

Multilateralism à la Carte?

The Bush II Administration and US Foreign Policy

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Die unilaterale Außenpolitik unter George W. Bush ist kein neues Phänomen der US-Diplomatie. Dem Autor zufolge ist sie vielmehr eine Fortführung der Politik der Clinton-Regierung und hat ihre Wurzeln in den Traditionen eines Andrew Jackson und Woodrow Wilson. Clinton vermochte jedoch seine unilaterale Politik mit einem „Lächeln“ zu verkaufen, wohingegen die Art und Weise der Bush-Administration stets Irritationen hervorrief.

US-Außenpolitik, George W. Bush, Unilateralismus

The use of unilateral force under George W. Bush is not a new phenomenon in US foreign policy. As the author argues, it is merely a continuation of Bill Clinton's foreign policy and is deeply rooted in both the foreign policy traditions of Jacksonianism and Wilsonianism. The analysis concludes that Clinton used unilateralist foreign policy with a 'smile' whereas the Bush administration uses it with an attitude.

US Foreign Policy, George W. Bush, Unilateralism

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This paper argues that the US foreign policy under George W. Bush is a continuation of President Clinton's foreign policy and is deeply rooted in both the foreign policy traditions of Andrew Jackson and Woodrow Wilson. It will further argue that the use of unilateral force is not a new phenomenon in US foreign policy that occurred during the Bush Presidency, but rather a continuation of Clinton's foreign policy doctrine. The analysis begins by explaining the 'new fundamentalism' in U.S. foreign policy after September 11th. It then outlines the theories of Jacksonianism and Wilsonianism before tracing the George W. Bush administration's foreign policy as it relates to these traditions.¹ Finally, Bush's foreign policy is compared to President Clinton's.

The Bush Doctrine and Jacksonian Tradition of US Foreign Policy

In 1999, Condoleezza Rice, then senior foreign policy advisor to the Presidential Candidate George W. Bush, published an article in *Foreign Affairs* that set the foreign policy agenda of the Bush administration.² She explained that, once elected, the administration's foreign policy would shift back towards focussing on what is in America's interests. Bush's foreign policy would be more realist. Rice argued it would pursue key priorities of ensuring that the American military was capable of deterring war, projecting power as well as renewing America's alliances. Rice and later Bush himself accused the Clinton administration of conducting foreign policy as 'social work'³ while risking the lives of US marines in conflicts around the world in which the United States does not have an interest. It was President Clinton's mishap, Bush argued himself⁴, to deploy American forces to countries abroad that were not primarily in America's national interest. He referred to U.S. military deployments to Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia. During the course of the pre-

¹ The latest scholarly work on traditions of American Foreign Policy can be found in Mead, Walter Russell (2003): *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press; as well as McDougall, Walter (1997): *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776*, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.

² Rice, Condoleezza (2000): *Promoting the National Interest*, in: *Foreign Affairs* (January/February), p. 57.

³ This term was coined by Mandelbaum, Michael (1996): *Foreign Policy as Social Work*, in: *Foreign Affairs* (January/February).

⁴ Bush, George W. (1999): „A Period of Consequences“, *The Citadel*, South Carolina, September 23, 1999; http://www.citadel.edu/pao/adresses/pres_bush.html (Accessed Aug. 15th, 2005).

sidential campaign Bush elaborated on his foreign policy vision and asserted that he would pursue a „distinctly American internationalism“.⁵

This ‘distinct foreign policy’, one can argue, is deeply rooted in the theory of classical realism à la Hans Morgenthau. It presumes that:

- (1) nation states are the principal actors in international affairs,
- (2) the power of states is the principal currency in conducting foreign affairs and the resources of power determine the national interests of the state,
- (3) great power politics is the primary concern of realists asserting that domestic affairs of sovereign states as well as humanitarian intervention are not of concern.

Yet, the terrorist attacks on New York have clearly changed President Bush’s foreign policy towards a paradigm of defensive realism. It shares the same assumptions with classical realists – however, it highlights the importance of the nation states’ insecurity and the importance of the military to defend the country.⁶ This, as the American scholar James McCormick argues, has also changed the definition of U.S. national interest and has transformed it from a narrow definition to a broader one.⁷ Further, the revised foreign policy of the Bush administration was flavoured with the notion of idealism. This became quite clear in the New National Security Strategy (NSS) in particular, where it was highlighted that one of the objectives of U.S. national security policy is to promote democracy and the rule of law around the world.⁸ In short, Bush’s ‘distinct internationalism’ was transformed by external influences to a ‘comprehensive globalism.’

