TY - JOUR A1 - Orland, Andreas A1 - Rostam-Afschar, Davud T1 - Flexible work arrangements and precautionary behavior BT - Theory and experimental evidence JF - Journal of economic behavior & organization N2 - In the past years, work-time in many industries has become more flexible, opening up a new channel for intertemporal substitution: workers might, instead of saving, adjust their work-time to smooth consumption. To study this channel, we set up a two-period consumption/saving model with wage uncertainty. This extends the standard saving model by also allowing a worker to allocate a fixed time budget between two work-shifts. To test the comparative statics implied by these two different channels, we conduct a laboratory experiment. A novel feature of our experiments is that we tie income to a real-effort style task. In four treatments, we turn on and off the two channels for consumption smoothing: saving and time allocation. Our main finding is that savings are strictly positive for at least 85 percent of subjects. We find that a majority of subjects also uses time allocation to smooth consumption and use saving and time shifting as substitutes, though not perfect substitutes. Part of the observed heterogeneity of precautionary behavior can be explained by risk preferences and motivations different from expected utility maximization. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. KW - Precautionary saving KW - Labor supply KW - Intertemporal substitution KW - Experiment Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.09.015 SN - 0167-2681 SN - 1879-1751 VL - 191 SP - 442 EP - 481 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Güth, Werner A1 - Nithammer, Juri A1 - Orland, Andreas T1 - Inefficient cooperation under stochastic and strategic uncertainty JF - Conflict resolution N2 - Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods. KW - stochastic uncertainty KW - strategic uncertainty KW - cooperation KW - Ultimatum KW - Game KW - experiment Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027211066614 SN - 0022-0027 SN - 1552-8766 VL - 66 IS - 4-5 SP - 755 EP - 782 PB - Sage Publ. CY - Thousand Oaks ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Orland, Andreas A1 - Padubrin, Max T1 - Is there a gender hiring gap in academic economics? BT - evidence from a network analysis JF - Royal Society Open Science N2 - We collect a network dataset of tenured economics faculty in Austria, Germany and Switzerland. We rank the 100 institutions included with a minimum violation ranking. This ranking is positively and significantly correlated with the Times Higher Education ranking of economics institutions. According to the network ranking, individuals on average go down about 23 ranks from their doctoral institution to their employing institution. While the share of females in our dataset is only 15%, we do not observe a significant gender hiring gap (a difference in rank changes between male and female faculty). We conduct a robustness check with the Handelsblatt and the Times Higher Education ranking. According to these rankings, individuals on average go down only about two ranks. We do not observe a significant gender hiring gap using these two rankings (although the dataset underlying this analysis is small and these estimates are likely to be noisy). Finally, we discuss the limitations of the network ranking in our context. KW - gender KW - networks KW - academia Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.210717 SN - 2054-5703 VL - 9 IS - 2 PB - Royal Society CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Orland, Andreas A1 - Padubrin, Max T1 - Is there a gender hiring gap in academic economics? Evidence from a network analysis JF - Royal Society Open Science N2 - We collect a network dataset of tenured economics faculty in Austria, Germany and Switzerland. We rank the 100 institutions included with a minimum violation ranking. This ranking is positively and significantly correlated with the Times Higher Education ranking of economics institutions. According to the network ranking, individuals on average go down about 23 ranks from their doctoral institution to their employing institution. While the share of females in our dataset is only 15%, we do not observe a significant gender hiring gap (a difference in rank changes between male and female faculty). We conduct a robustness check with the Handelsblatt and the Times Higher Education ranking. According to these rankings, individuals on average go down only about two ranks. We do not observe a significant gender hiring gap using these two rankings (although the dataset underlying this analysis is small and these estimates are likely to be noisy). Finally, we discuss the limitations of the network ranking in our context. Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.210717 SN - 2054-5703 VL - 9 SP - 1 EP - 9 PB - Royal Society of London CY - London ET - 2 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Orland, Andreas T1 - Personality traits and the perception of macroeconomic indicators BT - Survey Evidence JF - Bulletin of Economic Research N2 - I examine the determinants of both perceived inflation and unemployment in one single survey and include Big Five traits in the analysis. This is the first survey on this topic in Germany. My sample consists of 1771 students from different fields and levels. Using PhD students’ estimates as a reference, I create categories for underestimation and overestimation of both variables. Multinomial logit regressions show that females overestimate both variables. Education and news consumption reduce misestimation. A higher level of Neuroticism is related with a higher probability to overestimate unemployment. Overstating (understating) one indicator is associated with overstating (understating) the other. KW - cross-sectional heterogeneity KW - inflation perception KW - personality traits KW - unemployment perception Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12110 SN - 0307-3378 SN - 1467-8586 VL - 69 IS - 4 SP - E150 EP - E172 PB - Wiley CY - Hoboken ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Kurz, Verena A1 - Orland, Andreas A1 - Posadzy, Kinga T1 - Fairness versus efficiency BT - how procedural fairness concerns affect coordination JF - Experimental Economics N2 - We investigate in a laboratory experiment whether procedural fairness concerns affect how well individuals are able to solve a coordination problem in a two-player Volunteer’s Dilemma. Subjects receive external action recommendations, either to volunteer or to abstain from it, in order to facilitate coordination and improve efficiency. We manipulate the fairness of the recommendation procedure by varying the probabilities of receiving the disadvantageous recommendation to volunteer between players. We find evidence that while recommendations improve overall efficiency regardless of their implications for expected payoffs, there are behavioural asymmetries depending on the recommendation: advantageous recommendations are followed less frequently than disadvantageous ones and beliefs about others’ actions are more pessimistic in the treatment with recommendations inducing unequal expected payoffs. KW - Coordination KW - Correlated equilibrium KW - Recommendations KW - Procedural Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-017-9540-5 SN - 1386-4157 SN - 1573-6938 VL - 21 IS - 3 SP - 601 EP - 626 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Orland, Andreas A1 - Roos, Michael W. M. T1 - Price-setting with quadratic adjustment costs BT - experimental evidence JF - Journal of economic behavior & organization N2 - We test the price-setting behavior of firms using the Rotemberg (1982) model in order to explain puzzles in the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC). For our tests, we conducted experiments that adapt the model into an individual decision-making problem. We find systematic deviations in price-setting according to the subjects’ degree of information acquisition. Subjects rarely make use of past information. On the other hand, subjects that decide to acquire relatively little information about future desired prices tend to overweight their own past set price when they set prices. We study the impact of this heterogeneous price-setting behavior for theoretically derived forward-looking Phillips curves. Our estimated NKPCs are in line with the empirical literature. The deviations from theoretical predictions in our NKPCs are driven by the less-informed subjects. KW - Experimental macroeconomics KW - Intertemporal optimization KW - Nominal frictions KW - Phillips curve Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.05.010 SN - 0167-2681 SN - 1879-1751 VL - 163 SP - 88 EP - 116 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Orland, Andreas A1 - Selten, Reinhard T1 - Buyer power in bilateral oligopolies with advance production: Experimental evidence JF - Applied surface science : a journal devoted to applied physics and chemistry of surfaces and interfaces N2 - We conduct experiments based on the oligopoly model by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to assess the impact of demand side concentration on market outcomes. Both buyers and sellers in our markets are humans. The number of firms is fixed at three in all treatments. Only the number of buyers is varied and total demand is split equally among them. We observe that firms set lower prices in markets with only few buyers, namely one or two. Price dispersion is higher in markets with few buyers. Aggregate demand withholding decreases with the number of buyers. This results in lower profits for firms and higher profits for buyers in markets with few buyers. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. KW - Buyer power KW - Demand structure KW - Oligopoly KW - Advance production KW - Laboratory experiment Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.11.016 SN - 0167-2681 SN - 1879-1751 VL - 122 SP - 31 EP - 42 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Heuer, Leonie A1 - Orland, Andreas T1 - Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma BT - an experimental comparison between pure and mixed strategies JF - Royal Society Open Science N2 - Cooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts’ level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects’ level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperative behaviour more closely on their beliefs than in the pure-strategy group. In the mixed-strategy group, most subjects choose intermediate levels of cooperation. KW - cooperation KW - experiment KW - human behaviour KW - Prisoner's Dilemma Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.182142 SN - 2054-5703 VL - 6 PB - Royal Soc. Publ. CY - London ER -