TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Güth, Werner A1 - Nithammer, Juri A1 - Orland, Andreas T1 - Inefficient Cooperation under Stochastic and Strategic Uncertainty T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - Stochastic uncertainty can cause difficult coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can do so. To test this, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeatedly played Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not entail an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two main reasons for this finding: First, the stochastic uncertainty forces proposers to accept high strategic uncertainty if they intend to cooperate by claiming a low amount (which many proposers do not). Second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperative by transferring too little (which hinders cooperation in future periods). T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 20 KW - stochastic uncertainty KW - strategic uncertainty KW - cooperation KW - Ultimatum Game KW - experiment Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-475500 SN - 2628-653X IS - 20 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Nithammer, Juri A1 - Stolley, Florian T1 - ”Thanks in Advance” BT - The Negative Effect of a Polite Phrase on Compliance with a Request T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - This paper studies the effect of the commonly used phrase “thanks in advance” on compliance with a small request. In a controlled laboratory experiment we ask participants to give a detailed answer to an open question. The treatment variable is whether or not they see the phrase “thanks in advance.” Our participants react to the treatment by exerting less effort in answering the request even though they perceive the phrase as polite. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 7 KW - compliance behavior KW - gratitude KW - reciprocity KW - experiment Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427706 SN - 2628-653X IS - 7 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Güth, Werner A1 - Nithammer, Juri A1 - Orland, Andreas T1 - Inefficient cooperation under stochastic and strategic uncertainty JF - Conflict resolution N2 - Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods. KW - stochastic uncertainty KW - strategic uncertainty KW - cooperation KW - Ultimatum KW - Game KW - experiment Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027211066614 SN - 0022-0027 SN - 1552-8766 VL - 66 IS - 4-5 SP - 755 EP - 782 PB - Sage Publ. CY - Thousand Oaks ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Eisenkopf, Gerald A1 - Nithammer, Juri T1 - Pre-election communication in public good games with endogenous leaders T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - Leadership plays an important role for the efficient and fair solution of social dilemmas but the effectiveness of a leader can vary substantially. Two main factors of leadership impact are the ability to induce high contributions by all group members and the (expected) fair use of power. Participants in our experiment decide about contributions to a public good. After all contributions are made, the leader can choose how much of the joint earnings to assign to herself; the remainder is distributed equally among the followers. Using machine learning techniques, we study whether the content of initial open statements by the group members predicts their behavior as a leader and whether groups are able to identify such clues and endogenously appoint a “good” leader to solve the dilemma. We find that leaders who promise fairness are more likely to behave fairly, and that followers appoint as leaders those who write more explicitly about fairness and efficiency. However, in their contribution decision, followers focus on the leader’s first-move contribution and place less importance on the content of the leader’s statements. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 73 KW - leadership KW - public good KW - voting KW - experiment KW - promises Y1 - 2024 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-623952 SN - 2628-653X IS - 73 ER -