The Bush administration used this external event of terrorist attacks and submitted a New National Security Strategy to Congress.⁹ The document

⁵ Bush, George W. (1999): „A Distinctly American Internationalism,“ delivered at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Nov. 19th, 1999; <http://www.georgewbush.com/speeches/foreignpolicy/foreignpolicy.asp> (Accessed Feb. 1st, 2005).

⁶ Zakaria, Faared (1998): *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 8-10.

⁷ McCormick, James M. (2004): *American Foreign Policy and Process*, Florence, KY.: Thomson & Wadsworth, p. 219.

⁸ Idealists believe strongly in the affective power of ideas, in that it is possible to base a political system primarily on morality. The theory of idealism has its origins in the First World War when the widespread view was that military force cannot achieve the objective of keeping the peace. For further details see Hillis, Martin/ Smith, Steve (1990): *Explaining and understanding International Relations*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

⁹ President of the United States (2002): *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, September.

outlines the principles of American national security policies after 9/11 and became publicly known as the '*Bush doctrine*'. The Bush doctrine can be characterized as follows:

- (1) The Bush administration acknowledges that domestic regimes of certain states especially in the Middle East matter and change – in fact, they pose a threat to US national security. This argument is consistent with Kenneth Waltz's second image of explaining the causes of wars. Wars between states occur because there are "bad states" and "good states". Good states (or stable democracies), on average, start wars far less often than bad states (or authoritarian states). The logical strategic objective therefore is to pursue regime change in these countries.
- (2) The NSS specifically accentuates the fact that the United States reserves the right for pre-emptive as well as preventative attacks on sovereign states if deemed necessary. This is probably the most controversial point in the strategic outlook especially for European nations. It means that the President of the United States reserves the right of anticipatory military actions against any state that poses a national security threat to the United States. America's allies feared that the United States would pursue a foreign policy that is solely based on pre-emptive attacks instead of rule of law.
- (3) The policy of pre-emption combined with the policy of unilateralism, or, as Robert Jervis and John L. Gaddis called it the 'willingness to act unilaterally'¹⁰, made the NSS so controversial. In short, the United States was deemed to reduce the amount of entangling alliances that could have an impact on American sovereignty.
- (1) The document also assumes that international peace and stability can only be achieved if the United States remains the global hegemon. Put differently, the international community requires U.S. primacy to ensure global order.
- (2) Despite its unilateralist tone, the NSS also shows elements of Wilsonianism. The notion of spreading democracy, the rule of law, and free markets around the world to allow international citizens a greater share of global wealth is an internationalist approach to international affairs. This policy is based on President Wilson's notion of exporting American exceptionalism to the world.

¹⁰ See Gaddis, John Lewis (2004): *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*, Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2004; and Jervis, Robert (2003): *Understanding the Bush Doctrine*, in: *Political Science Quarterly* 118 (Fall 2003).

Jacksonianism

The 'Jacksonian' school of thought in US foreign policy is named after President Andrew Jackson. The doctrine of US unilateralism can be found in his tenure as an American General and later on as the President of the United States. Jacksonians as well as the early foreign policy elite were suspicious of entangling alliances and international treaties and agreements that would essentially limit the space of manoeuvre of conducting foreign policy. The Monroe doctrine was probably the most well-known exponent of this view. It asserted that the United States would not get involved in the domestic affairs of European nation states while at the same time encumbering European nation states were trying to gain influence in the internal affairs of the United States. President Jackson made use of the doctrine of pre-emption while invading Spanish dominated Florida in 1818 to restore order along the border. His Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, told the Spanish Ambassador that Spain failed to restore order along the border and this raised concerns in Washington.

