TY - GEN A1 - Heuer, Leonie A1 - Orland, Andreas T1 - Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma BT - an experimental comparison between pure and mixed strategies T2 - Postprints der Universität Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe N2 - Cooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts’ level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects’ level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperative behaviour more closely on their beliefs than in the pure-strategy group. In the mixed-strategy group, most subjects choose intermediate levels of cooperation. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe - 107 KW - cooperation KW - experiment KW - human behaviour KW - Prisoner's Dilemma Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-435929 SN - 1867-5808 IS - 107 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Heuer, Leonie A1 - Orland, Andreas T1 - Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma BT - an experimental comparison between pure and mixed strategies JF - Royal Society Open Science N2 - Cooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts’ level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects’ level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperative behaviour more closely on their beliefs than in the pure-strategy group. In the mixed-strategy group, most subjects choose intermediate levels of cooperation. KW - cooperation KW - experiment KW - human behaviour KW - Prisoner's Dilemma Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.182142 SN - 2054-5703 VL - 6 PB - Royal Soc. Publ. CY - London ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Felgendreher, Simon A1 - Güth, Werner A1 - Hertwig, Ralph T1 - Strategic ignorance in repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiments and its effects on the dynamics of voluntary cooperation T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - Being ignorant of key aspects of a strategic interaction can represent an advantage rather than a handicap. We study one particular context in which ignorance can be beneficial: iterated strategic interactions in which voluntary cooperation may be sustained into the final round if players voluntarily forego knowledge about the time horizon. We experimentally examine this option to remain ignorant about the time horizon in a finitely repeated two-person prisoners’ dilemma game. We confirm that pairs without horizon knowledge avoid the drop in cooperation that otherwise occurs toward the end of the game. However, this effect is superposed by cooperation declining more rapidly in pairs without horizon knowledge during the middle phase of the game, especially if players do not know that the other player also wanted to remain ignorant of the time horizon. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 10 KW - strategic ignorance KW - cooperation KW - prisoners' dilemma KW - experiment Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-431881 SN - 2628-653X IS - 10 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Nithammer, Juri A1 - Stolley, Florian T1 - ”Thanks in Advance” BT - The Negative Effect of a Polite Phrase on Compliance with a Request T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - This paper studies the effect of the commonly used phrase “thanks in advance” on compliance with a small request. In a controlled laboratory experiment we ask participants to give a detailed answer to an open question. The treatment variable is whether or not they see the phrase “thanks in advance.” Our participants react to the treatment by exerting less effort in answering the request even though they perceive the phrase as polite. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 7 KW - compliance behavior KW - gratitude KW - reciprocity KW - experiment Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427706 SN - 2628-653X IS - 7 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena T1 - Is There a Loyalty-Enhancing Effect of Retroactive Price-Reduction Schemes? T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - This paper presents an experiment on the effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes on buyers’ repeated purchase decisions. Such schemes promise buyers a reduced price for all units that are bought in a certain time frame if the total quantity that is purchased passes a given threshold. This study finds a loyalty-enhancing effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes only if the buyers ex-ante expected that entering into the scheme would maximize their monetary gain, but later learn that they should leave the scheme. Furthermore, the effect crucially hinges on the framing of the price reduction. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 5 KW - rebate and discount KW - buyer behavior KW - risk aversion KW - loss aversion KW - regulation of dominant firms KW - experiment Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427688 SN - 2628-653X IS - 5 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Stolley, Florian A1 - Utikal, Verena T1 - Getting a Yes BT - An Experiment on the Power of Asking T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game, in which the recipient can send a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter decides. We find that putting effort into the message, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Additionally, we find differences in the behavior of male and female dictators. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictator’s power and responsibility. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 2 KW - dictator game KW - communication KW - inequality KW - text analysis KW - experiment Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427638 SN - 2628-653X IS - 2 ER -