TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen A1 - Eppner, Sebastian T1 - Faire Repräsentation versus klare Richtungsentscheide? Zur Reform des Wahl- und Regierungssystems Fair representation versus clear decisions On the reform of the electoral system and form of government T1 - Fair representation versus clear decisions On the reform of the electoral system and form of government JF - Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft N2 - The increased fragmentation of European party systems and the resulting difficulties of government formation have led to renewed debates about electoral systems. Some authors characterize certain electoral systems as optimal compromises between "proportional" and "majoritarian" conceptions of democracy. We argue that these optimality arguments are biased towards the majoritarian conception. Ambitious proportional conceptions embrace the goals of mechanical proportionality, multidimensional representation and flexible, issue-specific legislative coalitions. However, in parliamentary systems of government these goals cannot be reconciled with majoritarian goals. This is because in parliamentarism the same electoral threshold applies to parliamentary representation and to participation in the vote of non-confidence procedure. The first threshold is crucial for the proportional, the latter for the majoritarian conception of democracy. If we are willing to decouple the two thresholds - and hence change the form of government - new avenues for reform open up. We illustrate our arguments using data for 29 democratic systems between 1995 and 2015. N2 - Die Fragmentierung europäischer Parteiensysteme und damit verbundene Schwierigkeiten bei der Koalitionsbildung haben zu einer Neuauflage altbekannter Debatten über unterschiedliche Wahlsysteme geführt. Einige Autoren sehen dabei bestimmte Wahlsysteme als optimalen Kompromiss zwischen den Prinzipien der Mehrheits- und der Verhältniswahl an. Wir argumentieren, dass diese Optimalitätsargumente eine konzeptionelle Schlagseite zugunsten „majoritärer“ Demokratiekonzeptionen haben. Eine anspruchsvolle „proportionale“ Demokratiekonzeption umfasst die Ziele mechanischer Proportionalität, multidimensionaler Repräsentation und wechselnder Gesetzgebungsmehrheiten. Diese Ziele lassen sich allerdings im parlamentarischen Regierungssystem nicht mit den Zielen der Mehrheitswahl vereinbaren. Der Grund ist, dass die relevanten Hürden des Wahlsystems gleichzeitig für die parlamentarische Repräsentation und die Teilnahme am Misstrauensvotum gelten. Erstere ist entscheidend für die proportionale, letztere für die majoritäre Konzeption der Demokratie. Sind wir bereit diese beiden Hürden zu entkoppeln – und somit das Regierungssystem zu verändern – ergibt sich eine Vielfalt neuer Reformoptionen. Wir illustrieren diese Punkte mit Daten für 29 demokratische Systeme im Zeitraum von 1995 bis 2015. KW - Forms of government KW - Types of democracy KW - Electoral systems Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s12286-019-00431-7 SN - 1865-2646 SN - 1865-2654 VL - 13 IS - 3 SP - 375 EP - 397 PB - Springer CY - Wiesbaden ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Eppner, Sebastian A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - Institutional veto players and cabinet formation BT - the veto control hypothesis reconsidered JF - European journal of political research : official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research N2 - Are potential cabinets more likely to form when they control institutional veto players such as symmetric second chambers or minority vetoes? Existing evidence for a causal effect of veto control has been weak. This article presents evidence for this effect on the basis of conditional and mixed logit analyses of government formations in 21 parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies between 1955 and 2012. It also shows that the size of the effect varies systematically across political-institutional contexts. The estimated causal effect was greater in countries that eventually abolished the relevant veto institutions. It is suggested that the incidence of constitutional reform is a proxy for context-specific factors that increased the incentives for veto control and simultaneously provided a stimulus for the weakening of institutional veto power. KW - government formation KW - veto players KW - second chambers Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12172 SN - 0304-4130 SN - 1475-6765 VL - 56 IS - 1 SP - 169 EP - 186 PB - Wiley CY - Hoboken ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen A1 - Eppner, Sebastian A1 - Pörschke, Alexander T1 - Australian bicameralism as semi-parliamentarism BT - patterns of majority formation in 29 democracies JF - Australian Journal of Political Science N2 - The article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executive-legislative system – a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government – which we call ‘semi-parliamentary government’. We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation, and that it can achieve a certain balance between competing models or visions of democracy. We specify theoretically how the semi-parliamentary separation of powers contributes to the balancing of democratic visions and propose a conceptual framework for comparing democratic visions. We use this framework to locate the Australian Commonwealth, all Australian states and 22 advanced democratic nation-states on a two-dimensional empirical map of democratic patterns for the period from 1995 to 2015. KW - Executive-legislative relations KW - bicameralism KW - parliamentary government KW - presidential government KW - visions of democracy Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2018.1451487 SN - 1036-1146 SN - 1363-030X VL - 53 IS - 2 SP - 211 EP - 233 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - Abingdon ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen A1 - Eppner, Sebastian A1 - Pörschke, Alexander T1 - Semi-parliamentary government in perspective BT - concepts, values, and designs JF - Australian