TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen A1 - Eppner, Sebastian T1 - Patterns of accountability and representation BT - Why the executive-parties dimension cannot explain democratic performance JF - Politics N2 - Arend Lijphart uses an average of five standardized variables – the executive-parties dimension (EPD) – to describe patterns of democracy and explain differences in democracies’ performance. The article suggests ways to improve the descriptive part of the project. It argues that the EPD maps different approaches to achieving accountability and representation, rather than differences in consensus. This re-conceptualization leads to a more coherent and valid measurement. It is also argued that more systematic adjustments are needed for differences in constitutional structures (presidentialism and bicameralism). The article presents data on a revised EPD and its components for 36 democracies in the period from 1981 to 2010. As to the explanatory part of the project, we contend that the EPD often hinders adequate causal analysis rather than facilitating it. We show this by re-analysing democracies’ performance with respect to turnout and capital punishment. KW - bicameralism KW - consensus democracy KW - death penalty KW - democratic performance KW - effective district magnitude KW - executive-parties dimension KW - turnout Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395717710566 SN - 0263-3957 SN - 1467-9256 VL - 39 IS - 1 SP - 113 EP - 130 PB - Sage Publ. CY - London ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism BT - Democratic Design and the Separation of Powers N2 - In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores ‘semi-parliamentary government’ as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids power concentration in one person by shifting the separation of powers into the democratic assembly. The executive becomes fused with only one part of the assembly, even though the other part has at least equal democratic legitimacy and robust veto power on ordinary legislation. The book identifies the Australian Commonwealth and Japan, as well as the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, as semi-parliamentary systems. Using data from 23 countries and 6 Australian states, it maps how parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems balance competing visions of democracy; it analyzes patterns of electoral and party systems, cabinet formation, legislative coalition-building, and constitutional reforms; it systematically compares the semi-parliamentary and presidential separation of powers; and it develops new and innovative semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require two separate chambers. KW - presidential government KW - parliamentary government KW - semi-parliamentary government KW - separation of powers KW - executive personalism KW - bicameralism KW - constitutional design KW - democratic theory KW - patterns of democracy KW - Australia Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-0-19-289714-5 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192897145.001.0001 SP - 1 EP - 199 PB - Oxford University Press CY - Oxford ER - TY - GEN A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism BT - Democratic Design and the Separation of Powers T2 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe N2 - In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores ‘semi-parliamentary government’ as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids power concentration in one person by shifting the separation of powers into the democratic assembly. The executive becomes fused with only one part of the assembly, even though the other part has at least equal democratic legitimacy and robust veto power on ordinary legislation. The book identifies the Australian Commonwealth and Japan, as well as the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, as semi-parliamentary systems. Using data from 23 countries and 6 Australian states, it maps how parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems balance competing visions of democracy; it analyzes patterns of electoral and party systems, cabinet formation, legislative coalition-building, and constitutional reforms; it systematically compares the semi-parliamentary and presidential separation of powers; and it develops new and innovative semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require two separate chambers. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe - 194 KW - presidential government KW - parliamentary government KW - semi-parliamentary government KW - separation of powers KW - executive personalism KW - bicameralism KW - constitutional design KW - democratic theory KW - patterns of democracy KW - Australia Y1 - 2021 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-537839 SN - 978-0-19-289714-5 SN - 1867-5808 ER -