TY - JOUR A1 - Franks, Max A1 - Kalkuhl, Matthias A1 - Lessmann, Kai T1 - Optimal pricing for carbon dioxide removal under inter-regional leakage JF - Journal of environmental economics and management N2 - Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) moves atmospheric carbon to geological or land-based sinks. In a first-best setting, the optimal use of CDR is achieved by a removal subsidy that equals the optimal carbon tax and marginal damages. We derive second-best policy rules for CDR subsidies and carbon taxes when no global carbon price exists but a national government implements a unilateral climate policy. We find that the optimal carbon tax differs from an optimal CDR subsidy because of carbon leakage and a balance of resource trade effect. First, the optimal removal subsidy tends to be larger than the carbon tax because of lower supply-side leakage on fossil resource markets. Second, net carbon exporters exacerbate this wedge to increase producer surplus of their carbon resource producers, implying even larger removal subsidies. Third, net carbon importers may set their removal subsidy even below their carbon tax when marginal environmental damages are small, to appropriate producer surplus from carbon exporters. Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2022.102769 SN - 1096-0449 SN - 0095-0696 VL - 117 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Lessmann, Kai A1 - Kalkuhl, Matthias T1 - Climate finance intermediation BT - interest spread effects in a climate policy model JF - Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists N2 - Interest rates are central determinants of saving and investment decisions. Costly financial intermediation distorts these price signals by creating a spread between deposit and loan rates. This study investigates how bank spreads affect climate policy in its ambition to redirect capital. We identify various channels through which interest spreads affect carbon emissions in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Interest rate spreads increase abatement costs due to the higher relative price for capital-intensive carbon-free energy, but they also tend to reduce emissions due to lower overall economic growth. For the global average interest rate spread of 5.1 percentage points, global warming increases by 0.2°C compared to the frictionless economy. For a given temperature target to be achieved, interest rate spreads necessitate substantially higher carbon taxes. When spreads arise from imperfect competition in the intermediation sector, the associated welfare costs can be reduced by clean energy subsidies or even eliminated by economy-wide investment subsidies. KW - financial friction KW - banking KW - greenhouse gas mitigation KW - investment subsidy Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1086/725920 SN - 2333-5955 SN - 2333-5963 VL - 11 IS - 1 SP - 213 EP - 251 PB - University of Chicago Press CY - Chicago, IL ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Franks, Max A1 - Kalkuhl, Matthias A1 - Lessmann, Kai T1 - Optimal Pricing for Carbon Dioxide Removal Under Inter-Regional Leakage T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) moves atmospheric carbon to geological or land-based sinks. In a first-best setting, the optimal use of CDR is achieved by a removal subsidy that equals the optimal carbon tax and marginal damages. We derive second-best subsidies for CDR when no global carbon price exists but a national government implements a unilateral climate policy. We find that the optimal carbon tax differs from an optimal CDR subsidy because of carbon leakage, terms-of-trade and fossil resource rent dynamics. First, the optimal removal subsidy tends to be larger than the carbon tax because of lower supply-side leakage on fossil resource markets. Second, terms-of-trade effects exacerbate this wedge for net resource exporters, implying even larger removal subsidies. Third, the optimal removal subsidy may fall below the carbon tax for resource-poor countries when marginal environmental damages are small. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 43 KW - carbon pricing KW - trade KW - unilateral climate policy KW - terms-of-trade effects KW - removal subsidies Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-538080 SN - 2628-653X IS - 43 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Kalkuhl, Matthias A1 - Franks, Max A1 - Gruner, Friedemann A1 - Lessmann, Kai A1 - Edenhofer, Ottmar T1 - Pigou’s Advice and Sisyphus’ Warning BT - Carbon Pricing with Non-Permanent Carbon-Dioxide Removal T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - Carbon dioxide removal from the atmosphere is becoming an important option to achieve net zero climate targets. This paper develops a welfare and public economics perspective on optimal policies for carbon removal and storage in non-permanent sinks like forests, soil, oceans, wood products or chemical products. We derive a new metric for the valuation of non-permanent carbon storage, the social cost of carbon removal (SCC-R), which embeds also the conventional social cost of carbon emissions. We show that the contribution of CDR is to create new carbon sinks that should be used to reduce transition costs, even if the stored carbon is released to the atmosphere eventually. Importantly, CDR does not raise the ambition of optimal temperature levels unless initial atmospheric carbon stocks are excessively high. For high initial atmospheric carbon stocks, CDR allows to reduce the optimal temperature below initial levels. Finally, we characterize three different policy regimes that ensure an optimal deployment of carbon removal: downstream carbon pricing, upstream carbon pricing, and carbon storage pricing. The policy regimes differ in their informational and institutional requirements regarding monitoring, liability and financing. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 62 KW - Carbon Dioxide Removal KW - Carbon Capture KW - Social Cost of Carbon KW - Climate Policy KW - Impermanence Y1 - 2023 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-575882 SN - 2628-653X IS - 62 ER -