TY - JOUR A1 - van Buuren, Jasper T1 - critique of neuroscience JF - Continental philosophy review N2 - Bennett and Hacker criticize a number of neuroscientists and philosophers for attributing capacities which belong to the human being as a whole, like perceiving or deciding, to a “part” of the human being, viz. the brain. They call this type of mistake the “mereological fallacy”. Interestingly, the authors say that these capacities cannot be ascribed to the mind either. They reject not only materialistic monism but also Cartesian dualism, arguing that many predicates describing human life do not refer to physical or mental properties, nor to the sum of such properties. I agree with this important principle and with the critique of the mereological fallacy which it underpins, but I have two objections to the authors’ view. Firstly, I think that the brain is not literally a part of the human being, as suggested. Secondly, Bennett and Hacker do not offer an account of body and mind which explains in a systematic way how the domain of phenomena which transcends the mental and the physical relates to the mental and the physical. I first argue that Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology provides the kind of account we need. Then, drawing on Plessner, I present an alternative view of the mereological relationships between brain and human being. My criticism does not undercut Bennett and Hacker’s diagnosis of the mereological fallacy but rather gives it a more solid philosophical–anthropological foundation. KW - Mereological fallacy KW - Neuroscience KW - Philosophical anthropology KW - Body as subject and object KW - Eccentric positionality KW - Personhood KW - Psychophysical neutrality Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-015-9318-4 SN - 1387-2842 SN - 1573-1103 VL - 49 SP - 223 EP - 241 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Ebke, Thomas A1 - Zanfi, Caterina A1 - Krüger, Hans-Peter A1 - Sommer, Christian A1 - Viennet, Thomas A1 - Johannßen, Dennis A1 - Balzaretti, Ugo A1 - Toussaint Ondoua, Hervé A1 - Agard, Olivier A1 - Henckmann, Wolfhart A1 - Simonotti, Edoardo A1 - Hand, Annika A1 - Tavakkoli, Amirpasha A1 - Hackbarth, Daniel A1 - Edinger, Sebastian A1 - Schollmeyer, Justus A1 - von Kalckreuth, Moritz Alexander A1 - Schmieg, Gregor A1 - Batista Rates, Bruno A1 - Kressmann, Philipp A1 - Hilt, Annette A1 - van Buuren, Jasper A1 - Keusch, Juliane A1 - Guzun, Mădălina A1 - Bruff, Kyla A1 - Stahl, Marion A1 - Held, Lukas ED - Ebke, Thomas ED - Zanfi, Caterina T1 - Das Leben im Menschen oder der Mensch im Leben? T1 - La vie dans l’homme ou l’homme dans la vie? BT - Deutsch-Französische Genealogien zwischen Anthropologie und Anti-Humanismus BT - Généalogies franco-allemandes entre anthropologie et anti-humanisme N2 - In der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts wird deutlich, dass es in Frankreich und in Deutschland voneinander abweichende Sichtweisen auf die Frage gibt, ob der Mensch eine "Sonderstellung" in der Dynamik des biologischen und geschichtlichen Lebens genießt. Während sich in Deutschland die Tradition eines anthropologischen Denkens neu formiert, ist in Frankreich eine scharfe Skepsis gegenüber dem Erbe des Humanismus charakteristisch. Die Beiträge dieses zweisprachigen Buches untersuchen diese deutsch-französische Konstellation von Fragen und Autoren, und aktualisieren die Reflexion auf die (Grenzen der) Singularität des Menschen. N2 - Dans la philosophie du 20e siècle, s'expriment en France et en Allemagne de fortes divergences quant à la question de savoir si l’homme jouit d’une «situation particulière» dans la dynamique de la vie biologique et historique. Alors qu’en Allemagne se renouvelle la tradition d’une pensée anthropologique, un fort scepticisme envers l'héritage humaniste caractérise la pensée française. Les contributions de ce livre bilingue examinent cette constellation de questions et d'auteurs franco-allemands et actualisent la réflexion autour (des limites) de la singularité de l'homme. Y1 - 2017 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-95409 SN - 978-3-86956-382-4 PB - Universitätsverlag Potsdam CY - Potsdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - van Buuren, Jasper T1 - Exzentrizität, Dingstruktur und der Leib als Subjekt und Objekt JF - Das Leben im Menschen oder der Mensch im Leben? KW - Philosophie KW - Exzentrizität KW - Dingstruktur KW - philosophy KW - eccentricity KW - object culture Y1 - 2017 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-396170 SN - 978-3-86956-382-4 SP - 419 EP - 439 PB - Universitätsverlag Potsdam CY - Potsdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - van Buuren, Jasper T1 - The Difference between Moral Sources and Hypergoods JF - International philosophical quarterly N2 - In Sources of the Self Charles Taylor makes clear that both hypergoods and moral sources are essential to the moral life. Although hypergoods and moral sources are not the same thing, Taylor’s descriptions of these concepts are quite similar, and so their distinction requires interpretation. I propose that we interpret the difference on the basis of another distinction that is central to Taylor’s thinking: that between immanence and transcendence. Whereas a moral source transcends us, a hypergood is the value of our immanent way of relating to that moral source. This interpretation requires that we first differentiate between a narrow and a wide sense of “moral source.” Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq201641259 SN - 0019-0365 SN - 2153-8077 VL - 56 SP - 171 EP - 186 PB - Philosophy Documentation Center CY - Charlottesville ER -