In general, Jacksonians are very much in favour of the autonomy of the state and are resentful to large federal bureaucracies. Partisans of this school of thought do not trust existing political departments, agencies, and the political elite.¹¹ Jacksonians also lobby for the autonomy of the states and local governments. Each U.S. State and local government should retain much more power than the federal government. Applied to the international level, Jacksonians see international institutions and international law as constraining America's autonomy. In short, Jacksonians are sceptical about such supranational bodies and their elites that have the power to decide about the fate of the United States' citizens. In terms of security, Jacksonian's foremost principle is self-reliance. They are convinced that the United States is better off taking care of its own security rather than putting trust and confidence in international bodies. This can be described as the 'individualistic moment' of Jacksonians, the right to „think and live as one pleases“.¹² In order to preserve world order and peace, the Jacksonian school of thought subscribes to the belief that a unipolar system of international affairs is much more conducive to ensure world order than a multipolar nature of the international system.¹³

¹¹ Mead, Walter Russel (2003): *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, p. 225.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 233.

¹³ In this sense one can argue that the Jacksonian view of the international system is consistent with the neo-realist theory of international relations as first described by Waltz, Kenneth (1979): *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, Mass.:

Overall, the Jacksonian school of American foreign policy is the source of recent hawkish foreign policy behaviour that is not well understood in Europe. Jacksonianism becomes very hawkish only when American national interests are threatened. Therefore, national threats are an important element in the Jacksonian foreign policy view that determines how militaristic their defence policies are going to be.

Bush and Jacksonianism

Being the unipolar moment and possessing the most capable military, the U.S. Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, bluntly confronted the international community by saying that “the mission will determine the coalition, not the coalition determines the mission”.

In fact, what Rumsfeld meant was that the United States welcomes allies joining the fight against terrorism but that allies’ support is not a prerequisite for the success of the overall campaign. This statement was the birth of the notion of ‘coalitions of the willing’. The President himself confronted the international community with a choice: „Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.“¹⁴ However, this statement can be seen as a replica of Jacksonian’s notion of community. They draw a clear distinction between their community and that of others as much as they differ between members of their community and members of other communities. „Through most of American history the Jacksonian community was one from which many Americans were automatically and absolutely excluded (...).“¹⁵ It is quite difficult for outsiders to enter this closed community. The membership in the Jacksonian community entails a common code that each member has to follow. Associates who break this code of conduct can be penalized without the formalities of law. The Bush doctrine is an application of this Jacksonian

Addison-Wesley Pub. Neo-realists argue that the unipolar nature of the international system is more favourable than a multipolar world in which great powers seek to balance each other. One of the greatest dangers of multipolarity is uncertainty, caused by misperceptions and misinterpretations of other nations and their behaviour, that could cause wars. This is the classical concept of the balance of power theory where two or more great powers strive for hegemony. See Benjamin Zyla (forthcoming), „Balance of Power Theory“, in: *Encyclopaedia of War and American Society* (MTM Publishing Company, Sage Publications: Spring 2005).

¹⁴ President Bush in an address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, United States Capitol, Washington, D.C.

¹⁵ Mead 2003 [Anm.11], p. 236.

community in which the U.S. reserves the right to act unilaterally without seeking the consent of international organizations.¹⁶

Secondly, Jacksonians are dubious of international institutions and international law. Already before the terrorist attacks the Bush administration announced that it would stop its support for the peace process in the Middle East and Northern Ireland, end US troop commitments in the Balkans and announced the deployment of a new missile defence system. In 2001, the administration revoked its commitment to the Kyoto protocol, withdrew from the 1973 Biological Weapons Convention, the International Criminal Court, and the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The President's explanation for the withdrawal was: „It does not make economic sense for America. (...) It's going to be in what's in the interest of our country, first and foremost.“¹⁷ America's retraction from international agreements diminishes its „entangling alliances“¹⁸ and will re-establish U.S. supremacy in the world. „We now have an administration willing to assert American freedom of action and the primacy of American national interests. Rather than contain power within a vast web of constraining international agreements, the new unilateralism seeks to strengthen American power and unashamedly deploy it on behalf of self-defined global trends.“¹⁹ These statements and actions are consistent with the Jacksonian world view that sees international agreements, negotiations, and treaties as inappropriate tools of diplomacy. Rather, the 'political enemy' should be met with full military strength.

