TY - JOUR A1 - Dörfler, Thomas T1 - Die Sanktionsausschüsse zwischen Macht und Regeln T1 - Sanctions Committees Caught between Power and Rules JF - Vereinte Nationen : Zeitschrift für die Vereinten Nationen und ihre Sonderorganisationen N2 - Sanktionen sind ein wichtiges Instrument des UN-Sicherheitsrats zur Erhaltung des Weltfriedens. Viele zentrale Entscheidungen, wie etwa die Listung und Entlistung terrorverdächtiger Personen, werden fernab der Öffentlichkeit in Sanktionsausschüssen getroffen. Die Einsetzung dieser Ausschüsse hat die Entscheidungsdynamiken im Rat erheblich verändert. N2 - Sanctions are an important instrument of the United Nations Security Council to maintain international peace and security. The Council, however, transfers many decisions, such as the listing and delisting of individuals suspected of supporting terrorism, to its subsidiary sanctions committees, mostly beyond public scrutiny. The article explores, how the creation of sanctions committees has changed decision-making dynamics, how committee members can be committed to rules and what this might imply for Germany’s future role on the Council. KW - Al-Qaida KW - Iran KW - Sanktionen KW - Sicherheitsrat KW - Sudan KW - UN Security Council KW - Terrorismus KW - sanctions committee Y1 - 2018 SN - 0042-384X SN - 2366-6773 VL - 66 IS - 2 SP - 62 EP - 66 PB - BWV CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Gehring, Thomas A1 - Dörfler, Thomas T1 - Constitutive mechanisms of UN Security Council practices BT - precedent pressure, ratchet effect, and council action regarding intrastate conflicts JF - Review of International Studies N2 - Based upon the current debate on international practices with its focus on taken-for-granted everyday practices, we examine how Security Council practices may affect member state action and collective decisions on intrastate conflicts. We outline a concept that integrates the structuring effect of practices and their emergence from interaction among reflective actors. It promises to overcome the unresolved tension between understanding practices as a social regularity and as a fluid entity. We analyse the constitutive mechanisms of two Council practices that affect collective decisions on intrastate conflicts and elucidate how even reflective Council members become enmeshed with the constraining implications of evolving practices and their normative implications. (1) Previous Council decisions create precedent pressure and give rise to a virtually uncontested permissive Council practice that defines the purview for intervention into such conflicts. (2) A ratcheting practice forces opponents to choose between accepting steadily reinforced Council action, as occurred regarding Sudan/Darfur, and outright blockade, as in the case of Syria. We conclude that practices constitute a source of influence that is not captured by the traditional perspectives on Council activities as the consequence of geopolitical interests or of externally evolving international norms like the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P). KW - Security Council KW - International Practices KW - Constitutive Mechanism KW - Responsibility to Protect KW - Precedent KW - Ratchet Effect Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210518000268 SN - 0260-2105 SN - 1469-9044 VL - 45 IS - 1 SP - 120 EP - 140 PB - Univ. CY - Cambridge ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Dörfler, Thomas A1 - Gehring, Thomas T1 - Analogy-based collective decision-making and incremental change in international organizations JF - European journal of international relations N2 - We examine how analogy-based collective decision-making of member states contributes to the endogenous emergence of informal rules and the incremental change of international organizations (IOs). Decision-making by analogy is an important characteristic of day-to-day decision-making in IOs. Relating current decisions to previous ones through analogies drives incremental change and simultaneously reinforces organizational resilience. Whereas the foreign policy analysis literature shows that analogies can be used as cognitive shortcuts in fuzzy and complex foreign policy situations, we focus on their use to overcome social ambiguity (indeterminacy) of coordination situations in IOs. Drawing on psychological conceptions, we develop two micro-level mechanisms that elucidate the effects of analogy-based collective decision-making in member-driven IOs. Analogy-based collective decisions emphasizing similarity between a current situation and previous ones follow an established problem schema and produce expansive and increasingly well-established informal rules. Collective decisions that are analogy-based but emphasize a crucial difference follow different problem schemas and trigger the emergence of additional informal rules that apply to new classes of cases. The result is an increasingly fine-grained web of distinct organizational solutions for a growing number of problems. Accordingly, an IO can increasingly facilitate collective decision-making and gains resilience. Empirically, we probe these propositions with a documentary analysis of decision-making in the Yugoslavia sanctions committee, established by the United Nations Security Council to deal with a stream of requests for exempting certain goods or services from the comprehensive economic embargo imposed on Yugoslavia in response to the War in the Balkans. Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066120987889 SN - 1354-0661 SN - 1460-3713 VL - 27 IS - 3 SP - 753 EP - 778 PB - Sage CY - London ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Dörfler, Thomas T1 - Security council sanctions governance BT - the power and limits of rules T3 - Routledge research on the United Nations ; 6 N2 - Little is known about how far-reaching decisions in UN Security Council sanctions committees are made. Developing a novel committee governance concept and using examples drawn from sanctions imposed on Iraq, Al-Qaida, Congo, Sudan and Iran, this book shows that Council members tend to follow the will of the powerful, whereas sanctions committee members often decide according to the rules. This is surprising since both Council and committees are staffed by the same member states. Offering a fascinating account of Security Council micro-politics and decision-making processes on sanctions, this rigorous comparative and theory-driven analysis treats the Council and its sanctions committees as distinguishable entities that may differ in decision practice despite having the same members. Drawing extensively on primary documents, diplomatic cables, well-informed press coverage, reports by close observers and extensive interviews with committee members, Council diplomats and sanctions experts, it contrasts with the conventional wisdom on decision-making within these bodies, which suggests that the powerful permanent members would not accept rule-based decisions against their interests. This book will be of interest to policy practitioners and scholars working in the broad field of international organizations and international relations theory as well as those specializing in sanctions, international law, the Security Council and counter-terrorism. Y1 - 2019 SN - 978-0-42944-232-2 SN - 978-1-138-33749-7 SN - 978-0-4298-0874-6 SN - 978-0-4298-0873-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429442322 PB - Routledge CY - London ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Hosli, Madeleine O. A1 - Dörfler, Thomas ED - Lesage, Dries ED - Van de Graaf, Thijs T1 - The United Nations Security Council BT - the Challenge of Reform T2 - Rising powers and multilateral institutions (International Political Economy Series) N2 - The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the most important multilateral institutions having the ambition to shape global governance and the only organ of the global community that can adopt legally binding resolutions for the maintenance of international peace and security and, if necessary, authorize the use of force. Created in the aftermath of World War II by its victors, the UNSC’s constellation looks increasingly anachronistic, however, in light of the changing global distribution of power. Adapting the institutional structure and decision-making procedures of the UNSC has proven to be one of the most difficult challenges of the last decades, while it is the institution that has probably been faced with the most vociferous calls for reform. Although there have been changes to the informal ways in which outside actors are drawn into the UNSC’s work and activities, many of the major players in the current international system seem to be deprived from equal treatment in its core patterns of decision-making. Countries such as Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, alongside emerging African nations such as Nigeria and South Africa, are among the states eager to secure permanent representation on the Council. By comparison, selected BRICS countries, China and Russia - in contrast to their role in other multilateral institutions - are permanent members of the UNSC and with this, have been “insiders” for a long time. This renders the situation of the UNSC different from global institutions, in which traditionally, Western powers have dominated the agenda. KW - Security Council KW - Winning Coalition KW - Veto Player KW - Social Choice Theory KW - Decision Probability Y1 - 2015 SN - 978-1-349-48504-8 SN - 978-1-137-39760-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137397607_8 SP - 135 EP - 152 PB - Palgrave Macmillan CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Dörfler, Thomas A1 - Holzinger, Katharina A1 - Biesenbender, Jan T1 - Constitutional Dynamics in the European Union BT - Success, Failure, and Stability of Institutional Treaty Revisions JF - International Journal of Public Administration N2 - Despite high institutional hurdles for constitutional change, one observes surprisingly many EU treaty revisions. This article takes up the questions of what determines whether a treaty provision is successfully changed and why provisions are renegotiated at subsequent Intergovernmental Conferences. The article presents an institutionalist theory explaining success and renegotiation and tests the theory using all core institutional provisions by means of Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The causal analysis shows that low conflict potential of an issue is sufficient for successfully changing the treaties. Furthermore, high conflict potential of an issue and its fundamental change are sufficient for it to be renegotiated. Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2017.1295267 SN - 0190-0692 SN - 1532-4265 VL - 40 IS - 14 SP - 1237 EP - 1249 PB - Taylor & Francis CY - Philadelphia ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Dorsch, Christian A1 - Dörfler, Thomas T1 - Organized hypocrisy of the international community BT - an institutionalist explanation of the UN security council’s contradictory activity on darfur JF - Zeitschrift für Genozidforschung Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/1438-8332-2014-1-2-8 SN - 1438-8332 SN - 2589-1510 VL - 15 IS - 1-2 SP - 8 EP - 31 PB - Velbrück Wissenschaft CY - Weilerswist ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Dörfler, Thomas A1 - Gehring, Thomas T1 - Wie internationale Organisationen durch die Strukturierung von Entscheidungsprozessen Autonomie gewinnen BT - der Weltsicherheitsrat und seine Sanktionsausschüsse als System funktionaler Ausdifferenzierung JF - Politische Vierteljahresschrift : PVS ; Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft. Sonderheft: Internationale Organisationen: Autonomie, Politisierung, interorganisationale Beziehungen und Wandel Y1 - 2015 SN - 978-3-8452-4851-6 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845248516-59 IS - 49 SP - 54 EP - 80 PB - Nomos CY - Baden-Baden ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Gehring, Thomas A1 - Dorsch, Christian A1 - Dörfler, Thomas T1 - Precedent and doctrine in organisational decision-making BT - the power of informal institutional rules in the United Nations Security Council’s activities on terrorism JF - Journal of international relations and development N2 - We examine how and under what conditions informal institutional constraints, such as precedent and doctrine, are likely to affect collective choice within international organisations even in the absence of powerful bureaucratic agents. With a particular focus on the United Nations Security Council, we first develop a theoretical account of why such informal constraints might affect collective decisions even of powerful and strategically behaving actors. We show that precedents provide focal points that allow adopting collective decisions in coordination situations despite diverging preferences. Reliance on previous cases creates tacitly evolving doctrine that may develop incrementally. Council decision-making is also likely to be facilitated by an institutional logic of escalation driven by institutional constraints following from the typically staged response to crisis situations. We explore the usefulness of our theoretical argument with evidence from the Council doctrine on terrorism that has evolved since 1985. The key decisions studied include the 1992 sanctions resolution against Libya and the 2001 Council response to the 9/11 attacks. We conclude that, even within intergovernmentally structured international organisations, member states do not operate on a clean slate, but in a highly institutionalised environment that shapes their opportunities for action. KW - decision-making KW - doctrine KW - international organisations KW - precedent KW - Security Council KW - terrorism Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-017-0101-5 SN - 1581-1980 SN - 1408-6980 VL - 22 IS - 1 SP - 107 EP - 135 PB - Palgrave Macmillan CY - Basingstoke ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Hosli, Madeleine A1 - Dörfler, Thomas ED - Hosli, Madeleine O. ED - Selleslaghs, Joren T1 - The United Nations Security Council BT - History, Current Composition, and Reform Proposals T2 - The Changing Global Order : Challenges and Prospects N2 - The chapter explores how the Security Council has reacted to the changing global order in terms of institutional reform and its working methods. First, we look at how the Security Council’s setup looks increasingly anachronistic against the tremendous shifts in global power. Yet, established and rising powers are not disengaging. In contrast, they are turning to the Council to address growing challenges posed by the changing nature of armed conflict, the surge of terrorism and foreign fighters, nuclear proliferation and persistent intra-state conflicts. Then, we explore institutional and political hurdles for Council reform. While various reform models have been suggested, none of them gained the necessary global support. Instead, we demonstrate how the Council has increased the representation of emerging powers in informal ways. Potential candidates for permanent seats and their regional counterparts are committed as elected members, peacekeeping contributors or within the Peacebuilding Commission. Finally, we analyze how innovatively the Council has reacted to global security challenges. This includes working methods reform, expansion of sanctions regimes and involvement of non-state actors. We conclude that even though the Council’s membership has not yet been altered, it has reacted to the changing global order in ways previously unaccounted for. KW - Institutional change KW - Security council KW - Security council reform KW - Informal reform KW - Global order KW - Changing nature of armed conflict Y1 - 2019 SN - 978-3-030-21603-0 SN - 978-3-030-21602-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21603-0_15 SP - 299 EP - 320 PB - Springer CY - Cham ER -