Bowler points out, "this way, a healthy mind becomes an important indicator

[66]The remedy is offered by the very same reason the problem exists in the first place.
[67]Illouz identifies those as corporation, family, mass media and the state (Illouz, *Modern Soul* 243).

of spiritual health and a vibrant conduit of faith" (Bowler, *Blessed* 125). The believers' life thus becomes a performance of being spiritually healthy and happy. Both qualities can be achieved by introspective insight and a spiritual navel-gazing into the self. With inner-worldly narcissism God is presumed to reside within oneself and can be discovered only by arduous listening into oneself and by pleading one's own wishes to oneself.

Osteen promotes a duty to be spiritually healthy and happy: If it is within the individuals' possibilities to achieve these states, a duty to do so can be derived. What Ahmed calls "a hopeful performative, [...] the hope that the repetition of the word happiness will make us happy. We hope that the word happiness will deliver its promise" (Ahmed, *Happiness* 200), is useful here as it describes what Osteen preaches. The responsibility of being psychologically and spiritually healthy and happy is thus shifted to the individual. He or she has to function and capitalism provides all the means necessary for the individual functioning. But as capitalism's material offer of prosperity for all is waning in the West, evangelicalism fills the free space by providing a similar offer wrapped differently: As Terry Eagleton has recently pointed out, the crisis of capitalism and the following decline of its secular promise of salvation—prosperity for all—might itself promote a new religious vigor:

> Since economic activity is without much built-in spiritual purpose, that meaning has to be imported from elsewhere [...] The very system which discredits religion in its spontaneously secular dealings is also the one most urgently in need of the symbolic unity that religion can provide. If traditional faith no longer offers such cohesion, new forms of it will have to be invented. (Eagleton, *Culture* 63)

Prosperity is the perfect contestant for what Eagleton is assuming. As an offer of cohesion, it adds symbolic activity to economic necessity. Late modern capitalism is not only able to sell symbolic value, as Streeck observed (see p. 184), but these symbolic commodities, especially in their religious form, as in evangelical expressions such as Prosperity, offer a

new form of cohesion and console the individual, which is at the center of Prosperity's promises of health and wealth. This is why a perspective on narcissism could be useful here.

3.6.1 Inner-Worldly Narcissism

The Weberian model of religion has been criticized for being outdated, euro-centric, positivist, offering a grand narrative, and departing from the allegedly false assumption of a general historical development of secularization. However, its typology is still worthwhile to consider, albeit in a slightly adapted way. Frederic Jameson has pointed out that Weber's term *Wertefreiheit* "has nothing in common with that positivistic and academic type of objectivity to which it has so often been assimilated by Weber's American interpreters" (Jameson, "Vanishing Mediator" 52). Jameson also points to the importance of binary oppositions in Weberian thinking. The checklist of oppositions include "Bureaucracy versus Charisma, but also: asceticism versus mysticism" (63) to which for the purpose of my subject inner-worldly versus outer-worldly could be added. Without wanting to conjure a purely structuralist analysis of Weberian thought here, a categorization and sorting of Weber's "roads to salvation" (Weber, *Charisma* 268) in such a manner seems productive for a theoretical examination of evangelicalism. This becomes necessary, because Comaroff's assessment that evangelicalism "contrasts sharply with this-worldly asceticism" (Comaroff 42-3) does not mean that evangelicalism could be described as *world-rejecting asceticism,* which is the opposing type in Weber's model. In order to find a fitting category that best describes evangelicalism in such a framework, it might be useful to reconstruct the four types along two binary oppositions that are already inherent to Weber's types. The original typology found in *Economy and Society* consists of three possible "roads to salvation": *inner-worldly asceticism*, *world-rejecting asceticism*, and *world-flying mysticism*. As Zaleski has argued, Weber's typology does provide a satisfying model of religious attitudes only if one avoids the notion of a chronological progression from

one type to another.[68] (Załęski 321) For that purpose, Zaleski proposes aligning the types along two axes that are already inherent to Weber's types: transcendence/immanence and engagement with/avoidance of the world (325). Such a new arrangement does not privilege any type as it manages to do without any notion of historical progression. It also re-establishes the fourth type, *world-active mysticism,* which was elaborated by Weber, but was not used by him in the original model. A brief look at the four types makes apparent why that is the case.

With *inner-worldly asceticism,* religiousness is fulfilled within the "institutional structure of the world" (Weber, *Religion* 168). It includes a duty to transform the world according to the ideals of asceticism: According to Weber, Protestants are required to participate within the institutions of the world, while being in opposition to them. This becomes necessary as a reaction to the "radical elimination of magic" (which precedes all three types) (*Protestant Ethic* 149) that happened in the process of secularization. Inner-worldly asceticism avoids transcendence and engages with the world. It is this type that Weber concentrates on in his work on the relationship between Protestantism and Capitalism.

World-rejecting asceticism is the conceptual antithesis to inner-worldly asceticism and is defined by a total rejection of the world that is perceived as a sinful place, void of God. Within this type, life is organized around the notion of avoiding all worldly matters and rejecting all natural impulses through discipline. World-rejecting asceticism is both transcendent and avoiding the world as it locates salvation outside of this world. This type can be found in Catholic conceptions of frugality, for example in the idealized monastic life, but also in evangelical fundamentalism as the afore mentioned retreat from public life to an existence in secluded communities.

The third type, *world-flying mysticism* is defined as seeking meditation as a means of enlightenment and works towards a transgression of reality. It can be found in

[68] The chronological progression begins with world-flying mysticism to world-rejecting asceticism to inner-worldly asceticism.

certain expressions of Buddhism and Brahmanism, clearly separating the worldly from other-worldly affairs, producing "outlets for the yearning to escape from the meaningless of inner-worldly work" (Whimster and Weber 79). World-flying mysticism avoids immanence and engages transcendence.

While the fourth type *this-worldly mysticism* was conceptualized by Weber, it appears seldom throughout his work, since it did not fit within his theoretical framework. It is a thoroughly secular category that combines escapism with the total rejection of the religious. Weber describes it as a "broken humility, a minimization of action, a sort of religious incognito existence in the world" (Weber, Gerth, and Mills 326). Mysticism in Weber's system is passive and retreating, qualities that might describe certain forms of Christian fundamentalist sects, but not evangelicalism as a whole. While evangelicalism is clearly this-worldly, mysticism is not helpful in approaching it. As we have already elaborated, the individual stands at the center evangelicalism. Its immense significance is exemplified by the therapeutic culture evangelicalism applies. Thus a more fitting term than mysticism has to be found and it might be narcissism.

Erich Fromm defines narcissism as "an orientation in which all one's interest and passion are directed to one's own person: one's body, mind, feelings, interests, and so forth" (Fromm, *Art of Being* 117). The offers made in all examples examined center around the interests and passions of the individual and reinforce it in its attitude toward the world. According to Fromm,

> for the narcissistic person, only he and what concerns him are fully real; what is outside, what concerns others, is real only in a superficial sense of perception; that is to say, it is real for one's senses and for one's intellect. But it is not real in a deeper sense, for our feeling or understanding. He is, in fact, aware only of what is outside, inasmuch as it affects him. [. . .] The narcissistic person has built an invisible wall around himself. He is everything, the world is nothing. Or rather: He is the world. (117)

For the evangelical donor, for example, investing in the supernatural has the quality to make the supernatural world become real. As evangelicalism promotes only the supernatural world, the world reigned by God, it is only this world that affects him or her, the world outside the evangelical world exists only to be overcome. Fromm's assertion is fitting for evangelicalism and how it affectively charges the world it envisions. Any other realities are blurred to the extend that they are not perceivable anymore to the evangelical believer. Fromm's definition comes with the caveat that the model he calls "group narcissism" can be a quality of any given group.[69] He also views this form of narcissism as a pathology that is a direct consequence of industrialization, the subsequent isolation of the self and thus a result of an economic order that is defined by competition, greed and hubris (*Psychoanalysis* 58) or late modern capitalism. But I am interested in a less Freudian approach to the subject here.

Evangelicalism might be more appealing and successful the more narcissist a society becomes, a development that has been attested to American society already in 1979 by Cristopher Lasch.[70] According to Lasch, a narcissistic culture is not a culture made up of narcissists[71] but one that is defined by an "essential antagonism between the desires of the individual and the demands of the culture" (Hall, Battani, and Neitz 29). This is a direct result of a therapeutic culture and the subsequent importance of recognition of the individual. The over-arching subject that lies at the base of all of these assumptions is, of course what Marx had called *alienation*, and is seen by Fromm, Lasch, and also Illouz as a constituting part of our reality. Like Fromm, Lasch locates the emergence of a narcissistic culture in the nineteenth century. One of the reasons for its emergence he finds in the development of mass-production and its ensuing cultural and

[69]The phenomenon of group narcissism, prevalent in religious, academic, political, religious and economical groups. Self-exaltation here takes the detour over a group that is charged with superiority (of knowledge, piety, power, racial purity, etc.) which the individual then makes his or her own (*Psychoanalysis* 56).

[70]Christopher Lasch's biting critique still resonates today, for example in the works of Illouz, Bellah, Nolan and others.

[71]Lasch's work has been misinterpreted and engrossed by both left and right commentators as an attack on the individual and its flaws, something that Lasch has refuted repeatedly (Hall, Battani, and Neitz 29).

psychic long-term changes.

Lasch had a rather pessimistic view regarding the possibility to escape a narcissistic culture and deemed it not even possible to escape it through art, religion or sex, as all of these lose their "power to provide an imaginary release"[72] (Lasch 98). A therapeutic culture answers to the maladies that rose as a consequence of that rupture between culture and the individual. Lasch sees as a consequence a patient with a "vague, diffuse dissatisfaction with life, who feels his amorphous existence to be futile and purposeless" (37). A therapeutic culture thus addresses the responsibility of the individual and not the circumstances that made him or her sick in the first place. The similarities between a therapeutic culture and how the individual is treated in evangelicalism become apparent: Evangelicalism also leaves the responsibility of salvation with the individual. The Evangelical offer of salvation is appealing to the narcissist, offering a way out of the "amorphous existence" without leaving the system that has produced that "amorphous existence" in the first place. The inner-worldliness of evangelicalism has already become apparent. The role of narcissism becomes apparent if we examine it in the examples from the previous chapter.

The offer of community in evangelicalism is an offer that emphasizes the individual contribution to the community over the actual community. The individual is part of a virtual community of individuals, thus the simulacral community replaces the real one. Praying here is one tool to tune in to such a *virtual* community and feel being part of a group. The pragmatic approach to praying also fills the life with meaning and recognition of the other's suffering, the believer can share the suffering and appropriate it as one's own. Similar to how Lasch argues, inner-worldly narcissism fosters a false sense of community that erodes previously existing local communities.

Evangelical fund-raising connects the duties to the evangelical community with a promise of individual success. A donation is transformed from something an individual has to give up for the sake of the community to a personal investment success

[72]This assertion itself is also a rather therapeutic imagination of "art, religion and sex"

that will eventually (but still in this world) pay off. Again, the duty can be fulfilled by acting in a certain sanctioned way. Another "win-win" situation whose evocation is so abundant in the business world. Christian investment also provides the religious investor with a feeling of meaning and enables him or her to contribute to wonders. Investment as envisioned within evangelicalism thus promises happiness through meaning and fulfillment of individual duty.

Short-Term mission follows a similar pattern in selling an experiential trip in a holiday-package-fashion as missionary work. The individual is enabled to perform mission by booking a trip that is centered on the feelings and experiences of the short term mission tripper and not on the missionized. The later representation of the mission is another variation of the performance of doing mission as it tells the story in a self-representative way. Happiness is gained here through contextualizing one's own experiences with a higher meaning, but again with the promise that happiness and duty coincide with the extra-religious desires.