Bush and Wilsonianism

This school of thought is named after former President Woodrow Wilson.²⁰ It is associated with an exceptionalist U.S. foreign policy that is rooted in the belief of spreading democracy around the globe, the promotion of human rights and the rule of law. The United States with its democratic institutions and government organizations is seen as an example other countries should follow. President Wilson introduced his internationalist

¹⁶ Lefler, Melvyn P. (2004): Bush's Foreign Policy, in: Foreign Policy (September/October), p. 23.

¹⁷ „Remarks by the President and German Chancellor Schroeder in Photo Opportunity,“ Washington D.C., March 29, 2001 (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010329-2.html).

¹⁸ This is a Monroe Doctrine notion from 1823.

¹⁹ Krauthammer, Charles (2001): The New Unilateralism, in: The Washington Post, 8 June 2001, p. A29.

²⁰ See Mead [Anm. 11] for an elaborate description of this tradition, and also McDougall, Walter (1997): *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776*, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.

foreign policy in his Fourteen Points speech to Congress in which he outlined that the U.S. has the duty to change the behaviour of other states and project its values and norms on them. This policy is the basis of what later became known as the democratic peace theory that argues that the spread of democracy to other states reduces the risk of international conflicts. However, when the President ordered American troops into Europe during WWI he also directed his administration to insist on calling the US being an „allied“ partner rather than an „associated power.“²¹ This clearly indicates that Wilsonians wanted to see the United States being detached from entangling, permanent alliances. However, concluding that the US was an isolationist country is incorrect – the United States was never isolationist, and, at the minimum was always interdependent economically.²²

The war against terrorism in the Middle East and the nation-building projects there are the latest examples of a Wilsonian foreign policy. The purpose of the war in Afghanistan and later on in Iraq was to change corrupt and dictatorial regimes that suppress their people and transform it into prosperous democracies. Washington pledged more than \$ 4.5 billion over five years for rebuilding the country. In addition, the administration is committed to supporting the development of institutions and opening opportunities for the Afghan people to make a living. „A world where some live in comfort and plenty, while half of the human race lives on less than \$ 2 a day, is neither just nor stable.“²³ The belief is that once the country is more stable and its institutions are more democratic it will provide more security for the country itself and the entire region. As a result, the spread of democracy around the world is not only a moral duty but a „practical imperative.“ In this sense the spread of democracy is a fundamental, global security imperative for the administration and can be seen as an element of the Wilsonian tradition.

Clinton vs. Bush – What is the difference?

Taking a closer look at President Clinton’s foreign policy and comparing it to George W. Bush’s foreign policy it can be argued that Bush’s foreign policies of unilateralism, fighting terrorism, and promoting democracies and

²¹ LaFeber, Walter (1994): *The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at home and abroad*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 303.

²² Zakaria, Fareed (1999): *Another Versailles? Yes, but not Isolationist*, in: *The Wall Street Journal*, October. See also Barry, Tom (2001): *Bush administration is not isolationist*, in: *Foreign Policy in Focus* (vol. 5 no. 23); accessed online at <http://www.fareedzakaria.com/> on Feb. 4th, 2005. See also *The Economist*, „America’s Place in the World“, September 12th, 2001.

²³ *The National Security Strategy of the United States* [Ann. 9], p. 21.

free markets in the Middle East present a continuation of Clinton's foreign policy and as such are not novel per se.

During President Clinton's tenure America's economic strategy was to lower trade and investment barriers all over the world. He became known as the „globalization president“: The Clinton administration signed the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico, it also completed the Uruguay Round talks, which brought the biggest reform to the world's trading system and opened economic markets around the world. Elements of Wilsonianism can be found in Bill Clinton's foreign policy. Humanitarian concerns were the driving force for the United States to intervene into internal conflicts of sovereign states – most notably in Kosovo, Haiti, Bosnia, and Iraq.

