TY  - RPRT
A1  - Kritikos, Alexander
A1  - Maliranta, Mika
A1  - Nippala, Veera
A1  - Nurmi, Satu
T1  - Does gender of firm ownership matter?
BT  - Female entrepreneurs and the gender pay gap
T2  - CEPA Discussion Papers
N2  - We examine how the gender of business-owners is related to the wages paid to female relative to male employees working in their firms. Using Finnish register data and employing firm fixed effects, we find that the gender pay gap is – starting from a gender pay gap of 11 to 12 percent - two to three percentage-points lower for hourly wages in female-owned firms than in male-owned firms. Results are robust to how the wage is measured, as well as to various further robustness checks. More importantly, we find substantial differences between industries. While, for instance, in the manufacturing sector, the gender of the owner plays no role for the gender pay gap, in several service sector industries, like ICT or business services, no or a negligible gender pay gap can be found, but only when firms are led by female business owners. Businesses in male ownership maintain a gender pay gap of around 10 percent also in the latter industries. With increasing firm size, the influence of the gender of the owner, however, fades. In large firms, it seems that others – firm managers – determine wages and no differences in the pay gap are observed between male- and female-owned firms.
T3  - CEPA Discussion Papers - 76 
KW  - entrepreneurship
KW  - gender pay gap
KW  - discrimination
KW  - linked employer-employee data
Y1  - 2024
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-636194
SN  - 2628-653X
IS  - 76
SP  - 1
EP  - 39
ER  - 
TY  - RPRT
A1  - Lessmann, Kai
A1  - Gruner, Friedemann
A1  - Kalkuhl, Matthias
A1  - Edenhofer, Ottmar
T1  - Emissions Trading with Clean-up Certificates
BT  - Deterring Mitigation or Increasing Ambition?
T2  - CEPA Discussion Papers
N2  - We analyze how conventional emissions trading schemes (ETS) can be modified by introducing “clean-up certificates” to allow for a phase of net-negative emissions. Clean-up certificates bundle the permission to emit CO2 with the obligation for its removal. We show that demand for such certificates is determined by cost-saving technological progress, the discount rate and the length of the compliance period. Introducing extra clean-up certificates into an existing ETS reduces near-term carbon prices and mitigation efforts. In contrast, substituting ETS allowances with clean-up certificates reduces cumulative emissions without depressing carbon prices or mitigation in the near term. We calibrate our model to the EU ETS and identify reforms where simultaneously (i) ambition levels rise, (ii) climate damages fall, (iii) revenues from carbon prices rise and (iv) carbon prices and aggregate mitigation cost fall. For reducing climate damages, roughly half of the issued clean-up certificates should replace conventional ETS allowances. In the context of the EU ETS, a European Carbon Central Bank could manage the implementation of cleanup certificates and could serve as an enforcement mechanism.
T3  - CEPA Discussion Papers - 79 
KW  - carbon removal
KW  - carbon pricing
KW  - net-negative emissions
KW  - carbon debt
Y1  - 2024
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-641368
SN  - 2628-653X
IS  - 79
ER  -