TY  - RPRT
A1  - Hunold, Matthias
A1  - Petrishcheva, Vasilisa
T1  - Foreclosure and Tunneling with Partial Vertical Ownership
T2  - CEPA Discussion Papers
N2  - We demonstrate how the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profits from the target (tunneling). Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target’s profit but influence the target’s strategy significantly. We show that the incentives for customer and input foreclosure can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations affect the scope for profit extraction.
T3  - CEPA Discussion Papers - 57 
KW  - Backward ownership
KW  - Entry deterrence
KW  - Foreclosure
KW  - Minority shareholdings
KW  - Partial ownership
KW  - Uniform pricing
KW  - Vertical integration
Y1  - 2022
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-565601
SN  - 2628-653X
IS  - 57
ER  -