TY  - JOUR
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
A1  - Güth, Werner
A1  - Nithammer, Juri
A1  - Orland, Andreas
T1  - Inefficient cooperation under stochastic and strategic uncertainty
JF  - Conflict resolution
N2  - Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods.
KW  - stochastic uncertainty
KW  - strategic uncertainty
KW  - cooperation
KW  - Ultimatum
KW  - Game
KW  - experiment
Y1  - 2022
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027211066614
SN  - 0022-0027
SN  - 1552-8766
VL  - 66
IS  - 4-5
SP  - 755
EP  - 782
PB  - Sage Publ.
CY  - Thousand Oaks
ER  - 
TY  - GEN
A1  - Franzmann, Simon T.
T1  - Competition, contest, and cooperation
BT  - the analytic framework of the issue market
N2  - Although party competition is widely regarded as an important part of a working democracy, it is rarely analysed in political science literature. This article discusses the basic properties of party competition, especially the patterns of interaction in contemporary party systems. Competition as a phenomenon at the macro level has to be carefully distinguished from contest and cooperation as the forms of interaction at the micro level. The article gives special attention to the creation of issue innovations. Contrary to existing approaches, I argue that not only responsiveness but also innovation are necessary to guarantee a workable democratic competition. Competition takes place on an issue market, where parties can discover voters’ demands. Combined with the concept of institutional veto points, the article presents hypotheses on how institutions shape the possibility for programmatic innovations.
T3  - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe - 80 
KW  - cooperation
KW  - innovation
KW  - issue market
KW  - party competition
KW  - veto point
Y1  - 2017
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-402961
ER  -