President Bush's unilateralism was not a novelty, but as Robert Jervis and Stephen Walt have pointed out, the explicitness with which the U.S. administration outlined its unilateralist foreign policy was distinct.²⁴ Even though the Clinton administration was committed to a liberal institutionalist approach, it only relied on international institutions if it was in America's national interest to do so.²⁵ Otherwise, Washington made no secret of its criticism and disregard of them when they did not suit U.S. interests. For example, Clinton's administration was quick to blame the UN for the humanitarian disaster in Somalia. President Clinton was face a post Cold War international environment, in which domestic support for American interventions in foreign countries diminished. Sending troops to stop the spread of communism was understandable for the American people, but sending U.S. troops to re-build failed states was another. This made Clinton's foreign policy and support for it quite difficult. Considering that no other country had the ability to challenge the United States militarily or economically, Americans probably felt secure and open for political idealism. This idealist foreign policy soon disappeared when eighteen Rangers were killed in Somalia on October 4th, 1993. *Operation Restore Hope*, inherited from the Bush Sr. administration, was supposed to protect aid supplies of the international community. Earlier, the UN promised to take over this mission from the U.S. However, the lawlessness in Somalia continued and necessitated the Clinton administration to depart from its humanitarian mission. The tensions between the UN peacekeeping corps and the Somali National Army increased and Clinton himself vehemently disagreed with UN Secretary

²⁴ See Jervis, Robert (2003): Understanding the Bush Doctrine, in: Political Science Quarterly 118 (Fall 2003); and Walt, Stephen M. (2005): Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy, New York: Norton.

²⁵ Lefler, Melvyn P. (2004): Bush's Foreign Policy, in: Foreign Policy (September/October).

General Boutros Boutros-Ghali about the need to send forces to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe.²⁶ The killing of twenty four Pakistani peacekeepers in an attack on June 5th, 1993 set in motion a massive U.S. response. However, in a mission to catch the General of the Somali Army, U.S. forces got trapped – in the end US Rangers were killed and dragged through downtown Mogadishu while taped by the international press.²⁷ These pictures created a domestic outcry in the United States that forced the Clinton administration to withdraw U.S. forces from Somalia.

Clinton's Second Term – Towards Selective Wilsonianism?

After the disaster in Somalia, President Clinton signed the Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) in May 1994, which reviewed U.S. involvements in peacekeeping operations. The document stated that U.S. peacekeeping operations „can be a very important and useful tool of American foreign policy. Our purpose is to use peacekeeping selectively and more effectively than has been done in the past.“²⁸ The administration recognized that neither the United States nor the international community had the mandate and resources to intervene in every conflict. Clinton, aware of this dilemma, decided to allocate American resources more carefully to international peacekeeping missions – and where and when it can intervene: „And the reality is that we cannot often solve other people's problems; we can never build their nations for them. So the policy review is intended to help us make those hard choices about where and when the international community can get involved; where and when we can take part with the international community in getting involved; and where and when we can make, thus, a positive difference.“²⁹

²⁶ Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali's Agenda for Peace advocated that the UN should take on the role of rebuilding failed states. Somalia was viewed as a „case test“ by the Secretary General. His agenda for peace suggested an approach to peace and security which incorporated „preventive“ diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-building and development. A/47/277 - S/24111; 17 June 1992, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992.

²⁷ Exact numbers are: 500 Somalis were killed as well as 18 U.S. Rangers, 84 U.S. soldiers were wounded.

²⁸ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, „Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and Director for Strategic Plans and Policy General Wesley Wark“ May 5, 1994. Accessed online http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25_brief.htm, Feb. 26, 2005.

²⁹ Ibid.

The document concluded by stating that peacekeeping operations are in America's national interest. The primary purpose of the American military is to „fight and win wars“. ³⁰ PDD was a tool the administration used to further a humanitarian agenda without overstressing American forces. This approach to foreign crisis was labelled „selective engagement“. The important point to make in our analysis is that President Clinton returned priorities of American foreign policy to the defence of the United States homeland. Henceforth, homeland defence, international economic globalization as well as peace and stability were the cornerstones of Clinton's foreign policy. ³¹ Clinton's Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, explained that the United States should pursue arms control and non-proliferation, and hard line policies against international crime, terror, and drug trafficking. Clinton himself summed up America's global leadership ambitions: „We must continue to bear the responsibility for the world's leadership.“ ³² His policy of selective engagement ³³ called for the following:

- (1) Strengthening the community of major market democracies (including the US) which constitutes the core from which enlargement can proceed.
- (2) Fostering and consolidating new democracies and market economies.
- (3) Countering aggression and support the liberalization of states hostile to democracy and markets.
- (4) Pursuing a humanitarian agenda not only by providing aid but also by working to help democracy and market economies take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern. ³⁴