Inner-worldly narcissism emphasizes the well-being of each individual evangelical in the here and now. The institutions of this world are not opposed but serve a twofold purpose: the coming of the Kingdom of God, which is strangely similar to the world we live in—still relying on the mechanisms of late modern capitalism, but charged with the spiritual and affective. The second purpose is the individual well-being that is acquired by a lifestyle, which is aggressively marketed. What all evangelical offers examined in this thesis have in common is that they pander to the emotional: the products on display are charged affectively and promise a return of investment that is greater than any material gain could be: Each consumed product, be it a donation to a huge evangelical organization, booking a short-term mission trip or supporting World Christianity via the internet increases individual happiness and confirms one's individual lifestyle through a higher authority. The appeal to narcissism is visible in all examples: individual donations contribute directly to miracles, every prayer uttered by the individual counts for changing the world and just by consuming one can bring God's kingdom a bit nearer. The agency

that is ascribed here to the individual stands in contrast to the real agency at hand. It is the same therapeutic culture that creates and answers to the "amorphous existence" (Lasch 37) that is at play here.

3.6.2 Duty and Happiness

Apart from the structural homologies with late modern capitalism and the reliance on affect and emotion to mobilize its members, what all examples have in common is the appeal to duty and a promise that happiness will ensue if the appeal is met. The relationship of these two terms and their importance for evangelicals will be the subject of the last pages of this chapter, which are designed as a theoretical precursor for the derivation of the following conclusion.

Rick Warren, author of "The Purpose-Driven Live," mentions duty eight times throughout the book. In six instances, he points out how serving God should never be done out of duty, but out of joy and love: "God wants our worship to be motivated by love, thanksgiving, and delight, not duty" (Warren 37) or "We don't serve God out of guilt or fear or even duty, but out of joy" (147)[73]

Warren's statements are close to mainstream Christian normative ethics. The motivation to obey does not derive out of duty but out of love. Warren states that evangelical Christians obey God—which means living a Christian life—not out of duty or fear, but out of love and joy. The relationship between obedience and love is a resonating one. The better you obey, the deeper your love. The second point is that obedience itself brings joy ("we obey out of love-and our obedience brings great joy!" (63)). Warren's statements are exemplary for the complicated relationship evangelical Christianity has with normative ethics. Olson notes that evangelical ethics "seek to ground values, virtues, and moral principles, as well as right behavior, in divine *revelation*; more specifically it seeks to ground ethics biblically without falling into literalism or legalism" (author's

[73]The other passages are to be found under (Warren 50; 63; 65; 154; 166; 197).

emphasis, Olson, *Evangelical Theology* 173), while action-based ethics are considered "inexorably relativistic" (173). Warren's statements propose that duty is irrelevant as a motivator for evangelicals, only love and joy[74] mobilize evangelical Christians. But if love, joy and happiness are the motivators for a good evangelical Christian life than the unhappy and joyless subject that has no love cannot live the good life. That is what lies at the base of all the instances where an intrinsic connection between duty and happiness is found in the examples above. Ahmed describes this connection as

> finding happiness in certain places, it generates those places as being good, as being what should be promoted *as* goods. [...] We promote what [Ahmed calls] "happiness-causes," which might even cause happiness to be reported. [...] If we have a duty to promote what causes happiness, then happiness itself becomes a duty (author's emphasis Ahmed, *Happiness* 7).

The duty of happiness coincides with the evangelical duty to proselytize, the duty to invest properly in oneself and the kingdom of God, and the duty to become part of the evangelical community. In an evangelical context, the duty to be happy and to spread one's own happiness *is* to spread the "Good News," as Emma from the Short-term mission example realized in evangelical boot camp before her mission trip. What Ahmed suggests for happiness, that it offers a "hopeful performative" (200), is equally true for mission, donation and joining an evangelical community. As every aspect of an active evangelical subject's life can possibly be proof of the happiness that can be obtained through evangelicalism, in turn evangelicalism is amplified as a happiness-cause. Ahmed calls this *stickiness*: "affect is what sticks, or what sustains or preserves the connection between ideas, values, and objects. [...] Emotions [...] shape how bodies are moved by

[74] Although I am aware of the substantial differences between joy and happiness from a theological point of view, I will use joy and happiness interchangeably here as no indication that Warren wishes to separate joy from happiness conceptually was to be found. Evangelical author Randy Alcorn even makes a case for scrapping any difference between these terms altogether in his latest book (Alcorn). Considering that the evangelical offer is basically an offer of immanence, it makes sense conceptually to legitimize worldly happiness also from a theological point of view.

the worlds they inhabit" (230). Hereby, the subject's individual narrative becomes an evangelical narrative and vice versa. This does not only provide a powerful motivation to fulfill one's *happiness duty* by, for example, doing mission, because the "Good News" of evangelicalism are now also the "Good News" of the missionary, but it renders mission itself more powerful, as the missionary becomes individual proof of the evangelical promise of happiness being true. As a representation of evangelicalism, the missionary, the donor and the participant of the community all become objects that "point happily" (27).

The evangelical promise of happiness is immediate; what in traditional Christianity one could only hope to be granted at the end of a good life, becomes an immediate consequence of the individual's actions. Thereby evangelicalism offers happiness in this world and not salvation in the afterlife. It can be achieved here and now, instantly and repeatedly, by being born-again and then each and every Sunday in service, by going to work, by donating money, booking a short-term mission trip or praying online for Ukraine. The evangelical promise of happiness and its emphasis on personal action also serves as an effective motivator for mission, activism and, donations or other commitment. Spreading the "Good News" thus leaves Christian deontology and virtue ethics (or at least expands it) and changes from a duty to God and church to a personal duty, to a purpose for the individual. The evangelical believer becomes an entrepreneur of his or her own salvation and his actions lead to individual happiness. This requires the believer to fully commit to a religious life, in the sense of finding immanence in every aspect of one's life. In order to achieve this, the believer has to actively colonize his or her mind themselves.

In her anthropological study conducted over five years in Vineyard congregations in Chicago and California (Luhrmann xx), Tanya Luhrmann observed the exceptional amount of time that was being invested in praying and talking to God. Contrary to the notion that one of evangelicalism's primary appeals was easy accessibility due to its emotional and affective demeanor, Luhrmann's findings suggest that becoming an evangelical Christian was hard and enduring work. Her book "when God talks back" is full of personal studies of struggle, disclosing believer's fears of failure and their strategies

of motivation for devoting more time to prayer and personal conversation with God or Jesus. The pastors at Vineyard recommend to set aside at least thirty minutes a day for talking to Jesus/God (48). Many of her interviews with evangelicals deal with the struggle of hearing God's voice and the fear that one will never hear it. But over time, as the Vineyard people reassure, anyone will be able to hear it. A lot of the time spend at Vineyard was devoted to talk about one's own experiences, sharing prayer tips, praying together or praying for somebody else. Praying becomes a sort of meditative exercise, which, if attended to regularly and with devotion will at one day open up the world of God and let one hear his voice.

One particularly interesting technique that believers are advised upon is writing down what was experienced in attempt to make it real. The act of writing one's experiences down seems to have a "realizing" effect on many evangelicals, as Luhrmann notes (54). However fascinating Luhrmann's findings are, providing a rich material for venturing further into the evangelical existence, her explanation of the process is partly unsatisfying. Her theory relies on a psychological interpretation of repetition forming new brain structures, making something real, if it is only repeated often enough, which puts it into the vicinity of positive psychology.

The task evangelicals have to learn is, according to Luhrmann, to externalize an internal voice (140). While Luhrmann's book is indeed ground-breaking in looking into how evangelicals talk to God, how this skill is acquired through learning and theorizing the processes behind this, she is mostly silent on the ideological ramifications of being evangelical: What does it mean to accept this method of finding God's voice through repetitive labor and what is the intrinsic motivation to specifically seek out an evangelical congregation in order to pro-actively undergo such a treatment or conditioning?[75] But even so her material is interesting from a politics of affect perspective. Accepting the evangelical prayer tasks, the whole concept of working hard, repeating monotonously,

[75]I am not asking about the initial motivation to seek a religious congregation in the first place. The motivation for that is described by Luhrmann as "vague yearning" (Luhrmann 43); I chose to describe this as transcendental homelessness.

however stupidly, for the goal of encountering God reminds us of something Bellah observed for the evangelical Christian in "Habits of the Heart":

> Like the therapeutically inclined, the evangelical Christian worries about how to reconcile the spontaneous, emotional side of love with the obligations live entails. For the Christian, however, the tension is clearly resolved in favor of obligation. [...] Love thus becomes a matter of will and action rather than of feelings. While one cannot coerce one's feelings, one can learn to obey God's commands and to love others in a selfless way. This obedience is not, however, necessarily in conflict with personal freedom. Through training and shaping the will, the Christian can come to want to do what he must do. (Bellah, *Habits of the Heart* 94)

The evangelical way of seeking a transcendental quality for their lives, a way out of a life without meaning is the mechanical repetition of chores. Conceptually this method owes to several ideas: a work ethic that values dedication and endurance over creativity and scrutiny, Western interpretations of meditation in Asian religions and psychotherapy. These ideas become plausible in an individualized society where religious gratification—like everything else—is thought to be dependent on personal dedication and devotion.

Hillsong services, for example, equate becoming a good Christian with successful professional life. Their services often let members talk about their occupation and how their Christian faith helped them in being successful in their job. In the evangelical holistic vision, being successful becomes both, a result and a goal (a means and an end) of a Christian life. A whole industry that profits from the quest evangelical Christians have for initiating the encounter with God. And it is not surprising that much of the literature on the topic resembles the counseling literature that is so successful with the "therapeutically inclined." Bellah's comparison mentioned earlier is not without cause. Titles like "Being Home, Encountering the Spiritual in the Everyday" (G. B. Norris and Sibley) or "Bruce & Stan's Pocket Guide to Talking with God" (Bickel and Jantz) are

just two examples of hundreds of guidebooks available on the topic of how to initiate the conversation with God. The notion of happiness as duty can be seen as another exploration of what Bellah meant with "coming to want to do what one must do" (Bellah, *Habits of the Heart* 94) and similar inquiries have been made towards the nature of capitalism.

One of the earliest of these endeavors looked into the utilization of emotion as labor and was conducted as early as 1983 by Arlie Russel Hochschild (*Managed Heart*). Hochschild explores how many occupations rely on "emotional labor," the deliberate application of emotion as an intrinsic part of a profession.[76] Hochschild examines how through *deep acting*[77] emotions become emotional work and are commodified when utilized as part of the service rendered, implying that institutions or commercial enterprises control or manage the emotions of their employees: "various elements of acting are taken away from the individual and replaced by institutional mechanisms" (49). Emotional labor thus leads to *estrangement* from one's own emotions. The point that Hochschild makes is that the performance of emotional labor colonizes the emotions of the laborer:

> Those who perform emotional labor in the course of giving service are like those who perform physical labor in the course of making things: both are subject to the rules of mass production. But when the product-the thing to be engineered, mass-produced, and subjected to speed-up and slowdown-is a smile, a mood, a feeling, or a relationship, it comes to belong more to the organization and less to the self. And so in the country that most publicly celebrates the individual, more people privately wonder, without tracing the question to its deepest social root: What do I really feel? (198)

Emotional estrangement is a result of a politics of affect that requires employees to express

[76] Hochschild examines service sector workers, among them flight attendants and bill collectors, whose performance in the job relies on the management of their emotions as they are put into service of their respective employee—the flight attendant's smile turns into the professional friendliness of the airline carrier towards its customer, the bill collector "inspires fear" (Hochschild 11) on behalf of the creditor.

[77] Deep acting "is a natural result of working on feeling, the actor does not try to *seem* happy or sad but rather expresses spontaneously [...] a real feeling that has been self-induced" (author's emphasis, Hochschild 35).

the interest of the employer not only rationally but with his or her heart, to affectively internalize the employers interest. Emotional estrangement is no longer a feature of a few service sector occupations. To relate emotionally to one's occupation has become a primary requirement for any employment, however meaningless it might be. One does not have a job, one has a vocation. The potential of affect and emotion has long been recognized by companies who are working hard to replace material compensation for its employees' labor at least partially with emotional response.

