TY - JOUR A1 - Caliendo, Marco A1 - Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. A1 - Obst, Cosima A1 - Uhlendorff, Arne T1 - Risk preferences and training investments JF - Journal of economic behavior & organization N2 - We analyze workers’ risk preferences and training investments. Our conceptual framework differentiates between the investment risk and insurance mechanisms underpinning training decisions. Investment risk leads risk-averse workers to train less; they undertake more training if it insures them against future losses. We use the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to demonstrate that risk affinity is associated with more training, implying that, on average, investment risks dominate the insurance benefits of training. Crucially, this relationship is evident only for general training; there is no relationship between risk attitudes and specific training. Thus, consistent with our conceptual framework, risk preferences matter more when skills are transferable – and workers have a vested interest in training outcomes – than when they are not. Finally, we provide evidence that the insurance benefits of training are concentrated among workers with uncertain employment relationships or limited access to public insurance schemes. Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2022.11.024 SN - 0167-2681 VL - 205 SP - 668 EP - 686 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Caliendo, Marco A1 - Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. A1 - Pfeifer, Harald A1 - Uhlendorff, Arne A1 - Wehner, Caroline T1 - Managers’ risk preferences and firm training investments JF - European economic review N2 - This study analyses the impact of managers’ risk preferences on their training allocation decisions. We begin by providing nationally representative evidence that managers’ risk-aversion is negatively correlated with the likelihood that their firms engage in any worker training. Using a novel vignette study, we then demonstrate that risk-tolerant and risk-averse decision makers have significantly different training preferences. Risk aversion results in increased sensitivity to turnover risk. Managers who are risk-averse offer less general training and are more reluctant to train workers with a history of job mobility. Adopting a weighting approach to flexibly control for observed differences in the characteristics of risk-averse and risk-tolerant managers, we show that our findings cannot be explained by heterogeneity in either managers’ observed characteristics or the type of firms where they work. All managers, irrespective of their risk preferences, are sensitive to the investment risk associated with training, avoiding training that is more costly or that targets those with less occupational expertise or nearing retirement. This provides suggestive evidence that the risks of training are primarily due to the risk that trained workers will leave the firm (turnover risk) rather than the risk that the benefits of training do not outweigh the costs (investment risk). KW - manager decisions KW - risk attitudes KW - employee training KW - human capital investments Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104616 SN - 0014-2921 SN - 1873-572X PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Caliendo, Marco A1 - Tatsiramos, Konstantinos A1 - Uhlendorff, Arne T1 - Benefit duration, unemployment duration and job match quality aregression-discontinuity approach JF - Journal of applied econometrics N2 - We use a sharp discontinuity in the maximum duration of benefit entitlement to identify the effect of extended benefit duration on unemployment duration and post-unemployment outcomes (employment stability and re-employment wages). We address dynamic selection, which may arise even under an initially random assignment to treatment, estimating a bivariate discrete-time hazard model jointly with a wage equation and correlated unobservables. Owing to the non-stationarity of job search behavior, we find heterogeneous effects of extended benefit duration on the re-employment hazard and on job match quality. Our results suggest that the unemployed who find a job close to and after benefit exhaustion experience less stable employment patterns and receive lower re-employment wages compared to their counterparts who receive extended benefits and exit unemployment in the same period. These results are found to be significant for men but not for women. Y1 - 2013 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.2293 SN - 0883-7252 VL - 28 IS - 4 SP - 604 EP - 627 PB - Wiley-Blackwell CY - Hoboken ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Caliendo, Marco A1 - Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. A1 - Obst, Cosima A1 - Uhlendorff, Arne T1 - Risk Preferences and Training Investments T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - We analyze workers’ risk preferences and training investments. Our conceptual framework differentiates between the investment risk and insurance mechanisms underpinning training decisions. Investment risk leads risk-averse workers to train less; they undertake more training if it insures them against future losses. We use the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to demonstrate that risk affinity is associated with more training, implying that, on average, investment risks dominate the insurance benefits of training. Crucially, this relationship is evident only for general training; there is no relationship between risk attitudes and specific training. Thus, as expected, risk preferences matter more when skills are transferable – and workers have a vested interest in training outcomes – than when they are not. Finally, we provide evidence that the insurance benefits of training are concentrated among workers with uncertain employment relationships or limited access to public insurance schemes. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 23 KW - Human Capital Investment KW - Work-related Training KW - Risk Preferences Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-480927 SN - 2628-653X IS - 23 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Caliendo, Marco A1 - Künn, Steffen A1 - Uhlendorff, Arne T1 - Earnings exemptions for unemployed workers: The relationship between marginal employment, unemployment duration and job quality JF - Labour economics : an international journal N2 - In some countries including Germany unemployed workers can increase their income by working a few hours per week. The intention is to keep unemployed job seekers attached to the labour market and to increase their job-finding probabilities. To analyze the unemployment dynamics of job seekers with and without marginal employment, we consider an inflow sample into unemployment and estimate multivariate duration models. While we do not find any significant impact on the job finding probability in a model with homogeneous effects, models allowing for time-varying coefficients indicate a decreased job finding probability of marginal employment at the beginning of the unemployment spell and an increased job finding probability for the long-term unemployed. Our results suggest that job seekers with marginal employment find more stable post-unemployment jobs, and we find some evidence that the relationship between marginal employment and wages and employment stability varies with respect to skill levels, sector and labor market tightness. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. KW - Marginal employment KW - Mini-job KW - Unemployment duration KW - Job search KW - Employment stability KW - Multivariate duration models Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.07.003 SN - 0927-5371 SN - 1879-1034 VL - 42 SP - 177 EP - 193 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Caliendo, Marco A1 - Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. A1 - Uhlendorff, Arne T1 - Locus of control and job search strategies JF - The review of economics and statistics N2 - Standard job search theory assumes that unemployed individuals have perfect information about the effect of their search effort on the job offer arrival rate. We present an alternative model that assumes that each individual has a subjective belief about the impact of her search effort on the job arrival. These beliefs depend in part on an individual's locus of control. We estimate the impact of locus of control on job search behavior using a data set of newly unemployed individuals in Germany. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we find evidence that individuals with an internal locus of control search more and that individuals who believe that their future outcomes are determined by external factors have lower reservation wages. Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00459 SN - 0034-6535 SN - 1530-9142 VL - 97 IS - 1 SP - 88 EP - 103 PB - MIT Press CY - Cambridge ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Caliendo, Marco A1 - Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. A1 - Hennecke, Juliane A1 - Uhlendorff, Arne T1 - Locus of control and internal migration JF - Regional science and urban economics N2 - We model migration across domestic labor markets (internal migration) as the outcome of a job search process in which job seekers form subjective beliefs about the return search effort that are related to their locus of control. Job seekers with an internal locus of control are predicted to search across larger geographic areas and migrate more frequently as a result. We empirically test the relationship between locus of control and the propensity to migrate using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). We find that not only do individuals with an internal locus of control express more willingness to migrate, they do in fact also migrate more often. KW - Locus of control KW - Internal migration KW - Mobility KW - Job search Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2019.103468 SN - 0166-0462 SN - 1879-2308 VL - 79 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Caliendo, Marco A1 - Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. A1 - Obst, Cosima A1 - Seitz, Helke A1 - Uhlendorff, Arne T1 - Locus of control and investment in training JF - Journal of human resources N2 - We extend standard models of work-related training by explicitly incorporating workers’ locus of control into the investment decision through the returns they expect. Our model predicts that higher internal control results in increased take-up of general, but not specific, training. This prediction is empirically validated using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP). We provide empirical evidence that locus of control influences participation in training through its effect on workers’ expectations about future wage increases rather than actual wage increases. Our results provide an important explanation for underinvestment in training and suggest that those with an external sense of control may require additional training support. Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.57.4.0318-9377R2 SN - 0022-166X SN - 1548-8004 VL - 57 IS - 4 SP - 1311 EP - 1349 PB - University of Wisconsin Press CY - Madison ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Caliendo, Marco A1 - Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. A1 - Pfeifer, Harald A1 - Uhlendorff, Arne A1 - Wehner, Caroline T1 - Managers’ Risk Preferences and Firm Training Investments T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - We provide the first estimates of the impact of managers’ risk preferences on their training allocation decisions. Our conceptual framework links managers’ risk preferences to firms’ training decisions through the bonuses they expect to receive. Risk-averse managers are expected to select workers with low turnover risk and invest in specific rather than general training. Empirical evidence supporting these predictions is provided using a novel vignette study embedded in a nationally representative survey of firm managers. Risk-tolerant and risk-averse decision makers have significantly different training preferences. Risk aversion results in increased sensitivity to turnover risk. Managers who are risk-averse offer significantly less general training and, in some cases, are more reluctant to train workers with a history of job mobility. All managers, irrespective of their risk preferences, are sensitive to the investment risk associated with training, avoiding training that is more costly or targets those with less occupational expertise or nearing retirement. This suggests the risks of training are primarily due to the risk that trained workers will leave the firm (turnover risk) rather than the risk that the benefits of training do not outweigh the costs (investment risk). T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 44 KW - Manager Decisions KW - Employee Training KW - Risk Attitudes KW - Human Capital Investments Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-538439 SN - 2628-653X IS - 44 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Caliendo, Marco A1 - Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. A1 - Silva-Goncalves, Juliana A1 - Uhlendorff, Arne T1 - Locus of control and the preference for agency T2 - IZA discussion paper N2 - We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how locus of control operates through people's preferences and beliefs to influence their decisions. Using the principal-agent setting of the delegation game, we test four key channels that conceptually link locus of control to decision-making: (i) preference for agency; (ii) optimism and (iii) confidence regarding the return to effort; and (iv) illusion of control. Knowing the return and cost of stated effort, principals either retain or delegate the right to make an investment decision that generates payoffs for themselves and their agents. Extending the game to the context in which the return to stated effort is unknown allows us to explicitly study the relationship between locus of control and beliefs about the return to effort. We find that internal locus of control is linked to the preference for agency, an effect that is driven by women. We find no evidence that locus of control influences optimism and confidence about the return to stated effort, or that it operates through an illusion of control. KW - locus of control KW - preference for agency KW - decision-making KW - beliefs KW - optimism KW - confidence KW - illusion of control Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4416820 SN - 2365-9793 VL - No. 16061 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER -