TY - GEN A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - Designing Democratic Constitutions BT - The Search for Optimality T2 - Postprints der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe N2 - This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe - 120 KW - electoral systems KW - parliamentary government KW - presidential government KW - semi-parliamentary government Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-445408 SN - 1867-5808 IS - 120 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Ganghof, Steffen A1 - Eppner, Sebastian A1 - Stecker, Christian A1 - Heeß, Katja A1 - Schukraft, Stefan T1 - Do minority cabinets govern more flexibly and inclusively? BT - evidence from Germany T2 - Postprints der Universität Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe N2 - A widespread view in political science is that minority cabinets govern more flexibly and inclusively, more in line with a median-oriented and 'consensual' vision of democracy. Yet there is only little empirical evidence for it. We study legislative coalition-building in the German state of North-Rhine-Westphalia, which was ruled by a minority government between 2010 and 2012. We compare the inclusiveness of legislative coalitions under minority and majority cabinets, based on 1028 laws passed in the 1985–2017 period, and analyze in detail the flexibility of legislative coalition formation under the minority government. Both quantitative analyses are complemented with brief case studies of specific legislation. We find, first, that the minority cabinet did not rule more inclusively. Second, the minority cabinet’s legislative flexibility was fairly limited; to the extent that it existed, it follows a pattern that cannot be explained on the basis of the standard spatial model with policy-seeking parties. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe - 114 KW - Australian bicameralism KW - pledge fulfillment KW - majority formation KW - veto players KW - patterns KW - coalitions KW - consensus KW - democracy KW - parties KW - policy Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-434175 SN - 1867-5808 IS - 114 SP - 541 EP - 561 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Ganghof, Steffen A1 - Eppner, Sebastian A1 - Pörschke, Alexander T1 - Australian bicameralism as semi-parliamentarism BT - patterns of majority formation in 29 democracies T2 - Australian Journal of Political Science N2 - The article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executive-legislative system – a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government – which we call ‘semi- parliamentary government’. We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation, and that it can achieve a certain balance between competing models or visions of democracy. We specify theoretically how the semi-parliamentary separation of powers contributes to the balancing of democratic visions and propose a conceptual framework for comparing democratic visions. We use this framework to locate the Australian Commonwealth, all Australian states and 22 advanced democratic nation-states on a two- dimensional empirical map of democratic patterns for the period from 1995 to 2015. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe - 95 KW - executive-legislative relations KW - bicameralism KW - parliamentary government KW - presidential government KW - visions of democracy Y1 - 2018 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-412984 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - Reconciling representation and accountability BT - three visions of democracy compared T2 - Government and Opposition N2 - An egalitarian approach to the fair representation of voters specifies three main institutional requirements: proportional representation, legislative majority rule and a parliamentary system of government. This approach faces two challenges: the under-determination of the resulting democratic process and the idea of a trade-off between equal voter representation and government accountability. Linking conceptual with comparative analysis, the article argues that we can distinguish three ideal-typical varieties of the egalitarian vision of democracy, based on the stages at which majorities are formed. These varieties do not put different relative normative weight onto equality and accountability, but have different conceptions of both values and their reconciliation. The view that accountability is necessarily linked to clarity of responsibility', widespread in the comparative literature, is questioned - as is the idea of a general trade-off between representation and accountability. Depending on the vision of democracy, the two values need not be in conflict. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe - 96 KW - visions of democracy KW - political equality KW - accountability Y1 - 2018 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-413456 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - Does public reason require super-majoritarian democracy? BT - Liberty, equality, and history in the justification of political institutions T2 - Politics, philosophy & economics N2 - The project of public-reason liberalism faces a basic problem: publicly justified principles are typically too abstract and vague to be directly applied to practical political disputes, whereas applicable specifications of these principles are not uniquely publicly justified. One solution could be a legislative procedure that selects one member from the eligible set of inconclusively justified proposals. Yet if liberal principles are too vague to select sufficiently specific legislative proposals, can they, nevertheless, select specific legislative procedures? Based on the work of Gerald Gaus, this article argues that the only candidate for a conclusively justified decision procedure is a majoritarian or otherwise ‘neutral’ democracy. If the justification of democracy requires an equality baseline in the design of political regimes and if justifications for departure from this baseline are subject to reasonable disagreement, a majoritarian design is justified by default. Gaus’s own preference for super-majoritarian procedures is based on disputable specifications of justified liberal principles. These procedures can only be defended as a sectarian preference if the equality baseline is rejected, but then it is not clear how the set of justifiable political regimes can be restricted to full democracies. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe - 86 KW - public-reason liberalism KW - democracy KW - coercion KW - political equality KW - majority rule KW - Gerald Gaus Y1 - 2018 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-477860 VL - 12 IS - 2 ER -