For that purpose a whole new profession has emerged: "feelgood managers" are set with the task to develop and implement new reward systems. The purpose is to keep employees happy without compensating them materially. Feelgood managers are highly sought after these days, they are commissioned with keeping the employees happy, to compensate them with happiness for their labor; emotion and affect thus become also in the economic sphere the tender comparable to money that it already is in evangelical donation as described earlier. Something else follows: a company that pays specialized staff to keep its employees happy expects them to be happy. This is crucial for this transaction: The employees happiness thus becomes a duty, they cannot decline to be happy.

What additionally follows Hochschild's concept of emotional labor is that its implementation allows inanimate bodies to express themselves with human emotions: the *body corporate* gains the ability to use emotions of real human bodies to express its feelings in order to pursuit its desires (which are profit and expansion). This process remains one of the least examined when dealing with politics of affect, as Ahmed points out by referring to Raymond Williams' classic notion of "structures of feelings" (cf. *Marxism and Literature*): it is the feelings of structures we might want to examine, because "feelings might be how structures get under our skin" (Ahmed, *Happiness* 216). As evangelicalism colonizes the mind of its followers, so does capitalism colonize the minds of its employees (and consumers). Hochschild's assumption that individuals in capitalism find it difficult to discern between individual feelings and feeling rules from outside resonates with Ahmed's

concept of happiness-scripts. And this might be the most fundamental structural homology between late modern capitalism and evangelicalism. They both provide "ways of aligning bodies with what is already lined up" (91).

One crucial aspect is still missing to fully understand the intrinsic connection between capitalism and evangelicalism and the affective bond that holds this nexus together: *nostalgia*. Nostalgia is one of the reasons why evangelicalism primarily is perceived as a reactionary political force that is first of all concerned with extreme right-wing values, border-lining more often than not with homophobia, chauvinism and religiously motivated anti-science to name but a few. These aspects are undeniably part of the evangelical structure. We encounter these tropes in what Ahmed has called elsewhere "a threat to the object of love" ("Affective Economies" 117). It is the love for the 'natural family,' for life ('Pro-Life'), and for intuitive offers of traceability of one's origin (creationism or intelligent design). All these terms imply a positive deed instead of a negative one and can thus be easily charged with positive emotions: It is easier to be in favor of defending the family than to oppose homosexuality. Who would not agree to be 'pro-life' without knowing what it stands for and an 'unintelligent design' would not find many followers. But these positively labeled charades already mark how they owe to a certain form of nostalgia, or to use a term from Lukács mutatis mutandis, *transcendental homelessness*—the "longing of all souls for the place in which they once belonged, and the nostalgia for utopian perfection, a nostalgia that feels itself and its desires to be the only true reality the urge to be at home everywhere (Lukács 40-41)". What Lukács proposed for German Romanticism can also be applied to the radical hyperbole of evangelicalism. For the evangelical movement they are the texts that work as a promise to overcome the *transcendental homelessness*. The promise of World Christianity is to be "at home everywhere". Furthermore, evangelical political or social conservative issues have to remain vague and/or categorical, because they are mere pastiches (Jameson, *Postmodernism* 17) of an imagined past. These pastiches are a necessary part of the evangelical narrative. They paint a world that is attractive to people longing to be at home transcendentally, inviting them to enter a neatly arranged

and homogenous world without any threatening *other*. These social conservative issues are not an end, rather they are a means to an end. Below the brightly and naively painted pastiches of evangelical nostalgia, an imagined past where each and everything had its place, the machine is steadily working untouched by the motivations of the people that feed it. Void of any sentiment itself, evangelicalism teaches us that affects are feeding the affectless structure. Depthless emotion is crucial here. It is at the same time the catalyst for turning to evangelicals' nostalgia—the feeling that something is amiss, the longing for another world—and the major mean for the transition evangelicalism promises. Evangelicals' offer of an alternative is just another mode of experience of late modern capitalism, that share more similarities with other offers than other Christian religions.

4 Conclusion

This last chapter serves the purpose of briefly summarizing the theses of this dissertation, to present the conclusions I draw from my research, to give arguments why this research is meaningful and to give recommendations for further research. I will start by summarizing the theses that are a result of my research and then turn to the implications that can be drawn from the examination of the similarities of the affective mobilization in both evangelicalism and late modern capitalism by exploring how these results can be integrated with or explained by existing systems and theoretical approaches. In other words, this chapter is intended to provide an outlook that muses beyond the scope of this dissertation. More specifically, the discussion of two perspectives that have been recurring throughout the past chapters is developed here. These theoretical perspectives are Brian Massumi's notion of non-ideological means producing ideological effects and in how far evangelicalism can be viewed as 'messianic capitalism'.

4.1 Theses Overview

Evangelicalism's worldwide success derives to a great extend from the affective mobilization of its members. The affective mobilization of its members is one of the main reasons for the worldwide success of evangelical Christianity. A reciprocal relationship between evangelical entities and global corporations can be found in the distribution strategies of each. While evangelical organizations borrow from the distribution developed for promoting the success of commercial brands, corporations borrow from the strategies

of mobilization that can be found in organized religion and is especially expressed in evangelicalism.

Evangelicalism and late modern capitalism are approximating to each other and the examined examples show that the evangelical promise of salvation in great parts is an inner-worldly promise and similar to the individual promise of happiness that late modern capitalism offers with consumerism. The example of Jerry Falwell's fund raising strategy shows how the practice of donation is re-contextualized into a financial investment that offers a direct return to the individual investor. The analysis of the representations of vendors of short term missions shows how religiously themed vacations are charged with affect and are marketed as participating in Christian mission. Evangelical news reporting on the Ukraine crisis shows how an evangelical sense of community is promoted heavily through global media distribution and the use of social media. All examples have in common that marketing strategies of the internet age such as "content marketing," "clicktivism" and "micro-investments" play a central role.

Evangelicalism thus fosters what I call *affect carry-over* from Christian values to economic practices. Evangelicalism encourages a carry-over of the positive affective charges that are attached to Christian values and practices towards economic practices. Affect carry-over, shows in each of the examined examples: The positive affective charge of being a part of the Christian community (in the case of Ukraine), of participating in Christian mission (in the case of short term mission) and generosity are carried-over to objects and practices of consumerism: the use of social media, going on a vacation and doing a financial investment, and adhering to the Prosperity Gospel in which the carry-over is already completed and material gains are accepted as signs of grace.

The distribution is more important than the message. Although the evangelical message, which is often received as reactionary if not fundamentalist, is very visible, it is not the defining aspect of evangelicalism[1]. The crude and often naive Nostalgia is

[1]The message is not more than the "the poisoned meat the burglar carries to distract the watchdog of the mind." as McLuhan put it in regard to the content of a medium.

only a mean for the bracing of economic principles inherent to late modern capitalism into the individual lives of evangelicals. Depending on the target group the messages changes and follows the logic of the market to guarantee the highest possible distribution.

The inner-worldliness of these newly shaped religious experiences confirms individual lifestyle choices through an outer-worldly authority. The direct communication with God as promoted by evangelicals allows its members to transgress the divide between the inner- and outer-worldly by their own efforts, which in turn are connected to the accumulation of capital. Acts such as a donation to an evangelical organization, the booking of a short term mission trip or the support of world Christianity via social media confirms the individual lifestyle through a higher authority. It becomes apparent how evangelicalism caters to an "inner-worldly narcissism": individual donations contribute to wonders, individual prayer directly changes very specific issues and consumption itself becomes a religious act. Each discrete act of consumption becomes an invaluable part of a greater plan thus affirming the importance of each believer through his or her mundane actions.

The 'spirit of late modern capitalism' promotes a re-enchantment of the world. While "The spirit of capitalism" (Weber) triggered a disenchantment of the world through rationalization, a presumed 'spirit of late modern capitalism' means a re-enchantment of the world in which irrational methods and techniques of late modern capitalism are legitimized through the religious sphere. Evangelicalism thus provides a historically developed form of 'doing business' with a higher legitimacy. The dialectic element here being that late modern capitalism is naturalized by a higher outer-worldly sphere and thus becomes extra-discursive. The evangelical promise of happiness is central to this process because it positions the individual pursuit of happiness within the existing market paradigm – and not a discourse on what might lead to happiness.

Evangelicalism often evokes a narrative of it and its promise of happiness being an alternative to a late modern capitalist world, however, this is—at least on the basis of the cases examined here—not the case. Quite on the contrary, evidence suggests

that evangelicalism is intrinsic to late modern capitalism, reinforcing the very structure it claims to overcome. The four examples discussed are commodified offers of fulfilling one's sense of religious duty: to donate money enables miracles as in the example of Jerry Falwell, to go on vacation becomes Christian (short-term) mission, and using social media strengthens the global community of World Christianity as seen in the case of the Ukraine crisis. The fourth example, the prosperity gospel, shows a community that holds together almost exclusively on the individual promise of success, wealth and the presumed resulting happiness.

Cherishing the Christian community (allelon), being generous and giving (duty to the poor) and doing mission (ad gentes) are all vital aspects of Christianity. They are part of a canon of Christian duties whose fulfillment is encouraged in all Christian currents, also in evangelicalism. What evangelicalism offers, however, is a simplified means, a commodified promise of fulfilling one's Christian duty. Thus the duties in evangelicalism are still similar to those in other Christian groups in appearance, but they have shifted toward the respective means accepted as a fulfillment of the duty. These commodified offers are yet another example of how capitalism is most efficient in incorporating anything that could foster alternatives to capitalism or even just prove to be fertile soil for resistance. Similar to the iconic Che Guevara T-Shirt that can be purchased in all shopping malls across America, evangelicalism offers a commodified version of an other-worldly promise that answers to a longing to fill a void felt by many as a consequence of the life late modern capitalism entails. Late modern capitalism thus offers a remedy to the problem it generated in the first place—usually something that treats the symptoms, but not the malady itself. And what else would be more fitting considering Eileen Barker's observation that it is "an unfettered [...] capitalism, from which consumerism emerges as the dominant form of communitas" (Barker 163)?

For evangelicals, happiness in this world can be acquired by fulfilling one's duty, a duty that correlates with the duties of the non-religious world. Those duties, both religious and economic have long become interchangeable. Consumption is duty and

happiness-cause simultaneously in the Western world. To consume means reward and fulfilling a duty to keep the economy running. This capitalist sense of duty does not only resonate with civic and religious duties in the United Sates, it has permeated or even replaced any other senses of duty. Lizabeth Cohen argues that it was the post-World War II era in America, where the "ideal of the Consumers' Republic" (Cohen 237) was created to transition a war time mass-production to a peacetime economy. But this transition eventually led to a "'consumerization of the republic.' Americans increasingly came to judge the success of the public realm much like other purchased goods, by the personal benefit individual citizen-consumers derived from it" (239). One of the many examples that show how essential the economic has become to American society is a news conference held by President George W. Bush on December 20, 2006. It was a time of crisis as the Secretary of State had just resigned, America's death toll in Iraq was rising and the economy was not recovering as fast as had been hoped. Two points are emphasized in this address: The duty of America to help Iraq become a free nation, alluding to the American sense of having a mission to the world, and second, the duty of each American to keep the economy running: "And I encourage you all to go shopping more" (Bush, "President Bush's News Conference"). Five years earlier, days after the attack on the World Trade Center the same President had urged the nation to continue with their lives as usual, which included to take the family to Disneyland ("At O'Hare, President Says 'Get On Board'"). The World Trade Center had just collapsed and the biggest worry conveyed by Bush was whether the airline industry would survive the terror attack: "to say as clearly as we can to the American public, get on the airlines, get about [sic] the business of America" ("At O'Hare, President Says 'Get On Board'"). The pivot here is this: The more late modern capitalism moves into crisis mode, the more appeals to support it through increasing consumption can be heard – it becomes each individuals duty to save capitalism.