Further, as Madeleine Albright explained, the United States would act unilaterally as well as multilaterally – it will decide on a case by case basis. ³⁵

Looking at the most recent NSS, Clinton's doctrine of engagement and enlargement is exactly what President Bush outlined in his National Security Strategy. The self-perception of primacy led the United States to believe

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ The first victim of Clinton's revised policy was the conflict in Rwanda and the evolving genocide. The President did not send American forces into the African country to stop the conflict and to restore peace and stability. Clinton deemed that the crisis in Rwanda was not in America's national interest. See Wheeler, Nicholas (2000): *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, for details.

³² Address at Freedom House, Washington D.C., October 6, 1995, typescript.

³³ McCormick 2004 [Ann. 4], p. 182.

³⁴ „From Containment to Enlargement: Current Foreign Policy Debates in Perspective“, National Security Affairs Presidential Assistant Anthony Lake's speech at Johns Hopkins University, September 21, 1993.

³⁵ Secretary of State Warren Christopher, „Building Peace in the Middle East“, address at Columbia University, September 20, 1993. U.S. Department of State Dispatch, September 1993.

that it is an indispensable and inescapable nation³⁶ – a theme in American foreign policy that is consistent with Clinton's foreign policy approach. His policies were first introduced by the National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, in a speech in 1996. Lake sketched six tasks which call for the use of force.³⁷ Among these tasks was to counter terrorism, to defend key economic interests, to preserve, promote, and defend democracy, to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international crime, and drug trafficking. In contrast, however, the major difference between Clinton and Bush is that Clinton pursued 'unilateralism with a smile' whereas the Bush administration employs unilateralism with an attitude.³⁸ The distinctions are about style rather than substance; there is nothing revolutionary about Bush's foreign policy that we have not seen in previous Presidents' foreign policies.

In addition, the last National Security Strategy of the Clinton administration clearly envisioned the pre-emptive, unilateral use of force if U.S. national interests are in danger. „We will do what we must“ to defend America's national interests, wrote the Clinton national security team just before leaving office in 2000.³⁹ This included military action without consulting coalition partners where deemed necessary or appropriate. Earlier, in 1993, President Clinton made use of the unilateralist doctrine and authorized the unilateral use of force in signing the Presidential Decision Directive 39 that deals with terrorism. It points out that the United States would „seek to identify groups or states that sponsor such terrorists, isolate them and extract a heavy price for their actions“.⁴⁰ Further, President Clinton authorized the bombing of a chemical production facility in Sudan which was believed to be producing weapons of mass destruction. In sum, President Clinton acted unilaterally; President George W. Bush administration simply continued to follow Clinton's doctrine despite public concerns.

³⁶ Joffe, „Clinton's World“, p. 144.

³⁷ Anthony Lake, „Defining Missions, Settling Deadlines: Meeting New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War World,“ remarks at the George Washington University, Washington D.C., March 6, 1996, White House Press Release (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, March 7, 1996), quoted in: Joffe, „Clinton's World“, p. 146.

³⁸ Quote from Dr. Sokolsky, Dean of Arts, Royal Military College of Canada, September 2004.

³⁹ The White House, „A National Security Strategy for a new Century“, October 1998, p. 5.

⁴⁰ The White House, „Presidential Decision Directive 39, June 21, Washington, 1995, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm> (accessed December 23rd, 2004).

Conclusion

This paper has argued that the most recent hawkish tone in US foreign policy under the current Bush administration is not a new phenomenon in the history of US foreign policy. In fact, the unilateralist approach of the Bush administration is consistent with President Clinton's foreign policy. Clinton used unilateralist foreign policy with a 'smile' whereas Bush uses it with an attitude.

Furthermore, this article has shown that the foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration is deeply rooted in the Wilsonian as well as Jacksonian tradition of US foreign policy. In the National Security Strategy the US intends to bring democracy, the rule of law and open market societies to the Middle East. This is the Wilsonian element in Bush's doctrine. However, the Jacksonian nature of the doctrine can be found in the US unilateralist approach in international affairs focussing on its national interest rather than the well being of the international community. However, most recent developments in Iraq contribute to the assumption that the Wilsonian element will prevail.

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