Journal of Political Science N2 - The article responds to four commentaries on the concept of semi-parliamentary government and its application to Australian bicameralism. It highlights four main points: (1) Our preferred typology is not more ‘normative’ than existing approaches, but applies the criterion of ‘direct election’ equally to executive and legislature; (2) While the evolution of semi-parliamentary government had contingent elements, it plausibly also reflects the ‘equilibrium’ nature of certain institutional configurations; (3) The idea that a pure parliamentary system with pure proportional representation has absolute normative priority over ‘instrumentalist’ concerns about cabinet stability, identifiability and responsibility is questionable; and (4) The reforms we discuss may be unlikely to occur in Australia, but deserve consideration by scholars and institutional reformers in other democratic systems. KW - Executive-legislative relations KW - bicameralism KW - visions of democracy KW - parliamentary government KW - presidential government Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2018.1451488 SN - 1036-1146 SN - 1363-030X VL - 53 IS - 2 SP - 264 EP - 269 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - Abingdon ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen A1 - Eppner, Sebastian T1 - Patterns of accountability and representation BT - Why the executive-parties dimension cannot explain democratic performance JF - Politics N2 - Arend Lijphart uses an average of five standardized variables – the executive-parties dimension (EPD) – to describe patterns of democracy and explain differences in democracies’ performance. The article suggests ways to improve the descriptive part of the project. It argues that the EPD maps different approaches to achieving accountability and representation, rather than differences in consensus. This re-conceptualization leads to a more coherent and valid measurement. It is also argued that more systematic adjustments are needed for differences in constitutional structures (presidentialism and bicameralism). The article presents data on a revised EPD and its components for 36 democracies in the period from 1981 to 2010. As to the explanatory part of the project, we contend that the EPD often hinders adequate causal analysis rather than facilitating it. We show this by re-analysing democracies’ performance with respect to turnout and capital punishment. KW - bicameralism KW - consensus democracy KW - death penalty KW - democratic performance KW - effective district magnitude KW - executive-parties dimension KW - turnout Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395717710566 SN - 0263-3957 SN - 1467-9256 VL - 39 IS - 1 SP - 113 EP - 130 PB - Sage Publ. CY - London ER - TY - GEN A1 - Ganghof, Steffen A1 - Eppner, Sebastian A1 - Stecker, Christian A1 - Heeß, Katja A1 - Schukraft, Stefan T1 - Do minority cabinets govern more flexibly and inclusively? BT - evidence from Germany T2 - Postprints der Universität Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe N2 - A widespread view in political science is that minority cabinets govern more flexibly and inclusively, more in line with a median-oriented and 'consensual' vision of democracy. Yet there is only little empirical evidence for it. We study legislative coalition-building in the German state of North-Rhine-Westphalia, which was ruled by a minority government between 2010 and 2012. We compare the inclusiveness of legislative coalitions under minority and majority cabinets, based on 1028 laws passed in the 1985–2017 period, and analyze in detail the flexibility of legislative coalition formation under the minority government. Both quantitative analyses are complemented with brief case studies of specific legislation. We find, first, that the minority cabinet did not rule more inclusively. Second, the minority cabinet’s legislative flexibility was fairly limited; to the extent that it existed, it follows a pattern that cannot be explained on the basis of the standard spatial model with policy-seeking parties. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe - 114 KW - Australian bicameralism KW - pledge fulfillment KW - majority formation KW - veto players KW - patterns KW - coalitions KW - consensus KW - democracy KW - parties KW - policy Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-434175 SN - 1867-5808 IS - 114 SP - 541 EP - 561 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen A1 - Eppner, Sebastian A1 - Heess, Katja T1 - Normative balance and electoral reform: a finnish puzzle and a comparative analysis JF - West European politics Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2014.929342 SN - 0140-2382 SN - 1743-9655 VL - 38 IS - 1 SP - 53 EP - 72 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - Abingdon ER - TY - GEN A1 - Ganghof, Steffen A1 - Eppner, Sebastian A1 - Pörschke, Alexander T1 - Australian bicameralism as semi-parliamentarism BT - patterns of majority formation in 29 democracies T2 - Australian Journal of Political Science N2 - The article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executive-legislative system – a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government – which we call ‘semi- parliamentary government’. We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation, and that it can achieve a certain balance between competing models or visions of democracy. We specify theoretically how the semi-parliamentary separation of powers contributes to the balancing of democratic visions and propose a conceptual framework for comparing democratic visions. We use this framework to locate the Australian Commonwealth, all Australian states and 22 advanced democratic nation-states on a two- dimensional empirical map of democratic patterns for the period from 1995 to 2015. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe - 95 KW - executive-legislative relations KW - bicameralism KW - parliamentary government KW - presidential government KW - visions of democracy Y1 - 2018 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-412984 ER -