As late modern capitalism moves from crisis to crisis, it is proposals such as evangelicalism's that promise footing in a complex world while motivating its members

to do the right thing to keep the well-oiled machines running. This thought is reminiscent of something Wolfgang Streeck has formulated recently. Namely that crises in capitalism lead to the production of more symbolic value: "The ever growing lion's share of consumer spending today is not allotted to the use value of purchased goods, but to their symbolic value, their aura or charisma" (my translation, Streeck 112). The symbolic value to the customer translates directly to surplus value on the other side of the transaction. Capitalism in a way needs the symbolic mobilization of meaning systems like evangelicalism to further expand. However, evangelicalism is just one proposition among many (albeit a very successful one). It competes with other religious groups who follow a similar route of offering the symbolic such as the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) or Scientology.[2] They can be seen as the most blatant supplementary religion to capitalism. But all these religions also compete with rather mundane outfits like Oprah Winfrey's empire and Google or Apple as providers of commodified meaning (who themselves ponder to the religious as lined out in section 2.2). All of these suppliers of symbolic value in a way that Brian Massumi has described as producing "ideological effects by non-ideological means" (Massumi, "The Autonomy of Affect").

[2]A profound examination of Mormons along the lines of my thesis would go beyond the scope of this dissertation. While the Mormons share many key features with evangelicalism regarding their entanglement with late modern capitalism, they also differ significantly. However, the Mormon's complex relationship with capitalism would be worth scrutinizing. For a first advance into this subject, see *The Mormon Hierarchy: Extensions of Power* (Quinn) and *The Mormon People: The Making of an American Faith* (Bowman) and *People of Paradox: A History of Mormon Culture* (Givens) and presumably the forthcoming *The Mormon Hierarchy: Wealth and Corporate Power* also by Quinn.

4.2 Non-Ideological Means Produce Ideological Effects

Massumi analyzes Ronald Reagan's appeal and continuous success as a politician as a direct consequence of his affective power. According to Massumi, Reagan was "able to produce ideological effects by non-ideological means" ("The Autonomy of Affect" 102). A process I will call here "Massumi's ideology conveyance mechanism." Rather than the message, it was Reagan's "means that were affective" (102). "He was unqualified and without content [...] But his incipience was prolonged by technologies of image transmission and then relayed by apparatuses such as the family or the church or the school" (103). According to Massumi, Reagan had so much affective power that his "air of confidence" was enough to inspire others into thinking he was a great president, "because he was actualized, in their (Reagan's voters) neighborhood, as a movement and a meaning of their selection—or at least selected for them, with their acquiescence" (103). As voters were concerned about the economic situation, the "non-ideological means" of Reagan's "air of confidence" became more important than a rational analysis of what kind of ideological affects could be expected: It was Ronald Reagan's affective force that made him so successful: "Reagan could be so many things to so many people; [...] the majority of the electorate could disagree with him on every major issue, but still vote for him" (103).

Evangelicalism is a system that has a similar effect on its followers than Massumi's Ronald Reagan had on his voters. Evangelicalism is also actualized by its members, of whom many see it as the place where their individual conceptions of what it means to be a Christian are accepted and cherished. From the outside evangelicalism is easily confused with a monolithic reactionary block, and obviously the reactionary, the irrational, and the anti-secular do exist in evangelicalism. But these notions are what Massumi calls "non-ideological means," affects that in their inherent meaninglessness serve a nostalgia most of its members can agree upon out of a gut-feeling. While not disputing that non-ideological effects can have direct political consequences, they are not

the essence of evangelicalism, but are nostalgic offers that attract many believers. As all nostalgia, they include a longing to an imagined past that never was. Below the surface of this nostalgia is no other meaning than late capitalist ideology. Evangelicalism thus produces other *ideological effects* as the non-ideological means that are visible on the surface, namely the naturalization of late modern capitalism. Partially, this explains the high adaptability of Evangelicalism. Massumi's ideology conveyance mechanism seems to at least promote a transfer of an affective charge from one object to another; from the non-ideological means to the ideological effect. If this were the case, it would imply that it is not the desired effect that is charged directly with emotion and affect, but that existing positive emotions and affects can transfer to newly introduced objects.

Let me turn to the examples given in the previous chapter once more. Analyzing evangelical fund raising with the help of 'Massumi's ideology conveyance mechanism' shows that Jerry Falwell is similar to Massumi's Ronald Reagan. Both were able to affectively mobilize others rather by their means than by their respective messages. While Reagan's affective means resonated with what his voters associated with the qualities of a good President, Falwell was able to evoke the image of a devout and earnest Christian that many followers found credible enough to support him financially. The immediate was profit for Falwell's numerous endeavors, a more abstract ideological effect was contributing to a gradual shift from an understanding of late modern capitalistic principles as a result of a historical development to the conviction that these principles are part of the natural world. While Falwell preached stability, social conservatism and nostalgia, he exercised flexible competition, adaptability and profit orientation (section 3.3): Asking for miracles or asking to give to God both had the effect of generating profit and transferred the emotional charge of doing something good in a religious sense to monetary transactions themselves. In this case, the non-ideological means would be the social conservative politics that were being used as a decoy for a 'progressive' (or rather neoliberal) economic agenda. This relationship has been described as "Evangelical-Capitalist Resonance Machine" (Connolly) or "Neocon-Theocon Alliance" (Heilbrunn).

The contribution that affect theory can bring to the understanding of this relationship here is is two-fold: that the ideological effect can be successfully achieved by completely unrelated non-ideological means, and second, that in this process the positive affective charge of the former can be transferred to the latter. This is how the very secular transfer of money in the case of donating for evangelicals can become an almost transcendent act that fosters the supernatural.

The same mechanism can be observed in the evocation of a sense of a worldwide community as analyzed in section 3.2. The sense of community evangelicalism in this case is offering is the continuous evocation of the imagined community of World Christianity that diminishes other communities. The non-ideological mean—the emotional invocation of the worldwide evangelical community—has the ideological effect that it replaces all other models of community. While this imagined community is used to spread the Gospel around the world, its effect is that it also supersedes other local evangelical communities. In short, the ideological effect of creating a non-ideological means—in this case the feeling of belonging to a worldwide community—is the expansion and distribution of American evangelicalism in the world. The sense of community advertised is better described as a group of individuals who feel like a community by consuming a similar product and thus sharing similar consumer experiences in "intimate public spheres" (Berlant, *Female Complaint*). The affective shift occurring here is that from real communities to an experience that resembles community by reproducing a virtual model of it, a simulacrum of community. Simulacrum, because it is not a mere simulation of community, since it is not based upon shared experiences, but based on shared consumer experiences.

The third example, short-term mission, utilizes the affective appeal mission has within the evangelical community as a non-ideological means. It affirms the findings of the other two examples. The promotion of consumption—in this case of touristic offers—is affectively charged and becomes a religious act. The immediate effect here is also profit for the vendors of such short-term mission trips. The ideological effect is a fostering of the

acceptance of consumption as a substitute for mission. In addition, various other aspects of late modern capitalism are affectively charged as components of mission: The system of promotion of short-term mission trips relies on the positive narratives that former participants publish online via different social media channels. This makes the system circulatory by utilizing principles of viral marketing, micro-funding and content marketing. Also, debt was encouraged not to be seen as a systemic result of the marketing scheme, but to be accepted as a consequence of one's own actions. In all examples the non-ideological means producing ideological effects have a tendency to conflate the former with the latter over time: transactions themselves become charged affectively, consumption becomes a religiously sanctioned activity, and virtual communities replace other, more substantial communities. In each case affect moves from the non-ideological mean to the ideological effect.

The political aspect of affect and emotion here lies in the utilization of its general mobility towards new objects and not in the content these emotions are originally connected to. However, this assumption does only work in a framework expanded beyond Massumi's original one, which relies on a strict division between emotions and affects. Ahmed criticizes that such a model "creates a distinction between conscious recognition and 'direct' feeling, which itself negates how that which is not consciously experienced may itself be mediated by past experiences. [...] This analytic distinction between sensations or affect and emotion risks cutting of emotions off from the lived experiences of being and having a body" (Ahmed, *Emotion* 40n4). Ahmed rather suggests "that even seemingly direct responses actually evoke past experiences and that this process bypasses consciousness" (40n4). Evangelicalism is not as successful as it is because it is merely more emotional and affective (and thus irrational) than other Christian currents, but because it is able to affectively charge objects and actions that before had a mere use-value.

The ideological effects produced by evangelicalism seem to emphasize economic aspects in a way that reaffirms the viability of late modern capitalism. What poses as an offer of an alternative to this world is just the non-ideological means to convey

something else that is very much part of this world. That makes evangelicalism another mode of experience of late modern capitalism. What is more, many of its supporters and believers endorse with evangelicalism the very same things they have been trying to digress from in the first place. The notion that "happiness [...] is the happiness of dreaming about something that you do not want" (Žižek 60) as discussed in the introduction is relevant here. This relationship can also be described with the term "cruel optimism." Lauren Berlant argues that "a relation of cruel optimism exists when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing" (cf. Berlant, *Cruel Optimism*). For those, who see evangelicalism as a means to heal their uneasiness with the world, to answer to the "yearning for more," as Luhrmann encountered it in her field work (Luhrmann 42-3), it might not be the remedy that is sought after, because it gives the very same answers capitalism provides itself.

Evangelicalism is a religious offer that caters to those who want to charge their live religiously, give it a religious meaning, without leaving the comfort zone. As much as evangelicalism emphasizes the transformative, the before and after, no leap of faith is required from the believer. However, that does not mean that no transformation takes places at all. Evangelicalism colonizes the mind by facilitating what I call *affect carry-over*.[3] The transformation that takes place is the carry-over of affects from one object to another that before had no emotional value. The emotions had been there before, but are now transferred to another object.

Evangelicalism orbits around the individual being, his or her desires, experiences, aspirations, and hopes. Affect carry-over helps to keep these within the framework of late modern capitalism, which has been more or less obscured by the loud and noisy ravings that make up social conservatism, a misleading term that in the United States means following a reactionary agenda. There are already signs that the affect carry-over in evangelicalism is so effective that soon the social conservatism as non-ideological means

[3]Similar to the financial term "amount carry over."

will not be necessary anymore, something that can be derived both from demographics[4] and from the consequences of decades of successful neoliberal economic policy.[5] With shifting demographics this model may be about to come to an end. Ironically, not least because this tactic has been largely successful the past forty years. In political terms, the "cruel optimism" (cf. Berlant, *Cruel Optimism*) of the poor that have been voting against their own economic interests is exemplary for the assumed affect carry-over. The marginalized have also been associated with evangelicalism in its more populist variant. As Harvey Cox has pointed out, "they [the people attracted to Pentecostalism] are the very people who are already bearing the brunt of the same numbing social dislocation and cultural upheaval that is in store for all of us" (Cox 310). And since more and more people bear this "brunt," it could be argued, that this cruel optimism is directly fueling the spectacular rise of the most dynamic branch of evangelicalism: the Prosperity Gospel as examined in section 3.5. But evangelicalism and capitalism are also intertwined on a different tier that feeds an inner-worldly narcissism and enables a re-enchantment of the world.

[4]Demographics all point out that young evangelicals becoming more liberal and thus cannot be mobilized by social conservative tropes and ultra-reactionary causes as easily (cf. Pew Research Center, "Less Religious").

[5]An interesting account of this process has recently been published by journalist George Packer, who describes the ensuing economic shifts by illuminating the biographies both of public figures who initiated this process and unknown individuals, who were affected by it (Packer).

4.3 The Vanishing Mediator and Messianic Capitalism

The relationship between what I call inner-worldly narcissism and late modern capitalism is a mirror of the historical relationship between inner-worldly asceticism and capitalism. While inner-worldly asceticism engaged the immanent and avoided the transcendent, inner-worldly narcissism engages both (making it the antithesis to world-flying mysticism). According to Jameson's interpretation of Weber's typology of religion, a rationalization of inner-worldly life took place within the bracket of Protestantism—both capitalism and Protestantism reacted with each other and thus enabled each other. Protestantism acted as a "vanishing mediator," and was a "catalytic agent" for capitalism (Jameson, "Vanishing Mediator" 78). Jameson recalls Weber's example of the monasteries: Although Luther's goal was to re-generate original religious values, he unknowingly liberated the rationalism that was exclusive to monasteries, which could then spread beyond the seclusion of monastic life—it is not so much that Luther introduced something new "but rather in his having actualized or thematized what was already implicit" (77).

Taking up this thought, it could be argued that the affect carry-over discussed earlier is the result of a similar process in reverse: as Protestantism served as a bracket for "the rationalization of the inner-worldly life" (78), evangelicalism might serve as a bracket for an irrationalization of the inner-worldly through the reaction of evangelicalism with an assumed spirit of late modern capitalism. The irrational that is being liberated in this process of re-enchantment and affectively charging the world reciprocates with the similarly affective and spiritual late modern capitalism, the condensation point being the self-concentrated narcissistic individual. Irrationalization of the inner-worldly naturalizes late modern capitalism values and principles to the point that they are not recognizable anymore as a result of a historical development, but become the fundamental principles of the world. As rationality was dormant in the monasteries liberated by Luther, irrationality lay dormant in the bank towers of New York City, London, and Frankfurt until the sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2008 triggered a worldwide financial meltdown, revealing how

much the financial system had relied on imaginary assets that have become detached from this-worldly material as discussed in section. Jean Comaroff elaborated the similarities between a messianic capitalism that resonates with evangelicalism's emphasis on business, as described in subsection 3.3.1.

The more the two spheres, that of late modern capitalism and that of evangelicalism converge, the more they adopt the practices, concepts and mechanisms of the other without the need of a mediator. As the CEOs become messianic[6] and the charismatic preachers become pragmatic, a similar development than that which Weber imagined for the emergence of the spirit of capitalism can be observed. As Coleman notes "the irony may be that Prosperity Christians are closer to secular economic actors than the latter might always admit, even if the power and influence of the latter is vastly greater on a global scale" (Coleman, "Prosperity Unbound?" 42). As Weber envisioned the spirit of capitalism as a transfer of making profits for religious reasons to making profit for its own sake (the religious reasons for why making money was positive were forgotten over time.), as a reverse development it might be assumed that at one point it could be forgotten that the irrational and enchanting beginnings of evangelicalism, particularly Prosperity, originated in the economic sphere. Evangelicalism would in this case become the vanishing mediator that fuses Christian religion with the spirit of the market.[7]

This development relies on emotionalization and affective charges. Ironically enough, by doing so it is able to fuse even the most mundane objects of a mass producing society with the mystic, if not even capitalism itself. That way, the CEOs, analysts and other capitalists become the priests of a new age as much as the evangelical preachers gain managerial properties.

[6] See also Tsing on the "the economy of appearances." Tsing examines how corporations create their own self-fulfilling prophecies and how their actions are performances to obtain capital, "creating a magic show of peculiar meanings, symbols, and practices" (Tsing 119).

[7] Similar to Eagleton, Boltanski and Chiapello argue that the spirit of capitalism might change or might even have changed already. They define capitalism by its "need for the unlimited accumulation of capital by formally peaceful means" (Boltanski and Chiapello 5) that in its present condition is not able to motivate or to activate its workers anymore, because neither the material incentives nor the low level role of the majority of occupations are sufficient for that task. It is therefore dependent on extrinsic strategies of meaning and justification.

The less late modern capitalism is able to fulfill its promise of prosperity for all, justification of its existence becomes more and more the task of its religious branch—evangelicalism. These developments contrast sharply with the Weberian notion of the "disenchantment of the world" (Weber) in the wake of rationalization. Lately, the notion of a disenchanted world has been challenged by various authors. Among others, Endrissat has shown how the the meager and monotonous works in the supermarkets and service stations are re-enchanted in order to give them an external meaning (Endrissat, Islam, and Noppeney). In prose literature, George Saunders chronicles the realities of everyday life in the workforce of capitalism by escalating its conditions into a dark and yet tragicomic dystopian future, where even the most absurd task is charged affectively and with meaning: Workers in imaginary theme parks have to play their roles as prehistoric troglodytes on pain of penalties even when nobody is watching (Saunders, *Pastoralia*).

In another short story the young protagonists live a privileged life in gated broadcasting compounds as advertising mediums, who have forgotten to express their feeling other than through advertisement jingles ("jon" in Saunders, *Reign of Phil*).[8] It might be that the iron cage does not need emotions to function itself, but it seems evident that it relies on the emotional investment of its workers and consumers. This interdependence has even increased recently and continues to do so. The world might be re-enchanted, but that does not mean it would move at a slower pace.[9] Recently, Hartmut Rosa has taken up the task to re-examine how the acceleration of the social changes power relations (cf. Rosa).[10] The evangelical offers examined in this text are examples for a world where everything has to be both achieved instantly and enchanted. It is mundane acts and concepts that are given the appeal of the sacred. Prosperity is only the latest stage in this development. The less time is available for recreation and personal matters, the more the heteronomous work-relation has to be charged affectively in order to be

[8]See also "The Re-Enchantment of the World: Secular Magic in a Rational Age" (Landy and Saler).
[9]The continuing acceleration can also be understood as a lead that we are living in the late modern rather than the postmodern.
[10]See also the anthology on the subject (Rosa and Scheuerman).

fulfilled until exhaustion.

Both evangelicalism and late modern capitalism not only rely on affective mobilization, but also contribute to a re-enchantment of the world. In this process evangelicalism serves as a vanishing mediator for a re-enchanted capitalism. This spirit of late modern capitalism fosters an irrational, overheated finance capitalism that relies more on the affective mobilization by messianic CEOs than on rational assessments. This development is enabled by a therapeutic culture that emphasizes the individual well-being. The production of ideological effects through non-ideological means leads to an affect carry-over that affectively charges principles of late modern capitalism and thus contributes to a prevention of a political discourse on late modern capitalism.

To conclude this chapter, I want to illustrate in how far other inroads to the relationship between evangelicalism and late modern capitalism could be made on the basis of my findings. However fragmentary, an attempt to go beyond the scope of this thesis might be worthwhile and set this work into a broader framework. The most promising of possible inroads that should lead to future research on the subject is an an aesthetic approach to evangelicalism and its relationship to late modern capitalism.

Birgit Meyer elaborates how evasive capitalism reacts to any attempt of representation (Meyer, "Religious Sensations" 31). She has recently began to look into the aesthetics of religion in order to find another theoretical approach both to evangelicalism, examining its "sensational forms" and capitalism via what she calls "aesthetics of persuasion."[11] The concept shares many conceptual analogies with Ahmed's affect: the bodily and experiential emphasis, how ideology is fostered by it and how it serves as an offer of belonging.

What sets Meyer's approach apart and makes it interesting here is its examination of aesthetics, which promises to offer a different perspective on the convergence

[11]Meyer's term "aesthetics of persuasion" explains evangelicalism's, particularly Pentecostalism's "sensational forms" "within religious structures of repetition" ("Aesthetics of Persuasion" 756). Meyer sees the aesthetics of persuasion as "responsible for the 'truth effects' of religion, for instance, by authorizing the body as the harbinger of ultimate truth and authenticity" (author's emphasis "Aesthetics of Persuasion" 756).

of late modern capitalism and evangelicalism—or inner-worldly narcissism. As Meyer points out with Walter Benjamin's assertion that although capitalism "essentially serves to satisfy the same worries, anguish and disquiet formerly answered by so-called religion," it remains difficult to "prove capitalism's religious structure," because "we cannot draw close the net in which we stand" (Benjamin 259). While my term inner-worldly narcissism might help to emphasize the importance of the individual as condensation point for the relationship late modern capitalism and evangelicalism have, it falls short of enabling a perspective of how exactly both take part in an re-enchantment of the world.

Meyer suggests to revisit Jameson's notion of capitalism as "a sublime power that resists representation, yet all the more requires to be understood" (Meyer, "Religious Sensations" 31).[12] In a similar way, evangelicalism might be understood as part of the aesthetic production that, according to Jameson, "has become integrated into commodity production generally" (*Postmodernism* 4). This integration is complete and does more than "merely reproduce the logic of late capitalism; it reinforces and intensifies it" (46). The result is "a new depthlessness [...]; a consequent weakening of historicity [...]; a whole new emotional ground tone [...] which can best be grasped by the return to older theories of the sublime" (6). Evidence for such an assumption can be found in the "depthlessness" of the examples from the previous chapter: Short-term mission, fund-raising as investment, and the sense of community conveyed via social media all share that they are mere pastiches with no connection to the concepts they represent.

As argued before, short-term mission focuses on the individual and its experiences and not on the process of missionary work, evangelical donation as portrayed is more an acknowledgment of individual financial agency than a humble deed to help those in need, and communities within social media in the best case are a supplement to real communities, in the worst case they stand alone and are mere simulacrum. All

[12] Jameson's use of the sublime in relation to "late capitalism" is, of course, more complex than Meyer presents it in the lecture quoted here. According to Jameson, it is not capitalism that is sublime, but the logic of capitalism creates a new "depthlessness" that can best be described by a "hysterical sublime" (cf. Jameson, *Postmodernism*).

examples share only the name with their historical counterparts, pointing out to their synchronicity or lack of historicity, and all examples rely on the intensified use of emotions.

What is more important for the evangelical offers than depth is their easy adaptability and repeatability. They are thus representative of evangelicalism, whose duties and offers more often than not, as seen with Luhrmann (*God Talks Back*), circle around iteracy. How might the sublime relate here? The "hysterical sublime" occurs in the recognition of the "networks of power and control" (Jameson, *Postmodernism* 37) of late modern capitalism that can only be recognized indirectly through the networks made possible through technology. And even these representations are "faulty," merely "distorted figures" (37) of what is behind them. While the thought that evangelicalism might pass (barely) as some sort of network—the evangelical imagination of World Christianity could be a suitable contender—behind which believers might glimpse at something they consider to be God, is certainly tempting, but it fails to address the central importance of its narcissist perspective. However, Sianne Ngai offers an alternative that also addresses a feeling of sublimity when facing a finite system, but takes iteracy as a central aspect into account: "Stuplimity," which is

> . . . intended to invoke the older aesthetic category of the sublime without its implications of profundity. While the sublime emerges in confrontations with the infinite and natural, the "stuplime" emerges in encounters with vast but finite artificial systems, resulting in repetitive acts of nominalism, enumeration, and classification. (Ngai, "Stuplimity" 36)

Stuplimity addresses a problem encountered when dealing with evangelicalism: While there is some sort of sublime that is sought after by evangelicals, it is not the sublime in a Kantian or Burkean sense that can be found, but something else. Neither is it part of a hysterical sublime, although it shares with it the facing of a finite system. Stuplimity is an "aesthetic experience in which astonishment is paradoxically united with boredom" (271), something that can be found in evangelical endeavors to fuse the quotidian with

the transcendent—the constant invocation of the sacred in the face of the mundane. Stuplimity is the "bringing together [...] of sharp, sudden excitation and prolonged desensitization, exhaustion, or fatigue" (271). In an evangelical context stuplimity is useful to describe the search for the transcendent in iteracy.

Transcendence in evangelicalism is not found in a meditative or "world-flying" way, where meditation is an act in its own regard separated from the quotidian life, but by accepting your role as a consumer and an employee as something that brings you closer to God and promises happiness. Stuplimity thus can be used to describe what evangelical Christianity claims to be the coalescence of the two spheres, but in reality only means the acceptance of what is there in the first place. The "hopeful performative" (Ahmed, *Happiness* 200), "the hope that repetition of the word happiness will make us happy" (200) is thus an offer to face the terror through iteracy.

The encounters in late modern capitalism thus lead to a state similar to the encounter with nature. Both, the sublime and the stuplime lead to a negative experience, but the repeated confrontations with the vast but finite artificial system of capitalism lead to something that is confused with the sublime, or, deliberately described as the sublime while in reality the only thing one faces is a part of oneself that is confused with something bigger—God or God's voice. Stuplimity is thus a direct consequence of an artificial and finite system (i.e. late modern capitalism) that has become naturalized and relies on the narcissism of the beholder, who is accepting the possibility of having a direct connection with a higher being. The re-enchantment that evangelicalism thus offers might be both a reaction to the stuplime of capitalism as it is a consequence of it.

In a similar vein, but another context, Paul Crowther described this very poignantly: "the rectified and monotonous pattern of life demands a compensating substitute for real experience. The shocks and thrills provided by media news items, or such things as violent adventure films and the like, fulfill this function" (Crowther 190). The iterant "compensating substitute," be it an evangelical one or one produced by the entertainment industry as Crowther describes it, might address different needs, but they

are both offers of late modern capitalism, which itself provides the compensating shocks and thrills. Credotainment as described in chapter two is an example of a compensating substitute that is both evangelical and a product of the entertainment industry and thus exemplary for the development here described: The more the affective mobilizations of evangelicalism and late modern capitalism are entangled, the more difficult it becomes to recognize what causes the "rectified and monotonous pattern of life" (190) in the first place.

4.4 Significance, Limits, Future Research and Closing

Sometimes political and societal changes can occur swiftly, shifting paradigms and washing away formerly held believes in the matter of weeks or months. During the process of writing this doctoral thesis such a radical shift occurred. Western societies are experiencing a rapid development towards a new tribalism that relies on the invocation of affect and emotion rather than reason and fact as a collective common denominator. While the latter might always have been more an ideal to aspire to than practiced reality, the new reality sees a rise in authoritarianism, a revived demarcation from the other, and a new eagerness to believe in something uncritically (the nation, the race, or, the one religion) rather to make an effort to come to a conclusion based on a hermeneutic process or empiric observation.

Those characteristics are familiar to any researcher of evangelicalism. The world has changed dramatically in a way that much of what was valid for evangelicalism has become even more relevant to the world outside evangelicalism. Once again, as has been the case many times during the last century as described in chapter 1, evangelicals have provided the shape of things to come. Seemingly unconnected events like the slow alienation of Poland and Hungary (and to some extend the other Visegrád countries) from the EU, Brexit, the rise of right-wing populism in Western European countries, and, last but not least, the election of Donald Trump Jr. as 45th president of the United States all share that they are carried and facilitated by an emotional and irrational momentum.

It is becoming more and more apparent that all those occurrences and developments are part of a greater trend towards a re-enchanted world that relies on feelings and emotions rather than the tedious process of listening to the other side and try to come to a mutual solution. And these feelings and emotions make politics. They ostracize experts the people have had enough of[13], they produce conspiracies behind accidents, as in the case of the 2010 Polish Air Force Tu-154 crash, or identify George

[13] "The people of this country have had enough of experts." Lord Chancellor Michael Gove on the expert's informed arguments against Brexit.

Soros as the root of all evil, as being the case in Hungary, and they endeavor to build walls around countries like the United States.

If this assessment, that we are witnessing a trend towards a new political landscape, is correct, than we are standing at the threshold of a world in which evangelicalism and its mode to navigate the world is not an obscure niche anymore, but one of the central offers to make sense of our world. The importance of this research thus derives from the opportunity to observe some of the mechanisms of this new world in the fishbowl of evangelicalism and extrapolate them on what is going on in the world today. The re-enchantment of the world, capitalism, and inner-worldly narcissism are all vital parts of the most successful non-evangelical political and societal movements we are seeing today.

The obvious candidates for application of the theses are both religious organizations that rely on market mechanisms like the the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) and multinational corporations that borrow from the religious by utilizing elements of religion to make a holistic offer to make sense of the world to the consumer. Another interesting candidate would be Scientology which combines the drive to financial success with transcendence on an equal footing. Those candidates are obvious, because they are either religious organizations or rely on religious elements and hence are structurally in close proximity to evangelicalism. A closer examination of any of these organizations will possibly yield similar results with high probability: The importance of a positive affective mobilization of its members, an approximation to late modern capitalist values and practices, a resulting affect carry-over from group specific values to economic values. Furthermore, the shift of importance from message to distribution, the catering to an inner-worldly narcissism and a resulting re-enchantment of the world.

However, as this theses are not as much a critique of religion but rather a critique of ideology, it would be far more interesting to examine if the findings of this research are also applicable to seemingly different matters. As already alluded to in the

previous pages, if the re-enchantment of the world is indeed a greater trend that extends the religious sphere, other organizations, movements or phenomena might utilize similar approaches to similar aims, but with completely different non-ideological means. A very obvious candidate would Trump's voting base: Many vote clearly against their interests and are oblivious to rational discourse. On the other hand, a group as homogenuous as Trump's voter base would be even harder to define than evangelicals.

Another interesting target for application of the theses presented here would be what historian Yuval Noah Harari has labeled "dataism" and "trans-humanism" (Harari 428), the two movements originating from Silicon Valley, actively promoted by founders and investors like Peter Thiel and corporations like Alphabet, the parent organization of Google Inc. Both ideologies combine narratives of individual salvation with libertarian capitalism: trans-humanism by promoting the enhancement of human bodies through human-machines interfacing and dataism through the collection and analysis of huge data pools. However, it is still to early to examine how affect and emotion are entangled with trans-humanism and dataism on a greater scale. But that might change very soon.

One organization would be specially interesting to scrutinize due to its distance to the object of this research: the pop culture empire of Oprah Winfrey. As a pop cultural phenomenon, Oprah Winfrey has obtained a multi-million following through her talk show Oprah that ran until 2011. Her media empire consists of dozens of outlets, most prominent the Oprah book club and the film production company "Harpo Studios". Oprah Winfrey's media empire would be especially interesting as it would be an example from the cultural left that nevertheless offers an interesting narrative of individual suffering as a source of strength. Both the book club and the long-running TV-Show emphasize dramatic individual accounts of suffering and usually offer either some sort of solace in the form of a product or self-help book that can be obtained via one of Oprah Winfrey's outlets. Consumers involved in Oprah Winfrey's holistic offer are affectively mobilized by public display of the suffering of their peers and can find hope in the financial success of Oprah Winfrey and her messianic narrative of how she obtained it through hard work and

despite personal suffering. She utilized her personal suffering to become successful and is spreading the word, that anyone of her customers can do the same—a variation of the American Dream. Oprah Winfrey thus promotes a form of self-help (with the occasional New Age or homeopathic offer sprinkled in) that enables success in late modern capitalism. The resulting affect carry-over takes places place from the positive value of self-help as an individual emancipatory act towards a means towards financial success, or even from suffering to wealth in which case the individual suffering becomes a prerequisite to be successful.

The question on the importance of the message over distribution here is complicated and would need more thorough analysis than can be provided here. But it seems plausible that all offerings from Oprah Winfrey are products that serve the purpose of generating revenue, a underlying message other than an incentive to consume is hard to discern. However, as Eva Illouz (*Oprah*) has already pointed out, Oprah's products share a certain dispute over the subject of individual suffering and its implications and utility. It could be worthwhile to analyze Oprah's narrative offers throughout her empire to discern a message and its importance. The appeal to inner-worldly narcissism in this case then would be the acknowledgment of the individual suffering of the consumer and the offer to give solace for pain. Oprah's offer thus also contributes to a re-enchanted world that is similar to the salvatic history of capitalism: individual suffering enables success. This is certainly not the space for a thorough examination of Oprah Winfrey's media empire, but even a such a short sketch of how such an examination could look like already shows how interesting the application of the theses elaborated here could be.

Apart from these possible cases of future research, this text closes with a return to the International Christian Fellowship found in Berlin-Friedrichshain mentioned at the beginning of this dissertation. The evangelical church is thriving and expanding. It has now three branches in Berlin and suburbs and continues to draw followers in with its offer to celebrate the individual and his or her aspirations. It is a celebration of the individual and one of the many fractured and scattered examples of how rational

and detached examination give way to personal emotional experience, threatening any discourse to become illegible or simply not applicable anymore, since the individual that is only concerned with its state of happiness which is achieved by the repetitive evocation of happiness itself. The narcissist impulse works like a scene that disrupts the story: As Ahmed argues, the "powers-that-be might want their subjects happy rather than sad. And in wanting our happiness, they might forbid recognition of sadness as that which gets in the way, not just of happiness but its want" (Ahmed, *Happiness* 213). This might be why the invocation of happiness is so central to evangelicalism which promotes an irrational late modern capitalism that has no means to convince of its use rationally anymore, because nothing would be more fatal for the economic paradigm if those who are exposed to it would begin seek meaning outside of the economic transactions that have colonized already most of our existence.

Appendix

Appendix

Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse in dt. Sprache

Die USA sind erfüllt vom heiligen Geist. In emotionalen Gottesdiensten vergießen evangelikale Christen Freudentränen. Die Hände hoch erhoben singen sie christliche Rocksongs in den Megakirchen, die im ganzen Land zu finden sind. Millionen amerikanischer Christen folgen einem Glauben, der die persönliche Erfahrung und die affektiven Aspekte von Religion betont. Diese recht stereotype Beschreibung des evangelikalen Christentums entspricht häufig dem öffentlichen Bild des Evangelikalismus. Was als eine obskure und marginalisierte Sekte Anfang des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts begann, hat mittlerweile den traditionellen Protestantismus als wichtigste christliche Religion in den USA eingeholt. Von dort aus erobert diese relativ junge Form christlichen Glaubens die Welt. Einige Quellen gehen von mittlerweile 800 Millionen Gläubigen weltweit aus (Pew Research Center, "Global Christianity" 67). Als religiöse Bewegung fällt das evangelikale Christentum vor allem durch seine aggressiven Missions- und Proselytisierungsstrategien auf. Radikale Prediger vertreten äußerst medienwirksam extreme ethische Positionen, welche für nicht-Evangelikale als Ausdruck von religiösem Fundamentalismus verstanden werden können. Aber das evangelikale Christentum ist mehr als ein Refugium für Fundamentalisten und Ultra-Reaktionäre. Es lohnt sich allerdings, über dieses Bild hinaus zu blicken. Denn es ist auch möglich, den Evangelikalismus als eine der modernsten Ausdrucksformen des Christentums zu deuten, welche enorme Mengen an Freiwilligen und Geldmitteln für die weitere Expansion zu mobilisieren vermag. Der Fokus dieser Arbeit liegt auf dieser Expansion: Warum mobilisiert das evangelikale Christentum seine Mitglieder weit erfolgreicher als andere christliche Gruppen? Um dem nachzuspüren, untersuche ich das evangelikale Christentum als eine Affektökonomie nach Ahmed (Ahmed, *Emotion*). Ziel ist es aufzuzeigen, inwieweit die affektive Mobilisierung seiner Mitglieder einer der Hauptgründe für den weltweiten Erfolg des evangelikalen Christentums ist und inwieweit diese affektive Mobilisierung Parallelen in der Ökonomie hat.

Das evangelikale Christentum hat seine Wurzeln in den Erweckungsbewe-

gungen Nordamerikas der letzten beiden Jahrhunderte und ist stark verwoben mit der kulturellen und historischen Entstehung der Vereinigten Staaten. Die unüberschaubare Anzahl verschiedener Gruppen und Kirchen, die sich unter dem Überbegriff Evangelikalismus sammeln – von eher liberal eingestellten Baptisten über Pfingstler (*pentecostals*) und der charismatischen bis hin zur Neo-Evangelikalen Bewegung – erschwert eine Betrachtung des Phänomens als Ganzes. Allerdings ist gerade diese Unübersichtlichkeit eine der Stärken des evangelikalen Christentums: Jeder Suchende kann just jene Gemeinde finden, die am besten seinen individuellen Bedürfnissen entspricht.

Was die verschiedenen Gruppen und Kirchen eint ist ihr Angebot, eine direkte Beziehung zwischen den einzelnen Gläubigen und einem personalisierten Gott herzustellen, der lebendig und erfahrbar ist. Evangelikale lernen, eine Beziehung zu einem Gott aufzubauen, der allgegenwärtig ist und dessen Stimme jederzeit vernommen werden kann – und das im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes, wie Tanya Luhrmann erarbeitet hat (Luhrmann). Evangelikalismus ist somit auch ein Angebot, den Graben zwischen dem Säkularen und dem Heiligen oder dem Natürlichen und dem Übernatürlichen zu überwinden, den Evangelikale seit der Moderne vermuten. Der Evangelikalismus ist daher auch eine Kampfansage an andere christliche Ausdrucks- und Organisationsformen, die von einer strikteren Trennung des Inner- und Außerweltlichen ausgehen.

Der Evangelikalismus bietet an, beide Sphären (wieder) zu vereinen und damit all jenen eine Heimat zu geben, die unter einer "transzendenten Obdachlosigkeit" leiden, um einen Gedanken von György Lukács *mutatis mutandis* zu verwenden. Das Übernatürliche manifestiert sich vor allem in den evangelikalen Gottesdiensten, die voller Wunder sind: die Kranken werden geheilt, der heilige Geist kommt über die Gläubigen und es wird in Zungen geredet, um nur einige zu nennen. Das evangelikale Christentum betont damit die körperliche Erfahrung auf Kosten der Botschaft – wichtiger als diese zu vernehmen ist es, Gottes Präsenz zu spüren und zu erfahren – und versucht dabei, auf eine vormoderne Art den Sinn der Nachricht wieder zu entdecken: Gott wird jeden Gläubigen individuell erkennen, wenn er lernt, direkt mit ihm zu sprechen. Diese Fähigkeit verlangt

allerdings gewissenhaftes und diszipliniertes Training.

Der Evangelikalismus ist außerdem stark mit einem amerikanischem Selbstverständnis verknüpft, welches das individuelle Engagement über das Gemeinwohl stellt. Das evangelikale Angebot steht daher auch im Zeichen des amerikanischen Traums und des Versprechens, dass es 'jeder schaffen kann', solange man nur fleißig und zielstrebig ist. Auch Evangelikale können nur errettet werden, wenn sie selbst handeln – sie müssen sich also selbst um ihr spirituelles Wohlbefinden kümmern.

Mit der evangelikalen Botschaft wird häufig eine Anti-Moderne und irrationale Alternative zu einer als säkular empfundenen Welt vermittelt. Allerdings ergibt eine nähere Betrachtung ein differenzierteres Bild; dass es nämlich gerade die Prinzipien dieser Welt sind, auf denen der Evangelikalismus beruht. So hat der Evangelikalismus gerade von den Globalisierungsprozessen der letzten vierzig Jahre immens profitiert und nutzt für seine Expansion die Prinzipien des gegenwärtigen Marktparadigmas, das ich als "spätmodernen Kapitalismus" (Mandel, siehe Jameson, *Postmodernism* xvii-xix) beschreibe.

So können zum Beispiel die gegenwärtigen etablierten Distributionsstrategien evangelikaler Organisationen (von denen die klassische Missionstätigkeit nur eine von vielen ist) als ein hoch adaptives System beschrieben werden, dass die "Frohe Botschaft" den Anforderungen der jeweiligen Zielregion anpasst. In dieser Strategie, die Roland Robertson als *Glocalization* beschrieben hat (siehe Robertson), sind Ähnlichkeiten zu global agierenden Wirtschaftsunternehmen auszumachen. Sie lässt darauf schließen, dass für den Evangelikalismus die Distribution der Botschaft wichtiger ist als diese selbst. Damit unterscheidet sich die hier vertretene Betrachtungsweise grundsätzlich von der Theorie religiöser Märkte (siehe z.B. Stark und Finke), die auf der Basis der Theorie der rationalen Entscheidungen den religiösen Marktteilnehmer als einen *homo oeconomicus* beschreibt. Bei diesem Modell stehen sich Religionen in einem Wettstreit der Botschaften und Ideologien auf einem idealen Markt gegenüber. Die hier vertretene Ansicht geht allerdings eher von einem Wettstreit um die effektivsten Distributionsmethoden aus.

Zahlreiche Autoren haben bereits auf die reziproke Verbindung zwischen

Evangelikalismus und (spätmodernem) Kapitalismus hingewiesen. So erklärt Jean Comaroff beispielsweise, dass dieses Verhältnis sowohl intrinsischer als auch reaktiver Natur ist (meine Übersetzung Comaroff 54).[14] Intrinsisch, da beide einer ähnlichen Logik des Wachstums folgen und dabei verwandte Strategien anwenden; reaktiv, da der Evangelikalismus sich als eine Alternative zur rationalisierten und kommodifizierten Welt anbietet, die den Sinn für das Spirituelle verloren hat. So ist es nicht weiter verwunderlich, dass sich viele Evangelikale auch als eine globale religiöse Bewegung sehen, die Widerstand gegen den Kapitalismus leistet und den Marginalisierten und Machtlosen der Welt eine Stimme verleiht. Diese Narrative geht von dem "Globalen Süden" als dem neuen Zentrum einer "Weltchristenheit" aus, die natürlich alle nicht-evangelikalen Christen ausschließt. Dieser Narrative zum Trotz ergibt eine Betrachtung der materiellen Begebenheiten, dass das finanzielle Zentrum, welches die evangelikale Wachstumsdynamik ermöglicht, nach wie vor in der historischen Heimat des Evangelikalismus – den Vereinigten Staaten – zu finden ist. Von hier aus werden nicht nur Freiwillige mobilisiert, sondern auch substantielle Spendengelder eingetrieben, die das weltweite Wachstum erst ermöglichen.

Zur Diskussion über das Verhältnis von spätmodernem Kapitalismus und Evangelikalismus möchte ich eine neue Perspektive einbringen, die sich mit der Rolle von Affekt und Emotion in beiden Sphären befasst: wie Affekt und Emotion benutzt werden, um Mitglieder zu außerordentlichem Engagement anzutreiben und inwieweit auch auf dieser Ebene Ähnlichkeiten zum spätmodernen Kapitalismus ausgemacht werden können. Angelpunkt dieser Dissertation ist die Erkundung der Mittel, mit deren Hilfe das evangelikale Christentum das freiwillige Engagement seiner Mitglieder, Finanziers und Missionare zu aktivieren vermag und inwieweit dieses Engagement in pragmatische Distributionsstrukturen eingebettet ist. Dafür untersuche ich die evangelikale Dynamik als eine Affektökonomie (nach Ahmed, *Emotion*) und analysiere das Glücksversprechen (*Happiness*), das als Motivator für dieses Engagement dient.

[14] Comaroff beschreibt hier das Verhältnis zwischen "neuen holistischen Bewegungen" und dem "neoliberalen Paradigmenwechsel" und sieht dabei den Evangelikalismus als eine von vielen "neuen holistischen Bewegungen".

Appendix

Die wissenschaftliche Betrachtung von Affekt entstand auch aus einem "Bedürfnis zu erkennen, wie die Welt uns bewegt" (meine Übersetzung, Wetherell und Beer). Das Verhältnis von Affekt zu Bewegung ist entscheidend, da ich Affekt als ein Werkzeug benutzen möchte, um die Gemeinsamkeiten, die der spätmoderne Kapitalismus und der Evangelikalismus miteinander teilen, zu untersuchen. Folglich bin ich eher daran interessiert, was Affekt *macht*, als was Affekt sein möge. Nach Sara Ahmed sind Objekten oder Zeichen Affekte nicht inne, sondern selbst eine Folge der Zirkulation von Zeichen und Objekten. Je mehr Zeichen oder Objekten zirkulieren, desto affektiver werden sie aufgeladen (Ahmed, *Emotion* 45). Damit betont Ahmed die Bedeutung des Sozialen für die affektive Aufladung von Objekten und Zeichen: Affekt und Emotion sind nicht unbedingt dem Einzelnen im Sinne von psychologischen Status inne, sondern sollten eher als etwas soziales betrachtet werden, als etwas, das selber *wirkt*. Damit sind Affekt und Emotion auch politisch: Sie sind es, die "Struktur verinnerlichen" ("to get structures under our skin," Ahmed, *Happiness* 216) und die Verbindung zwischen Ideen, Werten und Objekten überhaupt erst herstellen.

Um anschaulich zu machen, wie eine solche Affektökonomie Evangelikale zu mobilisieren vermag, untersuche ich das jüngere Engagement amerikanischer Evangelikaler im Zuge der Ukraine-Krise und wie amerikanische evangelikale Medien eine "vorgestellte Gemeinschaft" (*imagined community*) (B. Anderson 6) des Weltchristentums evozieren, was eine der Grundlagen für weiteres freiwilliges und monetäres Engagement schafft. Die Berichterstattung US-evangelikaler Medien zur Ukraine-Krise wirkte wie eine 'evangelikale Linse', die eine eigene Narrative des Konfliktes produzierte: Die von der Ukraine als eines der vielen Schlachtfelder des Weltchristentums, dass von nicht-christlichen Kräften belagert wird. In dieser Narrative waren es vor allem die ukrainischen Evangelikalen, die durch die Krise als verfolgte Christen bedroht wurden. Durch diese Verschiebung des Fokus sollte es amerikanischen Evangelikalen leichter fallen, sich mit einem weit entfernten Konflikt direkt identifizieren zu können. Affektiv aufgeladene Medienberichte suggerierten einem evangelikalen amerikanischen Publikum vor allem die Wirkungsmacht des Gebetes

für die Ukraine. Affekttheoretisch betrachtet förderte das Beten für die Ukraine hier eine affektive Verbindung zwischen amerikanischen Evangelikalen und ukrainischen Evangelikalen, die dadurch ein Teil des imaginierten Weltchristentums wurden. Die Anerkennung des ukrainischen Leids durch amerikanische Evangelikale legitimierte dabei auch deren eigenes Leid als das Leid verfolgter Christen und erfüllte damit die "neue Nachfrage nach Anerkennung" (Illouz, *Cold Intimacies* 37), die Eva Illouz als zentral für die Formierung eines emotionalen Kapitalismus erachtet. Beten erfüllt auch darüber hinaus eine zentrale Rolle. Es ist nicht mehr nur ein (unilaterales) Kommunikationsmittel mit Gott, sondern auch ein Medium für die emotionale Kommunikation mit anderen Evangelikalen. Dabei spielen neue Formen der Nutzung sozialer Medien eine herausragende Rolle. Speziell entwickelte Anwendungen für Mobiltelefone und Computer ermöglichen die Kommunikation Evangelikaler untereinander. In diesen geschlossenen Systeme werden Affekte durch die Zirkulation von Objekten und Zeichen verstärkt. Mit Hilfe dieser Anwendungen können Nutzer zum gemeinsamen Beten für ein spezifisches Ziel zu einer spezifischen Zeit eingeladen werden. Diese affektive Formierung der imaginären Gemeinschaft Weltchristentum trägt dazu bei, die Ressourcen für die weitere Expansion zu aktivieren. Dabei handelt es sich vor allem um Spendenleistungen und freiwilliges Engagement.

Diese Formen des Engagements sind dabei selbst affektiv aufgeladen. Denn jede von Evangelikalen geleistete Kontribution ermöglicht Gottes Wunderwerk. Es ist der Akt des Gebens selbst – und nicht das mit den Spendengeldern Ermöglichte – der zur guten Tat wird. Jeder noch so kleine Betrag wirkt auf das kommende Reich Gottes hin, da jede Spende eine direkte Investition in die übernatürliche Welt bedeutet und damit verbunden einem Entzug von Mitteln aus der säkularen und rationalen Welt bedeutet. Dieser Vorgang ist nur auf den ersten Blick eine Hinwendung zum Übernatürlichen und damit verbunden eine Abkehr von der natürlichen Welt. Denn der Vorgang führt beide Sphären wieder zusammen: Das Investieren von Kapital – ein säkularer und rationaler Vorgang – wird zu einer bedeutenden christlichen Handlung und gleichzeitig Grundlage des Übernatürlichen. Die Spende, oder eher gesagt das Investment in das kommende

Reich Gottes, wird damit zu einem "Glücksanlass", ein Begriff mit dem Ahmed "Objekte zur Förderung der Konformität oder Wege, um Körper mit dem bereits Bestehenden zu eichen" meint (meine Übersetzung, Ahmed, *Happiness* 30): Wenn jede Spende das Reich Gottes näher bringt, bedeutet spenden, eine aktiven Beitrag dazu zu leisten. Damit ähneln die Mechanismen der evangelikalen Spende eher denen des Finanzkapitalismus. Denn die Spende wird hier nicht als etwas imaginiert, dass anderen helfen könnte, sondern dem Spender zugute kommt – ein Investment, dass in Zukunft Früchte tragen wird. Damit gleicht der Glücksanlass der evangelikalen Spende auch dem der Wirtschaftswelt: Gutes Investment führt zu Erfolg und damit zum Glück – was indirekt auch das Investieren legitimiert.

Ein Großteil der erhaltenen finanziellen Zuwendungen werden für die Missionstätigkeit benötigt. Die Mission hat dabei einen hohen emotionalen Stellenwert unter Evangelikalen. Eine unüberschaubare Zahl von Biographien, Sachbüchern und Prosa behandelt das Leben und Werk evangelikaler Missionare. Die Missionstätigkeit ist genreübergreifend eines der zentralen Themen evangelikaler Literatur; der Missionar ist archetypische Held dieser Narrativen. Um die Missionstätigkeit auch für eine breite evangelikale Öffentlichkeit erfahrbar zu machen hat sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten ein neues Model der Mission herausgebildet: Die Kurzzeitmission.

Bei der Kurzzeitmission wird die Missionstätigkeit als eine konsumierbare Erfahrung re-imaginiert. Tausende junger amerikanischer Evangelikaler nehmen sie jedes Jahr wahr, um für eine kurze Zeit ins Ausland zu gehen und die "Frohe Botschaft" zu verkünden. Dabei sind Ähnlichkeiten mit den Angeboten der Tourismusindustrie zu beobachten: Die Mehrheit der Teilnehmer verbringt weniger als zwei Wochen für eine Kurzzeitmission und die beliebtesten Zielregionen decken sich mit jenen, die sich bei eher säkular eingestellten Individualreisenden großer Beliebtheit erfreuen, wie zum Beispiel Thailand oder Nepal. Missionstätigkeit wird so von einer Lebensaufgabe zu einer Ware, die dem Reisenden zum einen das Gefühl vermittelt, missionarisch tätig zu sein, zum anderen Abenteuer und Selbsterfahrung bietet.

Die dabei gemachten Erfahrungen werden nach Abschluss der Reise häufig aufbereitet und medienwirksam präsentiert: Internetseiten wie zum Beispiel "Adventures in Mission" (adventure.org) aggregieren tausende individuelle Missionsnarrativen in der Form von Blogs, um so die "Saat für künftige Kurzzeitmissionen zu säen", wie es ein Anbieter beschreibt (Herwig). Das Blogging selbst ist dabei integraler Bestandteil einer Kurzzeitmission. Die Blogs formen ein Reservoir individueller christlicher Biografien, die einerseits Beweis für das individuelle Engagement der jeweiligen Autoren sind, andererseits Ansporn und Ermutigung für diejenigen, die noch nicht an einer Kurzzeitmission teilgenommen haben. Somit sind die Erfahrungsberichte der Kurzzeitmissionare integraler Bestandteil einer "antizipatorischen Kausalität" (meine Übersetzung, Ahmed, *Happiness* 28) zwischen der Kurzzeitmission und dem evangelikalen Glücksversprechen: Die Kurzzeitmission wird als etwas wahrgenommen, das zum individuellen Glück beiträgt, *bevor* man ihr überhaupt begegnet ist. So wissen Kurzzeitmissionare schon vor Antritt ihrer Mission, dass diese erfolgreich und lohnend verlaufen wird, da die Missionstätigkeit stark affektiv aufgeladen ist. Missionstätigkeit ist daher auch ein "Glücksanlass". Die kurzen Missionsreisen mögen nicht sehr viel zur Erlösung der noch nicht Erlösten beitragen, aber sie schaffen eine noch stärkere affektive Bindung zwischen den Teilnehmern und ihrer Glaubensgemeinschaft und erlauben ihnen, sich als Teil von etwas Größerem zu fühlen.

Alle untersuchten Beispiele bestätigen meine Ausgangsthese, dass der Evangelikalismus sich innerhalb des Marktparadigmas bewegt und der Erfolg der evangelikalen Bewegung zu einem erheblichen Teil auf der affektiven Mobilisierung seiner Mitglieder beruht. Zentrale Möglichkeiten christlichen Engagements wie zum Beispiel die Missionstätigkeit unterliegen einer Kommodifizierung, während Spendenleistungen zu dem Spender einträglichen Finanzinvestments umgedeutet werden. Was den Gemeinschaftssinn angeht, wird dieser auch besonders durch soziale Medien gefördert, wobei hier die dem *e-commerce* inhärenten Techniken "content marketing", "clicktivism" und "micro-investments" eine besondere Stellung einnehmen. Obwohl eingeräumt werden muss, dass auch andere religiöse Gruppen diese und ähnliche Praktiken erfolgreich anwenden, scheint der Evangelikalismus

besonders effektiv in der Anwendung dieser Methoden zu sein. Während andere Gruppen diese neuen Formen der Werbung und der Distribution größtenteils als Mittel zum Zweck einsetzen, laden Evangelikale die Mittel selber affektiv auf. Die genutzten Mittel werden somit selbst Teil des evangelikalen Heilsversprechens. In diesem Sinne ist das anfänglich angesprochene Angebot an die transzendental Obdachlosen mitnichten ein transzendentes Angebot, sondern ein immanentes Angebot, Gott im Hier und Jetzt zu finden. Das Überweisen von Geldern, das Buchen einer Reise oder die Nutzung sozialer Medien werden affektiv aufgeladen und selbst zu religiösen Handlungen, die Evangelikalen das Gefühl geben, aktiv an einer religiöseren Welt mitzuarbeiten.

Brian Massumi beschreibt Affekte als "nicht-ideologische Mittel, welche ideologische Effekte produzieren" ("The Autonomy of Affect" 102). Dies wird aus den erarbeiteten Beispielen nicht nur ersichtlich, sondern kann auch noch erweitert werden: Die affektive Aufladung der originären Objekte, welche hier die christliche Gemeinschaft, Missionstätigkeit und Großzügigkeit sind, überträgt sich auf zentrale Objekte und Handlungen der Konsumgesellschaft: den Konsum sozialer Medien, die Teilnahme an Urlaubsreisen und Finanzinvestment. Diesen Vorgang, den ich "affektiven Übertrag" nenne, untersuche ich exemplarisch Anhand des Beispiels des Wohlstandevangeliums (*Prosperity Gospel* oder auch *Faith movement*), einer bedeutenden Gruppierung innerhalb des evangelikalen Spektrums, bei der dieser affektive Übertrag von christlichen Werten auf Objekte der individualisierten Konsumkultur am Weitesten fortgeschritten ist. Hier lässt sich beobachten, wie individueller Wohlstand und Gesundheit direkt mit Gottwohlgefälligkeit gleichgesetzt werden und beide in die Verantwortung der einzelnen übergeben wird. Somit lässt sich hier eine Entpolitisierung materieller Verhältnisse bei gleichzeitiger Naturalisierung marktwirtschaftlicher Prinzipien erkennen.

Um darzustellen wie sehr sich der Evangelikalismus damit vom traditionellen Protestantismus entfernt hat, ist ein Blick auf die Typologie der Religion von Max Weber aufschlussreich. Die "innerweltliche Askese" (Weber, *Protestant Ethic* 95) ist dabei zentral für das Verständnis des historischen Verhältnisses zwischen Kapitalismus

und Protestantismus und der resultierenden Entstehung des "Geist des Kapitalismus" im Weberschen Sinn. Als einer der "Wege zum Heil" bedeutet die innerweltliche Askese für den Protestanten eine Partizipation mit den Institutionen der Welt, gegen die er eigentlich in Opposition steht. Das Leitmotiv ist dabei die aktive Veränderung der Welt. Im Gegensatz dazu arbeite ich heraus, inwieweit das evangelikale Christentum auf Grundlage der Weberschen Typologie beschrieben werden könnte: Dafür entwickle ich den Begriff *innerweltlicher Narzissmus*. Denn der Evangelikalismus betont das individuelle Wohlbefinden jedes einzelnen Evangelikalen in *dieser* Welt. Die Institutionen dieser Welt stehen dabei nicht im Wege und sind nicht mehr notwendiges Übel, sondern integraler Bestandteil des Heilversprechens: Denn das kommende Reich Gottes ähnelt der Welt in der wir leben – es beruht auch auf den Mechanismen des spätmodernen Kapitalismus, welche nun allerdings affektiv und spirituell aufgeladen sind und sich damit jedem Diskurs entziehen: Alle Angebote haben gemeinsam, dass sie an das Emotionale appellieren, die angebotenen Produkte sind affektiv aufgeladen und versprechen einen 'Kapitalertrag', der größer ist als es jeder materielle Gewinn sein könnte. Denn jedes Angebot, sei es eine Spende an eine große evangelikale Organisation, die Buchung einer Kurzzeitmission oder die Unterstützung des "Weltchristentums" bestätigt auch den eigenen individuellen Lebensstil durch eine außerweltliche Autorität. Hier wird offenbar, wie der Narzissmus bedient wird: individuelle Spenden tragen direkt zu Wundern bei, jedes Gebet verändert die Welt und selbst der Konsum kann, soweit im richtigen Kontext stehend, als religiöse Handlung verstanden werden.

Der Evangelikalismus steht somit in einem ähnlichen Verhältnis zum spätmodernen Kapitalismus wie der Protestantismus zum Industriekapitalismus bei Weber. Doch während der "Geist des Kapitalismus" eine Rationalisierung der Gesellschaft einläutete, bedeutet der 'Geist des spätmodernen Kapitalismus' eine neue Irrationalität, eine Wiederverzauberung der Welt, in der die irrationalen Methoden und Techniken des spätmodernen Kapitalismus, den Jean Comaroff als "messianischen Kapitalismus" beschreibt, durch die religiöse Sphäre legitimiert werden. Gleichzeitig verleiht der Evangelikalismus

damit einer historisch entstandenen Form zu Wirtschaften eine höhere Legitimation, die diese naturalisiert und damit jedem Diskurs entzieht. Denn je weniger plausibel die rationalen Argumente für einen entfesselten Kapitalismus klingen, desto mehr bedarf es eines von außen exportierten Sinns, wie Terry Eagleton feststellt (Eagleton, *Culture* 63). Das evangelikale Glücksversprechen ist dabei deshalb so wichtig, da es das individuelle Streben nach Glück *innerhalb* dieses Marktparadigmas in den Mittelpunkt stellt und eben nicht den Diskurs darüber, was eigentlich glücklich machen würde.

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